The dispositional analysis of sentences ascribing powers and abilities to things and people runs into many difficulties. The situation is especially complex and confusing when such ascriptions are brought to bear on particular occasions, and carry some implication about the opportunities available on those occasions. Some of these difficulties are produced by superficial confusions, but I shall concentrate on those that beset any version of the dispositional analysis. Three difficulties will be examined, one presented by Lehrer, and two by Austin.Lehrer (...) presents his difficulty as a refutation of Moore's dispositional analysis of “X could have acted otherwise”, which was “If X had chosen, he would have acted otherwise”. I shall introduce his objection by relating it to the distinctions drawn in Part I.· Expressed in my terminology, his point is that Moore's analysis presupposes that choosing is not an S-factor, and yet it might conceivably be an S-factor. (shrink)

Austin's lecture on this topic contributes little to the problem of freedom of the will, and so in my discussion of his ideas I shall stop short of the difficult part of that problem. His most important positive suggestion is that hypotheticals should be divided into two classes, conditionals and pseudo-conditionals. He claims that neglect of this distinction has been the cause of mistakes in certain forms of the dispositional analysis of the statement that an agent could have acted otherwise, (...) and he then goes on to criticise all forms of that analysis using arguments which do not depend on the difference between the two kinds of hypothetical.This discussion will be in two parts. In the first I shall take up Austin's distinction between conditionals and pseudos and criticise it and develop it at length, because it seems to me to be the most important thing in his lecture. Since I shall not have space for comment on fortuitous errors made by defenders of the dispositional analysis of the claim that an agent could have acted otherwise, I shall concentrate on the essential features of that analysis. (shrink)

In his Introduction, Hochberg writes: "Since this book is an attempt to resolve some problems about thought, truth, and reference within the tradition of Logical Atomism, readers of Bergmann and Sellars will find, not surprisingly, familiar themes." He continues a bit later: "What is attempted is the resolution of some issues that preoccupied Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore and their successors, as well as an explication of some links between Logical Atomism and Moore's early assault on idealism. The book is thus a (...) partial study of the ontology and the history of Logical Atomism." Hochberg accomplishes what he attempts. Note that he did not promise an introduction to the ontology and history of Logical Atomism. The book is intended for people who have read early Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, are familiar with some Fregean themes, who have read some secondary literature on Logical Atomism such as Urmson's or Pear's books, and who have read some of G. Bergmann's developments of Logical Atomism. Because the metaphysical analyses of several contemporary philosophers such as Quine, W. Sellars, D. Davidson, and D. Kaplan are criticized, familiarity with such writers, especially Quine, would be very helpful. Nevertheless, although the themes are familiar ones such as: realism vs. phenomenalism; realism vs. nominalism; theories of definite descriptions; coping with Bradley's regress; analyses of objects; analyses of thoughts; and although no sophisticated logic is needed to handle his formalizations, Hochberg demands almost too much concentration from even his intended readers. It is easy to get lost in the numerous alternative analyses and theories Hochberg considers. He seems unable to resist temptations to explore alternative analyses suggested to him by the one he is considering. Consequently, it is difficult to determine what are the analyses actually held by philosophers discussed, what are Hochberg's own analyses and theories, and what are serious alternatives. Because so many subtle and complicated alternatives are juggled it is difficult to uncover the main premisses of Hochberg's arguments for his resolutions. The combined insights and discipline of a seminar or reading group would be helpful in the effort to recognize the main themes and to stay with the work. (shrink)

The four principles approach to biomedical ethics (4PBE) has, since the 1970s, been increasingly developed as a universal bioethics method. Despite its wide acceptance and popularity, the 4PBE has received many challenges to its cross-cultural plausibility. This paper first specifies the principles and characteristics of ancient Chinese medical ethics (ACME), then makes a comparison between ACME and the 4PBE with a view to testing out the 4PBE's cross-cultural plausibility when applied to one particular but very extensive and prominent cultural context. (...) The result shows that the concepts of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice are clearly identifiable in ACME. Yet, being influenced by certain socio-cultural factors, those applying the 4PBE in Chinese society may tend to adopt a "beneficence-oriented", rather than an "autonomy-oriented" approach, which, in general, is dissimilar to the practice of contemporary Western bioethics, where "autonomy often triumphs". (shrink)