Although normative systems, or social laws, have proved to be a highly influential approach to coordination in multi-agent systems, the issue of compliance to such normative systems remains problematic. In all real systems, it is possible that some members of an agent population will not comply with the rules of a normative system, even if it is in their interests to do so. It is therefore important to consider the extent to which a normative system is robust, i.e., the extent (...) to which it remains effective even if some agents do not comply with it. We formalise and investigate three different notions of robustness and related decision problems. We begin by considering sets of agents whose compliance is necessary and/or sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of a normative system; we then consider quantitative approaches to robustness, where we try to identify the proportion of an agent population that must comply in order to ensure success; and finally, we consider a more general approach, where we characterise the compliance conditions required for success as a logical formula. We furthermore introduce a logic for specifying properties of norm compliance in general and norm robustness in particular. (shrink)

We study a logic whose formulae are interpreted as properties of a finite set over some universe. The language is propositional, with two unary operators inclusion and extension, both taking a finite set as argument. We present a basic Hilbert-style axiomatisation, and study its completeness. The main results are syntactic and semantic characterisations of complete extensions of the logic.

Qualitative Coalitional Games are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper is to develop and (...) study logics for reasoning about QCGs. We begin by introducing a logic for reasoning about “static” QCGs, where participants play a single game, and we then introduce and study Temporal QCGs , i.e., games in which a sequence of QCGs is played. In order to represent and reason about such games, we introduce a linear time temporal logic of QCGs, called ℒ. We give a complete axiomatisation of ℒ, use it to investigate the properties of TQCGs, identify its expressive power, establish its complexity, characterise classes of TQGCs with formulas from our logical language, and use it to formulate several solution concepts for TQCGs. (shrink)

We propose a non-standard interpretation of Alternating-time Temporal Logic with imperfect information, for which no commonly accepted semantics has been proposed yet. Rather than changing the semantic structures, we generalize the usual interpretation of formulae in single states to sets of states. We also propose a new epistemic operator for ?practical? or ?constructive? knowledge, and we show that the new logic (which we call Constructive Strategic Logic) is strictly more expressive than most existing solutions, while it retains the same model (...) checking complexity. Finally, we study properties of constructive knowledge and other operators in this non-standard semantics. (shrink)

Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) is a branching time temporal logic in which statements about what coalitions of agents can achieve by strategic cooperation can be expressed. Alternating-time temporal epistemic logic (ATEL) extends ATL by adding knowledge modalities, with the usual possible worlds interpretation. This paper investigates how properties of agents’ actions can be expressed in ATL in general, and how properties of the interaction between action and knowledge can be expressed in ATEL in particular. One commonly discussed property is that (...) an agent should know about all available actions, i.e., that the same actions should be available in indiscernible states. Van der Hoek and Wooldridge suggest a syntactic expression of this semantic property. This paper shows that this correspondence in fact does not hold. Furthermore, it is shown that the semantic property is not expressible in ATEL at all. In order to be able to express common and interesting properties of action in general and of the interaction between action and knowledge in particular, a generalization of the coalition modalities of ATL is proposed. The resulting logics, ATL-A and ATEL-A, have increased expressiveness without loosing ATL’s and ATEL’s tractability of model checking. (shrink)

We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new links between game theory and dynamic logics of information, and to exploit the dynamic/strategic structure that, we think, lies implicitly inside (...) epistemic models for epistemic languages, and to make that structure an explicit subject of logical study. Our main contributions are: the notion of a two-person question-answer game with information goals, the existence and computation of equilibria for these games, the correspondence with Bayesian games and their equilibria, and a connection between logic and game theory namely the existence of equilibria for positive goal formulae. (shrink)

A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically (...) defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge, and for lying as private announcements to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts. (shrink)

In the most popular logics combining knowledge and awareness, it is not possible to express statements about knowledge of unawareness such as “Ann knows that Bill is aware of something Ann is not aware of”—without using a stronger statement such as “Ann knows that Bill is aware of \(p\) and Ann is not aware of \(p\) ”, for some particular \(p\) . In Halpern and Rêgo (Proceedings of KR 2006; Games Econ Behav 67(2):503–525, 2009b) Halpern and Rêgo introduced a logic (...) in which such statements about knowledge of unawareness can be expressed. The logic extends the traditional framework with quantification over formulae, and is thus very expressive. As a consequence, it is not decidable. In this paper we introduce a decidable logic which can be used to reason about certain types of unawareness. Our logic extends the traditional framework with an operator expressing full awareness, i.e., the fact that an agent is aware of everything, and another operator expressing relative awareness, the fact that one agent is aware of everything another agent is aware of. The logic is less expressive than Halpern’s and Rêgo’s logic. It is, however, expressive enough to express all of the motivating examples in Halpern and Rêgo (Proceedings of KR 2006; Games Econ Behav 67(2):503–525, 2009b). In addition to proving that the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is PSPACE-complete, we present an axiomatisation which we show is sound and complete. (shrink)

We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as "every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ" and "there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ". We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more expressive than Coalition Logic, it is (...) nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents. (shrink)

Modal logics for reasoning about social networks is currently an active field of research. There is still a gap, however, between the state of the art in logical formalisations of concepts related to social networks and the much more mature field of social network analysis. In this paper we take a step to bridge that gap. One of the key foundations of social network analysis is balance theory, which is used to analyse signed social networks where agents can have positive (...) or negative relationships. Certain combinations of positive and negative relationships are considered to be unbalanced, or unstable—in particular the occurrence of cycles with an odd number of negative relationships. Especially relatively short cycles with an odd number of negative relationships are thought to put pressure on the agents to change one or more of the involved relationships from negative to positive or the other way around. Most existing logics for reasoning about social networks are defined for unsigned networks. In this paper we develop a modal logic for reasoning about structural properties of signed social networks, and give a sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatic system. Furthermore, we completely axiomatise classes of signed social networks that are balanced to a certain degree n, in the sense that there are no cycles of length up to n with an odd number of negative relationships. Finally, we completely axiomatise the class of all fully balanced complete signed social networks, i.e., networks where everyone is connected with everyone else. Axiomatic completeness is non-trivial because neither the balance properties, nor the dichotomy between positive and negative relations, are modally definable. The paper thus provides a logical basis for reasoning about signed social networks in general and balanced networks in particular. (shrink)

The Russian Cards Problem has been extensively studied as an example of a problem of an unconditionally secure protocol where the sender and receiver are able to transmit secret information safely over a public non-secure channel without the secret being learned by a third party with access to the channel. Epistemic logic in general and public announcement logic in particular have been very useful in this study, as it involves careful analysis of subtle properties of nested knowledge. A long standing (...) open problem is whether or not there exist protocols of length strictly greater than two for the original problem. In this paper we finally settle this problem, answering the question in the affirmative, by presenting a new solution to the original Russian Cards Problem that involves more than two steps. It starts with an initial announcement with so-called crossing hands, after which it is not common knowledge that the protocol can terminate in one more step. (shrink)

We study the logic of strategic ability of coalitions of agents with bounded memory by introducing Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Bounded Memory (ATLBM), a variant of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). ATLBM accounts for two main consequences of the assumption that agents have bounded memory. First, an agent can only remember a strategy that specifies actions in a bounded number of different circumstances. While the ATL-formula means that coalition C has a joint strategy which will make φ true forever, the ATLBM-formula (...) means that C has a joint strategy which for each agent in C specifies what to do in no more than n different circumstances and which will make φ true forever. Second, an agent has bounded recall—a strategy can only take the last m states of the system into account. We use the logic to study the interaction between strategic ability, bounded number of decisions, bounded recall and incomplete information. We discuss the logical properties and expressiveness of ATLBM, and its relationship to ATL. We show that ATLBM can express properties of strategic ability under bounded memory which cannot be expressed in ATL. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze how the semantics of the Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL$^*$ deals with agents' commitments to strategies in the process of formula evaluation. In (\acro{atl}$^*$), one can express statements about the strategic ability of an agent (or a coalition of agents) to achieve a goal $\phi$ such as: ``agent $i$ can choose a strategy such that, if $i$ follows this strategy then, no matter what other agents do, $\phi$ will always be true''. However, strategies in \acro{atl} are (...) \emph{revocable} in the sense that in the evaluation of the goal $\phi$ the agent $i$ is no longer restricted by the strategy she has chosen in order to reach the state where the goal is evaluated. -/- Here we discuss some alternatives leading to amendments of that semantics. In particular, we consider variants of \acro{atl}$^*$ where strategies, on the contrary, are \emph{irrevocable}. Unlike in the standard semantics of \acro{atl}, memory plays an essential role in the semantics based on irrevocable strategies. -/- Further, we propose and discuss various syntactic and semantics mechanisms for handling commitments to strategies and release from such commitments in the semantics of ATL$^*$, leading to more expressive and semantically refined versions of that logic. (shrink)

While dynamic epistemic logics with common knowledge have been extensively studied, dynamic epistemic logics with distributed knowledge have so far received far less attention. In this paper we study extensions of public announcement logic ( $\mathcal{PAL }$ ) with distributed knowledge, in particular their expressivity, axiomatisations and complexity. $\mathcal{PAL }$ extended only with distributed knowledge is not more expressive than standard epistemic logic with distributed knowledge. Our focus is therefore on $\mathcal{PACD }$ , the result of adding both common and (...) distributed knowledge to $\mathcal{PAL }$ , which is more expressive than each of its component logics. We introduce an axiomatisation of $\mathcal{PACD }$ , which is not surprising: it is the combination of well-known axioms. The completeness proof, however, is not trivial, and requires novel combinations and extensions of techniques for dealing with $S5$ knowledge, distributed knowledge, common knowledge and public announcements at the same time. We furthermore show that $\mathcal{PACD }$ is decidable, more precisely that it is $\textsc {exptime}$ -complete. This result also carries over to $\mathcal{S 5\mathcal CD }$ with common and distributed knowledge operators for all coalitions (and not only the grand coalition). Finally, we propose a notion of a trans-bisimulation to generalise certain results and give deeper insight into the proofs. (shrink)

In Hollis’ paradox, A and B each chose a positive integer and whisper their number to C. C then informs them, jointly, that they have chosen different numbers and, moreover, that neither of them are able to work out who has the greatest number. A then reasons as follows: B cannot have 1, otherwise he would know that my number is greater, and by the same reasoning B knows that I don’t have 1. But then B also cannot have 2, (...) otherwise he would know that my number is greater (since he knows I don’t have 1). This line of reasoning can be repeated indefinitely, effectively forming an inductive proof, ruling out any number – an apparent paradox. In this paper we formalise Hollis’ paradox using public announcement logic, and argue that the root cause of the paradox is the wrongful assumption that A and B assume that C’s announcement necessarily is successful. This resolves the paradox without assuming that C can be untruthful, or that A and B are not perfect reasoners, like other solutions do. There are similarities to the surprise examination paradox. In addition to a semantic analysis in the tradition of epistemic logic, we provide a syntactic one, deriving conclusions from a set of premises describing the initial situation – more in the spirit of the literature on Hollis’ paradox. The latter allows us to pinpoint which assumptions are actually necessary for the conclusions resolving the paradox. (shrink)

Public announcement logic is an extension of epistemic logic with dynamic operators that model the effects of all agents simultaneously and publicly acquiring the same piece of information. One of the extensions of PAL, group announcement logic, allows quantification over announcements made by agents. In GAL, it is possible to reason about what groups can achieve by making such announcements. It seems intuitive that this notion of coalitional ability should be closely related to the notion of distributed knowledge, the implicit (...) knowledge of a group. Thus, we study the extension of GAL with distributed knowledge, and in particular possible interaction properties between GAL operators and distributed knowledge. The perhaps surprising result is that, in fact, there are no interaction properties, contrary to intuition. We make this claim precise by providing a sound and complete axiomatisation of GAL with distributed knowledge. We also consider several natural variants of GAL with distributed knowledge, as well as some other related logic, and compare their expressive power. (shrink)

This special issue on Formal Models of Awareness contains five papers that concentrate on different approaches to the notion of awareness. They include syntactic and semantic approaches to modelling awareness and an alternative view from the multi-agent systems perspective where awareness is identified as the ability to perceive and understand actions of other agents.Velázquez-Quesada studies a logic of plausibility acknowledgement models used to interpret the notions of implicit and explicit beliefs. The models use the notion of a formula being acknowledged (...) as true that is similar to syntactic awareness in that the set of formulas acknowledged as true by an agent is not assumed to be closed under logical consequence. However it has a different meaning . A dynamic epistemic logic over such models is cons .. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (CTL) by extending the language with path quantifiers $E^\delta $ and $E^\delta $ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a CTL axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for CTL to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that (...) the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for CTL. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional CTL logic. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that (...) the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic. (shrink)

We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as “every coalition satisfying property P can achieve φ” and “there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve φ”. We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more expressive than Coalition Logic, it is (...) nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents. (shrink)

In the paper, we study the dynamics of coalitional ability by proposing an extension of coalition logic (CL). CL allows one to reason about what a coalition of agents is able to achieve through a joint action, no matter what agents outside of the coalition do. The proposed dynamic extension is inspired by dynamic epistemic logic, and, in particular, by action models. We call the resulting logic coalition action model logic (CAML), which, compared to CL, includes additional modalities for coalitional (...) action models. We investigate the expressivity of CAML, and provide a complexity characterisation of its model checking problem. (shrink)

This volume collects selected papers presented at the Second Chinese Conference on Logic and Argumentation in 2018 held in Hangzhou, China. The papers presented reflect recent advances in logic and argumentation, as well as the connections between the two, and also include invited papers contributed by leading experts in these fields. The book covers a wide variety of topics related to dynamics, uncertainty and reasoning. It continues discussions on the interplay between logic and argumentation which has a long history from (...) Aristotle’s ancient logic to very recent formal argumentation in AI. (shrink)

One of the classic formalisms for reasoning about multi-agent coalitional ability is coalition logic. In CL it is possible to express what a coalition can achieve in the next step no matter what agents outside of the coalition do at the same time. We propose an extension of CL with dynamic operators that allow us to grant dictatorial powers to agents or to revoke them. In such a way we are able to reason about the dynamics of coalitional ability. We (...) also discuss some logical properties of the proposed formalisms and compare their relative expressive power. (shrink)

Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changing actions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre-and post conditions. For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public, truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing and analysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predicting what rational self-interested agents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchange ultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assuming that agents (...) have preferences over such outcomes, this is a game theoretic scenario. This is, in our opinion, an interesting general research direction, combining logic and game theory in the study of rational information exchange. In this article we take some first steps in this direction: we consider the case where available actions are public announcements, and where each agent has a (typically epistemic) goal formula that she would like to become true. What will each agent announce? The truth of the goal formula also depends on the announcements made by other agents. We analyse such public announcement games. (shrink)

We define a multi-modal version of Computation Tree Logic (ctl) by extending the language with path quantifiers E δ and A δ where δ denotes one of finitely many dimensions, interpreted over Kripke structures with one total relation for each dimension. As expected, the logic is axiomatised by taking a copy of a ctl axiomatisation for each dimension. Completeness is proved by employing the completeness result for ctl to obtain a model along each dimension in turn. We also show that (...) the logic is decidable and that its satisfiability problem is no harder than the corresponding problem for ctl. We then demonstrate how Normative Systems can be conceived as a natural interpretation of such a multi-dimensional ctl logic. (shrink)

This paper introduces and studies a notion of cautious distributed belief. Different from the standard distributed belief, the cautious distributed belief of a group is inconsistent only when all group members are individually inconsistent. The paper presents basic results about cautious distributed belief, investigates whether it preserves properties of individual belief, and compares it with standard distributed belief. Although both notions are equivalent in the class of reflexive models, this is not the case in general. While we argue that an (...) understanding of the concept of cautious distributed belief from first principles is important, cautious distributed belief can be expressed using standard distrbuted belief and we show that the propositional language extended only with cautious distributed belief is in fact strictly less expressive than the propositional language extended only with standard distributed belief. We, finally, identify a small extension of the language making the former as expressive as the latter. (shrink)

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

This volume brings together for the first time a significant number of Reid's manuscript papers on natural history, physiology and materialist metaphysics. An important contribution not only to Reid studies but also to our understanding of eighteenth-century science and its context.

Thomas Reid was a philosopher who founded the Scottish school of 'common sense'. Much of Reid's work is a critique of his contemporary, David Hume, whose empiricism he rejects. In this work, written after Reid's appointment to a professorship at the university of Glasgow, and published in 1785, he turns his attention to ideas about perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste. He examines the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, arguing that 'when we find philosophers maintaining that (...) there is no heat in the fire, nor colour in the rainbow … we may be apt to think the whole to be only a dream of fanciful men, who have entangled themselves in cobwebs spun out of their own brain'. Written by one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most important thinkers, this work brings to life the intellectual debates of the time. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas produced a voluminous body of work on moral theory, and much of that work is on virtue, particularly the status and value of the virtues as principles of virtuous acts, and the way in which a moral life can be organized around them schematically. Thomas Osborne presents Aquinas's account of virtue in its historical, philosophical and theological contexts, to show the reader what Aquinas himself wished to teach about virtue. His discussion makes the complexities of Aquinas's (...) moral thought accessible to readers despite the differences between Thomas's texts themselves, and the distance between our background assumptions and his. The book will be valuable for scholars and students in ethics, medieval philosophy, and theology. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the undecidability of a number of logics with quantification over public announcements: arbitrary public announcement logic, group announcement logic, and coalition announcement logic. In APAL we consider the informative consequences of any announcement, in GAL we consider the informative consequences of a group of agents all of which are simultaneously making known announcements. So this is more restrictive than APAL. Finally, CAL is as GAL except that we now quantify over anything the agents not in that group (...) may announce simultaneously as well. The logic CAL therefore has some features of game logic and of ATL. We show that when there are multiple agents in the language, the satisfiability problem is undecidable for APAL, GAL, and CAL. In the single agent case, the satisfiability problem is decidable for all three logics. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the undecidability of a number of logics with quantification over public announcements: arbitrary public announcement logic, group announcement logic, and coalition announcement logic. In APAL we consider the informative consequences of any announcement, in GAL we consider the informative consequences of a group of agents all of which are simultaneously making known announcements. So this is more restrictive than APAL. Finally, CAL is as GAL except that we now quantify over anything the agents not in that group (...) may announce simultaneously as well. The logic CAL therefore has some features of game logic and of ATL. We show that when there are multiple agents in the language, the satisfiability problem is undecidable for APAL, GAL, and CAL. In the single agent case, the satisfiability problem is decidable for all three logics. (shrink)