RésuméLes auteurs présentent le problème de l'omniscience logique qui entrave la formalisation de la connaissance et de la croyance dans la thhrie des mondes possibles. Ils étudient ensuite les solutions qui s'inspirent de la distinction entre croyance implicite et explicite proposée par Levesque, et celles qui se fondent sur la logique de la conscience de Fagin et Halpern. Pour remédier aux insuffisances de ces solutions, ils proposent de concevoir la croyance explicite à partir d'une fonction d'analyse logique qui filtre les (...) propositions selon leur profondeur, ce qui permet de justifier logiquement et structurellement la limitation du pouvoir déductif des agents. (shrink)

The dynamic nature ofGame-Theoretical Semantics is emphasized. The role of strategic meaning in accounting for linguistic competence is examined. The semantics of epistemic possibility is shown to involve a dynamic ingredient. Update semantics has been designed to capture it. The paper focuses on the interplay betweenlogical and linguistic competences indiscourse understanding.

The dynamic nature ofGame-Theoretical Semantics is emphasized. The role of strategic meaning in accounting for linguistic competence is examined. The semantics of epistemic possibility is shown to involve a dynamic ingredient. Update semantics has been designed to capture it. The paper focuses on the interplay betweenlogical and linguistic competences indiscourse understanding.

W. van Orman Quine is one of the leading philosophers in America today. His thinking, however, has received little attention from philosophers in continental Europe. This book is a systematic and critical account of Quine's philosophy which aims at isolating what is of lasting value in his work. Each of his major theses is submitted to a thorough examination both from within and from without his general standpoint. Quine's positions have changed a great deal over the years in response to (...) external criticism and to internal stresses and strains. These changes are described and assessed. Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is considered in the light of non-monotonic logic. The multi-farious versions of his holism are brought together and evaluated. Dummett's objection to the effect that holism is inconsistent with empiricism is refuted. lt is argued, however, that the controversial thesis of the indeterminacy of translation becomes implausible as soon as learnability constraints are brought to bear on the matter. Quine's new definition of logical truth in terms of grammatical structure is vindicated. It is shown how the apparent conflict between his earlier and his later views on ontology can be superseded. Can Quine hold a relativist view of ontology and at the same time maintain a non-relativist theory of truth? Can he hold that truth is internal to theories and claim that scientific theories are underdetermined by observational data without lending support to relativism? An affirmative answer to the first question is defended. It is argued, however, that Quine could not meet the second challenge. Quine's penetrating criticism of modal logic has prompted several research programs. Paul Gochet exhibits the interrelations between these programs and argues that Quine's objections against modal logic can be met without any commitment to doctrines such as essentialism. Of interest to: Philosophers, logicians, linguists. (shrink)

1. IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT In 1900, in A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leihniz, Russell made the following assertion: "That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof". 1 Forty years later, the interest aroused by this notion had not decreased. C. J. Ducasse wrote in the Journal of Philosophy: "There is perhaps no question more basic for the theory of knowledge than that of the nature (...) of 2 propositions and their relations to judgments, sentences, facts and inferences". Today, the great number of publications on the subject is proof that it is still of interest. One of the problems raised by propositions, the problem of deter mining whether propositions, statements or sentences are the primary bearers of truth and falsity, is even in the eyes of Bar-Hillel, "one of the major items that the future philosophy oflanguage will have to discuss". 3 gave a correct summary of the situation when he wrote in his Ph. Devaux Russell : Since Peano and Schroder who, in fact, adhered more faithfully to Boole's logic of classes, the logical and epistemological status of the proposition together with its analysis have not ceased to be the object of productive philosophical controversies. And especially so since the establishment of contemporary symbolic logic, the foundations 4 of which have been laid out by Russell and Whitehead. * 2. (shrink)

In this paper I shall examine the interrelationships holding between four of the main theses of Quine's philosophy. (1)Ho1ism (2)Underdetennination of scientific theories (3) Indeterminacy of translation (4) Ontological Relativity -/- These four doctrines have generated a lasting controversy: in one interpretation they seem to be false and in the other they are threatened to collapse into triviality. Moreover it has been claimed that they cannot be consistently upheld together. I shall argue, on the contrary, that they are true, original (...) and mutually consistent. (shrink)

In this paper, Chateaubriand’s account of the productivity of language is put to an historical perspective. Its philosophical significance is assessed. It is shown how it could be expanded to accommodate recent findings of professional linguists.O presente artigo analisa o tratamento da produtividade da linguagem oferecido por Chateaubriand de uma perspectiva histórica. Seu significado filosófico é avaliado. Também se mostra que este tratamento poderia ser expandido de forma a incluir descobertas recentes de lingüistas profissionais.

I will pick out five philosophical theses which are central in Quine’s philosophy, investigate their relationships, discuss problems raised about their compatibility and show how they should be interpreted.

Lauener's philosophical approach is well-articulated and has many features that are fully justified: epistemology appears at the level of metascience, as a normative discipline; Lauener's transcendentalism is open, the norms being able to evolve over time; in his analytic a priori-synthetic a posteriori dichotomy, analyticity is relative to the context and results from conventions, and the dichotomy is compatible with Quine's universal revisibility; Lauener has shown that a theory and the metatheory it is based on cannot be revised at the (...) same time, a strong argument for ontological relativity but against general holism, he conceives of tmth as applicable only within a theory, relative to an ontology and dependent on references, etc. Other aspects, however, appear more problematic: the idea that mathematical entities are the product of our thinking, which makes them more similar to fictional than to physical objects (the main objection to this is that mathematics plays a constitutive role in physical concepts), or the tendency to speak of "existence relative to modem physics" (as if real existence were a type of existence, on a par with existence in fiction). (shrink)

Lauener's philosophical approach is well-articulated and has many features that are fully justified: epistemology appears at the level of metascience, as a normative discipline; Lauener's transcendentalism is open, the norms being able to evolve over time; in his analytic a priori-synthetic a posteriori dichotomy, analyticity is relative to the context and results from conventions, and the dichotomy is compatible with Quine's universal revisibility; Lauener has shown that a theory and the metatheory it is based on cannot be revised at the (...) same time, a strong argument for ontological relativity but against general holism, he conceives of tmth as applicable only within a theory, relative to an ontology and dependent on references, etc. Other aspects, however, appear more problematic: the idea that mathematical entities are the product of our thinking, which makes them more similar to fictional than to physical objects (the main objection to this is that mathematics plays a constitutive role in physical concepts), or the tendency to speak of "existence relative to modem physics" (as if real existence were a type of existence, on a par with existence in fiction). (shrink)

1. Introduction Dans l?encyclopédie Wikipedia accessible sur Internet, les thèses de Bren­tano sont résumées dans les trois phrases suivantes : L?intentionnalité est une caractéristique de la conscience. L?intentionnalité peut être caractérisée par quelques formules : « contenir quelque chose (pas forcément réel) à titre d?objet », « être à propos de quelque chose », « avoir un objet immanent ». Selon Franz Brentano, l?intentionnalité est le critère permettant de distinguer les « faits » psychiques des « faits » physiques : (...) tout fait psychique est intentionnel, c?est-à-dire qu?il contient quelque chose à titre d?objet bien que ce soit toujours d?une manière différente (croyance, jugement, perception, conscience, désir, haine, etc.). Comme le souligne Denis Seron, l?intentionnalité pour Brentano est une rela­tion, mais ce n?est pas une relation comme les autres dans la mesure où elle n?exige pas l?existence de tous ses termes [Seron 2010]. C?est pour capter cette particularité que Brentano emprunte à saint Thomas le concept d? in­existence intentionnelle [McCormick 1981]. P ar exemple, on peut penser à un objet non réel comme la planète inexistante Vulcain dont certains astro­nomes du xix e siècle avaient postulé l?existence pour expliquer les pertur­bations de l?orbite de Mercure. Il est clair qu?une relation intentionnelle comme « penser à » aura une logique à part. (shrink)