In this paper, I argue that both perdurance theory and the ‘relations-to-times’ endurantist view rely on an atemporal notion of property instantiation and relation bearing. I distinguish two possible meanings of ‘atemporal’ which result in two different understandings of what it is for an object to have a property or to bear a relation atemporally. I show that standard presentations of the theories considered are indeterminate as to which of these two understandings is the intended one. I claim that even (...) if both understandings are admissible, one of them is more attractive and has more to recommend than the other. (shrink)

This paper argues against the common practice of presenting perdurantism, endurantism, and other views about persistence and time as solutions to an alleged puzzle about change. Various recent attempts to generate a puzzle about change are examined and found unsuccessful. This does not mean, however, that the relevant views about persistence and time are not well motivated, but rather that their interest and purpose is independent of their suitability for solving the alleged puzzle.

In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and persist by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ or ‘London’. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take (...) to be the best alternative available for them. (shrink)

Truthmaking without truthmakers (TWT, for short) is the thesis that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. The first substantial part of this paper (section 2) is devoted to developing a particular version of TWT and at the same time defending TWT in general from arguments against it that have been advanced by orthodox truthmaker theorists. In the second part of (...) the paper (section 3) I argue that talk about truthmakers within the theory can be understood as metaphoric and as conveying valuable information about something other than the supposed truthmakers: about truthmaking. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. On the one hand, I intend to present the view on truthmaking, a version of TWT, that I find most plausible in the light of the arguments for and against truthmaker theory. On the other hand, I argue that friends of TWT have good reason to adopt a figuralist approach to truthmaker theory, rather than rejecting it outright. (shrink)

The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore ( 2007 ) and McGrath ( 2007 ) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain support (...) from the puzzles of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I will evaluate their arguments and defend the opposite view: that the paradoxes of coincidence do give some support to perdurantism. However, the way in which they do so is rather unexpected. As we will see, there are different ways in which coincidence scenarios may be thought to support perdurantism, some of which have not yet been sufficiently explored. Thus, my immediate goal is to explore one of those directions, bringing into focus a new argument from coincidence to perdurantism. And although I motivate my discussion by examining the arguments in the work of Gilmore and McGrath, the merits of this argument can be independently assessed. More generally, my overall purpose is to contribute to our general understanding of how the topics of coincidence and persistence bear on each other. (shrink)

In this introductory study I discuss the notion of alternative possibilities and its relation to contemporary debates on free will and moral responsibility. I focus on two issues: whether Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities, and whether alternative possibilities are relevant to grounding free will and moral responsibility. With respect to the first issue, I consider three objections to Frankfurt-syle cases: the flicker strategy, the dilemma defense, and the objection from new dispositionalism. With respect to the second issue, (...) I consider the debate between Alternative Possibilities views and Actual Sequence views, as framed by Carolina Sartorio in her Causation and Free Will. I then explain how these two issues are relevant to the papers included in this volume. (shrink)

A good part of the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility in the last fifty years has revolved around so-called Frankfurt-style cases. One of the most important milestones in this debate is the case described by Mele and Robb (1998), which was intended to avoid some earlier objections directed at Frankfurt’s original argument. However, the success of Mele and Robb’s case has been contested by Pereboom (2001), Widerker (2003), and Moya (2003, 2017), among others. The present paper aims (...) to vindicate Mele and Robb’s (and Frankfurt’s) general argument by describing a variation of their case that overcomes or avoids the objections of those authors. (shrink)

[ES] El término «metaontología» se aplica a la indagación sobre la naturaleza de la ontología. Si bien este tipo de indagación tiene importantes precedentes en la historia de la filosofía moderna, en los últimos quince años ha cobrado renovado interés dentro de la tradición analítica, en parte debido al notorio desarrollo de la ontología misma en las últimas décadas. En este capítulo se presentarán algunos de los principales problemas metaontológicos, y las posiciones más destacadas sobre los mismos. [EN] The term (...) «metaontology» applies to the inquiry on the nature of ontology. Although this type of inquiry has important precedents in the history of modern philosophy, in the last fifteen years it has gained renewed interest in the analytic tradition, partly because of the remarkable development of ontology itself in recent decades. This chapter will present some of the main metaontológicos problems, and the most prominent positions on them. (shrink)

Daniel Isaacson has advanced an epistemic notion of arithmetical truth according to which the latter is the set of truths that we grasp on the basis of our understanding of the structure of natural numbers alone. Isaacson’s thesis is then the claim that Peano Arithmetic (PA) is the theory of finite mathematics, in the sense that it proves all and only arithmetical truths thus understood. In this paper, we raise a challenge for the thesis and show how it can be (...) overcome. We introduce the concept of purity for theories of arithmetic: a theory of arithmetic is pure when it only proves arithmetical truths. Then, we argue that, under Isaacson’s thesis, some PA-provable truths—including transfinite induction claims for infinite ordinals and some consistency statements—are seemingly not arithmetical in Isaacson’s sense, and hence that Isaacson’s thesis might entail the impurity of PA. Nonetheless, we conjecture that the advocate of Isaacson’s thesis can avoid this undesirable consequence: the arithmetical nature, as understood by Isaacson, of all contentious PA-provable statements can be justified. As a case study, we explore how this is done for transfinite induction claims with infinite ordinals below ε0. To this end, we show that the PA-proof of such claims employs exclusively resources from finite mathematics, and that ordinals below ε0 are finitary objects despite being infinite. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the claim that supervaluationist consequence is not classical for a language including an operator for definiteness. Although there is some sense in which this claim is uncontroversial, there is a sense in which the claim must be qualified. In particular I defend Keefe's position according to which supervaluationism is classical except when the inference from phi to Dphi is involved. The paper provides a precise content to this claim showing that we might provide complete (and (...) sound) systems of deduction for supervaluationist consequence in which proofs are completely classical with the exception of a single last step (involving the above mentioned inference). (shrink)

To what degree can language be acquired from linguistic input alone? This question has vexed scholars for millennia and is still a major focus of debate in the cognitive science of language. The complexity of human language has hampered progress because studies of language–especially those involving computational modeling–have only been able to deal with small fragments of our linguistic skills. We suggest that the most recent generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) might finally provide the computational tools to determine empirically (...) how much of the human language ability can be acquired from linguistic experience. LLMs are sophisticated deep learning architectures trained on vast amounts of natural language data, enabling them to perform an impressive range of linguistic tasks. We argue that, despite their clear semantic and pragmatic limitations, LLMs have already demonstrated that human-like grammatical language can be acquired without the need for a built-in grammar. Thus, while there is still much to learn about how humans acquire and use language, LLMs provide full-fledged computational models for cognitive scientists to empirically evaluate just how far statistical learning might take us in explaining the full complexity of human language. (shrink)

A partir de una presentación general del concepto de especie aplicado a los humanos, este texto expone dos nociones generales sobre la naturaleza humana: la tipológica y la filogenética. Una vez expuestos los fundamentos de cada noción, se defiende una distinción entre naturaleza humana e identidad humana como dos aspectos que se han confundido respecto a este problema, pero que cumplen distintos roles en las explicaciones, por lo que se proponen como dos nociones complementarias. Así, la naturaleza humana estaría definida (...) en términos metafísicos y daría cuenta de la realidad biológica de los humanos desde un punto de vista filogenético, mientras que la identidad humana estaría definida en términos epistemológicos y daría cuenta de los conocimientos que tienen los humanos sobre ellos mismos, aludiendo a aspectos contingentes. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 634-645, July 2022.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction On Law and Morality Legal Rights and Legal Principles Law and Legal Systems Deontic Logic and Legal Philosophy Philosophical Doctrines in Latin America Conclusion References.

The relevance of Martin Heidegger’s thinking to Paul Celan’s poetry is well known. Between Celan and Heidegger proposes that, while the relation between them is undeniable, it is also marked by irreducible discord. Pablo Oyarzun begins with a deconstruction of Celan’s Todtnauberg, written after the poet visited Heidegger in his Schwarzwald cabin. The poem stands as a milestone, not only in the complex relationship between the two men but also in the state of poetry and philosophy in late modernity, (...) in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Discussion then turns to The Meridian, Celan’s acceptance speech for the prestigious Büchner Prize for German language literature. Other issues are insistently addressed—place, art, language, pain, existence, and the Heideggerian notion of dialogue—as Oyarzun revisits several essential poems from Celan’s oeuvre. A rare translation of Oyarzun’s work into English, Between Celan and Heidegger affirms the uniqueness of Celan’s poetry in confrontation both with Heidegger’s discourse on Dichtung (a poetic saying centered in the idea of gathering) and with Western philosophical notions of art, technē, mimesis, poiesis, language, and thinking more broadly. (shrink)

What kind of discourse is likely to build up constitutional norms? How do legal-philosophical insights get along with competing political claims? This book presents the main conclusions from the CITC (Congreso Internacional de Teoria Constitucional) in Cordoba, Argentina. While addressing the very foundations of Constitutional Law, leading scholars from Europe and America got together to debate legal and political issues which impinge upon institutional design and polity assessment, political representation and rights protection. Not to mention other vexing challenges such as (...) the proper latitude of judicial review, the threatening phenomena of untamed emergency powers and the current international dimension of supra-national state-building. Beyond governance and human rights discourse, the core content of this book is concentrated on shedding some light on which theoretical and/or political conditions could better stand and give shelter to civil obedience and constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

La lectio divina es un ejercicio ascético y espiritual usado por la comunicad cristiana en las asambleas litúrgicas. Desde los Padres del Desierto su práctica nunca se ha extinguido como ejercicio espiritual. Ahora parece haber vuelto con fuerza como ejercicio de lectura de la Palabra de Dios. La primera parte del artículo recrea los datos históricos fundamentales, la segunda explica su validez para los cristianos y las comunidades de nuestro tiempo.

In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...) which we call tolerant truth and strict truth. We characterize the space of consequence relations definable in terms of those and discuss the kind of solution this gives to the sorites paradox. We discuss some applications of the framework to the pragmatics and psycholinguistics of vague predicates, in particular regarding judgments about borderline cases. (shrink)

Un atlas zoopolítico es lo que pretende tener aquí lugar. Un atlas en el sentido en que cada pequeño tratado de los cincuenta y dos que configuran el libro se presenta en la forma de un retrato donde el pensamiento, entre sus pensadores, se aplica en el esfuerzo de hacerse cargo de la presencia animal sin renunciar a la diferencia humana, y en que, entre todos ellos, se delinea en todas sus valoraciones posibles esta nueva presencia del animal entre nosotros. (...) Retrato con animal. Prefacio. Pablo Perera Velamazán es escritor, además de filósofo e historiador del arte. Esta triple condición –y alguna otra (profesor, traductor)- le han permitido entrar en el círculo de los que escriben siempre de los que no saben y le ha impedido, también formar parte de ninguna empresa concreta, salvo la del precipicio del pensamiento en la singularidad que se resiste a los nombres. Allí suelen estar acompañado de niños y animales, de ángeles como muñecos, pero allí también se pueden encontrar a cualquiera. Buen compañero de viaje de invierno. (shrink)

This is a collective work of philosophy of science on a topic, even though it could already be considered a classic, of great academic actuality in the field: change and incommensurability in science. The contributors are researchers from Spain, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Colombia.

This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.

The incredible success of quantum theory as a mathematical model makes it especially frustrating that we cannot agree on a plausible philosophical or metaphysical description of it. Some philosophers of science have noticed certain parallels between quantum theory and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and these parallels are deepened and strengthened if the “observer” of modern physics is associated with the “intellect” of scholastic ontology. In this case we are talking about a human observer. But this type of observer has (...) a unique quality that is not considered at all by either physics or scholastic philosophy—the human observer is mimetic and therefore “interdividual.” By taking this fundamental anthropological fact into account, it turns out that the critical gaps still separating Aquinas from modern physicists can be effectively closed, reconciling the realism of Aquinas with the empirical evidence of quantum mechanics. This book explores this new bridge between the physical and the human—a bridge essentially designed by scholastic theory, clarified by mimetic theory, and built by quantum theory—and the path it opens to that metaphysical understanding for which philosophers of modern science have been striving. It is an understanding, not merely of the physical but of physics in the fuller sense of what is real and what is true. Here the reader will find a physics that describes the natural world and our place as mimetic observers within it. (shrink)