O'Donnell, J. R. Anton Charles Pegis on the occasion of his retirement.--Conlan, W. J. The definition of faith according to a question of MS. Assisi 138: study and edition of text.--Spade, P. V. Five logical tracts by Richard Lavenham.--Maurer, A. Henry of Harclay's disputed question on the plurality of forms.--Brown, V. Giovanni Argiropulo on the agent intellect: an edition of Ms. Magliabecchi V 42.--Synan, E. A. The Exortacio against Peter Abelard's Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum.--Fitzgerald, W. Nugae Hyginianae.--Sheehan, M. (...) M. Marriage and family in English conciliar and synodal legislation.--Shook, L. K. Riddles relating to the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium.--Boyle, L. E. The De regno and the two powers.--Colledge, E. A Middle English Christological poem.--Gough, M. R. E. Three forgotten martyrs of Anazarbus in Cilicia.--Häring, N. Chartres and Paris revisited.--Hayes, W. Greek recentiores, (Ps.) Basil, Adversus eunomium, IV-V.--Owens, J. The physical world of Parmenides. (shrink)

The book is consists of lectures by Reginald O. Kapp, known as Riddle Memorial Lectures.

This is all the more necessary because, more often than not, the context in which the three words occur together is a philosophical one and I do not, in these ...

Excerpts: THIS book is an attempt to solve, in a way which any interested layman can understand, a problem which has been hotly debated throughout the centuries. Is Matter the only reality? Philosophers, theologians, scientists as well as others who can lay claim to no specialized knowledge, but whose concerns range beyond the petty tasks each day brings forth, have all said their say. And some of them have said yes, others no. Those who say yes are called materialists. Those (...) who say no have no collective name. They all believe that there are other things besides Matter, but they are not all interested in the same things. "Matter is not everything," say many philosophers. "There is also Mind. This can be proved to have a separate existence." "Matter is not everything," say the theologians. "There are also a God and the Souls of men. Those who do not realize this will fail to seek that spiritual guidance which alone can raise men above the level of brute creation." "Matter is not everything," say various idealists. Among them are teachers, moralists, poets. These insist on the non-material reality of "higher things," of beauty, truth and goodness. In the materialism of our age they see the risk that mankind may ignore those things which make life most worth living. Values disappear, or, at least, have but a precarious existence in materialistic doctrine, so that, to the idealist, it seems that the materialist says: "What harm if the temple be destroyed? The stones remain." "Yes, Matter is everything. Science proves it," says the materialist to this heterogeneous collection of opponents with their various interests, their various reasons for opposing him, their various ways of saying what they think. And always he feels a little contemptuous since they base their beliefs on considerations which he does not regard as valid. Their attitude seems to him to be due to ignorance and prejudice. For they fail to build as he does, or believe he does, "on the facts of science."... In this book we want to revive the old controversy and to do so in such a way as to secure the attention of both sides. We want to provide both with a common meeting ground or shall we call it a battleground? We want to put an end to the complacency with which those who hold tenaciously to their own opinions talk much and write much, but listen only to themselves or to those with whom they agree. At the same time we do not intend to seek a compromise. We shall take sides and offer our services (for what they may be worth) wholeheartedly to those who are opposed to materialism. (shrink)

Leibniz maintained that even though God knows absolutely for certain that an individual will actually act in a certain way, the individual could act otherwise. In my book I argue that Leibniz meant both that God consistently conceives of actual individuals acting otherwise and that God has the efficient power, even if not, in the end, the will power, to execute those conceptions. I also argue that the seemingly intractable feeling philosophers such as Nachtomy have that Leibniz’s doctrine of complete (...) concepts precludes this “real alternative” conception of di vine creative freedom is due to their misrepresenting or distorting that doctrine. (shrink)

Leibniz maintained that even though God knows absolutely for certain that an individual will actually act in a certain way, the individual could act otherwise. In my book I argue that Leibniz meant both that God consistently conceives of actual individuals acting otherwise and that God has the efficient power, even if not, in the end, the will power, to execute those conceptions. I also argue that the seemingly intractable feeling philosophers such as Nachtomy have that Leibniz’s doctrine of complete (...) concepts precludes this “real alternative” conception of di vine creative freedom is due to their misrepresenting or distorting that doctrine. (shrink)

Leibniz maintained that even though God knows absolutely for certain that an individual will actually act in a certain way, the individual could act otherwise. In my book I argue that Leibniz meant both that God consistently conceives of actual individuals acting otherwise and that God has the efficient power, even if not, in the end, the will power, to execute those conceptions. I also argue that the seemingly intractable feeling philosophers such as Nachtomy have that Leibniz’s doctrine of complete (...) concepts precludes this “real alternative” conception of di vine creative freedom is due to their misrepresenting or distorting that doctrine. (shrink)