The popularity of direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry services has exploded over the past five years, with as many as 250 direct-to-consumer genetic ancestry testing companies currently operating and estimates that 1 in 5 Americans are customers of one or more of those companies. Marketing of genetic ancestry testing has consistently linked the results of DNA testing to a consumer’s racial and ethnic identity, and, because of that, can help consumers find out “who they really are.” We argue that the “biologization” of (...) race and ethnicity promoted in such marketing violates norms of marketing ethics. In particular, we show that this marketing technique violates a number of the core commitments and values of the American Marketing Association Statement of Ethics. (shrink)

Toward Unity among Environmentalists is Bryan Norton’s most developed effort to surmount the frequently intractable debate between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists. Norton argues that the basic axiological differences between the two positions have become irrelevant at the level of policy formation. His thesis is that the two camps converge when dealing with practical goals and aims for environmental management. I argue that Norton’s approach falls significantly short of establishing such a convergence because of the overall methodological framework for policy formation that (...) he defends. The key problem with that framework is that it fails to provide for the degree of species protection most suitable to the nonanthropocentrist position. (shrink)

This book argues that, despite recent calls to arms to seek out and remove "corporate psychopaths" from the business world, efforts to eliminate the corporate psychopath presence would be illegal as well as unethical.

Market events of the past few years have resurrected long unheeded calls for the professionalization of the occupation of business manager, not in terms of increased technical proficiency, but in terms of a renewed vigor to shape the practice of management and the education of those who will fill its ranks along the lines of the “ideal of service” which characterizes socially established professions like law and medicine. In this paper I argue that the push to professionalize business management can (...) be grounded in an ISCT (Integrative Social Contracts Theory) treatment of the “vulnerable values” argument which itself has served as a source for the professionalization of medicine and law. Additionally, I offer a sketch of an argument that once business managers are considered to be members of a profession, we can begin to develop an account of “business malpractice” which would, when it occurs, represent an ethical violation of the “publicpledge” that members of all professions make to serve the broader good of society. (shrink)

Emotivism has enjoined a revival of sorts over the past few decades, primarily driven by a Darwinian interpretation of the Humean metaethic. Evolutionary ethics, the metaethical view that at the heart of our moral sense lies a set of moral sentiments whose existence 'pre-dates' in evolutionary terms our species' ability to engage in more explicit, cognitive moral deliberations and discourse, whether in the discovery of deontological rules or in the crafting of social contracts, figures prominently in Robert Solomon's work in (...) justice theory and J. Baird Callicott's work in environmental ethics, to name just two efforts to revive emotivism. Though the idea that our moral sense is grounded in our evolved biology lies at the heart of the new ethical emotivism, there has been a curious lack of a truly evolutionary account of the origin of that biological predisposition in the work of Solomon, Callicott, and others involved in the revival. In particular, what is missing is an account of how we evolved our moral sense as an adaptation to the ecology in which our very early ancestors existed. The typical explanation is to treat it as selected for by the pressure to cooperate that bore upon our early ancestors; for example, the advantage that cooperative effort confers in bringing down big game or warding off competing groups. But this type of explanation, I hope to show, rather than providing an account of how our moral sense came to be, actually must presuppose the existence of a rudimentary moral sense. If so, then the origin of our moral sense must be accounted for as an adaptation to our pre-social, ecological environment. As a model for what such an explanation might look like I will use Jared Diamond's recent work in biogeography, Guns, Germs and Steel. (shrink)

Typical of ecocentric approaches such as the land ethic and the deep ecology movement is the use of concepts from ecological science to create an “ecoholistic” ontological foundation from which a strong environmental ethic is generated. Crucial to ecocentric theories is the assumption that ecological science has shown that humanity and nonhuman nature are essentially integrated into communal or communal-like arrangements. In this essay, I challenge the adequacy of that claim. I argue that for the most part the claim is (...) false, and that, if it were true, it would overextend the sphere of morally considerable entities to include entities that are implausibly deserving of moral consideration. In either case, the foundation of ecocentrism is significantly weakened. (shrink)

In developing the metaethical foundation for the Land Ethic, J. Baird Callicott has relied on the cognitive plasticity and directionality of the moral sentiments in order to argue for an extension of those sentiments to the environment. As he sees it, reason plays a substantial role in determining which objects we direct those sentiments toward, and ecology has now shown to reason’s satisfaction that we are part of larger, land communities. In this essay, I would like to develop the claim (...) that we should be careful not to overemphasize the cognitive nature of the “moral sentiments” at the expense of their biological basis as an ecologicaladaptation. I hope to show that this is of special importance for the Land Ethic, where the metaethic involved is entirely dependent on a “felt” sense of community to generate the extension of moral consideration to the environment. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper, I pursue an interpretive goal and a critical goal. My interpretive goal is to offer a clear restatement of Nagel's argument for a requirement of altruism (as found in The Possibility of Altruism). My critical goal is to explain why this argument is unsuccessful, and to make a case for the thesis that any argument of its kind must fail.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I raise the following question: can the ethical thought of Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel provide us with a way of showing that morality is a rational requirement? The answer I give is that it cannot. I argue for this claim by showing that a decisive objection to Alan Gewirth’s line of thought in Reason and Morality also applies to discourse ethical arguments that try to show an inescapable commitment to a moral principle. RÉSUMÉ: La pensée (...) ethique de Jurgen Habermas et Karl-Otto Apel peut-elle nous fournir une façon de montrer que la moralité répond à un besoin rationnel? Ma réponse, malheureusement, est que non, elle ne le peut pas. Je défends cet argument en montrant qu’une objection décisive à ce courant de pensée, tel qu’il est présenté par Alan Gerwirth Raison et Moralité, s’applique aussi aux arguments ethiques qui essaient de prouver leur lien incontournable avec un principe moral. (shrink)

After decades of vigorous debate, many contemporary philosophers in the Kantian tradition continue to believe, or at least hope, that morality can be given a firm grounding by showing that rational agents cannot consistently reject moral requirements. In the present paper, I do not take a stand on the possibility of bringing out the alleged inconsistency. Instead I argue that, even if a successful argument could be given for this inconsistency, this would not provide an adequate answer to “the normative (...) question” (i.e., “why should I be moral?”). My defense of this claim emerges from a defense of a claim about Kant, namely, that he did not attempt to answer the normative question in this way. After carefully articulating Kant’s answer to the normative question, I argue that his answer to this question contains a lesson about why we should not embrace the approach that is popular among many contemporary Kantians. (shrink)

One popular sort of argument for the death penalty depends on the idea of possibly saving innocent lives through added deterrent value. Defenders of such arguments generally concede that: a) we do not know whether or not the death penalty actually adds marginal deterrent value beyond life in prison, and b) any actual death penalty regime is likely to include the execution of some innocent people. Use of the death penalty might save some innocent people, but it is also likely (...) that it will lead us to kill some innocent people. In the present paper, I attempt to give consideration to both sorts of innocents. I argue that it is morally more serious to intentionally kill people who are innocent than it is to fail to save innocent people whose death is in no way intended. Thus, in the absence of compelling evidence that our use of the death penalty would save significantly more innocent people than it would kill, we should err on the side of not using the death penalty as a means to try to achieve added deterrent value. (shrink)

The mysterious phrase, ‘the eternal validity of the self,’ is clearly quite important in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works. A reader of those works will see that becoming aware of your eternal validity is a prerequisite for becoming both Judge William’s ‘ethical man’ and Johannes de Silentio’s ‘knight of faith,’ but the same reader is likely to be unsure just what it means to become aware of yourself in your eternal validity. In this paper, I discuss and critique various accounts of the (...) concept of the eternal validity of the self. Then, I offer an account of that notion which proceeds from careful attention to Judge William’s use of the phrase in Either/or. Finally, I connect my account with some of Kierkegaard’s writings beyond Either/or. (shrink)

Several scholars have claimed that small-scale agriculture in which farmers sell goods to the local market has the potential to strengthen social ties and a sense of community, a phenomenon referred to as “civic agriculture.” Proponents see promise in the increase in the number of community supported agriculture programs, farmers markets, and other locally orientated distribution systems as well as the growing interest among consumers for buying locally produced goods. Yet others have suggested that these novel or reborn distribution mechanisms (...) are still primarily means of instrumental economic exchange and that optimistic characterizations of a renewed sense of community emerging from these practices are unfounded. This study provides an empirical assessment of the extent to which these community-based agriculture markets are associated with connection to community, volunteerism, and civic and political activities. In order to assess the relationship between civic agriculture and community engagement, we surveyed over 1,300 people in the Mid-Hudson region of New York State. The study design includes “civic agriculture participants” as the unit of analysis, defined as CSA farm members, shoppers at independent health food stores, and farmers market patrons. For comparison, a telephone survey of randomly selected residents of the region’s general population was also conducted. Unlike studies that focus solely on the perceptions of certain civic agriculture participants, by comparing the perceptions and behaviors of those engaged in a range of civic agriculture practices, we are able to identify the effects of different forms of participation. The results demonstrate higher levels of voluntarism and engagement in local politics among civic agriculture participants relative to the general population. In addition, we found variation among those engaged in different forms of civic agriculture, with those immersed in more socially embedded forms of exchange demonstrating greater community and political involvement. These findings lend empirical support to the civic agriculture thesis. (shrink)

In the 17th century Sir Francis Bacon advocated the patient study of Nature for the benefit of mankind. Most of science today, in its study of medicine, genetics, electronics etc., continues that pragmatic Baconian tradition without fuss. Over the years, however, as its investigation of Nature probed ever deeper into regions far removed from common experience, science has increasingly exhibited traits more usually associated with fundamentalist religion that with dispassionate study. Articulate voices from biology preach the belief in 18th century (...) materialism in the study of evolution; those from physics promulgate a kind of mathematical theology in its study of elementary particles and cosmology; both inveigh against heresy. But science should be beyond that sort of belief. It should not see its undoubted success in manipulating matter as justifying any sort of religious status, as offering a spiritual foundation alternative to religion. As a scientist himself, Brian Ridley is appalled by such theological trends, hence this book. It is an attempt to address these concerns, to reform science, to place science in its broad historical and philosophical context where dogmatic belief has no place, to remind science itself that it has limitations. (shrink)

Proteins account for the catalytic and structural versatility displayed by all cells, yet they are assembled from a set of only 20 common amino acids. With few exceptions, only 61 nucleotide triplets also direct incorporation of these amino acids. Endeavors to expand the genetic code recently progressed to nucleus‐containing cells, after Chin et al.1 transferred Escherichia coli genes for a mutant tyrosine‐adaptor molecule and its synthetase into Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Transformed yeast cells were produced that exhibit efficient site‐specific incorporation of non‐biotic (...) amino acids into proteins. This makes it likely that code complexity can be elevated experimentally in mammals. BioEssays 26:111–115, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This paper examines the philosophical basis for the argument that there is a connection between ethical behavior and profitability. Both sides of this argument – that good ethics is good business and that bad ethics is bad business – are explored. The possibility of a moral floor above which ethical behavior is not rewarded is considered, and an economic experiment testing such a proposition is discussed. Johnson & Johnson suffers a potentially devastating blow when some cyanide-laced Tylenol capsules cause several (...) deaths. Johnson & Johnson voluntarily pulls Tylenol off the shelf, to universal acclaim. When Tylenol is returned to the marketplace, its share of the over-the-counter painkiller market becomes greater than it was before the tragedy. Arthur Andersen, the venerable accounting firm, is caught in the web surrounding the downfall of Enron, Inc. As Enron’s various sins are discovered, it is found that Arthur Andersen auditors had signed off on flawed audits and had shredded documents to cover themselves. Andersen is prosecuted for, and convicted of, obstructing justice (although the conviction is later overturned). Today the firm barely exists and has no resemblance to the Big Five accounting giant of 1999. These stories seem to indicate that ethical (or unethical) behavior leads to positive (or negative) financial results. But the philosophical arguments underpinning such statements are seldom subjected to proper analysis. They are perhaps wishful thinking, or perhaps based on examples such as the above without considering other examples that may reinforce a contrary position. This paper will explore the philosophical arguments and empirical evidence regarding these statements and state some research questions for exploration in this area. In particular we will propose the possibility that a moral floor exists above which firms that engage in ethical activities will not reap rewards, but below which firms that engage in unethical activities will be punished by actors in the economic marketplace. We will discuss an economic experiment to determine if such actors indeed form a moral floor. (shrink)

Conrad Hal Waddington integrated genetics with embryology and evolution by formulating and providing experimental evidence for the mechanisms of canalization and genetic assimilation in the context of stabilizing selection, and by fostering an epigenetic rather than the prevailing gene-centered view of embryonic development and of evolutionary change in development and adult form. Waddington saw phenotypes as processes, not static structures and behaviors. Trained in geology at Cambridge, Waddington turned to experimental studies on the chemical nature of the primary organizer and (...) developed the concepts of evocation and individuation as separable components of embryonic induction. A move after WW II to Edinburgh provided Waddington with his professional home for the rest of his career, during which he integrated genetics and development into an evolutionarily relevant discipline. Our conception of embryonic development as a highly integrated series of canalized pathways owes much to Waddington’s development of the concepts of canalization, chreods, epigenetics, and the epigenotype. The integrated, heritable, epigenetic organization of embryonic development is Waddington’s lasting legacy to development. He demonstrated organismal response to environmental change and hidden genetic variation, integrated environmental responsiveness into heritable change in response to selection, and coupled development, environment, and evolution. (shrink)

The phenomenon of globalization of markets has been accompanied by calls for a globalization of ethical norms. One principle often referred to in such calls is the so-called Golden Rule. The rule, often stated as Do unto others as you would have others do unto you, has long been used and referenced in the business literature. But those who use it often do so without full realization of the rule itself and what it stands for. This paper examines the history, (...) meaning, and problems of the rule and attempts to show, through a case analysis, how these problems surface when using the rule in a business context. In so doing it attempts to clarify exactly what the rule means and how it can fit into a universal code of morality. (shrink)

Argues that the concept of the ethical is central to Hegel’s philosophy of art.

Hegel’s lectures on fine art, given in the 1820s, were published for the first time in 1835 and continued to influence thinking about aesthetics for the rest of the nineteenth century. After a long period of relative neglect in this century, when idealism in general fell into disfavor, Hegel’s Aesthetics has begun to awaken renewed interest. Appropriately, the larger questions of the relation of art, beauty, and truth have attracted the most attention. His treatment of musical aesthetics, on the other (...) hand, has generally been regarded as much less satisfactory, in spite of his being more qualified than most philosophers of his day to discuss music. It is known that Hegel sang in a choral group at one point, that he had attended operas by Gluck, Mozart, Rossini, and Weber, and that he had heard performances of symphonies and string quartets by Haydn and Mozart. Yet his remarks on music have been dismissed as the product of someone who knew very little about music and who had little sympathy for the newer genres and styles of music that still loom so large in the repertoire today. The important question, however, is whether his aesthetic of music makes sense musically and is philosophically coherent. If so, then his arguments are of more significance than has been recognized. In fact, they reveal the principles and aims of the art of music as it was practiced in his day and as it continued to be understood by many critics in the nineteenth century. They pose a challenge, moreover, to the prevailing ahistorical ways of understanding music in the twentieth century. (shrink)