This article discusses some methodological issues concerning the nature of the study of ancient philosophy, and especially the relation between the precise historical and philological reading of the ancient texts and the philosophical speculation about what these texts mean, or (as is often the case) what one thinks that they should, or must, mean. I take as a specimen of the ‘more philosophical’ approach two articles by Michael Frede, both from his Essays in Ancient Philosophy. In his Introduction, Frede seems (...) to base what he regards as the proper study of the ancient philosophical texts on the detection in these texts of what he calls “good reasons”, which he identifies with “what we ourselves would regard as good reasons”. This would imply – in this particular case – that the criteria employed by a contemporary analytic philosopher should serve as the acid test of the validity of any historical reconstruction of what an ancient philosopher – who had no idea whatsoever of analytic philosophy (or of any other modern philosophical fashion) – really meant. Purely historical considerations, according to Frede, should only serve in the last resort, in cases where we have failed to detect “good reasons”. To illustrate the consequences of such an approach, I discuss some of the features of the other article, ‘The Original Notion of Cause’, showing that, while it makes some very useful contributions to elucidating Stoic concepts of causality, it sheds no light on the earlier meanings of αἴτιος and αἰτία as two of the main, and original, Greek concepts of causation. This is demonstrated through a brief (and very basic) survey of the development of these two concepts from Homer to the early fourth century. (shrink)

Στὴν ἀνακοίνωσή μου θ᾿ἀσχοληθῶ μέ μερικὲς ἀσυνέπειες, ἀπορίες καὶ ἄλλες δυσκολίες που ἔχω ἀντιμετωπίσει διαβάζοντας τὸν πλα-τωνικὸ διάλογο Ἴων ὡς διάλογο, δηλ. ὡς μιὰ συζήτηση, φιλοσοφικὴ βεβαίως, ἀλλὰ ἀκόμα συζήτηση μεταξὺ δύο προσώπων. Αὐτὸ πού πα-ρατηρεῖ κανεὶς διαβάζοντας τὸν διάλογο προσεκτικὰ εἶναι ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης πολὺ συχνὰ ἐκμεταλλεύεται τὴν φιλοσοφικὴ ἀφέλεια τοῦ συνομιλητῆ του, ἀλλάζοντας μέσα στὸ διάλογο τὴ σημασία κεντρικῶν λέξεων, ἀποδίδοντας στὸν Ἴωνα πράγματα καὶ ἰδέες πού ὁ Ἴων ποτὲ δὲν ἐξέφρασε, καί κατηγο-ρώντας αὐτὸν γιὰ κάτι πού δέν (...) ἔκανε αὐτὸς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ ἔκανε ὁ ἴδιος ὁ Σωκράτης. Δὲν προσφέρω καμμία “μαγικὴ θεραπεία”·φτάνει νὰ δείξω, πολὺ συχνὰ γιὰ πρώτη φορὰ, τὴν ὕπαρξη τέτοιων δυσκολιῶν. (shrink)

"De Divinatione" 1.115 has been ascribed in the past to Posidonius, to 'a Pythagoreanizing Posidonius', or to 'the Stoics'. Its emphasis on the soul's eternity and knowledge of 'all things in Hades and on earth' precludes such sources. I point out that the passage contains clear reminiscences of the myth of transmigration and ἀνάμνησις in Meno and of a passage in the myth of Er, probably combining them with "Republic" 571-2. No philosopher or school known to us could be Cicero's (...) source for such a combination, taking, as it does, such details of the Platonic myths as literal truths. I suggest that Cicero's source for this passage was some contemporary or slightly earlier 'Pythagoreanizing Platonist', whose identity can no longer be established. (shrink)

The first part of this article deals with two cases of what seems to be Aristotelian reminiscences in the works of Philo of Alexandria. A passage in Quod deterius and a passage in De agricultura show close verbal reminiscences to two passages in Book i of Nicomachean Ethics; and a passage in De migratione Abrahami shows verbal reminiscences to two passages in Book ii. Since it appears from Book v of De finibus that Antiochus of Ascalon had already read at (...) least parts of Nicomachean Ethics; and the first commentator on the Ethics, Aspasius, has clear references to some predecessors who had already read and discussed this work, I argue for the possibility that Philo also read the Nicomachean Ethics. The second part deals with an almost forgotten book review by Jacob Freudenthal, published in 1875, which argues that Philo was familiar with various parts of the Aristotelian corpus as we have it. I examine his detailed arguments and conclude that, with all due respect to a great scholar, they do not seem to prove his point. (shrink)

This book is an extended review of three Hebrew books by Samuel Scolnicov, showing their deficiencies in matters of basic Greek, basic facts, and philosophical sense and consistency.

Critolaus' parable of the two scales is reported by Cicero in two passages of his philosophical writings: Tusc. 5.51 and Fin. 5.91–2. Despite the extremely close verbal parallels, Wehrli has edited these passages as two separate fragments of Critolaus.1 cite the passages as in the Teubner editions of Pohlenz and Schiche.

Critolaus' parable of the two scales is reported by Cicero in two passages of his philosophical writings: Tusc. 5.51 and Fin. 5.91–2. Despite the extremely close verbal parallels, Wehrli has edited these passages as two separate fragments of Critolaus.1 cite the passages as in the Teubner editions of Pohlenz and Schiche.

The essays in this volume illustrate the passage and influence of Greek into Latin from the earliest period of Roman history until the end of the period in which Latin was a living literary language. They show how the Romans, however much they were influenced, to begin with, by the Greek literary language and Greek literature and its forms, were conscious of being not mere conquerors and rulers of the Greek world, but active participants in the further development of the (...) culture initiated by the Greeks; how the importance of ancient Greek culture continued to be felt, with greater and lesser emphasis, in the Western Middle Ages, and the reintroduction of the Greek language in Renaissance Europe only made this interest in the Greek heritage more pronounced; and how ancient Greek works were received and transformed into Latin at various stages in the process of the rediscovery of ancient Greek culture in the West. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 101 Heft: 1 Seiten: 135-144.

This article treats Plato’s Ion as a test-case. It is widely accepted in literature about Plato that he was a consistent and systematic thinker, whose dialogues express his views and complement each other, and that each dialogue has a main purport which the reader should discover or be told about by the commentator even before reading the dialogue. In the first section of this article, specimen passages from the literature on Plato are cited and discussed. In the second part I (...) point out some serious contradictions, sometimes bordering on dishonesty, in Socrates’ treatment of Ion, in the sequence of his arguments, and in his use of words in different senses without warning his interlocutor. The offshoot of it is that one cannot simply accept the consistent, dogmatic image of Plato the dogmatic preacher, and only reading the dialogue as drama may help us have a guess at what Plato is playing at. (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.

For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.

Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and ...

What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...) But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to. (shrink)

Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...) normative requirements with reasons. (shrink)

This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.

This new edition of the classic Contemporary Theories of Knowledge has been significantly updated to include analyses of the recent literature in epistemology.