RÉSUMÉ: Cet article questionne la relation de pensée entre Martin Heidegger et Ernst Jünger. Pour comprendre les motifs philosophiques qui la sous-tendent, nous situons Jünger dans la reconstruction heideggérienne de la métaphysique. On s’aperçoit alors que Heidegger mesure la pensée de Jünger en fonction de la place de Nietzsche dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Parce que Jünger appartient au paradigme nietzschéen, Heidegger le juge digne d’être lu, et critiqué, car Jünger n’a pas accompli le projet que Nietzsche a rendu possible (...) en signant l’achèvement de la métaphysique. C’est ce projet que Heidegger a adapté, en menant la pensée philosophique par-delà la métaphysique et en espérant un renouveau civilisationnel de l’Allemagne. Nietzsche se présente comme le pôle central de la relation entre Heidegger et Jünger: à travers sa lecture critique de Jünger, Heidegger mène un dialogue ininterrompu avec Nietzsche.ABSTRACT: This article investigates Martin Heidegger’s intellectual relation to Ernst Jünger. In order to show that Heidegger’s appraisal of Jünger is directly related to his understanding of Nietzsche’s pre-eminent standing in the history of Western philosophy, I situate Jünger in the Heideggerian reconstruction of the history of metaphysics. It is because Jünger belongs to the Nietzschean paradigm that Heidegger believes he is worth reading-but also worth criticizing Indeed, Jünger did not overtake the philosophical project that Nietzsche made possible by accomplishing the end of metaphysics. This is the very project adopted by Heidegger, first by thinking beyond metaphysics, and second by hoping Germany would turn towards a spiritual renewal of its civilization. Thus, since Nietzsche is the central figure who stands between Heidegger and Jünger, this article wishes to show that through his critical reading of Jünger, Heidegger in fact fosters a fundamental and uninterrupted dialogue with Nietzsche. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article questionne la relation de pensée entre Martin Heidegger et Ernst Jünger. Pour comprendre les motifs philosophiques qui la sous-tendent, nous situons Jünger dans la reconstruction heideggérienne de la métaphysique. On s’aperçoit alors que Heidegger mesure la pensée de Jünger en fonction de la place de Nietzsche dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Parce que Jünger appartient au paradigme nietzschéen, Heidegger le juge digne d’être lu, et critiqué, car Jünger n’a pas accompli le projet que Nietzsche a rendu possible (...) en signant l’achèvement de la métaphysique. C’est ce projet que Heidegger a adapté, en menant la pensée philosophique par-delà la métaphysique et en espérant un renouveau civilisationnel de l’Allemagne. Nietzsche se présente comme le pôle central de la relation entre Heidegger et Jünger: à travers sa lecture critique de Jünger, Heidegger mène un dialogue ininterrompu avec Nietzsche.ABSTRACT: This article investigates Martin Heidegger’s intellectual relation to Ernst Jünger. In order to show that Heidegger’s appraisal of Jünger is directly related to his understanding of Nietzsche’s pre-eminent standing in the history of Western philosophy, I situate Jünger in the Heideggerian reconstruction of the history of metaphysics. It is because Jünger belongs to the Nietzschean paradigm that Heidegger believes he is worth reading-but also worth criticizing Indeed, Jünger did not overtake the philosophical project that Nietzsche made possible by accomplishing the end of metaphysics. This is the very project adopted by Heidegger, first by thinking beyond metaphysics, and second by hoping Germany would turn towards a spiritual renewal of its civilization. Thus, since Nietzsche is the central figure who stands between Heidegger and Jünger, this article wishes to show that through his critical reading of Jünger, Heidegger in fact fosters a fundamental and uninterrupted dialogue with Nietzsche. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article questionne la relation de pensée entre Martin Heidegger et Ernst Jünger. Pour comprendre les motifs philosophiques qui la sous-tendent, nous situons Jünger dans la reconstruction heideggérienne de la métaphysique. On s’aperçoit alors que Heidegger mesure la pensée de Jünger en fonction de la place de Nietzsche dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Parce que Jünger appartient au paradigme nietzschéen, Heidegger le juge digne d’être lu, et critiqué, car Jünger n’a pas accompli le projet que Nietzsche a rendu possible (...) en signant l’achèvement de la métaphysique. C’est ce projet que Heidegger a adapté, en menant la pensée philosophique par-delà la métaphysique et en espérant un renouveau civilisationnel de l’Allemagne. Nietzsche se présente comme le pôle central de la relation entre Heidegger et Jünger: à travers sa lecture critique de Jünger, Heidegger mène un dialogue ininterrompu avec Nietzsche.ABSTRACT: This article investigates Martin Heidegger’s intellectual relation to Ernst Jünger. In order to show that Heidegger’s appraisal of Jünger is directly related to his understanding of Nietzsche’s pre-eminent standing in the history of Western philosophy, I situate Jünger in the Heideggerian reconstruction of the history of metaphysics. It is because Jünger belongs to the Nietzschean paradigm that Heidegger believes he is worth reading-but also worth criticizing Indeed, Jünger did not overtake the philosophical project that Nietzsche made possible by accomplishing the end of metaphysics. This is the very project adopted by Heidegger, first by thinking beyond metaphysics, and second by hoping Germany would turn towards a spiritual renewal of its civilization. Thus, since Nietzsche is the central figure who stands between Heidegger and Jünger, this article wishes to show that through his critical reading of Jünger, Heidegger in fact fosters a fundamental and uninterrupted dialogue with Nietzsche. (shrink)

Cet article propose une lecture parallèle du premier essai de Friedrich Nietzsche, La naissance de la tragédie (1872), et du premier roman de Jean-Paul Sartre, La nausée (1938). L’auteure propose de dégager les sources nietzschéennes de la pensée sartrienne en montrant que La nausée est un roman nietzschéen. Dans son roman, qui relate les étapes de l’expérience existentielle que traverse le narrateur, Antoine Roquentin, Sartre a mis en situation un processus de prise de conscience de la vérité que Nietzsche a (...) décrit au début des années 1870. En effet, l’auteure du présent article montre que le parcours sartrien de la conscience nihiliste, tel qu’il est illustré dans La nausée , recoupe les étapes du processus de prise de conscience de la vérité que Nietzsche a décrit au début des années 1870. Sartre et Nietzsche s’entendent quant aux formes que prennent la vérité et la découverte de celle-ci. Afin de dégager le nietzschéisme de Sartre, l’auteure décrit d’abord les étapes du processus qui est décrit par Nietzsche en 1872, pour ensuite souligner que ce processus sous-tend le déroulement du roman de Sartre, ainsi qu’en témoignent les étapes de la transformation existentielle de Roquetin. En montrant que le Sartre de La nausée est un nietzschéen conséquent, cette étude dégage un terrain d’entente entre Sartre et Nietzsche quant à la détermination de la vérité et à la création. Cet article espère ainsi contribuer à l’étude de la complexe réception de la pensée nietzschéenne au 20e siècle. (shrink)

Les philosophes accordent peu d’importance au genre de la préface, qu’ils peuvent tenir pour extérieur à l’œuvre proprement philosophique. Le fait que Nietzsche ait écrit plus de préfaces que de livres et l’importance qu’il leur accordait conduisent à reconsidérer ce point de vue. Replacées dans ses stratégies éditoriales, les préfaces de Nietzsche, dont la fonction est performative, montrent l’imbrication de la production et de la réception dans une œuvre ouverte au lecteur : elles mettent en scène l’exercice de la philosophie (...) pour inciter le lecteur à faire lui-même cette « expérience vécue ». (shrink)

Afin de montrer qu'il faut situer le début du processus de réception de l'œuvre nietzschéenne avant les années 1980, cet article dépouille les études critiques et les recensions de cette œuvre, parues dans les pays germanophones entre 1872 et 1889. Une étude statistique révèle que Nietzsche était connu pour ses écrits sur Wagner et sa première Inactuelle. Le dépouillement de l'importante réception de l'essai sur D. F. Strauss montre que les critiques de l'époque s'intéressaient à cet essai en fonction de (...) son actualité: les divers griefs qui lui sond faits voient notamment la première Inactuelle comme un écrit schopenhauerien en continuité avec la querelle entourant La naissance de la tragédie. En grande patrie critique, la première réception des écrits nietzschéens montre que le statut philosophique qui fut accordé à lœvre et à son auteur est le résultat d'un long processus d'appropriation par le combat.Dieser Artikel wertet kritische Studien und Rezensionen von Nietzsches Werk aus,d ie zwischen 1872 und 1889 im deutschen Sprahraum erschienen sind. Es soll veranschaulicht werden, dass der Beginn des Rezeptionsprozesses seiner Werke bereits vor den 1890er Jahren leigt. Eine statistische Auswertung des Materials zeigt, dass Nietzsche für sein Schriften über Wagner und seine ersten Unzeitgemässen Betrachtungen bekannt war und sein Essais über D. F. Struß aufgrund seiner Aktualität für Kritiker interessant war. Die erste Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung wurde als eine schopenhauerische Forzetzung des Streits um Die geburt der Tragödie betrachtet. In den ersten kritischen Rezeptionen von Nietzsches Werken wird deutlich, dass der Status, der Autor und Werk in der Philosophie zugeteilt wurde, das Ergebnis eines langen Prozesses von Aneignung durch Kampf ist. (shrink)

This paper seeks to circumscribe the concepts, sources, and limits of Nietzsche’s early ethical thought through a reconstruction of his ethical "symptomatology." In the 1870s, Nietzsche stressed that the Greeks understood the true nature of the political phenomenon, and that this could correct fundamental errors that were responsible for the illness of German culture. His definition of the Greek ethos radically challenges modern democratic politics through a reassertion of aristocratic, heroic, and agonistic values. But because Nietzsche did not systematically describe (...) his early ethics, a reconstruction is necessary. His metaphor of the philosopher as a “physician of culture” is a guide for this reconstruction. Using concepts of wellness and illness, Nietzsche identified different symptoms and possible remedies, and hoped to cure German culture through a therapeutic transvaluation of modernity. To reconstruct this symptomatology I turn to The Greek State, Homer’s Contest, and The Birth of Tragedy. First, I define the notions of “agon” and “eris” that are central to his reading of Greek ethics. I then describe four ethical symptoms and their remedies. I conclude with interpretative hypotheses that address issues that were left unanswered by Nietzsche. This symptomatology shows that his reading of Greek ethics functions as a radical—albeit fragmentary—normative critique of his time, and of our democratic age. (shrink)

Martine Béland’s Kulturkritik et philosophie thérapeutique chez le jeune Nietzsche is an important contribution to the scholarly literature on Nietzsche in at least two respects. First, it exposes the therapeutic dimension of Nietzsche’s thought, which, despite recent interest, is a topic that remains largely unexplored. Second, it focuses on Nietzsche’s earliest writings, which tend to be—with the notable exception of The Birth of Tragedy—the least widely read of his...

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

On Inception is a translation of Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 70. This work belongs to the crucial period, before and during WWII, when Heidegger was at work on a series of treatises that begins with "Contributions to Philosophy" and includes "The Event" and "The History of Beyng." These works are difficult, even hermetic, but represent a crucial development in Heidegger's thinking. On Inception deepens the investigation underway in the other volumes of the series and provides a unique perspective on Heidegger's thinking (...) of Being and of Event. Here, Heidegger asks, with a greater insistence than anywhere else in his work, what it might mean to think of being as event, and not as presence. Event cannot be thought without the sense of a beginning - an inception - and so, Heidegger insists, we must try to think of being as inception, as fundamentally inceptive. On Inception pursues rigorously the difficult and puzzling implications of this speculation. It does not merely extend work already undertaken but also opens doors onto wholly other pathways. (shrink)

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence (AI) system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with (...) the particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

Over the past three decades, the philosophy of biology has emerged from the shadow of the philosophy of physics to become a respectable and thriving philosophical subdiscipline. The authors take a fresh look at the life sciences and the philosophy of biology from a strictly realist and emergentist-naturalist perspective. They outline a unified and science-oriented philosophical framework that enables the clarification of many foundational and philosophical issues in biology. This book will be of interest both to life scientists and philosophers.

We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...) aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy reflects his famous philosophical "turning." In this work, Heidegger returns to the question of being from its inception in Being and Time to a new questioning of being as event.

What exactly is hope and how does it influence our decisions? In How We Hope, Adrienne Martin presents a novel account of hope, the motivational resources it presupposes, and its function in our practical lives. She contends that hoping for an outcome means treating certain feelings, plans, and imaginings as justified, and that hope thereby involves sophisticated reflective and conceptual capacities. Martin develops this original perspective on hope--what she calls the "incorporation analysis"--in contrast to the two dominant philosophical conceptions of (...) hope: the orthodox definition, where hoping for an outcome is simply desiring it while thinking it possible, and agent-centered views, where hoping for an outcome is setting oneself to pursue it. In exploring how hope influences our decisions, she establishes that it is not always a positive motivational force and can render us complacent. She also examines the relationship between hope and faith, both religious and secular, and identifies a previously unnoted form of hope: normative or interpersonal hope. When we place normative hope in people, we relate to them as responsible agents and aspire for them to overcome challenges arising from situation or character. Demonstrating that hope merits rigorous philosophical investigation, both in its own right and in virtue of what it reveals about the nature of human emotion and motivation, How We Hope offers an original, sustained look at a largely neglected topic in philosophy. (shrink)

A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...) second idea – but I make a case here that it is the first idea that should be given up. As I shall show, there are a number of independent arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th Century. A major figure in the development of phenomenology, his work also profoundly influenced many of the intellectual movements that followed in his wake, from Sartre's Existentialism to Derrida's deconstructionism. Towards the Definition of Philosophy brings together two seminal lectures that mark a breakthrough moment in Heidegger's thought and introduces the major themes that he would develop in his opus Being and Time.

A landmark discussion between two great thinkers, vital to an understanding of twentieth-century philosophy and intellectual history.

This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that (...) passage can flip one fact into a contrary fact, even though neither side of the temporal passage is privileged over the other. We can make sense of this if the world is inherently perspectival. Such an inherently perspectival world is characterized by fragmentalism, a view that has been introduced by Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’ (2005). Unlike Fine's tense-theoretic fragmentalism though, the proposed view will be a fragmentalist view based in a primitive notion of passage. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation presents crucial elements for understanding Heidegger's thinking from 1936 to 1940. Heidegger offers a radically different reading of a text that he had read decades earlier, showing how his relationship with Nietzche's has changed, as well as how his understandings of the differences between animals and humans, temporality and history, and the Western philosophical tradition developed. With his new reading, Heidegger delineates three Nietzschean modes of history, which should be understood as grounded in the (...) structure of temporality or historicity and also offers a metaphysical determination of life and the essence of humankind. Ullrich Hasse and Mark Sinclair offer a clear and accessible translation despite the fragmentary and disjointed quality of the original lecture notes that comprise this text. (shrink)

This book provides the first systematic presentation of anthropology's 'ontological turn', placing it in the landscape of contemporary social theory.

The Liar paradox arises when we consider a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. If such self-referential sentences exist? and examples like?This sentence is not true? certainly suggest this?, then our logic and standard notion of truth allow to infer a contradiction: The Liar sentence is true and not true. What has gone wrong? Must we revise our notion of truth and our logic? Or can we dispel the common conviction that there are such self-referential sentences? (...) The present study explores the second path.0After comparing the Liar reasoning in formal and informal logic and showing that there are no Gödelian Liar sentences, the study moves on from the semantics of self-reference to the metaphysics of expressions and proposes a novel solution to the Liar paradox: Meaningful expressions are distinct from their syntactic bases and exist only relative to contexts. Detailed semantico-metaphysical arguments show that in this dynamic setting, an object can be referred to only after it has started to exist. Hence the circular reference needed in the Liar paradox cannot occur, after all. As this solution is contextualist, it evades the expressibility problems of other proposals. (shrink)

Richard Rorty (1931 - 2007) ist einer der wichtigsten amerikanischen Philosophen der Gegenwart, der die analytische Philosophie sowohl geprägt als auch maßgeblich zu ihrer Kritik beigetragen und damit die Wiederentdeckung des Pragmatismus vorangetrieben hat. In diesem Handbuch werden alle wichtigen Aspekte seines Lebens und seiner philosophischen Arbeit dargestellt und einer wissenschaftlichen Diskussion unterzogen.