Emmanuel Levinas was a significant contributor to the field of philosophy, phenomenology and religion. A key interpreter of Husserl, he stressed the importance of attitudes to other people in any philosophical system. For Levinas, to be a subject is to take responsibility for others as well as yourself and therefore responsibility for the one leads to justice for the many. He regarded ethics as the foundation for all other philosophy, but later admitted it could also be the foundation for theology. (...) Michael Purcell outlines the basic themes of Levinas' thought and the ways in which they might be deployed in fundamental and practical theology, and the study of the phenomenon of religion. This book will be useful for undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy, theology and religious studies, as well as those with a theological background who are approaching Levinas for the first time. (shrink)

From inception to extinction, objective criteria regarding the defining characteristics of "personhood" are sought to justify responsibility. But, when we relate to others, what do we actually relate to? In The Ethical Significance of Illeity, L vinas's concept of illeity is used to argue that the responsibility owed to others flows not from an ability to comprehend the defining characteristics of "personhood" but from the fact that persons are ultimately "neutral" and beyond disclosure. Ethics should not be dominated by knowledge; (...) rather, the ethical relationship with the other should guide the progress of understanding. Philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service of love. (shrink)

Karl Rahner distinguishes “the experience of grace” and “the experience of grace as grace.” How is the experience of grace to be understood? How is grace experienced? This article attempts to understand the experience of grace in terms of Maurice Blanchot’s thought of the impossible. “Human life is impossible,” as Simone Weil reflects. Blanchot, particularly through a reflection which echoes that of Levinas, seeks to reverse the relationship between possibility and impossibility. Whereas, for Heidegger, the subject is to be understood (...) in terms of possibility, Blanchot stresses the impossibility of human life which is only rendered possible through an initiative which is prior to the subject. The impossible relation with the other is the context for any possibility the self may have. With regard to grace, we argue its prior necessity, and its experience as impossible. Like suffering and death, the experience of grace is not the possibility of impossibility, but the impossibility of possibility. Maurice Blanchot himself remains relatively unfamiliar, he and his thoughts remaining in themselves inaccessible. Michel Foucault quite simply writes, “so far has he withdrawn into the manifestation of his work, so completely is he, not hidden by his texts, but absent from their existence, that for us he is that thought itself—its real, absolutely distant, shimmering, invisible presence, its inevitable law, its calm, infinite measured strength” (Foucault: Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from the Outside, 19). To a world espoused to philosophies of light and systems of integration, Blanchot’s thought presents itself as a “thought from outside” of any philosophy and any system, and refuses, as Levinas, says, to “see in philosophy the ultimate possibility.”. (shrink)

Liturgy has been the forum for the enactment of a diverse range of theologies, at times stressing the human, at times the divine. Following Emmanuel Levinas, this article understands the meaning of liturgy as ‘a movement of the Same towards the Other which never returns to the Same.’ Whether directed towards God, or expressive of human longing, the structure of liturgy is essentially ‘for‐the‐Other.’ This movement out of self is seen when one considers liturgy as the ‘work of the people,’ (...) where ‘work’ is understood as Œuvre rather than travail. To say that liturgy is œuvre is to situate its significance not in the activity of the subject who has a concern to achieve or realise something through his own effort, but in the Other who inspires the work. The activism of travail finds its counter in the essential passivity of œuvre. By recognising this the horizontal and vertical elements within divine liturgy can be brought together in a mutually indispensable way. As essentially ‘for‐the‐Other,’ responsible service, which is at one and the same time divine service and human service, is at the heart of the liturgy. In liturgy we are drawn out of ourselves in a ‘movement of the Same towards the Other which never returns to the Same’ and which is positively experienced as responsibility. It is not that we first worship and then are called unto service in a movement out of self towards the Otherness of God and thereafter towards the Otherness of the other person. The movement out of self – liturgy – is at one and the same time worship and ethics, an ethical worship, in which justice is rendered both to God and to the other person. (shrink)

Levinas' ethical metaphysics opens up a nexus of relationships, in the midst of which God becomes accessible as the counterpart of the justice I render to others. Although Levinas refuses a theorising theology which does violence to God, we attempt in this article nonetheless to glimpse the possibility of a divine threesome which can be articulated in the language of ethical metaphysics. We seek to trace a Trinity, not in Levinas, but with Levinas. We seek to ‘leash God with Levinas.’Thus, (...) we argue the liturgical nature of God. God is utterly ‘for‐the‐other.’ The Father, as utterly self‐diffusive, is ‘for‐the‐Son’, and the Son, as utterly responsive, is ‘for‐the‐Father.’ The divine nature is the ethical reality of ‘for‐the‐other.’ Secondly, this one nature has three distinct hypostases, which need to be understood ethically. The relationship between Father and Son is not the same as the relationship between the Son and the Father. The Father and the Son are the same in that they are essentially ‘for‐the‐other,’ bound by a bond or a Spirit of responsibility. Yet, the Son's relation to the Father is responsive, whereas the Father's relation to the Son is initiative or originary. Thus, there is both an identity yet a non‐identification of Father and Son. Again, since responsibility is the ethical hypostasis of ‘the‐other‐person‐in me,’ we might say that the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father , in a non‐identical way, and that it is precisely this perichoresis of the one in the Other which constitutes the hypostasis of each. (shrink)

Hesitation is a phenomenological moment. One is disturbed when, unexpectedly, someone else is there. There is that sharp intake of breath which accompanies being taken by surprise, and even a suspension of time, before one exhales. The other person takes us by surprise and often jolts us out of self-complacency and self-contentment, but also introduces us and invites us into a situation of responsibility in which the ego is no longer for itself but for the other. This is declining subjectivity (...) otherwise and in terms of the other. This short article takes as its point of departure a simple incident: one halts or gives way before someone pushing a child's pram. One says, 'after you.' With Levinas and Blanchot, this moment of 'giving way' needs to be phenomenologically frozen in that very moment of giving way, for hesitation is a hesitation in being. 'To be' is a reflexive verb, and existence is already fissured. Into this wound within existence, an other may enter, and provide an exit from ontology to ethics. (shrink)

Hesitation is a phenomenological moment. One is disturbed when, unexpectedly, someone else is there. There is that sharp intake of breath which accompanies being taken by surprise, and even a suspension of time, before one exhales. The other person takes us by surprise and often jolts us out of self-complacency and self-contentment, but also introduces us and invites us into a situation of responsibility in which the ego is no longer for itself but for the other. This is declining subjectivity (...) otherwise and in terms of the other. This short article takes as its point of departure a simple incident: one halts or gives way before someone pushing a child's pram. One says, 'after you.' With Levinas and Blanchot, this moment of 'giving way' needs to be phenomenologically frozen in that very moment of giving way, for hesitation is a hesitation in being. 'To be' is a reflexive verb, and existence is already fissured. Into this wound within existence, an other may enter, and provide an exit from ontology to ethics. (shrink)

This article argues that ministerial priesthood, rather than being ontologically comprehended, should be ethically articulated. The ‘character’ of priesthood is to be ‘for‐the‐other.’ Following a thought of Emmanuel Levinas on the ‘liturgical orientation of work,’ we argue that — Priesthood is essentially liturgical, in the sense of a movement out of oneself towards the other which never returns to the self. This movement is at one and the same time on orientation towards God, as divine other, and the other person. (...) This ‘liturgical’ orientation of the self is seen and celebrated in the sacred liturgy of the Church with which the life and ministry of the priest is intimately associated. In this sense, the liturgy of the Church is not only an expression of what the Church is, but also, as an expression of the ethical subjectivity of the self which is ‘the‐Other‐in‐me,’ a celebration of who I am. — Priesthood is essentially eucharistic. In the commemoration of the passion, death and resurrection of Christ, the ethical and ecclesial structure of subjectivity, is recalled and realised in the words ‘for you ’ and ‘for all .’ — Priesthood is self‐sacrificial. If living eucharistically is living ‘for you ’ and ‘for all ,’ then this finds its extreme expression in the sacrifice of oneself for‐the‐other in suffering and death. This involves substitution which, as Levinas says, ‘is indispensable to the comprehension of subjectivity.’. (shrink)

Le débat sur nature et grâce cherche à réconcilier théologiquement l'appel de la nature humaine à un accomplissement en Dieu sans compromettre en aucune façon la totale gratuité de la grâce. Rahner explique la relation entre les deux en termes de causalité quasi-formelle, par laquelle Dieu se communique à la créature tout en gardant sa transcendance et sa liberté. L'essence de Dieu «tient la place de la species dans l'esprit créé». Le langage de la causalité quasi-formelle reste, cependant, difficile a (...) utiliser dans un sens existentiel. Lévinas, quant à lui, unit le soi à l'autrui dans une relation de responsabilité, par laquelle l'«autre-en-moi» constitue le sujet comme l'«un-pour-l'autre» de la responsabilité, tout en se maintenant comme absolu dans la relation. L'article présent tente d'unir la notion rahnérienne de la causalité formelle avec la compréhension qu'a Lévinas de la responsabilité. Pour autant que le soi est constitué comme le pour de la relation «un-pour-l'autre», on peut employer le langage de la causalité formelle pour exprimer la relation à l'autre, tout en employant la qualification quasi pour préserver à l'intérieur de cette relation l'absolue altérité de l'autre qui se détache de la relation et ne subit par elle aucune modification. (shrink)

But when you are handed over, do not worry about how to speak or what to say; what you are to say will be given to you when the time comes, because it is not you who will be speaking; the Spirit of your Father will be speaking in you.

Karl Rahner explique la causalité des sacrements en termes de la causalité du signe. Sacramenta significando efficiunt gratiam. La théorie de Rahner se prête à une interprétation ontologique dont le thème dominant est celui de présence. Derrida critique, cependant, le lien qui est établi entre signe et présence, en disant que «l'âge du signe est essentiellement théologique». La distinction entre sacramentum et res continue à être importante, comme Marion l'affirme, mais cela devrait se comprendre en un sens éthique plutôt qu'ontologique. (...) Les sacrements signifient de façon éthique plutôt qu'ontologique. (shrink)

The understanding of the human person as a natural desire for the beatific vision prompted fierce and convoluted debate between those who, like de Lubac, espoused la nouvelle théologie, and those who sought to maintain the standard view of the nature-grace relationship. This paper attempts to draw attention to the criticisms which Rahner addressed towards la nouvelle théologie, and to suggest that the distinction which Emmanuel Levinas makes between need (besoin) and desire (désir) offers a useful way of progressing the (...) debate and articulating the understanding of the person as desiderium naturale beyond the language of logical and ontological coherence, and in the language of proximity, ethical summons, and responsibility. (shrink)

It is now almost 20 years since Janicaud’s critique of the ‘theological turn in French phenomenology’ (Janicaud 1991, 2000), with its emphasis on phenomenology and theology as two and never one. Yet since that time there been an explosion of phenomenologies which are, if not overtly, implicitly religious and phenomenology. Thus, we have phenomenologies of prayer, or love, or hope, and the possibilities of further phenomenologies. The challenge of these emerging phenomenologies is that there seems to be no noematic correlate (...) to a noesis in intentionality. To the fore in the reconsideration of this phenomenological challenge is Jean-Luc Marion (although there are others such as Levinas, Jean-Louis Chrétien, and Michel Henry): all aspects of lived experience appear now to belong to the proper scope of phenomenology. Marion considers the relation in Husserl between intentions and intuitions which fulfil these intentions, and suggests a reversal. In Marion, although intentionality is not rejected, the phenomenological flow which the reduction brings to light is from the object as such as it gives itself in intuition, and then from intuition to intention. For Marion, phenomena are saturated—they give too much. Religion becomes a test-case for all phenomenology. This bearing, drawing mainly on The Visible and the Revealed, offers some of the key things in Marion’s phenomenology. (shrink)

Guilt and shame are self-conscious emotions with implications for mental health, social and occupational functioning, and the effectiveness of sports practice. To date, the assessment and role of athlete-specific guilt and shame has been under-researched. Reporting data from 174 junior elite cricketers, the present study utilized exploratory factor analysis in validating the Athletic Perceptions of Performance Scale, assessing three distinct and statistically reliable factors: athletic shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and no-concern. Conditional process analysis indicated that APPS shame-proneness mediated the relationship between general (...) and athlete-specific distress. While APPS domains of guilt-proneness and no-concern were not significant mediators, they exhibited correlations in the expected direction with indices of psychological distress and well-being. The APPS may assist coaches and support staff identify players who may benefit from targeted interventions to reduce the likelihood of experiencing shame-prone states. (shrink)

The ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez has reignited debate in Latin America and internationally on the questions of socialism and revolution. This forum brings together six leading intellectuals from different revolutionary traditions and introduces their reflections on class-struggle, the state, imperialism, counter-power, revolutionary parties, community and communes, workplaces, economy, politics, society, culture, race, gender, and the hopes, contradictions, and prospects of ‘twenty-first-century socialism’ in contemporary Venezuela.

First, this collection seeks to examine exactly what Levinass writings mean for both Jews and Christians. Second, it takes a snapshot of the current state of Jewish-Christian dialogue, using Levinas as the rationale for the discussion. Three generations of Levinas scholars are represented. Contributors: Leora Batnitzky, Jeffrey Bloechl, Richard A. Cohen, Paul Franks, Robert Gibbs, Kevin Hart, Dana Hollander, Robyn Horner, Jeffrey L. Kosky, Jean-Luc Marion, Michael Purcell, Michael A. Signer, Merold Westphal, Elliott R. Wolfson, Edith Wyschogrod.

This chapter contains sections titled: Mark's Story: ‘It was like Line Dancing for the First Time’ Carl's Story: ‘Everyone Avoids the Front and Center in Class’ Jake's Story: ‘The only Judging going on is in my Own Head’ Competing against their own Bodies (but is it More than a Workout?) Competing against other People (perhaps the Real Competition is within Yourself) Competing against their Own Egos (Playing Nice with your Ego).

Kids are experiencing stress at unprecedented levels. But helping them understand their emotions and behavior when they're young will set them on a path to being successful students and empathetic people throughout their lives. With more than seventy easy-to-implement lessons and activities, this book provides educators proven techniques to help students: manage and reduce their anxiety; separate emotions from actions; stop impulsive reactions and respond mindfully to difficult situations; improve social skills, social awareness, and academic performance; and develop empathy.

Thirty hands-on lessons provide students opportunities to learn and practice self-regulation strategies. Students today face many challenges that did not exist a generation or two ago, and rates of emotional disorders (including anxiety and depression) have increased steadily over the years. Students must also manage an overwhelming amount of information. With today’s reliance on technology and social media, they have fewer opportunities to develop effective self-regulation strategies and interpersonal and stress management skills. Helping students understand their emotions and behavior when (...) they’re young will set them on a path to being successful learners and empathetic people throughout their lives. With thirty easy-to-implement, skill-based lessons and activities, Teaching Kids to Pause, Cope, and Connect provides educators with strategies to help students: manage and reduce their anxiety with healthy coping skills understand and regulate physical responses to stress separate emotions from actions respond mindfully (rather than impulsively) to difficult situations improve social skills, social awareness, and self-regulation develop empathy and compassion Digital cont(more...). (shrink)

This paper extends the discourse on the importance of the relationship between practitioner and young person as a defining tenet of effective youth work practice, recognising the privileged position occupied by Youth Workers in the social ecology of the young people with whom they work. Reflecting the ethical obligations inherent in this relationship, particularly its focus on enhancing young people’s agency and developmental outcomes, the paper outlines how youth work practice infused with professional love aligns with conceptualizations of an ethic (...) of care. Reporting on interviews conducted with Youth Workers practicing in different settings across one local authority area in the UK, the paper articulates how practitioners’ ethic of care shapes their work with young people, and the extent to which love features as an element of their professional practice. Practitioners describe their motivation to express care that extends beyond legalistic interpretations of their ‘duty of care’ towards young people, using the language of care, love and nurture almost interchangeably. The paper demonstrates the importance of inclusion and reciprocity as fundamental elements of ethical practice, as well as the need to infuse practice with hope, suggesting the value of an affirmative ethic to complement a focus on love and care. (shrink)

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.

The History of Death explores the compelling subject of death, burial, and the afterlife in varied cultures, societies, and ages. Examines the various approaches to funerals, from sky burials in Tibet and mummification in Egypt, to being left to rot in the family home in Indonesia. Balances grim facts with intriguing details, such as remarkable burial requests, extravagant funerals, human sacrifice, and ritual killings. Illustrated throughout with photographs and artworks of representations of death and funerary rituals throughout history up to (...) the present day"--Back cover. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...) on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. (shrink)

Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.