In Physics 2.8 Aristotle argues for his natural teleology by arguing for the goal-directed character of nature. The argument that he develops with the most care is directed against those natural philosophers, like Empedocles, who maintain that the results of natural processes which benefit organisms, such as teeth, come to be through chance. Aristotle counters by arguing that because the beneficial results of natural processes occur regularly, ‘always or for the most part’, they cannot be the outcome of chance, which (...) would yield beneficial results only irregularly. Thus such results must come to be only for the sake of some end. This argument against chance has received the most attention from scholars, but Physics 2.8 contains another argument for the goal-directed character of nature, which has received relatively little attention because it does not seem to offer much argument for natural teleology. The argument depends upon an analogy between action and nature, and it simply maintains that since human action and nature are analogous, and since action is goal-directed, so too is nature. The argument is of interest, despite its neglect, because it seems to prove nothing to us and yet Aristotle puts it forward confidently as advancing his view about the goal-directed character of nature. The argument from analogy should claim our attention because it provides important evidence for the basic spring behind Aristotle 's natural teleology. The fact that Aristotle takes for granted the strength of the analogy with human action in his argument for the goal-directedness of nature suggests that he holds human-like goal-directedness to be a condition of intelligibility that must be met by any intelligible process of coming to be, whether human or natural. (shrink)

Aristotle's Idea of the Soul considers the nature of the soul within Aristotle's psychology and natural philosophy. A survey is provided of the contemporary interpretations of Aristotle's idea of the soul, which are prominent in the Aristotelian scholarship within the analytic tradition. These interpretations are divided into two positions: `attributivism', which considers the soul to be a property; and `substantialism', which considers it to be a thing. Taxonomies are developed for attributivism and substantialism, and the cases for each of them (...) are considered. It is concluded that neither position may be maintained without compromise, since Aristotle ascribes to the soul features that belong exclusively to a thing and exclusively to a property. Aristotle treats the soul as a `property-thing', as a cross between a thing and a property. It is argued that Aristotle comes by this idea of the soul because his hylomorphism casts the soul as a property and his causal doctrine presents it as a causal agent and thereby as a thing. (shrink)

In this paper I shall defend the traditional claim that Aristotle's nonsubstantial particulars discussed in the second chapter of the Categories are unsharable particulars against G. E. L. Owen's claim that they are sharable universals. I shall proceed by presenting first a sketch of the traditional position that makes explicit why it holds that non-substantial particulars are unsharable particulars. Secondly, I shall sketch Owen's position and recount how it differs in certain important respects from the traditional position. Thirdly, I shall (...) present some of my own considerations that I believe support the traditional position at the expense of Owen's position. Finally, I shall offer what I take to be the primary reason Aristotle was committed to the existence of such odd items as non-substantial particulars. (shrink)

MetaphysicsZ.ll has in recent years received considerable attention, because of its importance for the exposition of Aristotle's psychology, which for some time now has been an immensely popular topic among Aristotelian scholars. Z.ll has proved contentious, however, especially over its statement of Aristotle's criticism of Socrates the Younger, who was wont to make a certain ‘comparison’ in the case of animals. Virtually nothing is known about this Socrates the Younger, nor is it known exactly what ‘comparison’ he made with animals. (...) But, as most interpreters suppose from the context of Z. 11, his comparison certainly had much in common with that made by ‘some', who argue that natural objects, like man, are comparable to geometrical figures, like the circle, with respect to their relationship to their matter. Just as the physical matter of circles, such as bronze, stone, and the like, are no part of the essence of the circle, so too the physical matter of man—flesh and bones—is no part of the essence of man. This comparison may hold true, even if, unlike circles, man is in fact found only in a single sort of matter, because the case of man may be like the counterfactual case in which all circles happen to be made of bronze. The bronze would still not belong to the essence of the circle; it would just be difficult psychologically to separate circularity from bronze. (shrink)

MetaphysicsZ.ll has in recent years received considerable attention, because of its importance for the exposition of Aristotle's psychology, which for some time now has been an immensely popular topic among Aristotelian scholars. Z.ll has proved contentious, however, especially over its statement of Aristotle's criticism of Socrates the Younger, who was wont to make a certain ‘comparison’ in the case of animals. Virtually nothing is known about this Socrates the Younger, nor is it known exactly what ‘comparison’ he made with animals. (...) But, as most interpreters suppose from the context of Z. 11, his comparison certainly had much in common with that made by ‘some', who argue that natural objects, like man, are comparable to geometrical figures, like the circle, with respect to their relationship to their matter. Just as the physical matter of circles, such as bronze, stone, and the like, are no part of the essence of the circle, so too the physical matter of man—flesh and bones—is no part of the essence of man. This comparison may hold true, even if, unlike circles, man is in fact found only in a single sort of matter, because the case of man may be like the counterfactual case in which all circles happen to be made of bronze. The bronze would still not belong to the essence of the circle; it would just be difficult psychologically to separate circularity from bronze. (shrink)

The topic under examination is the idea of ‘supervenient dualism’, which Christopher Shields first put forward in his study of Aristotle's theory of psychology. Shields takes supervenient dualism to be a form of ‘substance supervenience’, in which an immaterial substance supervenes upon a material or physical substance. Shields, however, does not develop a convincing version of supervenient dualism because he fails to develop a convincing version of substance supervenience. A plausible version of substance supervenience can be developed in the light (...) of Jaegwon Kim's idea of ‘multiple‐domain supervenience’, although this version of substance supervenience is not able to provide the basis for an adequate formulation of supervenient dualism. The nature of this version of substance supervenience depends upon a relation of coordination between the substances, and there does not seem to be any relation of coordination that yields a form of substance supervenience that also counts as a form of supervenient dualism. (shrink)

This carefully-researched book offers a dynamic and expansive Deweyan vision for the arts and education. This (re)vision acknowledges the influence on Dewey's aesthetics of art collector and educator Albert Barnes, while also exploring the various ways Dewey's writings on the arts, in moving beyond Barnes' "scientific aesthetic method," were an important resource for many innovative twentieth-century American artists, art movements, and arts-related educational institutions. Neither Barnes' influence on Dewey nor the features of Dewey's naturalistic aesthetics that made his Art as (...) Experience a favorite text of many artists and arts practitioners have been fully and adequately acknowledged in existing literature on Dewey's thinking about the arts and education. This book effectively remedies that situation. (shrink)

Peu étudiée, la querelle de la méthode, qui eut lieu entre 1828 et 1840 et mit en discussion trois nations philosophiques (Allemagne, Écosse, France) s’avère déterminante pour comprendre l’élaboration, via la réception de Schelling, d’une philosophie française. À partir de l’étude de cette querelle, ce travail propose d’identifier et d’analyser la fonction de Schelling dans l’élaboration d’une identité philosophique française, en particulier dans les spiritualismes concurrents de Victor Cousin et Félix Ravaisson. En retour, il nous ouvre de nouvelles perspectives sur (...) la philosophie française du xixe siècle, mais aussi sur la philosophie schellingienne. (shrink)

Predication and the problems of universals and individuation have preoccupied philosophers from Plato (if not before) to the present. Concerns about relations and the special problems posed by relational predication came later - along with the explicit recognition of facts as purported entities that make a judgment true, rather than false, and resultant questions about the structure of such grounds of truth. The essays in the volume explore aspects of the history of the classic issues raised as well as alternative (...) attempts to deal with such issues. (shrink)

In recent years the formerly quite strong interest in patient compliance has been questioned for being too paternalistic and oriented towards overly narrow biomedical goals as the basis for treatment recommendations. In line with this there has been a shift towards using the notion of adherence to signal an increased weight for patients’ preferences and autonomy in decision making around treatments. This ‘adherence-paradigm’ thus encompasses shared decision-making as an ideal and patient perspective and autonomy as guiding goals of care. What (...) this implies in terms of the importance that we have reason to attach to (non-)adherence and how has, however, not been explained. In this article, we explore the relationship between different forms of shared decision-making, patient autonomy and adherence. Distinguishing between dynamically and statically framed adherence we show how the version of shared decision-making advocated will have consequences for whether one should be interested in a dynamically or statically framed adherence and in what way patient adherence should be assessed. In contrast to the former compliance paradigm (where non-compliance was necessarily seen as a problem), using observations about (non-)adherence to assess the success of health care decision making and professional-patient interaction turns out to be a much less straightforward matter. (shrink)

-- Douglas Kellner, University of Texas, Austin.

Herbert Spencer, Victorian philosopher, biologist, sociologist and political theorist, one of the founders of Social Darwinism and author of the phrase 'survival of the fittest', was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1902, losing out to Theodor Mommsen. Spencer left his post at The Economist in 1857 to focus on writing his ten-volume System of Synthetic Philosophy, a work that offers an ethics-based guide to human conduct to replace that provided by conventional religious belief. Published in 1879, (...) this volume seeks to demonstrate that social evolution tends towards greater individualism, altruism and co-operation. Spencer argues that it is possible to establish rules of right conduct on a scientific basis, and declares that this work is the culmination of his life's study. He was anxious to publish it outside the planned order of the System, because he feared that his death would prevent its completion. (shrink)

Continuing his exploration of the organization of complexity and the science of design, this new edition of Herbert Simon's classic work on artificial ...

The foundation of historical materialism.--A study on authority.--Sartre's existentialism.--Karl Popper and the problem of historical laws.--Freedom and the historical imperative.