Paul Oskar Kristeller, Frederick Woodbridge professor emeritus of philosophy at Columbia University, was a major scholar of Renaissance philosophy and Renaissance humanism. He was born Paul Oskar Gräfenberg in Berlin but took the name of his stepfather at age 14. His father died shortly after Paul Oskar's birth. He attended school at Mommsen Gymnasium in Berlin. In 1923 Kristeller started college, studying philosophy, medieval history, and mathematics at Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Marburg between the years 1923-1928. He earned a (...) Ph.D. in 1928 at the University of Heidelberg, with a thesis on Plotinus. With the rise of the National Socialist government in Germany and its racist and anti-Semitic policies, he went to Italy in 1933, remaining there until 1938 when the Mussolini regime gained more power. He obtained a position at Yale University, then a permanent faculty position at Columbia University in 1939, where he spent the rest of his career. His talk, Renaissance Philosophy and the Mediaeval Tradition, was given as part of the Wimmer Memorial Lecture Series at Saint Vincent in 1961, and was published two years later. The widely-published and internationally-recognized scholar died in 1999 at the age of 94. (shrink)

Pétrarque.--Valla.--Marsile Ficin.--Pic de la Mirandole.--Pomponazzi.--Telesio.--Patrizi.--Bruno.

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in unethical work behavior. Several types of survey instruments to collect information about unethical work behavior are available. Nevertheless, to date little attention has been paid to design issues of those surveys. There are, however, several important problems that may influence reliability and validity of questionnaire data on the topic, such as social desirability bias. This paper addresses two important issues in the design of online surveys on unethical work behavior: the (...) response scale for questions regarding the frequency of certain types of unethical work behavior and the location of the background questions in an online survey. We present the results of an analysis of a double split-ballot experiment in a large sample (n = 3,386) on governmental integrity. We found that, when comparing response scales that have labels for all categories with response scales that only have anchors at the end, the latter provided answers with higher validity. The study did not provide support for the conventional practice of asking background questions at the end. (shrink)

La pensée d'Aristote a-t-elle encore quelque chose à nous apprendre aujourd'hui? Elle peut nous inviter à nous interroger sur ce qu'être homme, et sur notre rapport au monde. Mais les aristotélismes qui se sont construits à partir de ses oeuvres transmises, et traduites, dans l'Occident comme en terre d'Islam, ont donné un nouveau tour à ses interrogations. Il a fallu faire place au donné révélé. Une "voie romaine" a ainsi fait l'Europe. Une contribution autour du philosophe Rémi Brague.

1. Die antiken und mittelalterlichen Quellen.--2. Philosophie, Bildung und Kunst.

The scholar and his public in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance.--Thomism and the Italian thought of the Renaissance.--The contribution of religious orders to Renaissance thought and learning.--Bibliography (p. [115]-120).

Volume 19, Issue 5, May 2019, Page 80-81.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Greening Paul: Rereading the Apostle in a Time of Ecological Crisis, and: The Bible and Ecology: Rediscovering the Community of CreationKristel ClayvilleGreening Paul: Rereading the Apostle in a Time of Ecological Crisis David G. Horrell, Cheryl Hunt, and Christopher Southgate Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2010. 333 pp. $34.95The Bible and Ecology: Rediscovering the Community of Creation Richard Bauckham Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2010. 226 pp. $24.95Both (...) Greening Paul and The Bible and Ecology are timely entries into the ongoing conversation about the use of the Bible in ecological ethics. Given this shared focus, the books have much in common. First, and most superficially, all four authors have academic posts in the United Kingdom; they have been [End Page 200] citing each other’s work for years and have published books with the same press. Second, all four authors are motivated by a deep concern for stemming the anthropogenic ecological crisis through a positive reformulation of Christian anthropocentrism, eschatology, and relationship to science. Third, the authors see biblical interpretation as having a central role in this reformulation. Even with these commonalities, the books approach the problem of using the biblical text in constructive Christian ethics from vastly different perspectives. David Horrell, Cheryl Hunt, and Christopher Southgate are openly skeptical about the impact biblical exegesis can have in ethical constructions, whereas Richard Bauckham writes under the assumption that his exegetical work will be efficacious in adjusting Christian ethical responses to the ecological crisis.In Greening Paul, the authors develop an ecological hermeneutical lens from an exegesis of two Pauline texts (Rom. 8:19–23 and Col. 1:15–20), a lens that they then use to read the entire Pauline corpus. What emerges from this reading is a focus on Paul’s own extension of the Christian community to include non-Christians, which, ecologically speaking, becomes a biblical warrant for ethical extensionism. Additionally, this reading emphasizes Christ’s kenosis, which is expanded and transformed by the authors into other-regard, the idea that humans can and even should place the survival needs of others above their own. Extensionism and other-regard are not radical or new ideas in ecological ethics, but rarely are they given a biblical foundation. Moreover, the authors’ development of an ecological hermeneutical lens for reading Pauline texts contributes much more to the discussion of the use of the Bible in ecological ethics than any particular readings it produces.Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate devote six of their eight chapters to the development of their ecological hermeneutical lens. They situate their lens both in context of and contradistinction to recent ecotheology and hermeneutical scholarship on the Bible, such as feminist hermeneutics, while also drawing on the strengths of these positions and incorporating the tools of critical biblical scholarship, such as narrative criticism. The authors identify a typology of ecologically motivated readings of the Bible: recovery of the Bible’s positive ecological meaning, resistance to the Bible due to its negative ecological message, and resistance to ecological ethics due to the Bible’s authority. The authors construct a revisionist lens and situate it between recovery and resistance, thereby “enabl[ing] a positive, creative, and critical rereading of tradition” (43). This rereading entails reconstructing the creation narratives behind the Romans and Colossians texts, comparing them to each other, and then limiting their normative reach by putting them in conversation with scientific narratives of the world. While the authors see Pauline theology and ethics as linked through the category of narrative, such that character formation is at the heart of Paul’s ethics, the question remains as to why the epistolary genre needed to be augmented for their analysis. The turn to narrative seems somewhat reductionistic [End Page 201] in a work that is so theoretically sophisticated, and it focuses attention once again on creation narratives as the source for thinking through human relationships to nature.Even at the end of their book, the authors of Greening Paul remain skeptical about the move from exegesis to ethics, but they have done the exegetical work of preparing Pauline texts for use in ecological ethics. On their reading of Bauckham’s work, The Bible and... (shrink)

Frailty is a complex geriatric syndrome with multifactorial associated mechanisms that need to be examined more deeply to help reverse the adverse health-related outcomes. Specific inflammatory and physical health markers have been associated with the onset of frailty, but the associations between these factors and psycho-social health outcomes seem less studied. This systematic review aimed to identify, in the same study design, the potential associations between frailty and markers of inflammation, and physical or psycho-social health. A literature search was performed (...) from inception until March 2021 using Medline, Psycinfo, and EMBASE. Three raters evaluated the articles and selected 22 studies, using inclusion and exclusion criteria. Regarding biomarkers, 95% of the included studies showed significant links between inflammation [especially the higher levels of C-reactive protein and interleukin-6 ], and frailty status. Approximately 86% of the included studies showed strong links between physical health decline, and frailty status. At most, 13 studies among the 22 included ones evaluated psycho-social variables and mixed results were observed regarding the relationships with frailty. Results are discussed in terms of questioning the medical perception of global health, centering mostly on the physical dimension. Therefore, the development of future research studies involving a more exhaustive view of frailty and global health is strongly encouraged. (shrink)

Many studies claim to measure decision-making under risk by employing the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale, a self-report measure, or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), a behavioural task. However, these tasks do not measure decision-making under risk but decision-making under uncertainty, a related but distinct concept. The present commentary discusses both the theoretical and empirical basis of the distinction between uncertainty and risk from the viewpoint of several scientific disciplines and reports how many studies wrongfully employ the DOSPERT scale and (...) BART as risk-taking measures. Importantly, we call for proper distinguishing between (tasks measuring) decision-making under uncertainty and decision-making under risk in psychology and related fields. We believe this is vital as research has shown that people’s attitudes, behaviour, and brain activity differ between both concepts, indicating that confusing the concepts may lead researchers to erroneous conclusions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Généalogie de la liberté by Olivier BoulnoisKristell TregoOlivier Boulnois. Généalogie de la liberté. Paris: Seuil, 2021. Pp. 496. Paperback, €24.00.The author starts from an apparently simple question: are we free? But such a question is not as simple as it seems. This book shows that it is neither eternal nor universally asked; rather, it is a question linked to a specific culture (the West), and it has a (...) history. This is why the author intends to draw up its genealogy.In order to draw up a genealogy of the concept of freedom, we must leave aside the standard theoretical framework that assumes freedom as a given. Rather, we should ask: Does [End Page 152] freedom exist? What is its nature? Should it be described as the absence of compulsion or as the power of choice? We must also be wary of any systematic approach to these questions, such as those that have opposed partisans of freedom to determinists or intellectualists to voluntarists throughout the ages. If we want to draw up a genealogy of freedom, we should rather think about the theoretical conditions that made possible the birth and the development of this theoretical "artifact," as Boulnois calls it (23). Contemporary discussions about freedom tend to debate its nature without wondering why such a concept was forged in the first place. By contrast, Boulnois takes a step back and tries to discover the nature of freedom by turning to the moment of its birth.Boulnois has adopted a genealogical approach in his previous books. He used it in his Être et représentation, whose subtitle is une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (Paris: PUF, 1999). He also mentioned it in the title of a collection of edited essays, where he preferred to talk of "genealogies" in the plural in order to accommodate the diversity of approaches adopted by the authors of the contributions to that volume (Olivier Boulnois, ed., Généalogies du sujet: de saint Anselme à Malebranche [Paris: Vrin, 2007]). In his new book, Boulnois explains his choice of the genealogical method as an attempt to give a history of freedom that might reconcile the so-called continental and analytic approaches (18). Instead of giving a simple description of theories of freedom, by his genealogical method Boulnois intends to show how the Western approach to freedom has resulted in an aporia—the very aporia that Kant diagnosed as an insoluble problem in his Critique of Pure Reason. Boulnois's genealogy should be distinguished from the so-called archeology as heralded by the French scholar of the Middle Ages Alain de Libera. Although both the genealogical and the archeological methods originate in the writings of Michel Foucault, and as such are undeniably connected to each other, the genealogical enterprise is intended to "deconstruct" past philosophers' claims not in order to leave them behind and reject them (as the archeological method intends to do), but rather to become fully aware of those philosophers' theoretical choices and commitments (see Boulnois, Être et representation, 16). Genealogy is thus supposed to "liberate" our thought by making apparent the framework in which we think.To deconstruct the problem of freedom, Boulnois proceeds in four main steps. First, he shows how the problem of freedom is constructed by examining a cluster of related concepts (free will, will, power, and action) and discovering the aporia of free will, which appears to be both indubitable and impossible to conceptualize. Second, Boulnois turns to Aristotle's ethics and theory of action, which conceives of human choices without appealing to the idea of freedom. Third, he considers the "invention of freedom," or better of free will (in Latin, liberum arbitrium voluntatis), by highlighting three main moments: the Stoics' assent to the order of the world; Alexander of Aphrodisias's cogitations, which make room for free will in an Aristotelian framework, even without ever naming it; and finally, Augustine's reorganization of ethics around the very concept of free will. Fourth and finally, Boulnois focuses on the medieval debates concerning freedom and the way they contributed to contrasting human beings with the... (shrink)

Kristell Trego | Résumé : Qui agit quand j’agis ? Cet article s’intéresse à la réception philosophique de deux versets scripturaires, Jn 15,5 et Ph 2,13, qui, l’un comme l’autre, énoncent une certaine intervention de Dieu dans les actes que l’homme effectue. On prend en premier lieu en considération l’occasionnalisme malebranchiste. On envisage ensuite, au sein du kalâm, le courant asharite, souvent présenté comme « occasionnaliste », et sa réfutation par le philosophe chrétien de l’école de Baghdad Yaḥyâ ibn ‘Adî. (...) On regarde enfin comment la tradition médiévale a, à la suite d’Augustin, concilié nos deux versets avec l’affirmation de la libre volonté humaine. |: Who acts when I act ? The present essay is concerned with the philosophical reception of two scriptural verses, John 15, 5 and Philippians 2, 13, which both set forth a certain intervention of God in the acts performed by man. We first take into consideration Malebranche’s occasionalism. We then consider, within the kalâm, the ashrahit current, often presented as “occasionalist,” and its refutation by the Christian philosopher from the Baghdad school Yaḥyâ ibn ‘Adî. We finally take into account how the medieaval tradition has, in the wake of Augustine, conciliated our two verses with the affirmation of the free human will. (shrink)

In his Kitab al-ḥuruf, al-Fârâbî exposed a problem: Arabic language doesn’t have a word corresponding to the Greek verb einai. This paper examines the way Arabic philosophers managed to practice me...

The concept of hexis, in Latin habitus, is of great importance in Aristotle’s ethics. In this paper, I ask the question whether habitus has its place, and which one it is, when the will is said to be free. I examine the doctrines of three thinkers in whose thought the idea of the freedom of the will occupies a crucial place. Firstly, Augustine knows the moral sense of habitus, but does not use it to explain freedom; reading the Categories, he (...) understands that the term “habitus” refers to an accident, and uses this concept to explain modification. Secondly, describing the will, Anselm favours the word affectio, which designates a disposition which is not permanent; indeed, Anselm focuses on the dependence of the rational creature. Finally, Duns Scotus uses the Aristotelian concept of habitus, when he shows how the will, which is a rational power, determines itself freely. Thus, it can be said that Aristotle was a central and unavoidable source for the medieval developments of the concept of habitus and its use in relation with the doctrine of the will. (shrink)

L’article se propose de revenir sur la source avicennienne du concept d’intentio. Si ce concept n’est en effet pas aristotélicien, Avicenne est celui qui l’introduit en métaphysique: il est trois intentions premières, l’étant, la chose, l’un. Si le terme al-ma‘nâ indique d’abord la signification, il implique tout aussi bien une certaine manière de penser la réalité. L’article revient ainsi sur ce concept, d’abord utilisé par le kalâm comme dans le cadre de la grammaire, mais aussi utilisé en théologie, pour rendre (...) compte de la Trinité. On peut alors mieux comprendre comment son intégration par Avicenne à la métaphysique n’est pas neutre, mais est l’indice d’une attention nouvelle, non seulement à l’étant, mais à la chose. La question de l’intentionnalité ne se joue donc pas seulement dans le cadre de la psychologie et de la théorie, mais elle engage le sens même du projet métaphysique. (shrink)

Est-on encore libre lorsqu'on agit mal? Nos actes determinent-ils ce que nous sommes et devenons? L'homme s'excepte-t-il du monde? Ou bien, a l'inverse, en releve-t-il essentiellement? L'ethique d'Anselme se situe a la croisee des chemins. Si la liberte a pour fin la justice, c'est parce qu'elle ne se presente plus comme la fin de cette derniere, mais qu'elle demeure quoi que l'on fasse. Si l'ethique porte sur les actes de l'homme, qui font de lui ce qu'il est, ce n'est pas (...) pour refuser toute idee d'une nature essentielle que nous aurions recue. En un mot, l'homme echappe au cours naturel des choses, en faisant un certain usage des pouvoirs qu'il possede par nature. La liberte elle-meme, par laquelle l'homme se distingue des autres etres du monde, se pense ainsi comme un pouvoir naturel, et donc inamissible. Invoquer la superiorite de l'ame sur le corps ne suffit des lors plus pour penser la liberte; Anselme nous invite a la penser a partir d'une certaine interpretation de la constitution de ce qui est. En d'autres termes, la reflexion ethique appelle une exploration des sens de l'etre. Le present ouvrage montre comment, en l'absence d'une metaphysique etablie, Anselme recourt, pour fonder son ethique, a l'enseignement de la logique, ou dialectica, laquelle ne saurait etre reduite a une semantique. Les multiples remaniements des concepts ethiques, mais aussi logiques, revelent une pensee latine qui s'ouvre a l'interrogation metaphysique. (shrink)

Dans la Consolatio philosophiae, Boèce infléchit en direction de l’éthique son interrogation. La doctrine de la liberté qu’il propose dans ce cadre ne rompt toutefois pas avec la conception de la contingence qu’il avait élaborée dans le cadre de ses commentaires d’Aristote, plus spécialement du chapitre IX du De interpretatione. Si la volonté de mettre en avant la liberté humaine manifeste une inspiration chrétienne, l’élaboration de la doctrine correspondante suggère ainsi une reprise de sources antiques non spécifiquement chrétiennes.

Cet article s’attache à l’émergence de l’idée d’une cause agente, en lieu et place de la cause motrice aristotélicienne. Si Avicenne a dédoublé la cause agente en reconnaissant un principe du mouvement et un principe de l’être, la tradition exégétique grecque puis la falsafa d’expression arabe s’étaient d’abord attachées à reconnaître une cause rendant compte de l’advenue à l’être.

This article aims to consider the permanence of the Greek term ousia, sometimes transcribed as usia, during the early Middle Ages, when the translation by substantia was imposed. We consider two figures of the Carolingian period, John Scottus Eriugena and Ratramnus of Corbia. We suggest that the word ousia/usia may express aspects of being that the Latin term substantia does not support.

S'il reprend des thèmes chers à la patristique, Érigène adapte ces notions théologiques afin de penser non plus tant l'être divin, que l'être créé, en sa condition même de créature. Ainsi Érigène reconnaît-il aux êtres créés, qu'il nomme «existants» (existentia), une subsistence qui, si elle se fonde dans l'essence divine, s'en distingue toutefois.Quoi qu'il en soit du contexte néoplatonicien dans lequel intervient le terme subsistence (utilisé notamment pour traduire l'huparxis du Ps-Denys ou de Maxime le Confesseur), l'on ne saurait le (...) réduire à la nomination de la venue à l'être (c'est l'existence qui évoque cette idée). Réinvestissant la notion de subsistence qui s'est construite chez ses prédécesseurs latins, notre auteur s'en sert pour faire signe vers l'idée d'une permanence de ce qui est au-delà de la procession qui luia permis d'accéder à l'être. (shrink)

S'il reprend des thèmes chers à la patristique, Érigène adapte ces notions théologiques afin de penser non plus tant l'être divin, que l'être créé, en sa condition même de créature. Ainsi Érigène reconnaît-il aux êtres créés, qu'il nomme «existants» (existentia), une subsistence qui, si elle se fonde dans l'essence divine, s'en distingue toutefois.Quoi qu'il en soit du contexte néoplatonicien dans lequel intervient le terme subsistence (utilisé notamment pour traduire l'huparxis du Ps-Denys ou de Maxime le Confesseur), l'on ne saurait le (...) réduire à la nomination de la venue à l'être (c'est l'existence qui évoque cette idée). Réinvestissant la notion de subsistence qui s'est construite chez ses prédécesseurs latins, notre auteur s'en sert pour faire signe vers l'idée d'une permanence de ce qui est au-delà de la procession qui luia permis d'accéder à l'être. (shrink)