«Chesterton was one of the deepest thinkers who ever existed [...]». Ces mots ont été écrits par Étienne Gilson pour la commémoration de la mort de Gilbert Keith Chesterton. De prime abord, l’affirmation surprend. On pense ensuite qu’il ne s’agit, après tout, que d’un jugement porté par un historien de la philosophie, important certes, mais partageant tout de même avec l’auteur commémoré de fortes convictions chrétiennes. Légitime ou non, le doute soulevé s’estompe passablement au regard de l’évaluation émise par le (...) même médiéviste au sujet de l’étude de Chesterton intitulée St. Thomas Aquinas. The Dumb Ox : «I consider it, dit-il, as being without possible comparison the best book ever written on St. Thomas. Nothing short of genius can account for such an achievement». Notons que l’opinion de l’historien de la pensée n’est pas isolée et fut partagée par ses pairs contemporains les plus illustres, dont Mandonnet et Grabmann. (shrink)

Pierre Abélard est avant tout connu dans les milieux intellectuels en tant que logicien de génie et philosophe moraliste. On peut affirmer, sans risque de controverse, que la vieille logique a atteint son apogée dans la première moitié du XIIe siècle avec Abélard, qui favorisa dans son ensemble les études du trivium. L'éthique a également bénéficié des travaux de Maître Pierre, notamment par l'accentuation mise sur les anciennes notions augustiniennes d'intention et de bonne volonté. Mais il est un domaine où (...) la contribution d'Abélard passe inaperçue, si ce n'est par quelques médiévistes, à savoir celui de la théologie. Spécialiste respecté de la pensée abélardienne, Jean Jolivet présente, avec La théologie d'Abélard, un opuscule qui vient combler, en partie, cette lacune. Il ne s'agit certes pas de la première étude consacrée à ce sujet, ni même de la plus exhaustive. Les travaux de Gilson et surtout de Cottiaux constituent des précédents fameux et méritent toujours d'être consultés. Toutefois, la particularité et le principal intérêt de l'ouvrage que propose Jolivet résident dans son caractère à la fois accessible et actualisé. Ce texte non seulement sert d'introduction à la pensée théologique d'Abélard, mais prend également en considération les données les plus récentes. (shrink)

Pedro Abelardo apresenta na sua obra uma teoria da virtude de natureza, à primeira vista, aristotélica. Ao que parece, essa concepção também contém diferentes elementos estoicos, que não se opõem necessariamente à visão do Estagirita. Todavia, o essencial da interpretação da Escola do Pórtico acerca da virtude difere da explicação dada por Aristóteles. No presente estudo, pretendemos examinar, primeiro, a índole da virtude como habitus na obra de lógica de Abelardo. Nesse caso, não há dúvida de que predomina a influência (...) aristotélica. Em seguida, indicamos outras particularidades da virtude encontradas, desta vez, em tratados éticos e teológicos do nosso protagonista, as quais se revelam antes de caráter estoico. Em suma, projetamos identificar as diferentes fontes antigas e os principais intermediários latinos usados por Abelardo para elaborar a sua própria teoria da virtude. Trata-se de deixar clara a influência filosófica dominante em Abelardo sobre essa questão da virtude, já que este lógico não pode harmonizar teses substancialmente inconciliáveis. Peter Abelard in his work presents a theory of virtue, which is, at first sight, of Aristotelian nature. It seems that this view also contains different Stoic elements, but they are not necessarily opposed to Stagirite's vision. However, the essentials of the Stoa School about virtue differ from the explanation given by Aristotle. In this paper, we intend to examine, first, the nature of virtue as habitus in Abelard's work on logic. In this case, there is no doubt that Aristotle's influence on this topic predominates. Next, we specify other features related to virtue found, this time, in ethical and theological treatises of our protagonist that appear to be basically Stoic. In short, we want to identify the different ancient sources and the main Latin mediators used by Abelard to elaborate his own theory of virtue. In other words, we would like to shed light on the predominant philosophical authority on Abelard's theory of virtue since this logician cannot harmonize theses that are fundamentally irreconcilable. (shrink)

O VIIº Colóquio de História da Filosofia Medieval , realizado em novembro de 2009 em Brasília, foi dedicado ao tema: “Argumentação e interpretação na Filosofia Medieval”. Na ocasião, sete medievalistas brasileiros e estrangeiros encontraram-se para apresentar seu trabalho e discutir o assunto. O encontro foi possível graças à ajuda financeira do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília e da CAPES. Aproveitamos o espaço para agradecê-los. Apresentamos, no presente número temático, seis artigos ligados direta ou indiretamente a essa questão.

A ‘teoria da virtude’ contemporânea enfatiza a necessidade de voltar à formação moral do indivíduo, seguindo o modelo ético disponibilizado por Aristóteles. Segundo MacIntyre, representante importante dessa teoria, o estoicismo favoreceu o desenvolvimento da ética moderna e contemporânea, ao destacar noções como vontade, assentimento e lei natural ou divina. Por conseguinte, o desenvolvimento do próprio agente moral foi negligenciado. No século XII, Abelardo apresenta uma ética híbrida, que mantém, ao mesmo tempo, a teoria aristotélica da virtude e elementos da moral (...) estoica. No presente estudo, consideramos a crítica feita por MacIntyre da ética abelardiana, estimada ser na origem das concepções morais modernas e contemporâneas. (shrink)

Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) conception of moral sin contains a fundamental element from Stoicism, which is the notion of “consent” (consensus). After the presentation of the essentials of that Abelardian theory, we return to the source of that same idea in ancient and imperial Stoicism. According to their main representatives, “consent” or “assent” (sugkata/qesij) has a determining function not only in ethics, but also in the process of knowledge as well. We emphasize in passing the resemblance between some important components of (...) Stoic epistemology and the theory expounded by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics on the origin of knowledge. Augustine represents without any doubt one of the main intermediaries through whom this notion of consent is transmitted up to the time of Abelard in the 12th century. Even if he was influenced by the Bishop of Hippo on moral questions in general, Abelard seems to distance himself from Augustine by considering that consent is more a rational matter than a volitional one. (shrink)

The intelectual virtue of discernment occupies a privileged position in Aristotle’s ethics, since it intervenes in judging and choosing the best option regarding our voluntary actions. As for the Stoics, the virtues are cognitions and can be reduced to only one. The person who possesses that unique virtue is called a ‘sage’ and is able to choose, for himself, the right action to reach happiness. Thus, we propose to discover if the Stoic sage can be compared to the prudent man (...) in Aristotle by examining some key ethical issues of theses philosophical schools. We conclude that the similar theses exceed the different ones, despite encountering a quite distinct vocabulary which deceives at first sight. (shrink)

The Stoic School takes up the tripartite division of philosophy of the post-Platonic Academy, in which physics occupies, alongside dialectics and ethics, a prominent place. In this tripartition, there is no metaphysics, nor in the two subdivisions of Stoic physics. For the thinkers of the Stoa, there is nothing beyond physics. In spite of this statement, we try to discover, in this article, the presence of a study devoted to first philosophy among the various topics investigated by the Stoics in (...) their physics. It is with this aim that we first examine what precisely Aristotle deals with in the Metaphysics. This preliminary investigation will serve as a point of reference for determining what can be considered as metaphysics, at least in ancient Greece. Afterwards, we are interested in the Stoic view of nature itself since nothing superior exists. This examination leads us to scrutinize the Stoic conception of the Good, a notion closely linked to the subject of physics. We then take a good look at each one of the topics found in the two Stoic divisions of physics, highlighting the matters approaching Aristotelian metaphysics. On that occasion, a specific analysis is devoted to the two Stoic principles, due notably to the relevance of the subject in relation to first philosophy. From the diversity of the elements found in the course of our study, we come to the final part, in which we establish the position of the Stoic School on metaphysics. (shrink)

Peter Abelard and William of Ockham represent the two main figures of the nominalism of the Middle Ages. Both share the fundamental thesis of that doctrine, according to which only individual entities exist. The repercussions of nominalism are quite evident in relation to the question of universals, which constitutes a subject that, until now, won the attention of the majority of contemporary studies on the two most important logicians of their time. Nevertheless the nominalism of each of these two protagonists (...) apparently diverges in a significant manner, especially in respect to the role exercised by the mind in the semantic process. Ockham seems to distance himself definitely from his predecessors, including Abelard, when he transfers grammar and semantic functions of conventional language to the level of mental language. In the present article, the chief intention is to expound the theory of sign and signification of each of the authors under consideration. The ultimate objective is to compare their respective semantic positions and indicate the principal points of agreement and disagreement, keeping in mind the hypothesis according to which these two medieval nominalists should have more theoretical elements in common than not. (shrink)

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontological nature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’s and Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected. First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis) in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion of consent (consensus) in Abelard, which (...) also raises the question of its voluntary or rational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardian consent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularly to that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentators believe, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identification of the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion, which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative. (shrink)

Abelard closely follows the Augustinian view with regard to the notion of intention. However, he distances himself from him concerning the contribution of acts in the evaluation of moral responsibility. Independent thinker, the philosopher of the twelfth century, then, uses an ancient Stoic thesis according to which all actions are indifferent, except those related to virtue and vice. He also takes back another idea of the Stoa concerning, this time, the concept of will as habitus. In this paper, we first (...) expound Abelard’s position on these issues before presenting the main sources to which he has access directly. (shrink)

Le premier texte, traduit sous le titre Ethics, comporte deux livres dont le second, très bref, est incomplet. Dans le premier, Abélard traite essentiellement de questions qui tournent autour de la notion de faute morale. Il tente d’abord de préciser la nature exacte de cette faute, ce qui lui permet notamment de la démarquer du désir ou de la volonté mauvaise, du vice et de l’acte funeste. Le péché est alors proprement défini comme étant le fruit d’un consentement à ce (...) qui ne convient pas, qu’Abélard ramène finalement à un mépris de Dieu, à un mépris de sa volonté s’entend. Maître Pierre signale par la suite les trois principales étapes — penitence, confession, atonement — qui nous permettent sinon de nous détacher entièrement de nos fautes commises, du moins d’accomplir les gestes qui en atténueront la portée. La très brève section du second livre de l’Ethica est consacrée à la notion de vertu qui est définie, dans la lignée aristotélicienne, comme un état excellent de l’esprit. Ce qui retient habituellement le plus l’attention des historiens de la pensée dans cet ouvrage est l’accent mis à la fois sur la notion de consentement au mal, qui distingue clairement la faute morale d’autres manifestations humaines mauvaises, ainsi que sur celle d’intentio qui n’est le plus souvent que le pendant du consentement dans le bien. (shrink)

Na sua obra, Pedro Abelardo (1079-1142) destaca duas noções metafísicas que fundamentam sua teoria lógica: o status e o dictum propositionis , ao causar, respectivamente, a imposição ( impositio ) dos termos universais e o valor de verdade das proposições. Trata-se de expressões que se referem a naturezas ontológicas peculiares, na medida em que não são consideradas coisas ( res ), mesmo que constituem causas. Todavia, também não são nada. Abelardo as chama de ‘quase coisas’ ( quasi res ). No (...) presente artigo, explicamos, primeiro, essas duas noções essenciais da lógica abelardiana, antes de tentar, em seguida, encontrar a fonte dessa metafísica particular. Em oposição a comentadores importantes da lógica de Abelardo, que estimam que haja uma forte influência platônica sobre essa concepção específica, defendemos antes, com apoio de textos significativos e de acordo com o nominalismo abelardiano, que a maior ascendência sobre a metafísica do nosso autor é a do estoicismo, sobretudo, antigo. (shrink)

Le désir raisonnant ou, si l’on préfère, l’intellect désirant constitue un point d’ancrage crucial pour toute discussion se rapportant à la vie pratique. D’un point de vue à la fois historique et philosophique, l’apport d’Aristote représente non seulement une systématisation élaborée de cette question relative au principe de l’action morale, mais la position théorique qu’il défend demeure une référence pertinente et pose encore de nos jours un défi d’interprétation. Dans la longue série d’études consacrées à ce thème depuis les tout (...) premiers commentateurs aristotéliciens, il faut désormais compter celles qui furent présentées «lors d’une série de réunions de travail de professeurs de philosophie de l’Académie de Versailles», et que réunit Jean-Yves Chateau dans ce recueil. L’importance du livre VI pour la compréhension globale de l’éthique et de la philosophie d’Aristote est décisive, comme le souligne Chateau dans la présentation initiale de l’ouvrage: «Si nous ne le possédions pas [le livre VI], l’intelligibilité de sa pensée [d’Aristote] serait compromise ou très largement indéterminée [...]». Constituant l’un des trois livres communs à l’Éthique à Nicomaque et à l’Éthique à Eudème, le livre VI propose avant tout des éléments essentiels aux questions relatives à la coexistence de l’intellect et de l’agir moral. Le caractère bien délimité du thème du recueil rend possible une discussion à la fois élaborée et exhaustive. (shrink)

We live in times where it is possible to control our emotions using biomedical means – for example by taking pills that make us feel better. This chapter discusses one worry about the biomedical enhancement of mood. It is a worry that seems to play an important role in more familiar objections to biomedical enhancement of mood, such as the objection that it would lead to inauthenticity. The worry is that the use of positive mood enhancers will corrupt emotional lives. (...) Ethical questions about the biomedical enhancement of mood are often really questions about our affective reasons. Negative emotions typically feel bad, positive ones typically feel good. Here our hedonic reasons come into direct competition with affective reasons. Those who entirely dismiss affective reasons, or at least think that negative affective reasons are extremely weak, are likely to see little problem with positive mood enhancers. (shrink)

Adorno’s reading of Hegel’s theory of civil society shapes his way of addressing the core question of his critical theory of society: “Why do social crises not lead to social transformation?” Our chapter investigates the philosophical innovations at the heart of Hegel’s and Adorno’s respective approaches to the problems revealed by the antagonisms of civil society. We will do this by asking the questions: 1. How does Hegel conceive of the antagonistic structure of civil society? 2. How does Hegel conceive (...) of the way civil society addresses crises of legitimacy? 3. How does Adorno think of the way modern welfare states silence crises of legitimacy? 4. How does Adorno’s conception of Bannkreis aim to illuminate the root structure of how all antagonistic societies silence crises of legitimacy? We will thereby focus on the basic antagonism at work in both Adorno’s and Hegel’s theories of society: the antagonism between the overwhelming power of social orders over individuals, and the fragile power of individuals to demand legitimacy from their social orders. First, we will briefly sketch Adorno’s surprisingly affirmative reading of Hegel’s theory of civil society. We then go on to assess what role antagonism plays in the latter. We will argue that Hegel sees education (Bildung) as the central operator in reconciling the antagonisms of civil society. This will allow us to take a new look at Adorno’s social theory as tracing Bannkreis through a plurality of models, which discloses the reproduction of the social totality as a form of counter-education (Halbbildung). We ultimately argue that Adorno conceptualises Bannkreis as an answer to the question of Hegel’s account of world-spirit that revives the insights of Hegel’s conception of civil society. We conclude by taking a closer look at how Bildung turns into the counter-education of Bannkreis, and what potential for socially transformative practice this dialogue between Adorno and Hegel uncovers. (shrink)

The ML community recognizes the importance of anticipating and mitigating the potential negative impacts of benchmark research. In this position paper, we argue that more attention needs to be paid to areas of ethical risk that lie at the technical and scientific core of ML benchmarks. We identify overlooked structural similarities between human IQ and ML benchmarks. Human intelligence and ML benchmarks share similarities in setting standards for describing, evaluating and comparing performance on tasks relevant to intelligence. This enables us (...) to unlock lessons from feminist philosophy of science scholarship that need to be considered by the ML benchmark community. Finally, we outline practical recommendations for benchmark research ethics and ethics review. (shrink)

Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need "thick" evaluative concepts and with what do they contrast? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit (...) commitment to what we argue to be an epistemic analogue of the reductionistic centralist thesis which Bernard Williams, in our view, successfully repudiates in ethics. In this essay, we challenge the epistemic analogue of the traditional but mistaken thesis. In offering an alternative to it which provides a comfortable home for the epistemic normativity which attends thick evaluative concepts, we align ourselves with what has been recently called the Value Turn in epistemology. From this perspective, we defend that, contrary to tradition, as influenced by centralist assumptions, epistemology does need thick evaluative concepts. Further, the sort of theories that will be able to give thick evaluative concepts an irreducible role in both belief and agent evaluation are adequately social epistemologies. What loosely refer to as second-wave of virtue epistemology is the widespread interest to provide a comfortable home for the role of thick normativity, as it is connected both with epistemic evaluation, and guidance. We recognize that, in breaking from centralism, there is a worry that a resulting anti-centralist theory will be reductionistic in the other direction, making the thick primary. We contend however that second-wave virtue epistemologies take different sources of social and epistemic value into account; they seek the 'right thickness' to ride with conception of epistemology and a field which due in part to virtue theory's resurgence, is today normative, diverse and expansive than was the traditional set of problems from which it emerged. (shrink)

This paper examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy (§3), reinforceability (§4), non-detachability (§5), cancellability (§6), and calculability (§7). I argue (1) that conventional implicature is a clear non-starter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances (2) that generalised conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid but (3) that a non-implicaturist, and non-hybrid, alternative (...) might in fact be superior. (shrink)

The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...) second part of the paper asks what specific directions an expanded field of epistemology should take. While this is taken as an open question for debate, the expansion suggested here remains continuous with the analytic tradition, while also underlining the centrality of the acquired or ‘reflective’ intellectual virtues in meeting the burdens of the three arguments. Responsibilism, as here understood, is not a philosophical thesis so much as an orientation of commitment to clearing away philosophical assumptions that systematically obstruct recognition of the importance of empirically-informed research programs into the reflective virtues. (shrink)

In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.

透過莊子的人生哲學，引領我們進入「逍遙遊」的世界，在混亂無章的社會中，找回悠然自處的生活之道。 講到莊子，第一印象往往只是他輕鬆幽默的形象嗎？ 你知道莊子其實： 表達立場時，雖然輕描淡寫，卻讓人難以招架。 批評仁義，是因為對於仁義有更高的理想。 乍看消極遁世，實際上處處表達入世的關懷。 跟著老莊思想大家陳鼓應教授，深入了解莊子思想的精隨！ 「庖丁解牛」、「莊周夢蝶」、「螳螂捕蟬，黃雀在後」都是出自《莊子》的著名典故，而莊子與惠施在橋上那場「你不是我，怎麼知道我不曉得魚的快樂？」的精彩辯論，也是我們耳熟能詳的故事。在這些莊子寓言裡面，不僅 潛藏莊子對於人生、天地萬物的哲學思維，更是現代人面對忙碌、壓抑的社會，一帖解放人心的良方。 作者陳鼓應為研究老莊思想的大家，透過流暢的文字，結合自身的時代與人生感悟，深入淺出地剖析莊子哲學的精髓。在第一部分「莊子淺說」，介紹莊子的生活態度、生死觀與處世思想，談論莊子如何化除現實中的紛擾，追求 身心的自由。如同莊子「蝴蝶夢」中將人轉化為翩翩起舞的蝴蝶，比喻人類內心的自由，不受外在世界的束縛。相對於現代文學家卡夫卡（F. Kafka）《變形記》中的大甲蟲，象徵現代人的時間壓迫、空間囚禁與外界疏離感，讓我們能更深一層體會莊子的蝴蝶夢所代表的意涵。 第二部分「莊子思想散步」則彙整了作者自上世紀九○年代以來， 在兩岸三地發表有關莊子思想演講的內容，觸及莊子的審美意蘊、藝術心境等層面。其中更收錄了作者陳鼓應，與德國漢學家沃爾法特（Gunter Wohlfart）談到他們各自接觸莊子的人生經驗，以及透過莊子、老子的道家思想，表達他們對於將來的期許。其中談到莊子提倡破除自我中心的思想，正是現今自私自利的人類社會需要深切反省的課題。 一個人生活的體驗愈多，愈能欣賞莊子思想視野的寬廣、精神空間的開闊及其對人生的審美意境；一個人社會閱歷愈深，愈能領會莊子的「逍遙遊」實乃「寄沉痛於悠閒」，而其思想生命的底層，則未始不潛藏著深厚的憤激之情 。 ──陳鼓應.

In The Humanist Spirit of Daoism, Chen Guying presents a concise overview of his understanding of the meaning and significance of Daoist philosophy. Chen is a leading contemporary Chinese thinker and spokesperson for a new Daoist approach to existential and socio-political issues. He was born in mainland China in 1935, but after having resettled to Taiwan, he received his education there and was a student activist in the 1960s. He became famous in the Chinese-speaking world with his writings on Nietzsche, (...) Laozi and Zhuangzi. At present he is a Professor at Peking University. This volume collects representative essays from the past 25 years which not only outline Chen's interpretation of Daoism as a deeply humanist way of thinking and living, but also show how he employs this philosophy in a critique of totalitarianism and neo-imperialism. (shrink)

So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...) theory of well-being (the desire-fulfilment theory). Fourth, I try to defuse the worry that objective-list theories are problematically arbitrary and show how the theory can and should be developed. (shrink)

Protective measurements illustrate how Yakir Aharonov's fundamental insights into quantum theory yield new experimental paradigms that allow us to test quantum mechanics in ways that were not possible before. As for quantum theory itself, protective measurements demonstrate that a quantum state describes a single system, not only an ensemble of systems, and reveal a rich ontology in the quantum state of a single system. We discuss in what sense protective measurements anticipate the theorem of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR), stating (...) that, if quantum predictions are correct, then two distinct quantum states cannot represent the same physical reality. (shrink)

There are indications that simple reaction time might have slowed in Western countries, based on both cohort- and multi-study comparisons. A possible limitation of the latter method in particular is measurement error stemming from methods variance, which results from the fact that instruments and experimental conditions change over time and between studies. We therefore set out to measure the simple auditory reaction time (SRT) of 7,081 individuals (2,997 males and 4,084 females) born in Sweden 1959-1985 (subjects were aged between 27 (...) and 54 years at time of measurement). Depending on cut-offs and adjustment for ageing related slowing on SRT, the data suggest that SRT has increased between 3 and 16 ms in the 27 birth years covered in the present sample. The slowing is unlikely to be explained by attrition, as evaluated by comparing the general intelligence × birth-year interactions and standard deviations for both male participants and dropouts, utilizing military conscript cognitive ability data. The present result is consistent with previous studies employing alternative methods, and may result from several synergistic factors, such as possible recent micro-evolutionary trends favouring lower g in Sweden and the effects of industrially produced neurotoxic substances on peripheral nerve conduction velocity. (shrink)

Leibniz comprenait la question pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutot que rien? sur un mode ontologique; il l'interpretait dans le cadre d'une physique continue, lineaire et necessaire; et il y repondait en invoquant le principe de raison suffisante. Nous comprenons desormais cette question sur un mode non ontologique, en substituant une notion relativiste et pragmatiste de realite a la notion absolue d'etre; nous l'interpretons dans le cadre d'une physique discontinue, non lineaire et probabiliste; et nous y repondons en denoncant, sur (...) un mode non sceptique, le principe de raison suffisante. Operer un tel renversement de l'analyse leibnizienne ne suffit toutefois pas. Car nous restons dans le cadre de la logique binaire adoptee par Leibniz, a savoir l'opposition entre le quelque chose (1) et le rien (0)... (shrink)

Dans le sillage de la pensée rawlsienne, plusieurs défenseurs du « coopérativisme » soutiennent que l’étendue de la justice est strictement nationale et non mondiale. Dans cet article, nous défendons l’idée que la coopération internationale, malgré son caractère tantôt informel, tantôt imparfait, n’en est pas moins fondamentale, et qu’elle génère bel et bien une exigence égalitaire. Nous appuierons cette thèse par un examen attentif du rôle joué par le patrimoine cognitif mondial. Dans l’économie du savoir qui est la nôtre, ce (...) qui fait la richesse d’une société est l’ensemble de ses savoir-faire, techniques productives, etc. Mais le savoir est un bien public mondial puisque son partage ne s’arrête pas aux frontières nationales. Ainsi, la simple possibilité de créer la moindre richesse – au niveau prétendument « national » – dépend d’entrée de jeu d’un produit coopératif mondial. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges facing current generations is the environmental and climate crisis. Democracies, so far, have not distinguished themselves by their capacity to bring about appropriate political responses to these challenges. This is partly explicable in terms of a lack of state capacity in a globalized context. Yet we also argue that election-centered democracies suffer from several flaws that make them inapt to deal with this challenge properly: youth is not appropriately represented; parliaments suffer from a lack of (...) diversity; elected representatives’ time-horizon is too narrow; anti-regulation lobbies have too much influence. Considering this, we argue for rejuvenating our democratic systems by introducing a randomly selected legislative chamber, which would be permanently integrated to our political systems and would play a deliberative and scrutinizing role. We have identified four eco-political arguments in favor of such reform. The generational rebalancing argument, which we examine first, has some plausibility but is not the strongest. The other three arguments – its eco-epistemic promises; its wider time horizon; and the independence of its members from short-term corporate interests – however, appear to us to be much more convincing. (shrink)