Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such "moral saints" as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Shindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures.

Two models of assertion are described and their epistemological implications considered. The assurance model draws a parallel between the ethical norms surrounding promising and the epistemic norms which facilitate the transmission of testimonial knowledge. This model is rejected in favour of the view that assertion transmits knowledge by expressing belief. I go on to compare the epistemology of testimony with the epistemology of memory.

This authoritative Handbook brings together experts with backgrounds in philosophy, sociology, law, public policy and the health professions and reflects the increasing impact of globalization and the dynamic advances in the fields of ...

In Measuring the Immeasurable Mind: Where Contemporary Neuroscience Meets the Aristotelian Tradition, Matthew Owen argues that despite its nonphysical character, it is possible to empirically detect and measure consciousness. -/- Toward the end of the previous century, the neuroscience of consciousness set its roots and sprouted within a materialist milieu that reduced the mind to matter. Several decades later, dualism is being dusted off and reconsidered. Although some may see this revival as a threat to consciousness science aimed at (...) measuring the conscious mind, Owen argues that measuring consciousness, along with the medical benefits of such measurements, is not ruled out by consciousness being nonphysical. Owen proposes the Mind-Body Powers model of neural correlates of consciousness, which is informed by Aristotelian causation and a substance dualist view of human nature inspired by Thomas Aquinas, who often followed Aristotle. In addition to explaining why there are neural correlates of consciousness, the model provides a philosophical foundation for empirically discerning and quantifying consciousness. En route to presenting and applying the Mind-Body Powers model to neurobiology, Owen rebuts longstanding objections to dualism related to the mind-body problem. With scholarly precision and readable clarity, Owen applies an oft forgotten yet richly developed historical vantage point to contemporary cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

Imagine you were running a medical non-governmental organization (NGO) established to preserve the lives of poverty-stricken people in resource poor countries. Your NGO is also usually among the first to provide emergency assistance in case natural emergencies such as tsunamis strike. However, you did notice that agencies evaluating your efficiency1 give you a below-average ranking. That is a worry to your fundraising staff, mostly because you rely on donations and such ratings are said to impact eventually negatively, on your capacity (...) to raise cash. You investigate what the problem is, and it turns out that the ratings agency is critical of your policy of responding mostly in cases of high-impact disasters such as earthquakes, floods or civil wars, because they invariably require a highly resource intensive intervention. The agency's verdict is that, on the same capital outlay, you could preserve more lives in developing countries if you aimed at establishing medium- to long-term health delivery solutions, including setting up primary health care facilities, beginning vaccination programs, and other such relatively low-cost means. Chartering private jets to fly emergency teams in response to disaster also preserves lives deserving to be rescued, the ratings agency says, but it demonstrably results in a substantially lower number of lives preserved than you could preserve if you dropped such actions in favor of working toward better health care delivery infrastructure in the countries you usually serve. (shrink)

The demand for bodily parts such as organs is increasing, and individuals in certain circumstances are responding by offering parts of their bodies for sale. Is there anything wrong in this? Kant had arguments to suggest that there is, namely that we have duties towards our own bodies, among which is the duty not to sell parts of them. Kant's reasons for holding this view are examined, and found to depend on a notion of what is intrinsically degrading. Rom Harré's (...) recent revision of Kant's argument, in terms of an obligation to preserve the body's organic integrity, is considered. Harré's view does not rule out all acts of selling, but he too ultimately depends on a test of what is intrinsically degrading. Both his view and Kant's are rejected in favour of a view which argues that it does make sense to speak of duties towards our own bodies, grounded in the duty to promote the flourishing of human beings, including ourselves. This provides a reason for opposing the sale of bodily parts, and the current trend towards the market ethic in health care provision. (shrink)

Unlike many other animals, human beings enjoy freedom of action. They are capable of acting freely because they have certain psychological capacities which other animals lack. In this paper, I argue that the crucial capacity here is our ability to make practical judgements; to make judgements about what we ought to do. A number of other writers share this view but they treat practical judgement as a form of belief. Since, as I argue, we don't control our beliefs, that undermines (...) this model of human freedom. I suggest a different account of practical judgement, according to which they are cognitive states but not beliefs and I show how this provides us with a better model of practical freedom. (shrink)

The first book-length treatment in English of Habermas’s theory of social evolution and progress.

Augustine was arguably the greatest early Christian philosopher. His teachings had a profound effect on Medieval scholarship, Renaissance humanism, and the religious controversies of both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Here, Henry Chadwick places Augustine in his philosophical and religious context and traces the history of his influence on Western thlught, both within and beyond the Christian tradition. -- PUBLISHER DESCRIPTION.

Despite the recent increased emphasis on ethics in health care, the subject of community health care is rarely specifically addressed. Yet it is in the community that many ethical issues arise, both in the particular practice situation and in the wider social issues connected with changes in government policy. This edited text discusses these questions and looks at the whole range of community health nursing in the UK. The multidisciplinary group of contributors explore the issues of theory and practice that (...) arise in community health care. They encourage critical reflection on the differences between hospital-based care and community care. Everyday issues are addressed that confront health practitioners working in the community, such as discrimination, mental health, standard setting, rationing in health care, public health, health promotion and discharge decision making. This book will be essential reading for practitioners on post-registration courses in community health and students following courses in health care ethics and nursing studies. (shrink)

This is the first critical edition of a fascinating medieval work on music, written in Iraq in the tenth century. It is accompanied by an English translation and full annotation. The Epistle examines not just the technical, scientific, and mathematical aspects of music, but its cosmic, psychological, and spiritual dimensions.

Nick Bostrom and others have suggested treating decision-making under moral uncertainty as analogous to parliamentary decision-making. The core suggestion of this “parliamentary approach” is that the competing moral theories function like delegates to the parliament, and that these delegates then make decisions by some combination of bargaining and voting. There seems some reason to hope that such an approach might avoid standard objections to existing approaches (for example, the “maximise expected choiceworthiness” (MEC) and “my favourite theory” approaches). However, the parliamentary (...) approach is so far extremely underspecified, making it largely indeterminate how such a model will in fact behave in the respects that those concerned with moral uncertainty care about. This paper explores one way of making it precise. We treat predicaments of moral uncertainty as analogous to bargaining situations alone (setting aside voting), and apply a version of the Nash solution that is standard in bargaining theory. The resulting model does indeed perform in many of the hoped-for ways. However, so also does a version of MEC that employs a structural approach to intertheoretic comparisons. It seems to us an open question which, regarding this version of MEC and the bargaining-theoretic approach, is superior to the other. We identify the key points on which the two differ. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Problem of Normative Power Consent and Choice Promise, Consent and Normative Interests Permissive Interests.

In Morality Bernard Williams confronts the problems of writing moral philosophy, and offers a stimulating alternative to more systematic accounts which seem nevertheless to have left all the important issues somewhere off the page.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.4 (2004) 299-301 [Access article in PDF] The Right Not to Know: A Challenge for Accurate Self-Assessment Ruth F. Chadwick Anderson and Lux present a very interesting and thought-provoking argument for the view that accurate self-assessment is a requirement for personal autonomy. What I want to suggest is that although this may be helpful in the context with which these authors are primarily concerned, (...) namely psychiatry and brain dysfunction, it is of less value to an account of autonomy more widely construed. I want to look at a possible counterexample, taken from another area of medicine, namely genetics.Toward the end of their article Anderson and Lux consider three objections to their position. I shall not discuss them all. My concern is with the third, that inaccurate self-assessment sometimes promotes autonomy, because knowing the truth about one's weaknesses is sometimes very debilitating. It is commonly argued that "you can if you think you can" and vice versa. As they point out, there are some complex issues involved here, in that if the result of the positive thinking is the ability to do the thing in question, then how can the self-assessment be deemed to have been inaccurate in the first place? They go on, however, to say that "it is unclear that inflated self-assessments yield benefits in contexts where what is required is not just effort but competence" (290).Now it has been argued, by some, in the context of genetics, that the proper understanding of autonomy may imply a "right not to know" facts about oneself. In other words, this is not just a matter of accurate or inaccurate assessment of the relevant facts about oneself; rather, what may be involved is a deliberate decision not to have access to facts that may be relevant to that assessment. There are clearly cases in which genetic information appears to be pertinent to an accurate self-assessment, as the following example suggests. Suppose there is information "available", through genetic testing, that would affect one's chances of having children, or of having children without a particular genetic disorder, and, knowing that such information is available, a couple decides not to avail themselves of this. This is clearly an inaccurate self-assessment, but is their autonomy compromised?It might be thought that the reasons for this decision not to know could be relevant. If they have no family history of any particular genetic disorder, it could be regarded as subjectively reasonable to decline such testing as might be offered. Anderson and Lux, however, argue that whether or not a self-assessment is accurate depends on externalities. In other words, A's self-assessment is not to be assessed as accurate, or [End Page 299] not, according to what it is subjectively reasonable to believe; it has to be measured against the facts. The more that the possibilities of genetic testing increase, the more that "facts" of this nature will be available, including in the context of psychiatry.It might be objected that genetic information is not the type of information that is relevant in this context. In so far as it is predictive and probabilistic it is, arguably, different from the type of diagnostic information involved in the cases discussed by Anderson and Lux. It is not the place here, however, to discuss in general terms the thesis of "genetic exceptionalism" with regard to medical information. The important point is refusal of access to information that may be relevant to an accurate self-assessment. Historically, people have been mistaken in their self-assessment because of lack of information—for example, lack of understanding of facts about the reproduction process has led individuals automatically to blame the woman partner of a couple for infertility. And, as Anderson and Lux rightly point out, being autonomous is compatible with making mistakes, and indeed requires the freedom to make mistakes, it would look rather different if a person continued to hold this without any attempt to avail himself of the relevant—and now available—information... (shrink)

The term “industrial action” includes any noncooperation with management, such as strict “working to rule,” refusal of certain duties, going slow, and ultimately withdrawal of labor. The latter form of action, striking, has posed particular problems for professional ethics, especially in those professions that provide healthcare, because of the potential impact on patients' well-being. Examination of the issues, however, displays a difference in response between the healthcare professions, in particular between doctors and nurses. In considering the ethics of industrial (especially (...) strike) action there are various aspects of professional ethics to consider: (1) whether there is a tension between industrial action and the very notion of professional ethics; (2) what specific issues arise in the case of healthcare professions; (3) what, if anything, can explain and/or justify different responses from the medical and nursing professions? (shrink)

This paper examines the learning and performance of the air traffic control (ATC) work domain. This domain was chosen because it embodies features that represent future work for many other industries (e.g., information service provision mediated by information technologies; a high reliance on communication skills and collaborative work; increasing complexity and intensity of the work activity), within an organisational context undergoing considerable change. In ATC work learning occurs formally as part of accredited training and informally, as part of everyday practice. (...) In this way learning and experience of ATC work shapes – and is shaped by – the way work is organised, which includes the divisions of labour and technological artefacts. ATC work is experienced temporally, complexly, through affect and socially. Controllers learn to use a variety of socio-material resources which include embodiment and artefacts to undertake the work. In so doing the article demonstrates the ways in which learning and performance is not just a cognitive undertaking, but one that draws on embodiment to achieve what here is called “interdependent sentience”. This involves using all their senses to gain an awareness of problems as they emerge to collectively accomplish a seamless air traffic flow in a complex interdependent socio-technical system. (shrink)

Studying Lacan's Seminar VII offers a contemporary, critically informed set of analyses of Lacan's ethics seminar and astute reflections about what Lacan's ethics offers to the field of psychoanalytic thought today. The volume interrogates the seminar with fresh voices and situated curiosities and perspectives, making for a compellingly exciting range of explorations of the crucial matters related to an ethics of psychoanalysis. The essays question and tease out the paradoxes Lacan draws attention to in his seminar of 1959-1960, and in (...) addition, offer radical engagements with the seminar in light of theories of racism, inequality, capitalism, education, and subjectivity. The key elements in Lacan's seminar are explained, debated, and reconsidered with Antigone, das Ding, and the inevitable "ne ceder pas sur son desir" duly unpacked, examined, and ruminated upon. Studying Lacan's Seminar VII will be of interest to psychoanalytic scholars and students of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as psychoanalytic therapists and analysts. It will also be of interest to scholars and students of politics, philosophy, and studies at the intersections of racism, film, feminism, sociology, gender and queer theory. (shrink)

A historical review -- Contemplative practices in higher education -- Challenges and replies to contemplative methods -- Contemplative research -- The contemplative mind : a vision of higher education for the 21st century.

Joanna Leidenhag’s research monograph Minding Creation: Theological Panpsychism and the Doctrine of Creation argues that theologians should seriously consider and perhaps even support panpsychism. In light of rekindled interest in panpsychism amongst philosophers of mind and a noteworthy minority of cognitive neuroscientists, which comes in the wake of physicalism’s faltering, Leidenhag’s thesis is timely. This work briefly analyzes some key aspects of Minding Creation.

This chapter contains sections titled: Learning Difference Against Ignoring Difference I Am Because We Are and We Are Because I Am Practicing Just Parenting Teaching Alienation? Notes.

Arguing that the importance of painting and other visual art for Benjamin's epistemology has yet to be appreciated, Weigel undertakes the first systematic analysis of their significance to his thought. She does so by exploring Benjamin's dialectics of secularization, an approach that allows Benjamin to explore the simultaneous distance from and orientation towards revelation and to deal with the difference and tensions between religious and profane ideas. In the process, Weigel identifies the double reference of 'life' to both nature and (...) to a 'supernatural' sphere as a guiding concept of Benjamin's writings. Sensitive to the notorious difficulty of translating his language, she underscores just how much is lost in translation, particularly with regard to religious connotations. The book thus positions Benjamin with respect to the other European thinkers at the heart of current discussions of sovereignty and martyrdom, of holy and creaturely life. It corrects misreadings, including Agamben's staging of an affinity between Benjamin and Schmitt, and argues for the closeness of Benjamin's work to that of Aby Warburg, with whom Benjamin unsuccessfully attempted an intellectual exchange. (shrink)

After #MeToo, academics have become increasingly focused on the liberal concept of consent. Either problematized as a means of distinguishing between sex and rape, or vaunted as a tool for having better sex, consent remains central to discussions of sexual violence. Returning to Andrea Dworkin’s thought, this article argues that contemporary feminists must move beyond consent and recenter the problem of violence to theorize rape. Dworkin, alongside Catharine MacKinnon and Carole Pateman, critiques consent for disguising the violence of rape, sex, (...) and pornography. By defining violence as a process of objectification, Dworkin exposes rape, pornography, and most controversially, consensual heterosexual intercourse as “a new kind of death.” She, in turn, calls for the feminist exercise of violence as a tactic of disclosure that promises to make visible patriarchal violence hidden by consent and sexualization. Moving beyond consent to recenter the problem of violence, I conclude, opens up new avenues for feminist action and brings into view the seemingly unthinkable possibility of a world without rape. (shrink)

Heraclitus accepts as a principle that any particular insight into things is necessarily partial and perspectival. Edward Halper has discussed how, for this reason, it is in principle impossible for a particular thinker to attain the perspective of the Logos by which the whole can be made intelligible. So, metaphysics itself tells us that metaphysics is impossible. According to Halper, Heraclitus was wrong to take the Logos as applying to itself, as the Logos should properly be understood as applying only (...) to what is not a product of human agency. I argue that Halper’s move cannot serve as a corrective patch to Heraclitus’ metaphysical thought, since it posits a distinction between the human and the rest of reality which Heraclitus could never accept. Although not a radical monist who denies the reality of all multiplicity, a fundamental principle of his thought is that all distinctions and oppositions are grounded in a more fundamental unity. I instead approach the Heraclitean paradox by appealing to the strategy, familiar from a number of ancient Greek philosophers, of making a distinction between different levels of knowledge inherent within the same knower. (shrink)