I try to reconstruct how Frege thought to reconcile the cognitive value of arithmetic with its analytical nature. There is evidence in Frege's texts that the epistemological formulation of the context principle plays a decisive role; it provides a way of obtaining concepts which are truly fruitful and whose contents cannot be grasped beforehand. Taking the definitions presented in the Begriffsschrift,I shall illustrate how this schema is intended to work.

We offer a novel picture of mathematical language from the perspective of speech act theory. There are distinct speech acts within mathematics, and, as we intend to show, distinct illocutionary force indicators as well. Even mathematics in its most formalized version cannot do without some such indicators. This goes against a certain orthodoxy both in contemporary philosophy of mathematics and in speech act theory. As we will comment, the recognition of distinct illocutionary acts within logic and mathematics and the incorporation (...) of illocutionary force indicators in the formal language for both goes back to Frege’s conception of these topics. We are, therefore, going back to a Fregean perspective. This paper is part of a larger project of applying contemporary speech act theory to the scientific language of mathematics in order to uncover the varieties and regular combinations of illocutionary acts present in it. For reasons of space, we here concentrate only on assertive and declarative acts within mathematics, leaving the investigation of other kinds of acts for a future occasion. (shrink)

This monograph offers a comprehensive study of contingent a priori truths. Building onto a theoretical framework developed by the philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, the author also presents a new approach to these truths. The first part of the book details the many theories on contingent a priori truths. The coverage examines the cases of Kripke and David Kaplan, Donnellan and the de re requirement, Evans and weak contingency, as well as Plantinga, Salmon, Soames, and the pseudo a priori. Overall, (...) it provides a systematic discussion and critical review of all these many positions. Next, the author develops an alternative approach. His working hypothesis is that performative verbs must play a central role in Kripke's examples, even if they do not show up at the surface structure of the corresponding sentences. This opens up an entirely new way of looking at Kripke's cases and of treating them by exploring some aspects of the theory of illocutionary acts. His discussion also examines brute facts and institutional facts, indexicals and performatives, as well as Frege's theory of definitions. Providing an authoritative exploration into contingent a priori truths, this book will be of interest to students, academics, and researchers in philosophy and logic. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...) arithmetic. This would be inconsistent with his views on logical objects. Finally, I shall argue that there is a connection between Frege's view on this topic and the famous thesis first formulated in ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstand’ that ‘the concept horse is not a concept’. As far as I know, no due attention has been given to this connection in the scholarly literature so far. (shrink)

In this paper we argue, against a somewhat standard view, that pragmatic phenomena occur in mathematical language. We provide concrete examples supporting this thesis.

My primary goal in this paper is to defend the plausibility of Kripke’s thesis that there are contingent a priori truths, and to fill out some gaps in Kripke’s own account of these truths. But the strategy here adopted is, to the best of my knowledge, still unexplored and different from the one adopted both by Kripke himself and by his critics. I first argue that Kripke’s examples of such truths can only be legitimate if seen as introduced by performative (...) utterances sense). And, if this is so, we can apply the machinery of illocutionary act theory to these utterances to explain how one can have a priori knowledge of some contingent facts generated by the utterances themselves. I shall argue that the overall strategy can fill out two gaps in Kripke’s original account: first, we can explain the nature of the truth-makers of contingent a priori truths sense, broadly conceived) and, second, we can explain how contingent a priori knowledge can be transmitted from one speaker to another. (shrink)

Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue (...) that the assumption that `the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim. (shrink)

n this paper I discuss Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra�s notes on the proper language for publishing texts in analytic philosophy. I am basically in agreement with him on the practical side, i.e., publishing in English increases the chances of philosophical exchange with other communities. I disagree, however, if one wants to read a stronger �should� in his advice, for there is nothing in the essence of analytic philosophy that ties it to the English language. Finally, I end with a caveat that his (...) advice should not be misunderstood and degenerate into an exhortation of what I call �linguistic laziness�. (shrink)

Ruffino-Marco_Deferred-utterances-and-proper-contexts.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Frege’s view on vagueness, and to draw some relevant consequences of it. By examining what exactly Frege has in mind each time he complains about vagueness and advocates the sharpness requirement, I argue that he shows preoccupation with different kinds of vagueness in different periods of his thought. I also discuss the scope of the sharpness requirement, and argue that it is intended as applying primarily to mathematics and logic. Finally, I try (...) and argue that some of Frege’s remarks on incomplete functions suggest a view that is close in spirit to the contemporary supervaluationist approach to vagueness. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein claims that a sentence expresses the same proposition in every possible world and, hence, which proposition is expressed cannot depend on how each world is. In this paper, I shall explore the interpretation of this thesis under the perspective of Stalnaker’s theory of assertions as the reduction of the context set, i.e., the set of possible worlds compatible with the information gathered at a conversation. In Stalnaker’s version, this principle follows from the explication of assertions as (...) having the illocutionary point of excluding some possible worlds from the context set. If there is no unique instruction to exclude some worlds, then it is not clear which reduction is meant by the speaker. This might lead to a better understanding of Wittgenstein’s own version. (shrink)

There are some salient explanatory models for the semantic phenomenon known as quantifier domain restriction. Each of these models sees the context of utterance as playing a different role. A particularly clear and helpful way of organizing the issue is offered by Stanley and Szabó , who distinguish three kinds of approaches, and argue for one of them in particular . In this paper, I argue that neither Stanley and Szabó’s arguments against the rival approaches nor their arguments for the (...) semantic approach are conclusive.Há alguns modelos explanatórios proeminentes sobre o fenômeno semântico conhecido como restrição de domínios quantificacionais. Cada um destes modelos considera o contexto de proferimento como desempenhando um papel diferente. Uma forma particularmente clara e útil de organizar a discussão é proposta por Stanley e Szabó , que distinguem três tipos de tratamentos, e argumentam em favor de um deles . Neste artigo, eu procuro mostrar que nem os argumentos de Stanley e Szabó contra os tratamentos rivais nem o seu argumento em favor do tratamento semântico são conclusivos. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chateaubriand’s criticism of the so-called slingshot arguments, particularly of those versions proposed by Church and by Gödel . I concentrate on two critical points made by Chateaubriand, and argue that they are not decisive against these versions of the slingshot. I also discuss Chateaubriand’s hybrid theory of definite descriptions and argue that, despite its intrinsic interest, it cannot avoid the conclusion of the slingshot.

In this paper I discuss Chateaubriand’s notion of senses. His notions retains the spirit of the original Fregean notion, but differ from it in some fundamental ways. I compare both notions, especially concerning the issue of indirect reference, and also concerning their explanatory power in epistemic matters. Finally, I raise some worries concerning the semantic role played by Chateaubriand’s senses, as well as the notion of judgment that his notion of thoughts seems to imply.Neste artigo, discuto a noção de sentido (...) de Chateaubriand. Sua noção retém o espírito da noção Fregeana original, mas difere da mesma em alguns aspectos fundamentais. Eu comparo ambas as noções, especialmente no que diz respeito à questão da referência indireta, e também no que concerne ao seu poder explicativo em questões epistêmicas. Por fim, levanto algumas preocupações sobre o papel semântico desempenhado pelos sentidos de Chateaubriand, bem como a forma dos juízos que a sua noção de pensamento implica. (shrink)

Donnellan argues for a radical limitation of Kripke’s thesis concerning the possibility of contingent truths knowable a priori as a result of descriptive reference fixing for names. According to the former, in the absence of some form of acquaintance between the speaker and the object of knowledge, there can be no de re singular knowledge envisaged by Kripke. And in the presence of acquaintance, there can be no a priori knowledge. On the other hand, Jeshion argues that Donnellan’s main argument (...) is fundamentally flawed. She explores a loophole intentionally left open by Donnellan to say that he has not ruled out an alternative explanation for the problem that motivates the revision of Kripke’s thesis. In this paper, I access Jeshion’s argument against Donnellan. As I intend to show, she does not fully appreciate a second loophole in Donnellan’s account that offers a more appropriate way of seeing Kripke’s examples. (shrink)

In this article the author discusses what seems to be a puzzle for Frege’s notion of singular senses, in particular senses of definite descriptions. These senses are supposed to be complete, but they are composed of the incomplete senses of conceptual terms. The author asks how the definite article transforms an unsaturated sense into a saturated one and reviews some attempted explanations in the literature. He argues that none of them is compatible with Frege’s views in semantics. Next, he discusses (...) an alternative that Frege himself endorses and argues that it is also incompatible with his semantics. The author concludes that Frege has no coherent view on the senses of definite descriptions. If we assume that every name expresses a descriptive sense, then we must conclude that Frege has no coherent explanation for singular senses in general. (shrink)

In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really (...) be regarded as an advantage of Frege's theory. (shrink)

Logic and philosophy of logic have increasingly become areas of research and great interest in Latin America and Spain, where significant work has been done and continues to be done in both of these fields. The goal of this volume is to draw attention to this work through a collection of original and unpublished papers by specialists from Latin America and Spain. Some of the papers are of importance for set-theory and model theory. They cover topics such as the foundations (...) of paraconsistency, the use of paraconsistent logic as a basis for set-theory, and the methodological aspects in both the justification of new axioms in set theory and the formalization of pre-theoretic notions. Other papers are related to epistemic logic. They deal with the issues of abduction and the choice of the simplest hypothesis, the definition of group probability, and the nature of explanation and understanding in such logic. There are also papers on logical paradoxes, the semantics of names (including fictional names), and the nature of relations. (shrink)

In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.

The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.

In this review I briefly explain the most important points of each chapter of Dummett's book, and critically discuss some of them. Special attention is given to the criticisms of Crispin Wright's interpretation of Frege's Platonism, and also to Dummett's interpretation of the role(s) of the context principle in Frege's thought.

Logic and philosophy of logic have increasingly become areas of research and great interest in Latin America and Spain, where significant work has been done and continues to be done in both of these fields. The goal of this volume is to draw attention to this work through a collection of original and unpublished papers by specialists from Latin America and Spain. Some of the papers are of importance for set-theory and model theory. They cover topics such as the foundations (...) of paraconsistency, the use of paraconsistent logic as a basis for set-theory, and the methodological aspects in both the justification of new axioms in set theory and the formalization of pre-theoretic notions. Other papers are related to epistemic logic. They deal with the issues of abduction and the choice of the simplest hypothesis, the definition of group probability, and the nature of explanation and understanding in such logic. There are also papers on logical paradoxes, the semantics of names, and the nature of relations. Max A. Freund is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the University of Costa Rica and the National University of Costa Rica. He is co-author of the book Modal Logic its syntax and semantics, as well as the author of Judicial Logic, and of a forthcoming book The Logic of Sortals. Max Fernandez de Castro is Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico. He is the author of the book Quine y la Ontologíaa and co-author of the books Lógica Matemática I: lógica proposicional, intuicionista y modal, Lógica Matemática II: clásica, intuicionista y modal, Teoría de Conjuntos, Lógica y Temas Afines I. Marco Ruffino is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Campinas and the editor of Manuscrito, the Brazilian international journal for Analytic Philosophy. He has many publications, in important philosophical journals, in the philosophy of language, of logic, and of mathematics; in the history of analytic philosophy, and on Frege and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Marco Ruffino compares the notion of sense developed in my book with Frege’s notion of sense, and argues that whereas there are ontological similarities, my notion faces epistemological and semantic problems. In my response I discuss the various issues he raises, arguing that my notion of sense can confront them at least as well as Frege’s notion.Marco Ruffino compara a noção de sentido desenvolvida em meu livro com a noção de sentido de Frege, argumentando que mesmo (...) havendo semelhanças ontológicas, minha noção está sujeita a problemas epistemológicos e semânticos. Em minha réplica considero os problemas levantados por Marco, argumentando que minha noção de sentido pode confrontá-los pelo menos tão adequadamente quanto a noção de Frege. (shrink)

According to the standard characterization of logic in Frege’s writings, the word “true” indicates the essence of logic, as the word “good” indicates the essence of ethics and the word “beautiful” the essence of aesthetics. In a posthumous writing from 1915, however, Frege says that it is the assertoric force, and not the word “true”, which indicates the essence of logic properly. Prima facie, this correction is in conflict with Frege’s criticism of the psychologist conception of logic. For according to (...) this criticism, logic is not the science of the laws of “being taken as true”, but the science of the laws of “being true”, while the assertoric force expresses being taken as true. In previous writings, I tried to resolve this conflict by a reconstruction of Frege’s conception of truth that is based on his thesis that truth is expressed in natural language by the “form of the assertoric sentence”. The goal of this paper is to defend this interpretation against the objections recently made by Marco Ruffino. (shrink)

In §§1-2 I argue that Marco misidentifies my main objections to the Church and Gödel slingshot arguments and that his defense of these arguments does not overcome those objections. In §3 I discuss his criticisms of my theory of descriptions in relation to Church’s argument.

What is mathematics about? And if it is about some sort of mathematical reality, how can we have access to it? This is the problem raised by Plato, which still today is the subject of lively philosophical disputes. This book traces the history of the problem, from its origins to its contemporary treatment. It discusses the answers given by Aristotle, Proclus and Kant, through Frege's and Russell's versions of logicism, Hilbert's formalism, Gödel's platonism, up to the the current debate on (...) Benacerraf's dilemma and the indispensability argument. Through the considerations of themes in the philosophy of language, ontology, and the philosophy of science, the book aims at offering an historically-informed introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, approached through the lenses of its most fundamental problem. (shrink)

The classification of medical interventions as either invasive or non-invasive is commonly regarded to be morally important. On the most commonly endorsed account of invasiveness, a medical intervention is invasive if and only if it involves either breaking the skin (‘incision’) or inserting an object into the body (‘insertion’). Building on recent discussions of the concept of invasiveness, we show that this standard account fails to capture three aspects of existing usage of the concept of invasiveness in relation to medical (...) interventions—namely, (1) usage implying that invasiveness comes in degrees, (2) that the invasiveness of an intervention can depend on the characteristics of the salient alternative interventions, and (3) that medical interventions can be invasive in non-physical ways. We then offer the beginnings of a revised account that, we argue, is able to capture a wider range of existing usage. Central to our account is a distinction between two properties: basic invasiveness and threshold invasiveness. We end by assessing what the standard account gets right, and what more needs to be done to complete our schematic account. (shrink)

I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark’s hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with a commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that mind-extending resources must be phenomenally transparent when used. I then propose a solution to this problem claiming that the phenomenal transparency condition should be rejected. To do so, I put forth a parity argument to the effect that phenomenal transparency cannot be a (...) necessary condition on cognitive extension: roughly, since internal cognitive resources can fail to be transparent when used, by parity, external resources can fail to be phenomenally transparent too. Further, I argue that phenomenal transparency is not even a reliable indicator of cognitive extension; hence its absence should not be considered a problem for Clark’s extended mind-predictive processing hybrid. Lastly, I consider and allay a number of worries my proposal might raise, and conclude the paper. (shrink)

In the last decades it has become clear that medicine must find some way to combine its scientific and humanistic sides. In other words, an adequate notion of medicine requires an integrative position that mediates between the analytic-reductionist and the normative-holistic tendencies we find therein. This is especially important as these different styles of reasoning separate “illness” (something perceived and managed by the whole individual in concert with their environment) and “disease” (a “mechanical failure” of a biological element within the (...) body). While the demand for an integrative view has typically been motivated by ethical concerns, we claim that it is also motivated, perhaps even more fundamentally, by epistemological and methodological reasons. Evidence-based bio-medicine employs experimental and statistical techniques which eliminate important differences in the ways that conscious humans evaluate, live with, and react to disease and illness. However, it is precisely these experiences that underpin the concepts and norms of bio-medicine. Humanistic disciplines, on the other hand, have the resources to investigate these experiences in an intersubjectively testable way. Medicine, therefore, cannot afford to ignore its nature as a human science; it must be concerned not only with disease and illness, but also with the ways in which patients as persons respond to malady. Insofar as attitudes and expectations influence the criteria of illness and disease, they must be studied as part of the genuine subject matter of medicine as a human science. In general, we urge that this is a necessary step to overcome today's trend to split evidence-based and clinical medicine. (shrink)

The paper presents and discusses the Hubble tension with respect to recent results in cosmology. I shall argue that the measurements from the James Webb Space Telescope and TRGB stars calibrations allow us to infer that the estimates of H0 with late universe methods are robust. Building on from robustness analysis, I conclude that the resolution of the tension cannot be expected to come from new systematics, but rather from new physics.

We prove that the opposite of the category of coalgebras for the Vietoris endofunctor on the category of compact Hausdorff spaces is monadic over $\mathsf {Set}$. We deliver an analogous result for the upper, lower, and convex Vietoris endofunctors acting on the category of stably compact spaces. We provide axiomatizations of the associated (infinitary) varieties. This can be seen as a version of Jónsson–Tarski duality for modal algebras beyond the zero-dimensional setting.

We investigated motor resonance in children using a priming paradigm. Participants were asked to judge the weight of an object shortly primed by a hand in an action-related posture or a non action-related one . The hand prime could belong to a child or to an adult. We found faster response times when the object was preceded by a grasp hand posture . More crucially, participants were faster when the prime was a child’s hand, suggesting that it could belong to (...) their body schema, particularly when the child’s hand was followed by a light object . A control experiment helped us to clarify the role of the hand prime. To our knowledge this is the first behavioral evidence of motor simulation and motor resonance in children. Implications of the results for the development of the sense of body ownership and for conceptual development are discussed. (shrink)

Munch-Jurisic’s book thoroughly describes several cases of severe distresses reported and expressed by perpetrators of tremendous acts such as mass murders. Arguing against a simplistic reading according to which these signs of distress are straightforward manifestations of some innate moral nature, and against the optimistic reading according to which they will lead to prosocial behaviors, Munch-Jursic offers compelling reasons to adopt a more complex theory of emotion. In this commentary, I aim to stress the implications of her book for the (...) debate on moral enhancement and for emotion theory in general. However, while I concur with Munch-Jurisic that emotion theory must make room for complexity and indeterminacy, I challenge her claim that motivational theories of emotion are ill-equipped to face the challenges she poses. (shrink)