Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This (...) paper argues against such revisionism; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his “mature” years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances as efficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances. (shrink)

Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This (...) paper argues against such revisionism; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his “mature” years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances asefficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances. (shrink)

Leibniz dit souvent que toutes les substances individuelles et seulement les substances individuelles peuvent être agents moraux authentiques. Mais, dans un passage fascinant des "Nouveaux essais", Leibniz semble concéder à John Locke que si les machines pensantes existaient, elles pourraient être des agents moraux authentiques. Ce serait une concession très significative considérant le fait que pour Leibniz les machines ne sont pas du tout des substances authentiques, mais de simple agrégats de matière. En général, les érudits ont interprété ce passage (...) comme un moyen pour Leibniz d'affirmer que l'identité métaphysique à long terme n'est pas une condition nécessaire pour l'identité morale à long terme. Mais, dans cette étude, je vais soutenir que Leibniz ne concède réellement pas à Locke que les machines pensantes pourraient être des agents moraux. (shrink)

Leibniz's mature philosophy is monadological. The only true substances are monads which Leibniz compares to Cartesian res cogitans. In the monadological view, the only variant properties of monads are perceptions of varying degrees of distinctness; corporeal substances are phenomena that supervene on the ordered perceptions of monads. Monads continually change their perceptions, and in this minimal sense, monads are constantly active. The question that any account of Leibniz's monadological view must answer is: What causes the change in the perceptions of (...) monads? To answer this question is to gain clarity not only about Leibniz's monadological account of change, but also about Leibniz's views on causality and explanation for phenomena, since it is the changes in perceptions of monads that seem to account for changes in phenomena. (shrink)

"We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory (...) that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity. (shrink)

"In this paper, I shall consider the several ways in which interpreters, since 1976, have attempted to challenge the premises of Wilson's argument, and so have tried to rescue Leibniz's theory from Wilson's charge of incoherence. I shall argue that only one of these ways stands any chance of being successful." (S. 117/118)\nDiskussion zu Margaret Wilson: Leibniz : self-consciousness and immortality in the Paris notes and after. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), S. 335 - 352 (vgl. M 2, (...) Nr. 3171). (shrink)

Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for the soul after bodily death. Some, both Christian and non-Christian, including Geach, Strawson and Williams, have argued that the afterlife Descartes envisions is far from the attractive state heaven is supposed to be. Others, including Leibniz, Russier, and Cottingham, have argued that a Cartesian afterlife represents a state of existence that cannot even be rationally desired. But I shall argue in this paper that both criticisms fail to (...) appreciate fully the details of Descartes' doctrine of immortality. (shrink)

Leibniz’s reasons for rejecting materialism are complex and often rely on assumptions that are deeply puzzling to contemporary philosophers. However, the discussion of these issues in § 17 of the Monadology has received a lot of attention over the past couple of decades. For it is here that Leibniz presents the most well known version of his “mill argument.”.

In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who (...) claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who claim that Descartes had no theory of modality. I then move on to the defense of my view, both giving a positive account of my argument and noting how my interpretation enjoys certain advantages over my interlocutors. (shrink)

In this paper I present a novel view of the ontological status of possible objects for Descartes. Specifically, I claim that possible objects just are innate ideas considered objectively. In the act of creation, God creates possibilities—in all its richness—in the form of innate ideas. Thus, in acts of thinking, one may clearly and distinctly perceive, via one’s innate ideas, that such and such is possible. To argue this, I first analyze and critique two competing views—one from Calvin Normore who (...) claims that innate ideas represent an independent realm of possibilia, and another from David Cunning and Alan Nelson who claim that Descartes had no theory of modality. I then move on to the defense of my view, both giving a positive account of my argument and noting how my interpretation enjoys certain advantages over my interlocutors. (shrink)

The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty normal (...) subjects and 30 schizophrenic patients with and without hallucinations and/or delusional experiences were required to execute simple finger and wrist movements, without direct visual control of their hand. The image of either their own hand or an alien hand executing the same or a different movement was presented on a TV-screen in real time. The task for the subjects was to discriminate whether the hand presented on the screen was their own or not. Hallucinating and deluded schizophrenic patients were more impaired in discriminating their own hand from the alien one than the non-hallucinating ones, and tended to misattribute the alien hand to themselves. Results are discussed according to a model of action control. A tentative description of the mechanisms leading to action consciousness is proposed. (shrink)

Le cinema nous regarde, il en sait souvent plus sur nous et notre epoque que ce que nous croyons savoir sur lui. Il nous livre un instantane photographique du temps qui passe et ouvre la possibilite de la critique au coeur du divertissement. Cet art des masses est un art du monde, des peuples, du peuple, du depeuple, du populaire, et parfois du populiste. Le cinema, ce n'est pas exactement le film, c'est ce qui, dans le film, ne releve pas (...) du sens, en quelque sorte la part folle et non theologique du film. Ce art excede son esthetique, en rendant sensible en lui la trace des spectres, de l'oublie, du sans-voix et du laisse-pour-compte. Des qu'il eut franchi le pont, les fantomes vinrent a sa rencontre, entend-on dans Nosferatu de Murnau. Ces traces ou ces apparitions de fantomes sont inseparables du reve et de la rememoration qui a lieu au cinema. La pensee est cinematographique, depuis des temps immemoriaux, elle reve et pense en cinema. Depuis que le cinema existe par ses films, depuis que proliferent ces singulieres temporalisations des images par le mouvement, le cinema suscite, invente et innerve la pensee. (shrink)

Experiential evidence shows that pain is associated with common meanings. These include a meaning of threat or danger, which is experienced as immediately distressing or unpleasant; cognitive meanings, which are focused on the long-term consequences of having chronic pain; and existential meanings such as hopelessness, which are more about the person with chronic pain than the pain itself. This interdisciplinary book - the second in the three-volume Meanings of Pain series edited by Dr Simon van Rysewyk - aims to better (...) understand pain by describing experiences of pain and the meanings these experiences hold for the people living through them. The lived experiences of pain described here involve various types of chronic pain, including spinal pain, labour pain, rheumatic pain, diabetic peripheral neuropathic pain, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, endometriosis-associated pain, and cancer-related pain. Two chapters provide narrative descriptions of pain, recounted and interpreted by people with pain. Language is important to understanding the meaning of pain since it is the primary tool human beings use to manipulate meaning. As discussed in the book, linguistic meaning may hold clues to understanding some pain-related experiences, including the stigmatisation of people with pain, the dynamics of patient-clinician communication, and other issues, such as relationships between pain, public policy and the law, and attempts to develop a taxonomy of pain that is meaningful for patients. Clinical implications are described in each chapter. This book is intended for people with pain, their family members or caregivers, clinicians, researchers, advocates, and policy makers. (shrink)

Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon calls attention to the dynamic interaction that takes place between hermeneutics and phenomenology in Ricoeur's thought. It could be said that Ricoeur's thought is placed under a twofold demand: between the rigor of the text and the requirements of the phenomenon. The rigor of the text calls for fidelity to what the text actually says, while the requirement of the phenomenon is established by the Husserlian call to return "to the (...) things themselves." These two demands are interwoven insofar as there is a hermeneutic component of the phenomenological attempt to go beyond the surface of things to their deeper meaning, just as there is a phenomenological component of the hermeneutic attempt to establish a critical distance toward the world to which we belong. For this reason, Ricoeur's thought involves a back and forth movement between the text and the phenomenon. Although this double movement was a theme of many of Ricoeur's essays in the middle of his career, the essays in this book suggest that hermeneutic phenomenology remains implicit throughout his work. The chapters aim to highlight, in much greater detail, how this back and forth movement between phenomenology and hermeneutics takes place with respect to many important philosophical themes, including the experience of the body, history, language, memory, personal identity, and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

This article explores the prevailing assumption of instrumentalism in negotiation and argues that contrary to the popular conception in negotiation scholarship, negotiators need not be assumed to be ontologically individualistic or purely self-interested in their motivation and action. We show the contribution that can be made to the field by an approach to negotiation that does not presume a strong and inevitable self-interest as the fundamental starting point of any account of negotiation behavior and we offer ideas for an alternative (...) starting point, which we call the agentic-relational model. (shrink)

Existe-t-il une chose de tel qu'une conception herméneutique du langage? C'est à cette question que cet ouvrage se propose de répondre, de façon positive, en opérant une mise en dialogue des herméneutiques de Hans-Georg Gadamer et Paul Ricoeur. Malgré les différences indéniables entre les oeuvres de ces deux philosophes, l'auteur montre qu'elles ont en commun de penser le langage comme étant un principe fondamental de notre expérience du monde et de tout événement de compréhension. Une articulation entre les deux oeuvres, (...) qui mise sur une dialectique entre les notions d'appartenance et de distanciation, est possible à partir de cet accord de fond sur notre appartenance essentielle au langage. De ce point de vue, tout effort pour mettre à distance le langage afin d'en faire un objet d'étude doit tenir compte du caractère premier et irréductible de cette appartenance, s'il veut éviter de n'offrir qu'une vision réductrice du langage. Comme le révèlent les analyses de ce livre, les recherches de Gadamer et Ricoeur se caractérisent par la prise en compte de ce fait dans leurs réflexions sur le dialogue, le texte et la traduction, ainsi que dans leurs travaux sur la puissance créatrice du langage qui se manifeste dans la métaphore, le dire poétique et le récit. Cependant, le plus important pour l'herméneutique est que cette appartenance fondamentale ne soit pas synonyme d'un enfermement dans le langage, mais que le langage offre au contraire une ouverture sur l'être et permette à ce qui est de se dire et de se penser. (shrink)

Musical life became disrupted in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many musicians and venues turned to online alternatives, such as livestreaming. In this study, three livestreamed concerts were organized to examine separate, yet interconnected concepts—agency, presence, and social context—to ascertain which components of livestreamed concerts facilitate social connectedness. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling was conducted on 83 complete responses to examine the effects of the manipulations on feelings of social connectedness with the artist and the audience. Results showed that in concert (...) 1, where half of the participants were allowed to vote for the final song to be played, this option did not result in the experience of more agency. Instead, if their preferred song was played (regardless of voting ability) participants experienced greater connectedness to the artist. In concert 2, participants who attended the concert with virtual reality headsets experienced greater feelings of physical presence, as well as greater feelings of connectedness with the artist, than those that viewed a normal YouTube livestream. In concert 3, attendance through Zoom led to greater experience of social presence, but predicted less connectedness with the artist, compared to a normal YouTube livestream. Crucially, a greater negative impact of COVID-19 (e.g., loneliness) predicted feelings of connectedness with the artist, possibly because participants fulfilled their social needs with this parasocial interaction. Examining data from all concerts suggested that physical presence was a predictor of connectedness with both the artist and the audience, while social presence only predicted connectedness with the audience. Correlational analyses revealed that reductions in loneliness and isolation were associated with feelings of shared agency, physical and social presence, and connectedness to the audience. Overall, the findings suggest that in order to reduce feelings of loneliness and increase connectedness, concert organizers and musicians could tune elements of their livestreams to facilitate feelings of physical and social presence. (shrink)

How educators and students process and respond to emotions can either enhance or impede the development of the whole child. Social and emotional learning refers to the processes of developing social and emotional competencies, which depend on individuals’ capacity to recognize, understand, and manage emotions. Consensus across disciplines about the importance of EI highlights the need to advance the science of how to teach SEL. RULER, an evidence-based approach to teaching EI, provides an educational framework that encompasses a set of (...) practices for comprehensive SEL integration across a school or district. In this article, we describe RULER, explain how it teaches EI, and summarize evidence of its effectiveness. (shrink)

Motor development – traditionally studied in WEIRD populations – falls victim to assumptions of universality similar to other domains described by Henrich et al. However, cross-cultural research illustrates the extraordinary diversity that is normal in motor skill acquisition. Indeed, motor development provides an important domain for evaluating cultural challenges to a general behavioral science.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.