These essays--and an introduction by William Connolly that lucidly outlines Wolin's thought and the deep uncertainty about political theory in the 1960s that did much to inspire his work--offer unprecedented insights into Wolin's lament ...

The English philosopher Michael Oakeshott is known as a conservative who rejected philosophically ambitious rationalism and the grand political ideologies of the twentieth century on the grounds that no human ideas have ultimately reliable foundations. Instead, he embraced tradition and habit as the guides to moral and political life. In this book, Aryeh Botwinick presents an original account of Oakeshott's skepticism about foundations, an account that newly reveals the unity of his thought. Botwinick argues that, despite Oakeshott's (...) pragmatic conservatism, his rejection of all-embracing intellectual projects made him a friend to liberal individualism and an ally of what would become postmodern antifoundationalism. Oakeshott's skepticism even extended paradoxically to skepticism about skepticism itself and is better described as a "generalized agnosticism." Properly conceived and translated, this agnosticism ultimately evolves into mysticism, which becomes a bridge linking philosophy and religion. Botwinick explains and develops this strategy of interpretation and then shows how it illuminates and unifies the diverse strands of Oakeshott's thought in the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, epistemology, political theory, philosophy of personal identity, philosophy of law, and philosophy of history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism ARYEH BOTWINICK IN MANY HISTORIES OF WESTERN THOUGHTI--as well as in those devoted more specifically to the history of Western political thought2--the designation of Hume as a utilitarian in his ethical and political theory is taken for granted. The word "utility" occurs frequently in both the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and this has led most commentators to (...) posit a natural continuity between Hume's invocation of the term and later philosophical elaboration of it. However, more is involved here than simply a repetition of a key word or phrase. The doctrine of sympathy that plays a crucial role in nineteenth-century utilitarian thought 3 also appears to be central to Hume's ethical and political thought. Moreover, Hume's views on such a fundamental question as political obligation would appear to have been adopted directly by the utilitarians. Bentham, for example, when dealing with the question of the ground of political obligation, cites Hume directly in order to reaffirm his position," which seems to suggest that degree of shared assumptions and insight among thinkers that goes to constitute a particular tradition. Yet, it is my contention s that the historical categorization described in the previous paragraph 6is too facile in that it overlooks important discontinuities separating Hume from utilitarian thought. Although many interpreters have claimed that Hume was not a utilitarian simply because he was a noncognitivist, the theories of morals and politics often attributed to him are extensionally equivalent with I am grateful to Professor Thomas Scanlon of the Department of Philosophy at Princeton for his comments on earlier drafts of this paper. ' See, for instance, J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1960), p. 475. 2 See, for example, George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 602, where, however, Hume's utilitarianism is regarded as having more in common with John Stuart Mill's than with Bentham's. 3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1971), pp. 183-194. 4 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 49-56. 5Rawls, to some extent, supports an interpretation of Hume as a nonutilitarian. See, for instance, how he construes Hume's rejection of an original contract (Theory of Justice, pp. 32-33). Yet on the crucial question of a doctrine of sympathy he posits a continuity between Hume and utilitarian thought, which I find unacceptable. 6 John Plamenatz, in his history of utilitarian thought, specifically supports this categorization (The English Utilitarians [Oxford: Basil Blackwell], pp. 22-45). See below, final pages, for a further discussion of Plamenatz's scheme of categorization. [4231 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY utilitarianism. 7 It is precisely this claim that I wish to dispute. With regard to the doctrines of utility and sympathy, I shall try to pinpoint the import they carried for Bentham and his followers and compare this with the meanings these doctrines have in the context of Hume's thought. I shall also attempt to relate his thought to the important English philosophers in the social contract tradition--Hobbes and Locke-exploring the possibility that Hume's deepest affinities might lie with his contractarian predecessors, rather than with his utilitarian successors. As a preliminary question we might consider how Hume defines the concept of utility. It seems that for him the term remains a fairly vacuous one to be identified with an unspecified tendency of an action "to the good of mankind. ''8 He does not appear to connect the notion of utility with that of pleasure the way the utilitarians do. 9 Hume's invocation of the concept of utility outside the context of its association with pleasure would not necessarily prevent our considering him a utilitarian if in the structure of his theory of moral judgment (where he supplies some content to the notion of "the good of mankind") the notion of "pleasure" serves as the common denominator in terms of which a balancing process can be carried out. However, an examination of the arguments where Hume makes use... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 1 Seiten: 25-42.

ExcerptBeing able to sustain the distinction between God’s unknowability and God’s nonexistence is a crucial prerequisite for deepening the coherence of our understanding of Western religion and for the articulation and generation of prospects toward peace. This is true both internationally and domestically—and in terms of intrapsychic peace (peace of mind).

American democracy faces severe challenges today, as everyday life gathers pace, national borders become increasingly porous, and commodity culture becomes more dominant. Democracy and Vision assembles a cast of prominent political theorists to consider the problems confronting political life by reviewing, assessing, and expanding on the ideas of one of the most influential political thinkers of the past forty years, Sheldon Wolin. The book consists of three sections linked by the underlying theme of Wolin's monumental effort to define ''the political'' (...) and the conditions of democratic life. In the first, Nicholas Xenos, George Kateb, Fred Dallmayr, and Charles Taylor focus, in particular, on whether mass political participation, sustainable in times of upheaval as what Wolin aptly termed ''fugitive democracy,'' can be buoyed by political institutions during periods of stability. In the second section, Wendy Brown, Aryeh Botwinick, Melissa A. Orlie, and Anne Norton examine the relevance of Wolin's ideas to current debates about, for example, social diversity and the commercialization of culture. In the last, Stephen K. White, Kirstie M. McClure, Michael J. Shapiro, and J. Peter Euben address globalization and temporality in relation to Wolin's narrative of decline, asking, among other things, whether citizenship today must incorporate a cosmopolitan dimension. These essays--and an introduction by William Connolly that lucidly outlines Wolin's thought and the deep uncertainty about political theory in the 1960s that did much to inspire his work--offer unprecedented insights into Wolin's lament that modernity has meant the loss of the political. (shrink)

Aryeh Botwinick argues for the recovery of a radical democratic tradition that emphasizes the role of individual participation in the development and control of social and political institutions. Such involvement implies philosophical skepticism—the assumption that the truth about what is the best course of action cannot be known with certainty and that, therefore, every person’s opinion has an equal claim to be considered. The crucial stumbling block to reappropriating this radical egalitarian tradition is the supposed unviability of a (...) consistent skepticism. In an effort to chart a new course of philosophical inquiry into political matters, Botwinick grapples with the formulation of a consistent version of skepticism, claiming that it provides "a continually renewing impetus for the expansion of political participation." Twentieth-century philosophers have, for the most part, opted for some version of mitigated skepticism, which, the author argues, "has blinded them to the radical political implications of skepticism." Underscoring a pattern of convergence between Anglo-American and Continental philosophy, Botwinick proposes a number of strategies to rehabilitate the rationality of participatory democratic political institutions by articulating an acceptable version of consistent skepticism. (shrink)

In Postmodernism and Democratic Theory, Aryeh Botwinick is concerned with defining postmodernism and exploring its political-economic dimensions. Previous attempts at definition have foundered because the theory has a built-in incoherence: in their rejection of reasoned argument, postmodernists must rely on reasoned argument to make their case. This issue of "self-referentialism" is pivotal, for example, in Jurgen Habermas's criticism of the postmodernists. But Botwinick shows that postmodernism can be coherently conceived as a "generalized agnosticism," which remains open to (...) all possibilities - including the possibility of its own falsity. In developing this view of postmodernism, the author applies it to the work of a wide range of contemporary political philosophers, from Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard to Leo Strauss. Botwinick also invokes a "generalized agnosticism" in assessing the ideas of such classic thinkers as Rousseau, Freud, and Wittgenstein. In the second part of the book, Botwinick uncovers and analyzes participatory undercurrents in the thought of both Hobbes and Plato. On the basis of their work, Botwinick tries to plot the transition between modernist and postmodernist democratic society. (shrink)

Drawing upon diverse disciplines--political theory, metaphysics, analytic philosophy, intellectual history, and Jewish studies--Aryeh Botwinick calls into question cherished boundaries of western thought, specifically those that isolate religion. In developing his argument, he applies deconstructionist approaches to such classic texts as Plato's REPUBLIC, Maimonides' GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED, and Hobbes's LEVIATHAN.

ExcerptJudaism, Christianity, and Islam are each in their own way monotheistic religions–and I would argue that this unifying factor that links together all three Western religions has profound repercussions upon the conceptualization of God and the allowable limits to political behavior in the name of God that each of these religions would be theologically entitled/permitted to advocate. Plato in his dialogue Parmenides forms a significant part of the pedigree to the emergence of monotheism–and, if not a “pedigree,” because there are (...) conflicting views among historians as to when the texts of Genesis and Exodus actually appeared,1 then a cogent presentation of the same theme. Plato’s version is theologically and logically connected to the simultaneous introduction in the Parmenides of the tenets of negative theology, that we can only say what the One is not, but not what He is. Because negative formulations are inextricably grammatically and logically linked to positive formulations (they can always be rephrased in positive form), Plato’s concession to the intelligibility of negative theology is largely rhetorical, and not substantive. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 3 Seiten: 349-372.

Ben Zoma's mishnah is astounding from a number of different but interrelated perspectives. He indirectly addresses four of the most central, vexing questions emerging out of human experience—What is wisdom, knowledge, truth? What is strength, power, courage? What is wealth, exalted status? What is honor, reputation?—and manages to turn the questions on their head and resist answering them. His first move in this strategy of resistance is to transform inquiry into these various qualities and attributes into an investigation of the (...) person claiming or aspiring to possess them. This displacement is momentous. Instead of there being a known, finite, delimited…. (shrink)

The paper addresses the topic of the unavoidability of contradiction in dealing with issues of scepticism – and how coherence can be restored to sceptical arguments and texts. It considers six classic paradoxes in the history of Western thought – of how language works to undermine and derail the coherence of thought. It also theorizes a philosophy of language approach to restore coherence in the classic instances discussed. As its major example, the paper explores how and why the image of (...) successful, long-standing constitutions is a minimalist image through a discussion of the relationship between epistemological scepticism generally and textual scepticism specifically. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to argue that the best kind of philosophical defense of democracy is one that is worked out within the framework of negative theory. In a post-metaphysical intellectual climate, negative theory enables us to theorize the best defense of democracy possible. I am using the phrase “negative theory” on analogy with the term negative theology. Just as negative theology argues that we can only indefinitely say what God is not but cannot pinpoint in a positive (...) sense what He is, so, too, negative theory would advocate that we can only ceaselessly explore and highlight the…. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas has provided a hermeneutical key for reinterpreting the Western intellectual tradition. Certain recurring conundrums of Western philosophy led him to regard ethics above all other modes of inquiry and to emphasize infinity rather than totality. Yet, the primacy of the ethical cannot do what he wants it to do. To reinterpret the Western intellectual tradition, it is necessary to shift emphasis to the distinction between infinity and totality. This highlights the religious dimension of secularism, i.e., how modern liberalism (...) still nurtures a religious project, even if that project is itself the result of secularization. It also facilitates a…. (shrink)

ExcerptI. The Action of the Play: The Playacting Character of Human Life Antonio, the “Merchant of Venice,” in speaking to his friend Gratiano at the beginning of the play, says: “I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano: / A stage where every man must play a part, / And mine a sad one” (1.1.77–79).1 The Merchant of Venice, which is a play, is (as Shakespeare announces at the outset) about the inescapability and insurmountability of playacting as the substance (...) of human reality. Life, as it were, is lived at one remove from itself—where our assumption…. (shrink)

This book deals with the dilemmas of “grand theory,” which presents a synoptic view of human nature and society, and with testable hypotheses, which consist of more humble propositions subject to empirical testing. Although Alan Sica finds “no fewer than seven or eight distinct theoretical vantage points” (p. 12) represented in this volume,” for the most part they all share vulnerabilities which become evident when confronted with a common set of philosophical strategies. The dilemmas of grand theory are clear in (...) Robert J. Antonio's treatment of what he calls “epistemological perspectivism” (p. 31), whose advocates adhere to “conditional ideas of…. (shrink)

There is a way of looking at Christian doctrine as classically formulated by St. Paul in “Letter to the Romans” that enables us to see it as proceeding in a quite rigorous sense to introduce variations on monotheism (excavating and defining new dialectical pathways) that had been inaugurated by Judaism. The structure of Jewish belief that confronted St. Paul and his contemporaries had given rise to certain jarring paradoxes that St. Paul, with his Rabbinically trained mind1 that is amply in (...) evidence in the text of Romans, sought to resolve. I would like to map the emergence of these paradoxes…. (shrink)