The work of feminists in science may seem less voluminous and less theoretical than the feminist scholarship in some humanities and social science disciplines. However, the recent burst of scholarship on women and science allows categorization of feminist work into six distinct but related categories: 1) teaching and curriculum transformation in science, 2) history of women in science, 3) current status of women in science, 4) feminist critique of science, 5) feminine science, 6) feminist theory of science. More feminists in (...) science are needed to further explore science and its relationships to women and feminism in order to change traditional science to a feminist science. (shrink)

Flaws, biases, and ethical problems surrounding research and diagnosis may lead to inappropriate or inequitable treatments that exacerbate or fail to improve the misery that some individuals face due to their psychiatric conditions. Possible androcentric biases in the choice and definition of categories for diagnosis available in DSM-III-R may in turn influence the approaches of therapists to clients, particularly male therapists towards female clients. Androcentric bias in diagnosis, which may also be reflected in the values of the psychiatrist, may lead (...) to treatment regimens designed to make clients fit into roles, positions, and norms prescribed by a culture reflecting patriarchal values. Some acceptance of attempts by feminists to correct androcentrism are beginning to emerge in psychiatric diagnosis. Keywords: androcentrism, bias, feminist, psychiatry of biology CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Since modern medicine is based substantially in clinical medical research, the flaws and ethical problems that arise in this research as it is conceived and practiced in the United States are likely to be reflected to some extent in current medicine and its practice. This paper explores some of the ways in which clinical research has suffered from an androcentric focus in its choice and definition of problems studied, approaches and methods used in design and interpretation of experiments, and theories (...) and conclusions drawn from the research. Some examples of re-visioned research hint at solutions to the ethical dilemmas created by this biased focus; an increased number of feminists involved in clinical research may provide avenues for additional changes that would lead to improved health care for all. (shrink)

Ted Shotter's founding of the London Medical Group 50 years ago in 1963 had several far reaching implications for medical ethics, as other papers in this issue indicate. Most significant for the joint authors of this short paper was his founding of the quarterly Journal of Medical Ethics in 1975, with Alastair Campbell as its first editor-in-chief. In 1980 Raanan Gillon began his 20-year editorship . Gillon was succeeded in 2001 by Julian Savulescu, followed by John Harris and Soren Holm (...) in 2004, with Julian Savulescu starting his second and current term in 2011. In 2000 an additional special edition of the JME, Medical Humanities , was published, under the founding joint editorship of Martyn Evans and David Greaves. In 2003 Jane Macnaughton succeeded David Greaves as joint editor. Deborah Kirklin, under whose auspices MH became an independent journal, took over in 2008, and she was succeeded in 2013 by Sue Eckstein. This short paper offers reminiscences and reflections from the two journals’ various editors.From the start the JME was committed to clearly expressed reasoned discussion of ethical issues arising from or related to medical practice and research. In particular, both Edward Shotter and Alastair Campbell, each a cleric , were at pains to make clear that the JME was not a religious journal and that it had no sort of partisan axe to grind.Campbell's appointment as founding editor was something of a surprise, as the original intention had been to appoint a medical doctor, who could be expected to know medical practice from the inside. However, in 1972 Campbell, a Joint Secretary of the Edinburgh Medical Group, had published Moral dilemmas in medicine. …. (shrink)

In this brief, we argue that there is a diversity of ways in which humans (Homo sapiens) are ‘persons’ and there are no non-arbitrary conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can include all humans and exclude all nonhuman animals. To do so we describe and assess the four most prominent conceptions of ‘personhood’ that can be found in the rulings concerning Kiko and Tommy, with particular focus on the most recent decision, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery.

In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither necessary nor (...) sufficient conditions for the justification of our moral beliefs and (2) help ethical intuitionism to deal with the fundamental problem of peer disagreement over our basic moral intuitions. In doing so, I sketch out a novel and attractive diachronic way of thinking about peer disagreement more generally. (shrink)

In the middle of myMathematical logicI defined a certain class of formulae as “stratified,” and conjectured that exclusion from this class is a feature “shared, presumably, by all the untenable statements(p. 157). This ushered in a set of axioms of class-membership which Rosser has since shown to be inconsistent. Accordingly, inElement and numberI dropped the principle*200, in which had been assembled axioms to the effect, roughly, that “stratified functions of elements are elements.” In lieu of*200 I set forth alternatives (...) in which no appeal is made to stratification. The system ofMathematical logicexclusive of*200 carries over as an unchanging framework; and this framework admits, we know, of a simple consistency proof. My concern in the present paper is to draw attention to certain relationships between this framework and earlier theories. (shrink)