According to the view of Peter Singer, only persons deserve a right to life. As a consequence, a human being can claim such a right only at a certain point of its postnatal development and there is no essential moral difference between infanticide and abortion. Against this view, it is argued that - even on the basis of personhood as the fundamental criterion - there are convincing pragmatical reasons for attributing a right to life in social practice at the point (...) of birth. It is also shown how this position can be combined with a morally satisfactory position on the important problem of the treatment of infants who are severely handicapped. (shrink)

According to Tugendhat's moral theory of legitimation the equal consideration of the interests of all is required. Tugendhat claims that this concept is the only one remaining as traditional forms of justification are no longer available. The author argues that Tugendhat's theory must fail because he tries to realize two contradictory aims: on the one band that bis principle of legitimation should not to be reduced to individual interests; on the other band that it should be reached without any aprioristic (...) presuppositions. (shrink)

It is claimed that some important moral rules — more precisely: the social establishment of such rules — can best be argued for in terms of hypothetical imperatives, addressed to each member of the society in question. The main presuppositions of this conception of morality are analysed and the implications of it for the relations between morality on the one hand and such things as prudence, sanctions, and equality on the other are examined.

Peter Stemmer advocates a new foundation of morality. He claims that any moral principle is justified only if every person to whom the principle applies consents to it on the basis of his or her own interests. But how can this ‘metanorm’ of unanimous consent be justified? Since Stemmer decisively rejects all objectivist foundations of morality, the only justification for his ‘metanorm’ can again be nothing but a unanimous consent. Through numerous examples I hope to have shown in my article (...) that the alleged connexion of all our moral demands with a general, unanimous consent is not realistic – no matter whether these demands are based on our spontaneous or on our well considered attitudes. And this holds no less for legal norms with their hard sanctions than for moral principles. (shrink)

Karl Popper's well-known refusal of induction consists of three theses which have to be distinguished clearly: the thesis of deduction, the thesis of rationality, and the thesis of use. Whereas the first thesis is correct, the second thesis is pretty questionable and the third thesis is definitely false. It will be argued that Popper himself does not adhere to the second and third thesis consequently, insofar he thinks that practical induction is legitimate whereas theoretical induction is not. Further it will (...) be shown that Popper's presentation of David Hume's thoughts on induction is inadequate. (shrink)

Karl Popper's well-known refusal of induction consists of three theses which have to be distinguished clearly: the thesis of deduction, the thesis of rationality, and the thesis of use. Whereas the first thesis is correct, the second thesis is pretty questionable and the third thesis is definitely false. It will be argued that Popper himself does not adhere to the second and third thesis consequently, insofar he thinks that practical induction is legitimate whereas theoretical induction is not. Further it will (...) be shown that Popper's presentation of David Hume's thoughts on induction is inadequate. (shrink)

Is it rational to believe in the existence of a God who is not only omnipotent but also good or morally perfect? This is the famous Problem of Evil, the Theodicy problem. Unlike many theologians and philosophers who feel convinced of either the existence or the non-existence of a good God, I defend a sceptical view based on the following two assumptions: 1. The believers have so far not been able to show that all the evils of the world, for (...) which God is responsible, are logically necessary means for the attainment of higher values. 2. The burden of proof - contrary to what many theologians say - lies clearly on the believers in God’s goodness and not on the non-believers. Insofar we have at present no sufficient reason to believe in a God who is not morally indifferent. (shrink)

Norbert Hoerster has tried to show on the basis of what I call special and general interests that it is rational to endorse moral judgements. I argue that Hoerster’s attempt to vindicate the rationality of moral judgements fails. By appealing to special interests Hoerster can only establish the rationality of endorsing judgements that – by Hoerster’s own standards – are not moral judgements because they do not pass the test of generalization. While the appeal to (...) general interests, on the other hand, indeed establishes the rationality of endorsing judgements that pass the test of generalization, it does so only for some but not all people; for this reason, the vindicated judgements do not qualify as moral judgements either. (shrink)

Starting from the problem of evil, Norbert Hoerster argues for an atheistic position. He discusses several historical and current attempts to reconcile the existing evils with the existence of God and comes to the negative conclusion that all of these attempts fail. From this, he concludes that the existing evils speak against the existence of God. In this article I argue that Hoerster's arguments are not sufficient for an atheistic conclusion. Rather, they only strengthen the case for (...) agnosticism, the position according to which we cannot know whether God exists. I want to work out that Hoerster does not recognize this because he does not clearly distinguish the position of agnosticism from the position of atheism, and thereby gives away important potential for differentiation. (shrink)