In philosophy, as in any other theoretical endeavor, it is not rare to find conflicting but equally well grounded positions. Besides defending one of the positions and criticizing the other, philosophers can opt for pursuing other, more sophisticated, approaches aimed at incorporating the insights, intuitions, and arguments from both sides of the debate into a unified theory: Dialetheism, Analetheism, Gradualism, Pluralism and Relativism. The purpose of this article is to present each strategy's basic argumentative structure, relative strengths, and challenges, trying (...) to determine in which situations one is more appropriate than the others. Despite substantial differences between them, all four options have deep structural similarities; and which option is better for which dilemma or paradox will depend ultimately on a combination of epistemological, linguistic, and metaphysical factors. (shrink)

La falibilidad es una condición ubicua de nuestras empresas, la cual emana del hecho de que, comúnmente, las cosas que más nos interesan, como el descubrir la verdad, referirnos a cosas que de hecho existen, evitar dañar a los otros, etc., escapan nuestro alcance y, sin embargo, no dejamos de hacer grandes esfuerzos para conseguirlas. Es posible que hagamos todo lo que está en nuestras manos para actuar de manera cuidadosa y responsable y aun así nuestros actos tengan consecuencias negativas; (...) e igualmente es posible que nuestros actos tengan consecuencias positivas sin que podamos cobrar crédito por ellas como un logro. En este volumen, el autor se propone no solo explicar qué caracteriza a los casos de buena y mala suerte, sino también por qué valoramos más un logro que podemos atribuir al esfuerzo propio que el obtener lo que deseamos de manera accidental. (shrink)

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral (...) luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either. (shrink)

Using conjunction as an example, I show a technical and philosophical problem when trying to conciliate the currently prevailing views on the meaning of logical connectives: the inferientialist (also called 'syntactic') one based on introduction and elimination rules, and the representationalist (also called 'semantic') one given through truth tables. Mostly I show that the widespread strategy of using the truth theoretical definition of logical consequence to collapse both definitions must be rejected by inferentialists. An important consequence of my argument is (...) that there are different notions of conjunction at play in standard first order logic, and that the technical and philosophical connections between them are far from well established. (shrink)

This dissertation looks to make sense of the role 'grammar' plays in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics during the middle period of his career. It constructs a formal model of Wittgenstein's notion of grammar as expressed in his writings of the early thirties, addresses the appropriateness of that model and then employs it to test Wittgenstein's claim that mathematical propositions are ultimately grammatical. ;In order to test Wittgenstein's claim that mathematical propositions are grammatical, the dissertation provides a formalized theory of grammatical (...) analysis and applies it to a portion of language big enough to contain numerical expressions. It attempts to prove that, if the object language contains the appropriate numerical expressions, the resulting grammar will include at least some rules with a natural mathematical interpretation. In particular, it tries to show that Wittgenstein's grammatical analysis of the ordinary use of numerical expressions yields familiar theorems of arithmetic. ;The dissertation also endeavors to extend these results to a coherent picture of Wittgenstein's peculiar view of mathematics as grammar. It fits the formal results into the larger picture of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics during this period. A large portion of the dissertation explains how, by combining the notions of grammar and mathematics, Wittgenstein allowed himself to offer original answers to some central questions in the philosophy of mathematics. In this regard, the dissertation pays special attention to four main issues: Wittgenstein's use of the term 'grammar' in his philosophical writings of this period, in comparison with traditional understandings of 'grammar', mathematics as part of the syntax of language, his explanation of mathematical application, and Wittgenstein's account of mathematical necessity. Taking these points in consideration situates the dissertation's results in the larger philosophical discussion of these themes. (shrink)

Para concretar el proyecto naturalista de Penelope Maddy, sería necesario, pues, contar con un criterio que nos permita decidir cuándo la argumentación es en favor o en contra de revisar los criterios de existencia y justificación en matemáticas es ella misma matemática y cuando es más bien filosófica o metafísica. Esto pone a Maddy en una posición particularmente difícil. Por un lado, quiere que la matemática sea considerada tan científica como para merecer el mismo tipo de autonomía epistémica, pero no (...) tan científica como para requerir el mismo tipo de justificación. Esto la hace blanco de críticas tanto de parte de naturalistas (quienes criticarían la autonomía que le otorga a la matemática), como de positivistas (quienes cuestionarían el carácter científico de la matemática). (shrink)

In one of his recent articles published in this JOURNAL, Alvin J. Goldman argues that since one must counts epistemic rules among the factors that help to fix the justificational status of agents (generally called J-factors), not all J-factors are internalist i.e. intrinsic to the agent whose justificational status they help to fix. After all, for an epistemic rule to count as a genuine J-factor, it must be objectively correct, and therefore, “independent of any and all minds” (p.9). Consequently, it (...) cannot be intrinsic to any particular epistemic agent. In this brief commentary, I will argue that Goldman’s argument misunderstands what it takes for epistemic justification to be internalist and, therefore, fails to guarantee his externalist conclusion. In particular, I want to demonstrate that Goldman’s argument trivializes the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties that lays at the basis of the internalist/externalist debate. I will show that, if sound, simple variations on Goldman’s argument could be used to prove the absurd conclusion that all properties are extrinsic. Now, since the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is fundamental for debates in several areas of philosophy, not only the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology, I conclude that Goldman’s argument cannot be sound. (shrink)

I can make no sense of a true, literal application of the notion of proper (nontemporal) components or parts to things that occupy no space. Others apparently can, and some construct elaborate theories of propositional structure… Perhaps I am blind to a possibility that other, cognitively better endowed philosophers see. From my unseeing perspective, though, it is more likely that the appearance of sight deceives.

En esta nota critico la teoría de la interpretación de Mota Pinto, arguyendo que predice significados donde intuitivamente no debería haberlos. De paso, critico su presentación de la perspectiva comunitarista del significado, distinguiendo entre dos tipos diferentes de hechos semánticos: el que una palabra signifique lo que significa en vez de significar otra cosa, y el que una expresión signifique lo que significa en vez de no significar nada. In this brief commentary, I argue that Mota Pinto's theory of interpretation (...) predicts meanings where there are none. I also criticize his presentation of the communal perspective on meaning, drawing a distinction between two different kinds of semantic facts: a word meaning what it does rather than meaning something else, and such word meaning what it does rather than not meaning anything at all. (shrink)

Stainton argues that since sub-sentential speech acts lack the proper syntactic structure to have logical form, it is not from them that subsententially propositions conveyed derive their logical form, in this brief comment, I develop an argument for the claim that sub-sentential speech acts not only do have the proper syntactic structure, but that according to Stainton's own general pragmatic account of sub-sentential speech, they also satisfy all the criteria put forward by him to be the primary bearers of logical (...) form. Stainton arguye que, dado que los actos de habla suboracionales carecen de la estructura sintáctica apropiada para tener forma lógica, las proposiciones comunicadas de manera suboracional no derivan su forma lógica de ellos. En este breve comentario desarrollo un argumento a favor de la tesis de que los actos de habla suboracionales, no sólo tienen la estructura sintáctica apropiada, sino que — de acuerdo con la propia teoría pragmática general de Stainton sobre el habla suboracional— también satisfacen todos los criterios mencionados por el propio Stainton para ser los portadores básicos de forma lógica. (shrink)

En un artículo reciente, García-Ramírez ha argumentado que el análisis contrafáctico de la causalidad de Lewis tiene la indeseable consecuencia de hacer posible la causalidad transmundana. En este artículo argumento que, contrario a lo que García-Ramírez sostiene, la causalidad transmundana no se deriva de la teoría de Lewis de la causalidad intramundana, ya que no se puede extender la relación de cercanía entre mundos de Lewis a pares de mundo de una manera que no sea trivial o ad hoc.

Using conjunction as an example, I show a technical and philosophical problem when trying to conciliate the currently prevailing views on the meaning of logical connectives: the inferientialist (also called 'syntactic') one based on introduction and elimination rules, and the representationalist (also called 'semantic') one given through truth tables. Mostly I show that the widespread strategy of using the truth theoretical definition of logical consequence to collapse both definitions must be rejected by inferentialists. An important consequence of my argument is (...) that there are different notions of conjunction at play in standard first order logic, and that the technical and philosophical connections between them are far from well established. (shrink)

En este ensayo exploramos una perspectiva epistemológica en la que el elemento social y colectivo del conocimiento juega un papel fundamental en la explicación de su producción y transmisión. Primero presentamos y criticamos una posición individualista que ha sido dominante en la epistemología contemporánea y cuyas raíces pueden trazarse, al menos, hasta Descartes. Posteriormente introducimos y defendemos nuestra propia mirada, una en la que el conocimiento es un proceso constituido por un conjunto de actividades y prácticas que tiene un carácter (...) material. (shrink)

Abstract In this essay, I will argue that images can play a substantial role in argumentation: exploiting information from the context, they can contribute directly and substantially to the communication of the propositions that play the roles of premises and conclusion. Furthermore, they can achieve this directly, i.e. without the need of verbalization. I will ground this claim by presenting and analyzing some arguments where images are essential to the argumentation process. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s10503-011-9259-y Authors (...) Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Cto. Mario de la Cueva s/n, Cd. Universitaria, Coyoacán, 04500 DF, Mexico Journal Argumentation Online ISSN 1572-8374 Print ISSN 0920-427X. (shrink)

In conversation we trust others to communicate successfully, to understand us, etc. because they have the adequate skills to be competent in the linguistic domain. In other words, to be trustworthy regarding an activity is nothing but to have the appropriate skills required for the activity. In the linguistic case, this means that being trustworthy regarding conversation is nothing but to have the capacity of partaking as a responsible participant in linguistic conversation, which requires having the appropriate linguistic skills. Now, (...) to trust someone in conversation one better know that the person one trusts is trustworthy in the relevant sense, that is, one need to know that she has the relevant linguistic skills. Thus, in order to maintain mutual trust, participants in conversation must track not so much the linguistic successes of other participants, but their linguistic skills, i.e. they must be able to trace their successes to the agent and not to external circumstances. But lucky successes do not manifest skill and therefore show no evidence of the true capacities of performers and, therefore, are useless for building trust. This is as much true in the linguistic realm as outside of it. We care about successes because they provide us with defeasible evidence of skills, but this evidence is defeated if such successes cannot be attributed to the agent, but are instead the product of lucky. Therefore, if we care about trust, that is, if we care about agents and their skills, we need to be wary of lucky successes. (shrink)

Semantic analysis in early analytic philosophy belongs to a long tradition of adopting geometrical methodologies to the solution of philosophical problems. In particular, it adapts Descartes’ development of formalization as a mechanism of analytic representation, for its application in natural language semantics. This article aims to trace the mathematical roots of Frege, Russel and Carnap’s analytic method. Special attention is paid to the formal character of modern analysis introduced by Descartes. The goal is to identify the particular conception of “form” (...) developed by the analytic tradition, from Descartes to early analytic philosophy, and to determine its relation to similar notions, like ‘function’ and ‘syntax’. Finally, I focus on how Frege, Russell and Carnap’s methods of semantic analysis fit the general characterization of formal analysis previously developed. (shrink)

After the publication of Marshall’s theorem (2009), it has been widely accepted that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot be analyzed in broadly logical terms, but instead requires appealing to more robust metaphysical notions like grounding, naturalness or duplication. However, this is not so. Instead of showing the limitations of Marshall’s still impressive result, I will present here a broadly logical definition of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and show that it is extensional adequate regardless of our preferred conception of property identity.

Is there a notion of domain specificity which affords genuine insight in the context of the highly modular mind, i.e. a mind which has not only input modules, but also central ‘conceptual’ modules? Our answer to this question is no. The main argument is simple enough: we lay out some constraints that a theoretically useful notion of domain specificity, in the context of the highly modular mind, would need to meet. We then survey a host of accounts of what domain (...) specificity is, based on the intuitive idea that a domain specific mechanism is restricted in the kind of information that it processes, and show that each fails at least one of those constraints. (shrink)

a cuestión de si la realidad es homogénea o heterogénea es uno de los debates más antiguos de la filosofía occidental y se repite en prácticamente todas las tradiciones filosóficas del mundo. Hay tres motivaciones principales para adoptar una visión heterogénea de la realidad: para dar cuenta de errores categoriales, para resolver paradojas, y para respetar la aparente heterogeneidad de nuestra experiencia, pensamiento y lenguaje. A continuación, revisaremos cada una de ellas, para después ver los principales retos que enfrenta quién (...) quiera defender una visión plural del ser. (shrink)

Despite being very common in both public and private argumentation, accusations of selective application of general premises, also known as “whataboutisms”, have been mostly overlooked in argumentation studies, where they are, at most, taken as accusations of inconsistency. Here I will defend an account according to which allegations of this sort can express the suspicion that the argumentation put forward by one party does not reflect his or her actual standpoint and reasons. Distinguishing this kind of argumentative moves is important (...) for evaluating its appropriateness in critical discussions where knowing the honest opinion of arguers is relevant, as in political controversies or interpersonal communication. (shrink)

Alvin I. Goldman has argued that since one must count epistemic rules among the factors that help to fix the justificational status of agents (generally called J-factors), not all J-factors are internalist, that is, intrinsic to the agent whose justificational status they help to fix. After all, for an epistemic rule to count as a genuine J-factor, it must be objectively correct and, therefore, “independent of any and all minds.” Consequently, it cannot be intrinsic to any particular epistemic agent. In (...) this brief commentary, I will argue that Goldman’s argument misunderstands what it takes for epistemic justification to be internalist and, therefore, fails to guarantee his externalist conclusion. In particular, I want to demonstrate that Goldman’s argument trivializes the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties that lays at the basis of the internalist/externalist debate. I will show that, if sound, simple variations on Goldman’s argument could be used to prove the absurd conclusion that all properties are extrinsic. Now, since the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is fundamental to debates in several areas of philosophy, not only the internalist/externalist debate in epistemology, I conclude that Goldman’s argument cannot be sound. (shrink)

I argue that an ontological pluralist strategy that relies on category-relative properties is immune to all the particular criticisms Beall wields in his book against other strategies for recovering the consistency of the immutability of the incarnated god.

A good metaphysical account of logical form, must make clear why logical form is logical. However, this task has proved to be very elusive. Here, I analyze different attempts to meet this challenge and defend an inferential externalism where logical form is grounded on external logical relations as our most promising option.

Este breve ensayo se inscribe en la tradición de buscar similitudes entre los epítetos y otros fenómenos lingüísticos, tanto inofensivos como discriminatorios. En particular, trataré de motivar la introducción de una distinción entre el blanco de un epíteto y su extensión y mostraré cómo esta distinción nos sirve para ver similitudes entre el comportamiento de este tipo de expresiones y el del complemento “de verdad” en expresiones como “tacos de verdad”. De paso, trataré también de explorar si estas teorías, desarrolladas (...) en su mayor parte en los Estados Unidos de América, sirven de herramienta teórica para dar cuenta de como ciertas expresiones contribuyen a la exclusión y discriminación de grupos minoritarios en nuestro contexto, es decir, en el castellano de México. (shrink)

What exactly is it to be a social constructivist in Metaphysics? In this brief note I try to introduce a few acclamatory distinctions that I have identified as having generated a lot of confusion in recent literature as well as serving to better frame current debates within metaphysical social constructivism. I also illustrate it with an example from the ontology of disability/.

Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of Theaetetus 187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions (...) and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue. (shrink)

How does the compositional arrangement of elements in a complex image, like a diagram, a picture or a map, represent the structural features of its content? In this paper I argue that they do so iconically, through the exploitation of relations of visual similarity and dissimilarity. I develop the general claim that our interpretation of this sort of images is guided by the implicit defeasible assumption that things that are patently related represent things that are relevantly related in a similar (...) way. I also identify the usual intrinsic and extrinsic mechanisms we use to represent structural features and illustrate them with an example from real life: a recent infographic from a popular science magazine. (shrink)

El objetivo del texto de Del Río es cuádruple: primero, busca documentar la exclusión de la que han sido víctimas las mujeres mexicanas a partir del análisis de diecisiete obras de historia de la filosofía mexicana publicadas entre 1943 y 2018; segundo, mostrar que dicha exclusión, además de presentar una imagen distorsionada del quehacer filosófico en nuestro país, comete un injusticia contra las mujeres y la comunidad filosófica nacional; tercero, defender que el aparato conceptual sobre injusticia epistémica que Miranda Fricker (...) (2017) ha desarrollado recientemente es una herramienta valiosa para entender y contrarrestar el daño que ha causado dicha exclusión, y, finalmente, proponer algunas acciones para corregir esta injusticia. (shrink)

En este libro Barceló Aspeitia explora un fenómeno normativo ubicuo y ordinario: la tendencia sistemática a evaluar positivamente algunos ejercicios de capacidades orientadas a fines, que fracasan; es decir, ejercicios que no alcanzan su objetivo. No hay nada extraordinario, por ejemplo, con afirmar que un médico diagnosticó correctamente a un paciente y que implementó un tratamiento adecuado, a pesar de que éste fracase en su objetivo de salvar la vida del paciente. El fenómeno es perfectamente ordinario, pero una (...) explicación filosófica satisfactoria de éste entraña desafíos teóricos delicados. (shrink)

The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez-Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to evaluative language. In particular, I want to defend the thesis that at least some aesthetic predicates can have non-evaluative reference. As an example, I will work with the predicate “tasty” (and its antonym “disgusting”) to argue that it some times refers to a non-subjective non-evaluative (...) property, flavour, which is more fundamental that the relational property of being tasty to someone. In other words, some times, when we say of something that it is tasty, we are not saying how it tastes to us or whether we like it, but just how it tastes period. (shrink)

After the publication of Marshall’s theorem (2009), it has been widely accepted that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot be analyzed in broadly logical terms, but instead requires appealing to more robust metaphysical notions like grounding, naturalness or duplication. However, in this article I will defend that this is not so. Instead of showing the limitations of Marshall’s undoubtedly impressive result, I will present here a broadly logical definition of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and show that it is extensional adequate regardless of our (...) preferred conception of property identity. (shrink)

What is an inference and when is an inference deductive rather than inductive, abductive, etc. The goal of this paper is precisely to determine what is that we, humans, do when we engage in deduction, i.e., whether there is something that satisfies both our pre-theoretical intuitions and theoretical presuppositions about deduction, as a cognitive process. The paper is structured in two parts: the first one deals with the issue of what is an inference. There, I will defend the hypothesis that (...) an inference is a causal process where an initial cognitive state causes another in such a way that the causal translation depends essentially on the content of the involved states. In other words, in an inference, a mental state A causes another B, partially because they have the content they have. Based on the conclusion from the first part, I will develop an account of deductive inference in the second part of the article. In order to achieve this, I will start by setting the stage and developing four constraints that an adequate account of deductive inference ought to satisfy. Then, I will present six different hypotheses that one might propose to characterize inferences of this kind. I have divided the proposals in two groups, the first one – which I will call the “logical proposals” – assume that whether an inference is a deduction or not depends exclusively on the content of the mental states involved in the inference, while the second – which I will call the “cognitive proposals” – reject the aforementioned assumption and instead recognize that extra cognitive information is required to determine whether an inference is a deduction or not. I will evaluate each proposal in turn, according to whether they satisfy the constraints introduced at the beginning of this second part. As a result of such evaluation, I will conclude that only one of the cognitive proposals actually satisfies the four constraints and therefore should be considered to give an adequate characterization of deductive inference. (shrink)

Cuando pensamos en el análisis de un concepto, de una teoría o de un argumento, de inmediato nos vienen a la mente metáforas descomposicionales: pensamos en descomponer el concepto en sus condiciones necesarias y suficientes, la teoría en sus teoremas o conceptos y el argumento en sus premisas y conclusiones. Si bien esta metáfora ha sido muy útil a lo largo de la historia de la filosofía occidental, no podemos basar sobre ella una buena metodología filosófica, sino que necesitamos una (...) caracterización más rigurosa, una que no sólo revele los alcances y límites de la metáfora descomposicional, sino que también nos indique cómo podemos superarlos y desarrollar una herramienta de análisis más poderosa. En este libro, Axel Barceló ofrece precisamente eso: una teoría del análisis que hace justicia tanto a las fortalezas y debilidades de la concepción clásica en términos de condiciones necesarias y suficientes, como a los métodos de análisis más recientes que, con base en nociones como las de orden, estructura y escala nos permiten generar análisis más complejos y sofisticados de fenómenos como la vaguedad, la estructura lógica de los colores y las relaciones no simétricas, entre otros. (shrink)

Resumen La metáfora de la "descomposición" domina aún nuestra manera usual de pensar el análisis conceptual. Se trata de una herramienta muy útil para pensar este proceso tan abstracto, pero tiene limitaciones importantes. Por ejemplo, nos hace pensar que los componentes de un concepto deben estar en algún sentido contenidos en él o que la única manera en que dos conceptos pueden estar relacionados es que uno contenga al otro. Estas limitaciones no nos permiten dar cuenta de conceptos complejos cuya (...) estructura no es tan simple, como los de color o de medida. Por ello es tiempo de superar esta metáfora y pensar al análisis conceptual no sólo como descomposición, sino también como la asignación de diferentes funciones a los componentes de un concepto.Our customary way of thinking about conceptual analysis remains dominated by the metaphor of 'containment', which has certainly been very useful, but which also has important limitations. For example, it makes us think that the components of a concept must be, in some sense, contained in it or that the only way that two concepts can be related is if one contains the other. These limitations have not allowed us to account for concepts whose structure is not so simple, such as the concepts of color or measurement, among others. It is time, therefore, to overcome this metaphor and think of conceptual analysis not only as decomposition but also as the assignment of different functions to the components of a concept. (shrink)

En este texto retomo una pregunta importante que había quedado abierta al final del segundo capítulo de mi (2019): ¿cuáles son los límites del análisis? Sabemos que por obvias limitaciones materiales, todo análisis siempre será incompleto y por lo tanto, limitado. A estos límites les hemos llamado “metodológicos”, para distinguirlos de los metafísicos. Si el análisis tiene límites en este segundo sentido, aun si termináramos de analizar por completo un concepto, no podremos estar seguros de conocer todas sus propiedades esenciales (...) (ya que hay propiedades de este tipo que no las capta ningún análisis) o de ser capaces de distinguirlo de todos los conceptos (pues lo que lo distingue de otros conceptos puede ser inanalizable). Comúnmente se dice que el análisis no nos da todo el contenido de los conceptos, sino sólo su forma lógica o estructura semántica. Por lo tanto, otra manera de reformular la pregunta por los límites del análisis es ¿cuál es la relación entre forma y contenido? (shrink)

Pronpongo una nueva manera de concebir la aceptación de proposiciones y su relación con la creencia y la inferencia. Argumento además que adoptar esta propuesta nos permite resolver de manera relativamente sencilla algunas paradojas aparentemente tan disímbolas cómo la del prefacio, la lotería y el sorites. Según esta propuesta, el error detrás de la paradoja sorítica es pensar que quién cree que hay una línea divisoria entre lo que cae dentro de la extensión de un término y lo que cae (...) fuera de él debe creer también de algún lugar que ahí se encuentra dicha línea divisoria. Espero convencerlos de que no es así, y que por lo tanto, nuestros juicios de sentido común no nos llevan a ninguna contradicción. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es establecer algunas distinciones fundamentales para el estudio de las representaciones epistémicas, y en particular, de las representaciones epistémicas visuales. Para ello, presento tres distinciones estrechamente relacionadas: La primera es una distinción entre las restricciones impuestas a una herramienta por la tarea (que se busca nos ayude a realizar), y aquellas impuestas por nuestras características como usuarios. La segunda es una distinción entre la función estrecha de una representación (que no es sino representar) y su (...) objetivo más amplio, el cual puede ser epistémico, estético, litúrgico etc. La tercera es una distinción entre la interpretación y la aplicación de una representación, es decir, entre determinar cómo las cosas son de acuerdo a la representación, y determinar si realmente las cosas son como son representadas. Ilustro la utilidad de estas distinciones aplicándolas a un par de ejemplos: un caso de “final de fotografía” y un diagrama en geometría euclidiana. (shrink)

My purpose in this text is to offer a general roadmap for navigating most current debates in the metaphysics of social categories regarding what sort of fact it is for a person to inhabit one social category or another—for example, what makes a person Mexican, or gay, or rich. With this goal in mind, I propose classifying the debating positions into three broad camps: common sense theories, socio-historical accounts, and performative theories. I characterise their main differences, identifying the main challenges (...) and achievements of each. I show that for persons well integrated into their categories, the differences between these three broad camps are minuscule, yet become crucial when we try to account for people not so well integrated. Then, I sketch a pluralist proposal that reconciles the three camps I have identified, while doing justice to the challenges presented by interstitial phenomena such as mestizaje, transition, passing, migration, etc. (shrink)

En "Elementos esenciales de una hermenéutica analógica", Mauricio Beuchot trata de ubicar su hermenéutica analógica como una posición intermedia entre lo que él llama el univocismo y la hermenéutica alegórica. En este comentario busco mostrar, tomando como punto de partida que los objetivos teóricos de la hermenéutica no se encuentran muy distantes de los de las teorías analíticas de la interpretación, que el debate sobre el papel de los elementos extralingüísticos en la interpretación es mucho más complejo de lo que (...) el trilema de Beuchot sugiere. In "Essential Elements for an Analogical Hermeneutics", Mauricio Beuchot seeks to place his analogical hermeneutics in a position between what he calls univocism and allegorical hermeneutics. In this commentary I intend to show, taking into account that the theoretical goals of hermeneutics are not so different from those of analytical theories of interpretation, that the debate over the role played by extralinguistic elements in interpretation is much more complex than what Beuchot's trilemma suggests. (shrink)

En este ensayo exploramos una perspectiva epistemológica en la que el elemento social y colectivo del conocimiento juega un papel fundamental en la explicación de su producción y transmisión. Primero presentamos y criticamos una posición individualista que ha sido dominante en la epistemología contemporánea y cuyas raíces pueden trazarse, al menos, hasta Descartes. Posteriormente introducimos y defendemos nuestra propia mirada, una en la que el conocimiento es un proceso constituido por un conjunto de actividades y prácticas que tiene un carácter (...) material. (shrink)

1. La estructura como problema filosófico 2. Teorías metafísicas de la estructura 2.1. La concepción intrínseca de la estructura 2.2. Como parte sui-generis 2.3. La concepción extrínseca de la estructura 3. Conclusiones Referencias.

Intuitivamente, la realidad está formada por entidades y hechos existentes y concretos. Sin embargo, nuestro lenguaje y pensamiento versa también sobre hechos meramente posibles, sobre cosas inexistentes y entidades abstractas. ¿Cómo es esto posible? ¿Significa ello que cuando hablamos y pensamos de estas otras cosas no hablamos de nada real? ¿o mas bien la realidad está mas poblada de lo que pensábamos y hay diferentes maneras de formar parte de la realidad además de la de existir de manera positiva y (...) concreta? En este libro trataremos de arrojar luz a estas y otras preguntas similares, poniendo atención a las estrategias argumentativas generales que suelen esgrimirse en esta rama de la filosofía. (shrink)

En respuesta a los atinados comentarios de mis colegas, defiendo que el externismo no es un inferencialismo, que el color es una dimensión y que determinamos la forma lógica de las proposiciones expresadas en términos pictóricos de la misma manera que lo hacemos con las proposiciones expresadas en el lenguaje natural.

Dos de las respuestas a la pregunta sobre la naturaleza de la comprensión lingüística —el comunitarismo y el interpretativismo—, las cuales discuto ampliamente en Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, son objeto de la crítica de Axel Barceló en su comentario al libro. En esta réplica respondo a sus objeciones mostrando que la concepción comunitarista de la comprensión de palabras está en condiciones de distinguir entre una comprensión divergente y la no comprensión, y que el enfoque interpretativista (...) no exige el conocimiento previo de las intenciones comunicativas del hablante para dar cuenta de la fijación interpretativa de su comprensión lingüística. Two answers to the question about the nature of linguistic understanding —the community view and the interpretive stance—, which I discuss in my book Escepticismo del significado y teorías de conceptos, are criticized by Axel Barceló in his short commentary. Here, I address his objections by showing that, within the community view, distinguishing between a deviant understanding and no understanding at all is possible, and that the interpretive stance does not require previous knowledge of the speaker's communicative intentions in order to explain how an interpreter could determine the meaning of his words. (shrink)