(2007). Democracy Still Matters: A Response to the Rejoinder of my Review of Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New Imperialism: A Critical Pedagogy. Educational Studies: Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 180-182.

This paper discusses the work of Noam Chomsky in the context of democracy, the media, and education. Through the analysis of selected works, a critical perspective emerges. This view demands that educators at all levels understand and confront the often deleterious effects the media can have on students' social and political views and further how the media can undermine democratic action in schools and society.

This article analyzes the epistemological aims and justification of character education legislation passed by the North Carolina General Assembly. I take this specific state law as representative of the broader national trends in the character education movement. I primarily use the work of Richard Rorty as the theoretical lens for the analysis and critique. I conclude by commending aspects of the legislative effort, but I suggest that greater emphasis must be placed on strengthening students' ethics through democratic action inside and (...) outside schools and not on a right-leaning, conservative, and didactic curriculum. Further, as social foundations educators, it is imperative to make strides in our classrooms to expose preservice teachers to the apparent and hidden contradictions of using character education as a tool of educational reform. (shrink)

This article presents an overview and discussion of qualitative research in education by analyzing the roles of researchers, the history of the field, its use in policymaking, and its future influence on educational reform. The article begins by describing the unique position that qualitative educational researchers have in higher education, as they often attempt to serve both academic and policymaking audiences. The article then moves to discuss the ascent of qualitative methods in the social sciences and educational research. The article (...) concludes by attempting to work through a number of pressing concerns that qualitative researchers may face in upcoming decades; specifically, the final section presents possible strategies to improve the relevance and impact of qualitative researchers? work on reframing educational policy at local, state, and federal levels to meet the demands of equality and social justice. (shrink)

This article addresses the ongoing conflicts over the effectiveness of school choice in America's educational system. After discussing the ideological foundations of the school choice movement, I analyze four controversies where the research done to evaluate school choice programs was hotly debated and inconclusive. The central holding of the paper is that these disputes are indicative of an ideologically saturated policy environment, in which opposing factions are far too eager to either condemn or support a school choice program before it (...) has fully matured. I conclude by encouraging scholars and policymakers to examine factors beyond achievement, such as democratic participation and involvement, when considering school choice as an educational reform. (shrink)

The dormancy of American pragmatism is over. At least, this is what numerous articles and books have unequivocally stated in the decades since Richard Rorty gave up his belief in orthodox analytical epistemology and settled into his own brand of John Dewey's antifoundational epistemology. Even though Rorty's interpretation and manipulation of Dewey have been controversial, we are all the better for the revival of discourse around what pragmatism was, is, and will be. Robert Westbrook's Democratic Hope: Pragmatism and the Politics (...) of Truth (2005), a recent contribution to this revival, clearly demonstrates the value of a vibrant and robust tradition of pragmatism to American intellectual and public life. The depth of knowledge and passion for the subject matter that made Westbrook's magnum opus, John Dewey and American Democracy (1991), a landmark study are on display in this text as well. In both works, what makes... (shrink)

(2007). The Blackboard and The Bottom Line: Why Schools Can't Be Businesses. Larry Cuban. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. 253. $23.95. Educational Studies: Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 268-276.

Because of Professor Cooley's prosecutorial review, I want to make clear at the outset that my rejoinder is not a codefendant's answer to a plaintiff's replication. Instead, I first attempt to provide an ?immanent? analysis of Cooley's indictment, in the sense of dealing with what dwells within his reasoning. A specific philosophical definition of ?immanent? reads: taking place within the mind of the subject, but having no effect outside (this does not apply to me as an outsider). I (...) intend to battle with Cooley up close?no ?dancing??my defense against his offense. In the second part, the focus will be on what I think is missing from Cooley's attempt to discredit McLaren and Farahmandpur's book. His decision or failure to deal with what Marx and the most effective Marxists have written, and how some of this provided analyses that could be and/or was acted upon, may be more serious than his beating up on the book's authors. (shrink)

Aaron Zimmerman presents a new pragmatist account of belief, in terms of information poised to guide our more attentive, controlled actions. And he explores the consequences of this account for our understanding of the relation between psychology and philosophy, the mind and brain, the nature of delusion, faith, pretence, racism, and more.

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1909 Edition.

The fact that philosophy is systematic—that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected—was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. -/- I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are (...) rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism. (shrink)

This paper extends three decades of work arguing that researchers who discuss consciousness should not restrict themselves only to (adult) human minds, but should study (and attempt to model) many kinds of minds, natural and artificial, thereby contributing to our understanding of the space containing all of them. We need to study what they do or can do, how they can do it, and how the natural ones can be emulated in synthetic minds. That requires: (a) understanding sets of requirements (...) that are met by different sorts of minds, i.e. the niches that they occupy, (b) understanding the space of possible designs, and (c) understanding complex and varied relationships between requirements and designs. Attempts to model or explain any particular phenomenon, such as vision, emotion, learning, language use, or consciousness lead to muddle and confusion unless they are placed in that broader context. A methodology for making progress is summarised and a novel requirement proposed for a theory of how human minds work: the theory should support a single generic design for a learning, developing system that, in addition to meeting familiar requirements, should be capable of developing different and opposed philosophical viewpoints about consciousness, and the so-called hard problem. In other words, we need a common explanation for the mental machinations of mysterians, materialists, functionalists, identity theorists, and those who regard all such theories as attempting to answer incoherent questions. No designs proposed so far come close. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers lack the equivalent of an ethics committee to which their colleagues in the medical profession may turn when ethical dilemmas arise. In the US workers in aerospace industry have campaigned for a Technology Bill of Rights. In the UK there has been a vigorous movement around the concept of socially useful and environmentally desirable technology. The organisation Scientists for Social Responsibility has set up a panel of scientists who can advise younger colleagues on issues of ethical responsibility.

In their target article, McKay & Dennett (M&D) conclude that only “positive illusions” are adaptive misbeliefs. Relying on overly strict conceptual schisms (deficit vs. motivational, functional vs. organic, perception vs. belief), they prematurely discount delusions asbiologicallyadaptive. In contrast to their view that “motivation” plays a psychological but not a biological function in a two-factor model of the forming and maintenance of delusions, we propose asingleimpairment in prediction-error–driven (i.e., motivational) learning in three stages in which delusions play a biologically adaptive role.

From the bestselling author of Assholes: A Theory, a book that--in the tradition of Shopclass as Soulcraft, Barbarian Days and Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance--uses the experience and the ethos of surfing to explore key concepts in philosophy. The existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre once declared "the ideal limit of aquatic sports...is waterskiing." The avid surfer and lavishly credentialed academic philosopher Aaron James vigorously disagrees, and in Surfing with Sartre he intends to expound the thinking surfer's view of (...) the matter, in the process elucidating such philosophical categories as freedom, being, phenomenology, morality, epistemology, and even the emerging values of what he terms "leisure capitalism." In developing his unique surfer-philosophical worldview, he draws from his own experience of surfing and from surf culture and lingo, and includes many relevant details from the lives of the philosophers, from Aristotle to Wittgenstein, with whose thought he engages. In the process, he'll speak to readers in search of personal and social meaning in our current anxious moment, by way of doing real, authentic philosophy. (shrink)

I. Character of scientific knowledge -- motives -- II. Principles -- the two fundamental methods -- III. Positivism -- IV. Scientific analogy -- V. Criteria of truth -- VI. Matter -- quantity -- VII. Energy -- dynamism -- VIII. Mechanism -- IX. Law -- values -- X. Evolution -- XI. Postulates -- XII. Rationality of the world -- XIII. The external world.

Haskell Curry’s philosophy of mathematics is really a form of “structuralism” rather than “formalism” despite Curry’s own description of it as formalist (Seldin 2011). This paper explains Curry’s actual view by a formal analysis of a simple example. This analysis is extended to solve Keränen’s (2001) identity problem for structuralism, confirming Leitgeb’s (2020a, b) solution, and further clarifies structural ontology. Curry’s methods answer philosophical questions by employing a standard mathematical method, which is a virtue of the “methodological autonomy” emphasized by (...) Curry (1951, 1963) and more recently with greater clarity by Maddy (1997, 2007). (shrink)

Biological science uses multiple species concepts. Order can be brought to this diversity if we recognize two key features. First, any given species concept is likely to have a patchwork structure, generated by repeated application of the concept to new domains. We illustrate this by showing how two species concepts (biological and ecological) have been modified from their initial eukaryotic applications to apply to prokaryotes. Second, both within and between patches, distinct species concepts may interact and hybridize. We thus defend (...) a semantic picture of the species concept as a collection of interacting patchwork structures. Thus, although not all uses of the term pick out the same kind of unit in nature, the diversity of uses reflects something more than mere polysemy. We suggest that the emphasis on the use of species to pick out natural units is itself problematic, because that is not the term’s sole function. In particular, species concepts are used to manage inquiry into processes of speciation, even when these processes do not produce clearly delimited species. (shrink)

The topic of abortion has been extensively researched, and the research has produced a large number of arguments and discussions. Missing in the literature, however, are discussions of practices in some areas of the Developing or Third World. In this paper, we examine the morality of sex selection abortions in Kazakhstan's Kazakh culture, and argue that such abortions can be ethically justified based, in part, on the unique perspectives of Kazakh culture.

Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History explores the ways interpretation shaped the analytic tradition, from Frege to Dummet. It offers readers 17 chapters, written especially for this volume by an international cast of leading scholars. Some chapters are devoted to large, thematic issues like the relationship between analytic philosophy and other philosophical traditions such as British Idealism and phenomenology, while other chapters are tied to more fine-grained topics or to individual philosophers, like Moore and Russell on philosophical method or the history (...) of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s _Tractatus_. Throughout, the focus is on interpretations that are crucial to the origin, development, and persistence of the analytic tradition. The result is a more fully formed and philosophically satisfying portrait of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The trouble with theory and practice -- Preparing a place for a Peircean ethics -- Intelligent habits -- The metaphysics of habits -- Thinking of habits -- Self-controlled habits.

Introduction -- Logics of extraction -- Materialism & critical materialism -- Methodological parrhesia: truth-telling -- Methodological materiality: towards productive social change.

The American conservative movement is a force of anti-reflexivity insofar as it attacks two key elements of reflexive modernization: the environmental movement and environmental impact science. Learning from its mistakes in overtly attacking environmental regulations in the early 1980s, this counter-movement has subsequently exercised a more subtle form of power characterized by non-decision-making. We examine the conservative movement’s efforts to undermine climate science and policy in the USA over the last two decades by using this second dimension of power. The (...) conservative movement has employed four non-decision-making techniques to challenge the legitimacy of climate science and prevent progress in policy-making. We argue that reflexive modernization scholars should focus more attention on similar forces of anti-reflexivity that continue to shape the overall direction of our social, political and economic order, and the life chances of many citizens. Indeed, better understanding of the forces and effectiveness of anti-reflexivity may very well be crucial for societal resilience and adaptation, especially in the face of global environmental problems like climate change. (shrink)

Do powers have parts? Mereological thinking is typically guided by two different metaphors: building versus carving. The building picture treats wholes as constructed from fundamental bits; the carving treats wholes as the result of carving some interconnected space. After considering some suggestions for how to view powers as built from other components, this chapter opts for the carving picture and suggests that a mereology of powers can be generated by carving the underlying space of an interconnected web of fundamental powers. (...) The space of powers is a network of manifestation/triggering connections that can be modelled graph-theoretically where the identity of a fundamental power is importantly tied up with its position in the overall structure. This chapter considers the idea that powers are completely identified by their position in the structure (as pandispositionalists have thought), which then places limits on the sorts of structures that powers theorists can help themselves to. This chapter also considers another novel suggestion on the identity of powers borrowed from non-well-founded set theory. It shows how to identify principles governing ‘carving’ the web into groups of closely connected powers, such that one group can naturally be called ‘part’ of another group, and explore the resulting mereology. (shrink)

In Sounds, Ecologies, Musics, authors pose exciting challenges and provide fresh opportunities for scholars, scientists, environmental activists, and musicians to consider music and sound from ecological standpoints. The book covers topics such as how environment enables music and sound, how music and sound relate to Western environmental science, and mutidisciplinary collaborations among scholars.