We prove several results about groups of finite Morley rank without unipotent p-torsion: p-torsion always occurs inside tori, Sylow p-subgroups are conjugate, and p is not the minimal prime divisor of our approximation to the "Weyl group". These results are quickly finding extensive applications within the classification project.

We deal with two forms of the "uniqueness cases" in the classification of large simple K*-groups of finite Morley rank of odd type, where large means the 2-rank m2 is at least three. This substantially extends results known for even larger groups having Prüfer 2-rank at least three, so as to cover the two groups PSp 4 and G 2. With an eye towards more distant developments, we carry out this analysis for L*-groups, a context which is substantially broader than (...) the K* setting. (shrink)

We analyze the two cardinal properties of definable sets in homogeneous graphs.

We prove the hereditary undecidability of the L t theories of: (1) torsion-free Hausdorff topological abelian groups; (2) locally pure Hausdorff topological abelian groups.

The problem of the existence of a universal structure omitting a finite set of forbidden substructures is reducible to the corresponding problem in the category of graphs with a vertex coloring by two colors. It is not known whether this problem reduces further to the category of ordinary graphs. It is also not known whether these problems are decidable.

We study definable irreducible actions of SL₂(K) on an abelian group of Morley rank ≤ 3rk(K) and prove they are rational representations of the group.

THEOREM. The Jacobson radical of an $\aleph_0$-categorical associative ring is nilpotent.

THEOREM. The Jacobson radical of an ℵ 0 -categorical associative ring is nilpotent.

We show that all QE rings of prime power characteristic are constructed in a straightforward way out of three components: a filtered Boolean power of a finite field, a nilpotent Jacobson radical, and the ring Z p n or the Witt ring W 2 (F 4 ) (which is the characteristic four analogue of the Galois field with four elements).

Borovik proposed an axiomatic treatment of Morley rank in groups, later modified by Poizat, who showed that in the context of groups the resulting notion of rank provides a characterization of groups of finite Morley rank [2]. (This result makes use of ideas of Lascar, which it encapsulates in a neat way.) These axioms form the basis of the algebraic treatment of groups of finite Morley rank undertaken in [1].There are, however, ranked structures, i.e., structures on which a Borovik-Poizat rank (...) function is defined, which are not ℵ0-stable [1, p. 376]. In [2, p. 9] Poizat raised the issue of the relationship between this notion of rank and stability theory in the following terms: “… ungroupede Borovik est une structure stable, alors qu'un univers rangé n'a aucune raison de l'être …” (emphasis added). Nonetheless, we will prove the following:Theorem 1.1.A ranked structure is superstable.An example of a non-ℵ0-stable structure with Borovik-Poizat rank 2 is given in [1, p. 376]. Furthermore, it appears that this example can be modified in a straightforward way to give ℵ0-stable structures of Borovik-Poizat rank 2 in which the Morley rank is any countable ordinal (which would refute a claim of [1, p. 373, proof of C.4]). We have not checked the details. This does not leave much room for strenghthenings of our theorem. On the other hand, the proof of Theorem 1.1 does give a finite bound for the heights of certain trees of definable sets related to unsuperstability, as we will see in Section 5. (shrink)

In this paper the following theorem is proved regarding groups of finite Morley rank which are perfect central extensions of quasisimple algebraic groups.Theorem1.Let G be a perfect group of finite Morley rank and let C0be a definable central subgroup of G such that G/C0is a universal linear algebraic group over an algebraically closed field; that is G is a perfect central extension of finite Morley rank of a universal linear algebraic group. Then C0= 1.Contrary to an impression which exists in (...) some circles, the center of the universal extension of a simple algebraic group, as an abstract group, is not finite in general. Thus the finite Morley rank assumption cannot be omitted.Corollary1.Let G be a perfect group of finite Morley rank such that G/Z(G) is a quasisimple algebraic group. Then G is an algebraic group. In particular, Z(G) is finite([4],Section27.5).An understanding of central extensions of quasisimple linear algebraic groups which are groups of finite Morley rank is necessary for the classification oftamesimpleK*-groupsof finite Morley rank, which constitutes an approach to the Cherlin-Zil’ber conjecture. For this reason the theorem above and its corollary were proven in [1] (Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) under the assumption oftameness, which simplifies the argument considerably. The result of the present paper shows that this assumption can be dropped. The main line of argument is parallel to that in [1]; the absence of the tameness assumption will be countered by a model-theoretic result and results fromK-theory. The model-theoretic result places limitations on definability in stable fields, and may possibly be relevant to eliminating certain other uses of tameness. (shrink)

We classify countable metrically homogeneous graphs of diameter 3.

We classify countable metrically homogeneous graphs of diameter 3.

John Dewey’s Metaphysical Theory provides an overview and technical exposition of Dewey’s mature ontological theory. In particular, “nature,” “experience,” and their relationship, are given extended treatment through a close reading of primary texts. Following Dewey’s metaphysical postulates and conclusions, the book suggests how experience may reveal the fundamental traits of nature. In addition, the book reveals how Dewey understood the ways in which all phenomena may relate within an inclusive economy of existence, what it means to have an “identity,” what (...) constitutes “selfhood” or personality, and how metaphysics relates to the ideals of democracy and social ethics. (shrink)

A personal voyage of discovery drawing on musicology, literary theory, Jewish studies, and philosophical phenomenology.

In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it (...) is always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing--especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact--is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing. "In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema has made an immensely important contribution to the discussion of group morality and collective responsibility both within and far beyond professional academic philosophy. His clearly written book will be essential reading." --Fergus Kerr, Honorary Fellow, University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

In this paper, I explain the curious role played by the Argument from Absolute Terms in Peter Unger's book Ignorance, I provide a critical presentation of the argument, and I consider some outstanding issues and the argument’s contemporary significance.

Now in its twentieth year of publication, this rich collection, popular among teachers and students alike, provides an in-depth look at major cases that have shaped the field of medical ethics. The book presents each famous (or infamous) case using extensive historical and contextual background, and then proceeds to illuminate it by careful discussion of pertinent philosophical theories and legal and ethical issues.

Virtually all historical treatments of just war recognize the importance of the account given by Thomas Aquinas in Summa theologiae II-II, q. 40, ?De bello?, where he outlines three conditions ? legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention ? for a justifiable use of armed force. It is, however, less well known that within the same section of the work (q. 50, a. 4) Aquinas extended his reflection on just war into a theory of military prudence. By placing generalship under (...) the category of ?prudence?, rather than ?art? or ?science?, he held that military command involves more than a morally neutral skill with victory as its sole aim. Building on the premise that service to the common good constitutes the overarching purpose of the military profession, Aquinas showed how the virtue of prudence provides an inner compass for decision-making amid the uncertainty and confusion of the battlefield. (shrink)

Death is the destiny we all share, and this will not change. Yet the way we die, which had remained the same for many generations, has changed drastically in a relatively short time for those in developed countries with access to healthcare. For generations, if people were lucky enough to reach old age, not having died in infancy or childhood, in childbirth, in war, or by accident, they would take to bed, surrounded by loved ones who cared for them, and (...) fade into death. Most likely, they would have seen their parents and grandparents die the same way, and so this manner of dying would be familiar: it was part of the natural cycle of life. Now less than 25 per cent of Americans die at home, having reached much older ages than people would have dreamed of in past generations, often after surviving many illnesses and even diseases that would have been terminal for their grandparents. We are fortunate to live (and die) today, supported by myriad scientific, medical, and technological advancements, however we also face new problems as a result of the new way in which we die. We can no longer anticipate a peaceful waning at home with family. We know our lives will likely end in hospitals likely after we have endured grueling treatments to prolong life. We have to decide what decisions we want our loved ones, or care-givers, to make when we cannot choose for ourselves. We have to think about whether in any circumstances we would seek physician-assisted death. We know we face other questions as well, but we may not even know where to start. In the face of these decisions, we can feel daunted and afraid. The best remedy is information and planning. In this book, Gregory Eastwood - a physician who has cared for dying patients, served as an ethics consultant, and taught end of life issues to medical and other health profession students - draws from his substantial experience with patients and families to provide the information that will help us think clearly about the choices and issues we will face at the end of our own lives, and when faced with the deaths of our loved ones. With sensitivity and profound insight, Eastwood guides us through all the important questions about death and dying in straightforward, clear language, enhanced by real-life stories. Throughout, he shows us how we can take ownership of the way we want to die, when we must die, and feel more in control as death approaches. (shrink)

Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since (...) the lottery is fair, it is rational to accept that ticket 2 won’t win either—indeed, it is rational to accept for any individual ticket i of the lottery that ticket i will not win. However, accepting that ticket 1 won’t win, accepting that ticket 2 won’t win, . . . , and accepting that ticket 1000 won’t win entails that it is rational to accept that no ticket will win, which entails that it is rational to accept the contradictory proposition that one ticket wins and no ticket wins. (shrink)

Preliminary Abstract: -/- The late Mary Midgley (1919-2018) was one of the most relevant and wide-ranging moral philosophers of the last century. For over forty years, she drew attention to the necessity of philosophy in everyday life while making significant contributions on such topics as human nature, ethics, animals and the environment, science, religion, and other real-world issues. Midgley’s remarkable career saw the publication of over 250 books, journal articles, pamphlets, and other materials, concluding with the publication of What Is (...) Philosophy For? at age 99, just one month before her death. This work was the last in a series of publications late in Midgley’s career that underscored her reputation as a singular thinker and a shining example of the significant presence of women in philosophy. -/- Mary Midgley on What Matters offers a window into this noteworthy period late in Midgley’s career. This volume invites the reader into a series of visits and conversations between Gregory McElwain and Mary Midgley at her home in Newcastle from 2011-2018. Framed and thematically curated by McElwain, these conversations present Midgley’s thoughts, reminiscences, and concerns on life and the topics for which she is best known, with special emphasis on her influential perspective on animals and the environment. Midgley’s witty and lively voice is emphasized throughout this accessbile book, engaging the reader with one of the more vibrant philosophers in living memory. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the close link between technology and death in the philosophical writings of Lewis Mumford. Mumford famously argued that throughout the history of western civilization we find intertwined two competing forms of technics; the democratic biotechnic form and the authoritarian monotechnic form. The former technics were said to be strongly compatible with an organic form of life while the latter were said to be allied to a mechanical power complex. What is perhaps less (...) well known is the extent to which Mumford characterizes the authoritarian technical form as being a technics of death. This article will argue that the connection between death and technics is a key theme in Mumford’s philosophy of technology. In addition to elaborating this theme and detailing how it informs Mumford’s other positions on the nature of technology, this article will also argue that Mumford’s theory of a technics of death bears witness, both implicitly and explicitly, to the influence of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death instinct. Freud’s account of the death instinct will be outlined briefly and its influence on Mumford’s writings will be explained. Death, in Mumford’s technological writings, has a generally negative function and serves to warn humanity of the perilous course that its technological civilization is set upon. However it also has a positive function in that it encourages man to transcend its biological existence in acts of creativity and purpose. Death, in this positive sense, serves the purpose of life whereas, in the negative sense, it hinders it. The role of death, in both aspects, will be explored and related to Mumford’s overall perspective on technics and life. It is argued that Mumford’s philosophy of technology cannot be fully understood without an awareness of his views on death and its role in the life of technological society. (shrink)