O artigo de Goodman “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” teve um papel central no debate relativo a análise adequada dos condicionais contrafactuais. A seguir examinarei o artigo de Goodman em detalhe e discutirei algumas objeções e sugestões de Parry em seu artigo “A Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. Restringirei minha discussão ao “problema das condições relevantes”, assim denominado por Goodman, que é o tema principal das críticas de Parry e que considero ser o problema principal para a abordagem (...) de Goodman. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p383. (shrink)

The standard view of logical form is that logical forms are synthetic structures which are the forms of sentences and of other linguistic entities. This is often associated with a more general linguistic view of logic which is articulated in different ways by various authors. This paper contains a critical discussion of such linguistic approaches to logical form, with special emphasis on Quine’s formulation of a logical grammar in Philosophy of Logic. An account of logical forms as higher-order properties, which (...) essentially builds on Frege’s analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, is suggested at the end. (shrink)

Ontology played a very large role in Quine’s philosophy and was one of his major preoccupations from the early 30’s to the end of his life. His work on ontology provided a basic framework for most of the discussions of ontology in analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. There are three main themes (and several sub-themes) that Quine developed in his work. The first is ontological commitment: What are the existential commitments of a theory? The second (...) is ontological reduction: How can an ontology be reduced to (or substituted by) another? And what is the most economical ontology that can be obtained for certain given purposes? The third is criteria of identity: When are entities of some kind (sets, properties, material objects, propositions, meanings, etc.) the same or different? In this paper I discuss Quine’s development of these three themes and some of the problems that were aised in connection with his work. (shrink)

Classical logic is often characterized through certain laws such as bi-valence and sharpness of concepts, among others. My view is that its most fundamental feature is a commitment to an objective conception of truth, which goes together with a realistic metaphysical view. Truth is objective in that it derives from the nature of reality, and is not dependent on beliefs, theories, practices, and the like. Classical logic is a theory of logical properties, logical truths, and logical states of affairs.

Goodman’s paper “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals” played a central role in the debate concerning the proper analysis of counterfactual conditionals. In what follows I examine Goodman’s paper in detail and discuss objections and suggestions by Parry in his “Reexamination of the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”. I restrict my discussion to what Goodman termed “the problem of relevant conditions”, which is the main subject of Parry’s criticism, and which I also consider to be the central issue for Goodman’s approach.

In this paper I examine arguments by Benacerraf and by Chihara against Gödel’s platonistic philosophy of mathematics.

In this paper I present an abstract theory of senses, thoughts, and truth, inspired by ideas of Frege. "Inspired" because for the most part I shall not pretend to interpret Frege in a literal sense, but, rather, develop some of his ideas in ways that seem to me to preserve important aspects of them. Senses are characterized as identifying properties; i.e., roughly, as properties that apply, in virtue of their logical structure, to exactly one thing, if they apply to anything (...) at all. When Frege's analysis of sentences in terms of function and arguments is combined with his analysis of quantification as higher-order predication, all sentences (formal and informal) can be analyzed in various ways as a function (predicate) applied to one or more arguments. This allows for an abstract characterization of thoughts as senses that combine other senses in a uniform way, and whose truth derives from their instantiation by corresponding items of reality. (shrink)

In this critical study I try to highlight some of the most important issues discussed in Chateaubriand’s excellent book. In particular, I discuss in some detail Chateaubriand’s criticism of one of the icons of analytic philosophy, namely, Quine, as well as some of his own valuable contributions to philosophy in this book – for example, his refutation of the various forms of the slingshot argument and his characterization of logical truth.

ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...) and its relevance to some of Oswaldo Chateaubriand's work are discussed in my 2004 paper "The Principle of Wholistic Reference" in Essays on Chateaubriand's "Logical Forms". In Chateaubriand's réplica (reply), which is printed with my paper, he raised several important additional issues including the three I focus on in this tréplica (reply to his reply): truth-values, universes of discourse, and formal ontology. This paper is self-contained: it is not necessary to have read the above-mentioned works. The principle of wholistic reference (PWR) was first put forth by George Boole in 1847 when he espoused a monistic fixed-universe viewpoint similar to the one Frege and Russell espoused throughout their careers. Later, Boole elaborated PWR in 1854 from the pluralistic multiple-universes perspective. (shrink)

En este trabajo se examinan las concepciones de Oswaldo Chateaubriand acerca de la naturaleza del lenguaje, así como las relaciones de éste con la lógica y la ontología. En primer lugar, se aborda la tematización del lenguaje como actividad humana. A continuación, se analiza la elucidación que propone Chateaubriand acerca del significado en términos de uso o condiciones sociales de identidad. En tercer lugar, se indaga la fundamentación del lenguaje y del significado en propiedades ontológicas. Finalmente, se (...) plantean observaciones acerca de algunas tesis de Chateaubriand, tales como la distinción entre significado y sentido o el carácter innato de algunos conceptos.In this paper we examine Chateaubriand’s views on language and on its general relation to logic and ontology. We first discuss his account of language as a human activity. Secondly, we analyze Chateaubriand’s explanation of meaning as use or as social identity conditions. Thirdly, we spell out the ontological foundation of language and meaning on ontological properties. Finally, we make observations on some aspects of Chateaubriand’s tenets such as the distinction between meaning and sense and the innateness of some concepts. (shrink)

I present the realist conception of logic supported by Oswaldo Chateaubriand which integrates ontological and epistemological aspects, opposing it to mathematical and linguistic conceptions. I give special attention to the peculiarities of his hierarchy of types in which some properties accumulate and others have a multiple degree. I explain such deviations of the traditional conception, showing the underlying purpose in each of these peculiarities. I compare the ideas of Chateaubriand to the similar ideas of Frege, Tarski and (...) Gödel. I suggest a view of the logical properties in terms of the Aristotelian notion of focal meaning and I give a formal expression to the type of the entities in the hierarchy proposed by Chateaubriand. (shrink)

In this paper on Oswaldo Chateaubriand’s book Logical Forms I, I am mostly concerned with the critical task of indicating some shortcomings and stressing my disagreements with the distinguished scholar. The most important shortcoming of the book is Chateaubriand’s unfamiliarity with Husserl’s views on logic and semantics, some of which anticipate views propounded by the former – e.g., the distinction between logical law and logical necessity-, whereas others are more subtle than Chateaubriand’s views – e.g., Husserl’s (...) views on the referent of statements. One of the most important contributions of Chateaubriand’s book is his analysis and rejection of all forms of the so-called “slingshot argument”. On the other hand, I disagree with Chateaubriand’s rendering of some of Frege’s views, though some of these are very common among Fregean scholars. Finally, I assess Chateaubriand’s criticism of Kripke’s views as well as those of Tarski. I tend to agree with his criticism of Kripke, but disagree with his assessment of Tarskian semantics. (shrink)

In this short paper I am concerned with basically two especially important issues in Oswaldo Chateaubriand’s Logical Forms II; namely, the dispute between first- and higher-order logic and his conception of logical truth and related notions, like logical property, logical state of affairs and logical falsehood. The first issue was also present in the first volume of the book, but the last is privative of the second volume. The extraordinary significance of both issues for philosophy is emphasized and, (...) though there is a basic agreement with Chateaubriand’s views, some critical remarks are interspersed.Neste pequeno artigo considero basicamente duas questões particularmente importantes em Logical Forms II de Oswaldo Chateaubriand; a saber, a disputa entre a lógica de primeira e de segunda ordem e sua concepção de verdade lógica e noções relacionadas, como as de propriedade lógica, estado de coisas lógico e falsidade lógica. A primeira questão também estava presente no primeiro volume do livro, mas a última apenas aparece no segundo volume. Enfatizo o significado extraordinário de ambas as questões para a filosofia e, embora haja uma concordância básica com as visões de Chateaubriand, algumas observações críticas são inseridas. (shrink)

This study described and analysed the circumstances surrounding a fatal car accident involving personnel of a multinational corporation in a developing country. For some companies, road accidents are the leading cause of work-related fatalities in developing countries. This reality highlights the ethical dilemmas encountered in a global workplace. Questions as to how a company addresses safety concerns outside the standard work environment, the ethics of operating in a risky environment and the requirements for international consistency in compensation standards for loss (...) of life were addressed. The authors argued that multinational companies should localize health and safety practices to address the important asymmetries between different regions of the world regarding social, cultural and infrastructural issues. Furthermore, the authors analysed the leadership role that should be played by multinational companies to help and support national governments to reduce traffic fatalities in developing countries. From this perspective, the article represents a contribution for the body of knowledge dealing with the business–society relations. The authors used an action research approach to address these issues, both in response to the particular incident and to contribute to the body of research in this field. (shrink)

O artigo defende uma proposta filosófica neopirrônica, que se entende como inteiramente adequada às necessidades filosóficas do homem contemporâneo. O texto é diretamente inspirado na obra de Sexto Empírico e procura investigar as ricas potencialidades da noção pirroniana de fenômeno, uma vez restabelecido o seu sentido originário na obra de Sexto.

The applied discipline of agroecological design provides a useful case study for examining broader philosophical questions about the existence and importance of ecological generalizations or “laws.” Recent developments in the availability and use of formal meta-analyses have led to the discovery of many resilient generalizations in ecology (Linquist et al. 2016). However, these “laws” face numerous challenges when it comes to their practical application. Concerns about their reliability and scope might stem from unclear logical and epistemic connections to more foundational (...) or “unifying” generalizations (Lean in Philos Top 47(1), 2019) which, in ecology, tend to be derived from first principles and in association with highly abstract models. This raises questions about the nature of those foundational generalizations themselves. In particular, how resilient are they compared to the generalizations uncovered by empirically driven methods? Here we propose a procedure for evaluating the resilience of generalizations across five ecologically relevant dimensions. This procedure was applied to seven well known foundational generalizations in ecology. Surprisingly, it turned out to be impossible to estimate the resilience of these foundational generalizations based on the available literature. This points to the need for a more centralized repository of information about ecological generalizations, created with the explicit aim of evaluating such important dimensions as causal mechanism and predictive power. (shrink)