This paper is concerned with the nature of common-sense reasoning and understanding in relation to practical behaviour. It examines the relationship between intuitive knowledge based on everyday experience and institutionalized theory and practice. An analysis of the types of knowledge that guide the selection of actions and understanding in the domain of cooking practice is presented. Verbal transcripts were elicited from participants, with varying levels of experience, of the cooking methods they followed and their underlying rationale. The results suggest that (...) individuals utilize various high level knowledge primitives in combination with pragmatic utility principles in their reasoning. The findings are discussed in the light of recent theoretical approaches concerned with the relationship between knowledge and inference. (shrink)

Distributed Cognition is a hybrid approach to studying all aspects of cognition, from a cognitive, social and organisational perspective. The most well known level of analysis is to account for complex socially distributed cognitive activities, of which a diversity of technological artefacts and other tools and representations are an indispensable part.

I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as (...) of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised. (shrink)

The social media industry lacks developed principles of professional ethics that it would need in order to better navigate the ethics of conforming to local media laws in authoritarian countries that lack meaningful protections for privacy, personal and political expression, and intellectual property. This chapter analyzes this question through three frameworks of professional ethics—journalism ethics, technology ethics, and business ethics—and the ways that social media resembles and crucially differs from these three industries.

Clown characters have always played a decisive role when depicting social conflicts. Wearing their masks, they embody and reveal cultural anxieties.

Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of ‘‘weak awareness internalism’’ that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the ‘‘Subject’s Perspective Objection’’ horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of ‘‘strong awareness internalism’’ that do not fall prey to the dilemma’s ‘‘vicious regress’’ horn. We note along the way that (...) these versions of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat. (shrink)

Contemporary international law separates the international justice of war from the domestic justice of society, but empirically, there is a correlation between democratic governance and military effectiveness, which could have a number of causes. A contemporary reconstruction from _The Seven Military Classics_ of Chinese military philosophy offers potential lessons for how domestic virtues may yield military and geopolitical victory. This chapter reconstructs arguments from the seven treatises into a collective an amalgamated conception of “good governance” that weaves together military strategy (...) and virtue ethics and maintains that good governance at home actually wins wars abroad. A reconstructed classical Chinese conception of “good governance” presents theoretical and ethical challenges, but also offers viable justicial content for contemporary jus ad bellum considerations beyond sovereign self-defense or human rights. It presents a way of instantiating the sprawling conception of human rights that falls short in contemporary discourse. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the concept of virtue in nursing care. We particularly examine the description of ‘virtue’ offered by Aristotle, who considers it the mental constitution that forms the basis for laudable social behaviour. We then turn to Katie Eriksson's work on caritative caring ethics and draw parallels between the Aristotelian concept of virtue and being a good nurse. Eriksson suggests that embracing an ethos, a set of basic values, affects nurses’ attitudes as well as the way they (...) speak and take on their responsibility for the patient. We discuss these ideas in relation to a tentative ideal model of the movement from ethos to action to understand and address nurses’ ethical thinking and acting. Here, we focus on the catalytic role of virtue as a means for realizing a deliberate, intentional acting with the best of the patient in mind. As an outcome of our analysis, we suggest that the movement of virtue from ethos to action is most usefully conceptualized as knowledge about facts, habits of the heart, deeds of the hand and the power of words. Implications for nursing leadership are suggested, including incorporating organizational values through the means of ethical conversations. (shrink)

I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...) any causally relevant information, I’ve given my grounds for my belief. I’ve given reasons that might justify me in supposing that Tom’s baby is a boy. Less naturally, the question might be taken as a request for a broader causal explanation of my holding this belief. Appropriate answers might cite all manner of facts concerning the evolution of the human race, why I chose to pursue philosophy and hence came to know Tom, the mechanisms of email transmission, the firing of various neurons, the circumstances of concept formation as a result of which I’m able to grasp the thought that Tom’s baby is a boy, and so on. It is an interesting question what distinguishes the narrower set of answers that I first suggested. I won’t pursue that here. I assume you have a good enough sense of the distinction I’m drawing. We might call the narrower set of answers justifying reasons, the kind of reasons I might cite in justifying my belief. Answers of the first sort are clearly relevant to epistemological evaluation. In assessing whether you know p or are rational in believing it to the degree you do, I will naturally want to consider what reasons you have for your belief. In deliberating myself about whether to believe p, in seeking an answer to the question of whether p, I will naturally consider what reasons or grounds I have to suppose that p. But what I want to focus on here is how explanations of the broader sort bear on such questions as whether to believe p. From a third-person perspective we can ask, ‘In assessing the epistemic status of S’s belief that p, what is the relevance of causal information that lies outside of the realm of justifying reasons?’ From the first-person standpoint we can ask ‘In seeking to answer whether p, how should such causal information affect my deliberations?’ At first it might seem that such broader causal information could have little relevance if any. Like any belief my belief that p can be traced back to innumerable causes from far and wide.. (shrink)

The UN Security Council's approach to counterterrorism, which the United States has greatly shaped, has generally shown a marked human rights deficit. The process for seizing the assets of and imposing travel bans on suspected terrorists and their financiers must be reformed.

In 2009, with the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union entered into force. Under Article 8 of the Charter, for the first time, a stand-alone fundamental right to data protection was declared. The creation of this right, standing as a distinct right to the right to privacy, is undoubtedly significant, and it is unique to the European legal order, being absent from other international human rights instruments. This commentary examines the parameters of (...) this new right to data protection, asking what are the principles underpinning the right. It argues that the right reflects some key values inherent in the European legal order, namely: privacy, transparency, autonomy and nondiscrimination. It also analyses some of the challenges in implementing this right in an era of ubiquitous veillance practices and Big Data. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

This study focuses on the cultural context of ethical decision making by considering the relationship between power distance and ethical judgment. Specifically, we propose that this relationship exists because of the influence of peers on ethical judgment and perceptions of justice. Considering the importance of peers in stage three of Kohlberg's model of moral development, we argue that peers are the basis for social comparisons, social cues and social identification and, hence, are critical to an individual's beliefs about justice. Using (...) scenarios developed by Reidenbach and Robin, data were collected from German and Italian graduate business students. Germany and Italy differ substantially in power distance, but not in the three other cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Results show that the ethical assessment of the respondents from the two countries differs when justice criteria are used. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed. (shrink)

Objectives: Initially, we analyzed relations between the challenging working conditions of flight attendants with symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. As the COVID-19 pandemic plunged airlines into an unprecedented crisis, its impact on the mental health of flying cabin crews became the focus of a second survey.Methods: Flight attendants were surveyed online with DASS-21 in May 2019 and April 2020, complemented with questions about working conditions and existential fears and fear of job loss.Results: Sample 1 revealed that symptoms of depression, (...) anxiety and stress highly correlated with the subjective assessment of working conditions, but not with objectifiable parameters. Sample 2 showed significant positive correlations between existential fears and fear of job loss with depression, anxiety and stress. Crew members, grounded in April 2020, showed significantly higher scores in depression and stress, while still flying individuals had more clinically relevant symptoms of anxiety. Mean value comparisons between sample 1 and 2 in DASS-21 revealed a significant increase in symptoms at the time of crisis with effect sizes of d = 0.63 for depression, d = 0.26 for anxiety, and d = 0.52 for stress. The incidence of clinically relevant symptoms among the respondents increased from 8 to 23%, from 6 to 14%, and from 8 to 24%.Conclusion: The COVID-19 pandemic and associated work restrictions coincide with severe impairment of mental health of flying cabin crews, consistent with a mental health protecting function of labor. (shrink)

Yet, he also says that it is philosophically indeterminate which criterion for what exists is correct. Nominalism is the view that certain objects ( i.e ., abstract objects) do not exist, and not the view that it is philosophically indeterminate whether or not they do. I resolve the dilemma that Azzouni's claims pose: Azzouni is a non-factualist about what exists, but he is a factualist about which criterion for what exists our community of speakers has adopted. It is in the (...) latter sense only that Azzouni can call himself a nominalist. My thanks to Jody Azzouni and to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This study focuses on the cultural context of ethical decision making by considering the relationship between power distance and ethical judgment. Specifically, we propose that this relationship exists because of the influence of peers on ethical judgment and perceptions of justice. Considering the importance of peers in stage three of Kohlberg's model of moral development, we argue that peers are the basis for social comparisons, social cues and social identification and, hence, are critical to an individual's beliefs about justice. Using (...) scenarios developed by Reidenbach and Robin, data were collected from German and Italian graduate business students. Germany and Italy differ substantially in power distance, but not in the three other cultural dimensions of Hofstede. Results show that the ethical assessment of the respondents from the two countries differs when justice criteria are used. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed. (shrink)

Background:Within nursing, the concepts of home and homelike have been used indiscriminately to describe characteristics of healthcare settings that resemble a home more than an institution.Objectives:The aim of this study was to investigate the concept of home. The main questions were as follows: What does the concept of home entail etymologically and semantically? Of what significance is the meaning of the concept to caring science and nursing?Design and methods:This study had a qualitative design with a hermeneutical approach guided by Gadamer. (...) Eriksson’s model of concept determination was partly used to determine the etymology and semantics, the essence and epistemic category of the concept of home. In this study, etymological dictionaries and 17 Swedish language dictionaries published between 1850 and 2001 were investigated.Ethical consideration:In all parts of this study, ethical guidelines have been followed concerning both gathering data from dictionaries and other sources and during the interpretation of these sources.Findings:The home, framed as the ethos of caring, can be drawn as a three-dimensional picture where the three dimensions have a common core, enclosed and inviolable. Symbolically, the picture of home can be seen as the ethos of the human being’s innermost room, the human being’s manner of being and the tone expressed in the external or abstract room where the human being lives and interacts with others.Conclusion:Based on the findings in this study, we conclude that home as ethos is an inner ethical dimension within the human being. Human beings who are in contact with their ethos, the self, feel at home and dare to follow the voice of their heart. Nurses who experience at-homeness have an ability to invite the patient into a caring relationship. The home and the feeling of being at home have significant meaning in terms of human beings’ health and well-being. (shrink)

This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the compatibility of (...) the previously discussed views with dualist and monist interpretations of our mental states and our ways of modeling them. (shrink)

The Finnish nursing theorist Katie Eriksson's (1943–2019) theory of caritative caring represents a non‐medical paradigm concerning the phenomena of nursing. The aim of this article was to present an oversight of the development of Eriksson's theory of caritative caring from a human science point of view. The historical development of the theory is outlined, combined with a brief overview of its philosophical connections, its impact on contemporary caring science research and its implications for nursing care. Caring science is considered a (...) human science in the Nordic tradition, as it is deeply rooted in basic issues of human life and existence. The key ideas of Eriksson's theory of caritative caring are linked to the metaparadigm concepts of human being, health and suffering, caring and environment. All of these are permeated with the ethos of caritative caring, that is, the caritas thought of human love and mercy, and the honouring of the absolute dignity of human beings. Epistemologically, Gadamer is the most influential philosopher when it comes to the theory of caritative caring. Eriksson's theory is used in, for example, intercultural caring, caring for patients suffering from addiction, the importance of aesthetic surroundings, providing ethically good care for older people and mothers as patients in psychiatric care. In these fields of research, Eriksson's ideas of ethics, caring and suffering are highlighted in various clinical contexts. Beyond the areas of nursing care in which Eriksson's work has been cited and developed, there are at least two areas that have been actively enhanced by her works: the field of leadership and education for nursing teachers. According to Eriksson, it is momentous to ponder scientific results as not limited to empirically strengthened, randomized outcomes. Part of making the results of scientific work evident is up to the individual nurses and their being in the world. (shrink)

In this book, an international group of philosophers, economists and theologians focus on the relationship between justice, luck and responsibility in health care. Together, they offer a thorough reflection on questions such as: How should we understand justice in health care? Why are health care interests so important that they deserve special protection? How should we value health? What are its functions and do these make it different from other goods? Furthermore, how much equality should there be? Which inequalities in (...) health and health care are unfair and which are simply unfortunate? Which matters of health care belong to the domain of justice, and which to the domain of charity? And to what extent should we allow personal responsibility to play a role in allocating health care services and resources, or in distributing the costs? With this book, the editors meet a double objective. First, they provide a comprehensive philosophical framework for understanding the concepts of justice, luck and responsibility in contemporary health care; and secondly, they explore whether these concepts have practical force to guide normative discussions in specific contexts of health care such as prevention of infectious diseases or in matters of reproductive technology. Particular and extensive attention is paid to issues regarding end-of-life care. (shrink)

Preamble -- Holding on -- The public intellectual -- Stories of action in theories of context -- Life politics -- Curriculum -- Teachers' lives, professional knowledge, educational reform -- Narrative -- Preamble -- Biography -- Scholarship -- Learning and pedagogy.

Women generally initiate, lead, and constitute the rank and file of environmental justice activism. However, there is little research on why there are comparatively so few men involved in these movements. Using the environmental justice movement in the Central Appalachian coalfields as a case study, we examine the ways that environmental justice activism is gendered, with a focus on how women’s and men’s identities both shape and constrain their involvement in gendered ways. The analysis relies on 20 interviews with women (...) and men grassroots activists working for environmental justice in the coalfields of Appalachia. We find that women draw on their identities as “mothers” and “Appalachians” to justify their activism, while the hegemonic masculinity of the region, which is tied to the coal industry, has the opposite effect on men, deterring their movement involvement. We explore the implications of these findings for understanding the relationship of gender to environmental justice activism. (shrink)

Offers an in-depth exposition of the Confucian conception of persons as the starting point of Confucian ethics.

Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

Kofi Annan did more than any UN secretary-general before him to stress the close link between human rights and peace and security. With the creation of the Human Rights Council, said Annan, "a new era in the human rights work of the United Nations has been proclaimed.".

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 10, Page 12-14, October 2012.

After a regime-changing war, a state often engages in lustration—condemnation and punishment of dangerous, corrupt, or culpable remnants of the previous system—e.g., de-Nazification or the more recent de-Ba’athification in Iraq. This common practice poses an important moral dilemma for liberals because even thoughtful and nuanced lustration involves condemning groups of people, instead of treating each case individually. It also raises important questions about collective agency, group treatment, and rectifying historical injustices. Liberals often oppose lustration because it denies moral individualism and (...) ignores rule of law, and their only justifications for lustration are consequentialist ones. This article suggests that lustration may not necessarily be a problem for liberals. While group treatment might be justified on grounds of convenience and pragmatism in times of transitional justice, there are also valid moral arguments consistent with moral individualism and due process for wholesale group punishment after a war. This article offers four overlapping moral justifications, in a robust defense of the core concept of lustration that is covered by each argument. (shrink)

A substantial body of recent philosophy envisages a close, congenial relationship between blame and morality. It has been posited, assumed or argued, for instance, that blame is responsive to moral...

Does a human right to healthcare imply individual obligations to healthy behavior? Or put another way: Is a self-induced condition a relevant criterion for some sort of restriction of this right—like withholding or modifying treatment in circumstances where choices have to be made? For instance, should a drunk driver bear the costs of medical care that he needs after a car accident he has caused? Should there be a difference in healthcare entitlements between the smoker with a heart attack who (...) is seriously overweight and the 60-year old man who has always taken excellent care of himself and is suddenly stricken by leukemia? And how should we think about the risk-taking behavior of all the persons going on a skiing holiday or an exotic hiking trip? a. (shrink)

The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief – sensitivism – which (...) allows such a solution. I sketch a sensitivist account of the preface writer's doxastic state. (shrink)