The background of the brief analysis is the political turn taken place in the GDR in autumn 1989. The active role of the »basic-groups« and of the protestant churches in it is well-known. Nevertheless, there are many reasons to consider in a critical way the inner connection between protestantism and democracy in Eastern Germany. Not without any reserve the GDR-Protestantism can be looked at a forerunner and representative of democracy. The GDR-Protestantism seems tobe obliged to develop a better understanding of (...) all the elements constituting democracy. (shrink)

The article gives a tentative interpretation of the history of the Churches in Germany starting 1945 to 1989. Crucial points are the relations oftheGerman Churches to questions of modern pluralism, to questions of peace and war and to questions of the transformation of Churchstructures. Common points are mentioned between the Churches of the older FRG and the former GDR-Churches just so differences between them.

Kurt Nowak was perhaps the most important church-historian in the former GDR. He was also a novelist, author of five belletristic books: Eintreffe heute abend, Der Tod des Studenten Lothar Dahl, Stechow oder Ein Fluchtversuch, Schöner Übermut des Herbstes and Vertraute Fremde. The essay describes the process of creation of those five books and analyses the relation between the theologian and the novelist.

How does affectivity contribute to moral judgment making? -- Normative dissonance vs. the order of argumentation -- Facing otherness as an ethical experiment -- The concepts of respect revisited -- What is universal? Between subjectivity and intersubjectivity -- Experimenting with values in legal contexts : Hegel and Radbruch -- Democracy begins in the mind. Developing democratic personality.

Do technologies advance our self-identities, as they do our bodies or cognitive skills? Are doomed to disintegration and an episodic self? This book examines how technologies affect our selves from the perspective of health humanities (e.g., transplantology, bionics, disability studies), phenomenology, philosophy of mind and posthumanism.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins’ view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since (...) it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins’ argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything. (shrink)

"Der vorliegende Band geht auf logikbezogene Spurensuche und vereinigt durchdachte, hochintelligente und zahlreiche neue Einsichten versprechende Texte. Wer sich ernsthaft mit Musik beschäftigt, sollte sich diesen Band nicht entgehen lassen." (bs, Musica sacra 4/2015) Texte zur Praxis, Theorie und Ästhetik der Musik beanspruchen den Begriff ›musikalische Logik‹, wobei die Vorstellungen über Geltung, Inhalt und Umfang dieses Begriffes weit divergieren. Im vorliegenden Buch wird eine problemgeschichtliche Klärung unternommen. Musikalische Logik erweist sich als Inbegriff der Bedingungen, unter welchen Musik als in sich (...) selbst begründeter Prozess erscheinen kann. Sie besteht in einem musikalischen Denken, dessen Zusammenhang generiert wird durch Differenzierung von Klangrelationen und Zeitmaßen, durch Bildung von Verknüpfungsweisen und Verlaufsformen, durch den variativen Gebrauch der resultierenden Modelle sowie durch Aufhebung und Neubildung der Konstituenten; als produktives Denken lässt sich das musikalische Denken die Wege nicht festlegen, die sich für seine Ausdrucks- und Kommunikationsweise bewährt haben. Musikalische Logik kann sich in voraushörbarer Konsequenz zeigen, aber auch und besonders in der Art, wie sich ein nicht zu antizipierender Prozess als in sich begründet erweist. Die Vielfalt der Möglichkeiten spricht nicht gegen die Erwartung von Logik in der Musik, sondern erfüllt die Eigenart des Logischen im Bereich des Schaffens gegenüber dem Logischen im Bereich des Erkennens. Die historische Darstellung führt von der Spätantike bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Texts on the practice, theory and aesthetics of music make use of the term ‘musical logic’, although conceptions of the application, content and scope of the term differ greatly. This book attempts to solve this historical problem. Musical logic proves to be the embodiment of the conditions under which music can appear as a process founded in itself. It consists of musical thinking with ist context generated by the differentiation of relationships between sounds and of tempi, by the creation of forms of connection and progression, by the variational use of the resulting models and the suspension and re-creation of the constituent parts; as a form of productive thinking, music cannot define proven means for ist own expression and communication. Musical logic can manifest itself in consequences that can be aurally predicted, but also, and especially, in the ways in which a process that cannot be anticipated proves to be founded in itself. The range of possibilities does not contradict the expectation of logic in music but conforms to the peculiarity of logic in the sphere of creation as opposed to logic in the sphere of cognition. The historical presentation ranges from late antiquity to the mid 20th century. (shrink)

t. 1. Dialektyka.--t. 2. Ontologia i epistemologia.

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

It is often claimed that humans are rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral creatures. What these characterizations may all have in common is the more fundamental claim that humans are normative animals, in the sense that they are creatures whose lives are structured at a fundamental level by their relationships to norms. The various capacities singled out by discussion of rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral animals might then all essentially involve an orientation to obligations, permissions and prohibitions. And, if this is (...) so, then perhaps it is a basic susceptibility, or proclivity to normative or deontic regulation of thought and behavior that enables humans to develop the various specific features of their life form. This volume of new essays investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative animals in this sense. The contributors do so by looking at the nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative norms-social, moral, and linguistic-and asking whether they might all be different expressions of one basic structure unique to humankind. These questions are posed by philosophers, primatologists, behavioral biologists, psychologists, linguists, and cultural anthropologists, who have collaborated on this topic for many years. The contributors are committed to the idea that understanding normativity is a two-way process, involving a close interaction between conceptual clarification and empirical research. (shrink)

Anger, disgust, elevation, sympathy, relief. If the subjective experience of each of these emotions is the same whether elicited by moral or nonmoral events, then what makes moral emotions unique? We suggest that the configuration of moral emotions is special—a configuration given by the underlying structure of morality. Research suggests that people divide the moral world along the two dimensions of valence (help/harm) and moral type (agent/patient). The intersection of these two dimensions gives four moral exemplars—heroes, villains, victims and beneficiaries—each (...) of which elicits unique emotions. For example, victims (harm/patient) elicit sympathy and sadness. Dividing moral emotions into these four quadrants provides predictions about which emotions reinforce, oppose and complement each other. (shrink)

The Adventure of the Human Intellect presents the latest scholarship on the beginnings of intellectual history on a broad scope, encompassing ten eminent ancient or early civilizations from both the Old and New Worlds. Borrows themes from The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man (1946), updating an old topic with a new approach and up-to-date theoretical underpinning, evidence, and scholarship Provides a broad scope of studies, including discussion of highly developed ancient or early civilizations in China, India, West Asia, the Mediterranean, (...) and the Americas Examines the world view of ten ancient or early societies, reconstructed from their own texts, concerning the place of human beings in society and state, in nature and cosmos, in space and time, in life and death, and in relation to those in power and the world of the divine Considers a diversity of sources representing a wide array of particular responses to differing environments, circumstances, and intellectual challenges Reflects a more inclusive and nuanced historiographical attitude with respect to non-elites, gender, and local variations Brings together leading specialists in the field, and is edited by an internationally renowned scholar. (shrink)

We argue that we can avoid epistemic dilemmas by properly understanding the nature and epistemology of the suspension of judgment, with a particular focus on conflicts between higher-order evidence and first-order evidence.

The paper begins with a proposal for a reconstruction of three major statements of the traditional Marxian version of historical materialism. The general concept of an adaptive mechanism is introduced to explain how, in the Marxian sense, several parts of the superstructure are to be thought of as determined by the economic base. The paper proceeds by asking whether the classical type of economic determination is valid not only for precapitalist and capitalist societies, but for socialist societies as well. An (...) answer in the negative is given. The author tries to outline a type of historical materialism which takes into account the autonomous role of political institutions and social relations as determinants in socialist societies. (shrink)

Ogni tentativo di ripensare le nostre categorie politiche deve muovere dalla consapevolezza che della distinzione classica fra zoé e bios, tra vita naturale ed esistenza politica (o tra l'uomo come semplice vivente e l'uomo come soggetto politico), non ne sappiamo piú nulla. Nel diritto romano arcaico homo sacer era un uomo che chiunque poteva uccidere senza commettere omicidio e che non doveva però essere messo a morte nelle forme prescritte dal rito. È la vita uccidibile e insacrificabile dell' 'uomo sacro' (...) a fornire qui la chiave per una rilettura critica della nostra tradizione politica. Quando la vita diventa la posta in gioco della politica e questa si trasforma in biopolitica, tutte le categorie fondamentali della nostra riflessione, dai diritti dell'uomo alla democrazia alla cittadinanza, entrano in un processo di svuotamento e di dislocazione il cui risultato sta oggi davanti ai nostri occhi. Seguendo il filo del rapporto costitutivo fra nuda vita e potere sovrano, da Aristotele ad Auschwitz, dall'Habeas corpus alle Dichiarazioni dei diritti, il libro di Agamben cerca di decifrare gli enigmi - prima di tutti il fascismo e il nazismo - che il nostro secolo ha proposto alla ragione storica. Fino a vedere, nel campo di concentramento, il paradigma biopolitico nascosto della modernità in cui città e casa sono diventate indiscernibili e la possibilità di distinguere tra il nostro corpo biologico e il nostro corpo politico ci è stata tolta una volta per tutte. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \ (...) , and it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views. (shrink)