Concerned with the notions of morality that Christians have inherited, Vincent MacNamara revisits a topic he wrote about in 'The Truth in Love'. Going to the heart of the matter of morality and situating it in the call to be human, he displays a sympathetic understanding of the human condition and the demands of modern life.

This paper presents the main topics, arguments, and positions in the philosophy of AI at present (excluding ethics). Apart from the basic concepts of intelligence and computation, the main topics of ar-tificial cognition are perception, action, meaning, rational choice, free will, consciousness, and normativity. Through a better understanding of these topics, the philosophy of AI contributes to our understand-ing of the nature, prospects, and value of AI. Furthermore, these topics can be understood more deeply through the discussion of AI; so (...) we suggest that “AI Philosophy” provides a new method for philosophy. (shrink)

Theories of quantum gravity generically presuppose or predict that the reality underlying relativistic spacetimes they are describing is significantly non-spatiotemporal. On pain of empirical incoherence, approaches to quantum gravity must establish how relativistic spacetime emerges from their non-spatiotemporal structures. We argue that in order to secure this emergence, it is sufficient to establish that only those features of relativistic spacetimes functionally relevant in producing empirical evidence must be recovered. In order to complete this task, an account must be given of (...) how the more fundamental structures instantiate these functional roles. We illustrate the general idea in the context of causal set theory and loop quantum gravity, two prominent approaches to quantum gravity. (shrink)

Emotions are typically dual-faced: they involve both an evaluative and a practical aspect. What is more, an emotion's evaluative and practical aspects tend to exhibit a kind of fit. For example, Sakshi's fear of the bear involves apprehending the bear as a threat to something she cares about, i.e., her wellbeing. And it motivates her to act on behalf of this care: it motivates her to act in ways that protect her wellbeing. Both dimensions of Sakshi's fear are about her (...) wellbeing. Typically, characterizations of gratitude speak to both its evaluative and practical dimensions. Gratitude is described as a way of apprehending the significance of one's benefactor's kindness, and it is said to involve a disposition to thank one's benefactor and to return the kindness. In this article I show that this characterization is incomplete insofar as it leaves us without the resources needed to discern the link between gratitude's two dimensions. I argue that discerning the fit requires an account of gratitude's focus and goal. I urge that the beneficiary's communal relationship with her benefactor is gratitude's focus and that promoting this relationship is gratitude's goal. Both dimensions of a beneficiary's gratitude are about her communal relationship with her benefactor. (shrink)

Holism maintains that a phenomenon is more than the sum of its parts. Yet analysis--a mental process crucial to comprehension--involves dismantling the whole to grasp it piecemeal and relationally. Wading through such quandaries, Vincent Descombes guides readers to a deepened appreciation of the entity that enables understanding: the human mind.

A Border Disputeintegrates the latest work in logic and semantics into a theory of language learning and presents six worked examples of how that theory revolutionizes cognitive psychology. Macnamara's thesis is set against the background of a fresh analysis of the psychologism debate of the 19th-century, which led to the current standoff between logic and psychology. The book presents psychologism through the writings of John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant, and its rejection by Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl. It (...) then works out the general thesis that logic ideally presents a competence theory for part of human reasoning and explains how logical intuition is grounded in properties of the mind. The next six chapters present examples that illustrate the relevance of logic to psychology. These problems are all in the semantics of child language (the learning of proper names, personal pronouns, sortals or common nouns, quantifiers, and the truth-functional connectives) and reflect Macnamara's rich background in developmental psychology, particularly child language - a field, he points out, that embraces all of cognition. Technical problems raised by but not included in the examples in the main part of the text are dealt with in a separate chapter. The book concludes by describing laws in cognitive psychology, or the type of science made possible by Macnamara's new theory. John Macnamara is Professor of Psychology and Director of the Program in the History and Philosophy of Science, McGill University. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

While it is often said that robotics should aspire to reproducible and measurable results that allow benchmarking, I argue that a focus on benchmarking can be a hindrance for progress in robotics. The reason is what I call the ‘measure-target confusion’, the confusion between a measure of progress and the target of progress. Progress on a benchmark (the measure) is not identical to scientific or technological progress (the target). In the past, several academic disciplines have been led into pursuing only (...) reproducible and measurable ‘scientific’ results – robotics should be careful to follow that line because results that can be benchmarked must be specific and context-dependent, but robotics targets whole complex systems for a broad variety of contexts. While it is extremely valuable to improve benchmarks to reduce the distance be- tween measure and target, the general problem to measure progress towards more intelligent machines (the target) will not be solved by benchmarks alone; we need a balanced approach with sophisticated benchmarks, plus real-life testing, plus qualitative judgment. (shrink)

Many important theorists – e.g., Gary Watson and Stephen Darwall – characterize blame as a communicative entity and argue that this entails that morally responsible agency requires not just rational but moral competence. In this paper, I defend this argument from communication against three objections found in the literature. The first two reject the argument’s characterization of the reactive attitudes. The third urges that the argument is committed to a false claim.

Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...) take seriously the fact that reactive attitudes are emotions. In this paper, we appeal to insights of the emotions literature to highlight one key way in which reactive attitudes go beyond beliefs: beliefs about a person and her morally significant conduct merely ascribe to the person the property of having performed a morally significant action, while reactive attitudes are ways of experiencing that person as having performed a morally significant action. We then suggest that appreciating this is a crucial first step toward understanding why reactive emotions play roles in our practices around responsibility that beliefs do not. (shrink)

Criminal law as public law -- Criminal law as public law -- Criminal law as public law -- Mass incarceration and the theory of punishment -- Reasons to criminalize -- Formalism and pragmatism in criminal procedure -- Responsibility without resentment.

This open access monograph offers a detailed study and a systematic defense of a key intuition we typically have, as human beings, with respect to the nature of time: the intuition that the future is open, whereas the past is fixed. For example, whereas it seems unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first world war. -/- The book contributes, in particular, three major and original insights. First, it provides a coherent, (...) non-metaphorical, and metaphysically illuminating elucidation of the intuition. Second, it determines which model of the temporal structure of the world is most appropriate to accommodate the intuition, and settles on a specific version of the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT). Third, it puts forward a naturalistic foundation for GBT, by exploiting recent results of our best physics (viz. General Relativity, Quantum Mechanics, and Quantum Gravity). Three main challenges are addressed: the dismissal of temporal asymmetries as non-fundamental phenomena only (e.g., thermodynamic or causal phenomena), the epistemic objection against GBT, and the apparent tension between GBT and relativistic physics. It is argued that the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past must be grounded in the temporal structure of the world, and that this is neither precluded by our epistemic device, nor by the latest approaches to Quantum Gravity (​e.g., the Causal Set Theory). -/- Aiming at reconciling time as we find it in ordinary experience and time as physics describes it, this ​innovative book ​will raise the interest of both academic researchers and ​graduate students working on the philosophy of time. More generally, it ​presents contents of interest for all metaphysicians and non-dogmatic philosophers of physics. (shrink)

In this paper, I first introduce one of the most prominent objections against the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), the so-called ‘epistemic objection’, according to which GBT provides no way of knowing that our time is the objective present and, therefore, leads at best to absolute skepticism about our temporal location, at worst to the quasi-certainty that we are located in the objective past. Secondly, I express my dissatisfaction regarding the various traditional attempts to address this objection, especially Merricks (...) (2006), Forrest (2004) and Correia and Rosenkranz (2018). Thirdly, I show that the passage of time leads to an anti-essentialist picture of natural kinds. Finally, I develop my own solution to the epistemic objection, based on the continued existence of bare particulars. (shrink)

Many theorists claim that the reactive emotions, even in their private form, are communicative entities. But as widely endorsed as this claim is, it has not been redeemed: the literature lacks a clear and compelling account of the sense in which reactive attitudes qua private mental states are essentially communicative. In this paper, I fill this gap. I propose that it is apt to characterize privately held reactive attitudes as communicative in nature because they, like many paradigmatic forms of communication, (...) have representational content and the function of evoking uptake of this content in a recipient. (shrink)

The idea that demands are a key constituent of any analysis of the negative reactive attitudes is rarely challenged, enjoying a freedom from scrutiny uncommon in philosophy. In this paper I press on this orthodox view, arguing that there are broadly speaking, three ways in which the term ‘demand’ is used in discussions of the negative reactive attitudes and that each is problematic.

This chapter contains sections titled: Pluralistic Ignorance Modal Operator Epistemology Agents and Inquiry Methods Multimodal Systems Knowledge Transmissibility Knowledge Transmissibility and Public Announcement Knowledge Transmissibility and Pluralistic Ignorance References.

Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussions, however, have generally focused on the question of who counts as responsible, and for what. But as Gary Watson has noted, “Responsibility is a triadic relationship: an individual (or group) is responsible to others for something” (Watson Agency and answerability: selected essays, 2004 , p. 7). Thus, theorizing about responsibility ought to involve theorizing not just about the actor and her conduct, but also about those the actor is (...) responsible to—and specifically about how these people hold the actor responsible for her conduct. In this paper, I give a topology of the terrain of holding others responsible. Over the course of the paper I disambiguate two very broad senses of holding responsible—regarding another as a responsible agent and holding another responsible for a particular piece of conduct. Next, I argue that the latter sense of holding responsible is a genus with two species—what I will call “holding responsible as deep moral appraisal” and “holding responsible as accountability.” Appreciating these distinctions, I argue, sheds considerable light on a number of questions concerning the scope and nature of our practices of holding others responsible. Finally, illuminating these distinct senses of holding responsible and highlighting their features reveals an awkwardness in the most carefully explicated and influential account of holding responsible, namely R. Jay Wallace’s account in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. (shrink)

If I do you a good turn, you may respond with gratitude and express that gratitude by saying “Thank you.” Similarly, if I insult you, you may react with resentment which you express by shouting, “Screw you!” or something of the sort. Broadly put, when confronted with another’s morally significant conduct, we are inclined to respond with a reactive attitude and to express that reactive attitude in speech. A number of familiar speech acts have a call-and-response structure. Questions, demands and (...) hails are all call-types, and each seeks a defining response. Questions seek answers, demands seek compliance, and a hail, for example, “Hi Coleen” seeks a “Hi” in return. Many theorists claim that expressions of the reactive attitudes also have this structure. Yet, this insight raises a number of questions. There are, after all, many familiar call-types, not only questions, demands and hails, but also requests, invitations, recommendations and entreaties. Given this, it is natural to wonder whether the expressed reactive attitudes are a sui generis call-type or whether they can be properly assimilated to one of the better-known forms. Further, we might wonder about the response component. It is utterly familiar that the response suited to a demand is compliance, and that the response sought by a question is an answer, but what response do the expressed reactive attitudes seek? The answer to this question is not similarly ready to hand. In this paper, I provide a recognition-based theory of the call-and-response structure of the expressed reactive attitudes. On my account, both the positive and negative expressed reactive attitudes are modes of recognition that seek for their target to give expression to her recognition of having been appropriately recognized. In the negative case, the target does this by feeling and expressing guilt or remorse, and in the positive case, by feeling and expressing self-approbation. (shrink)

Western democracies experience profound conflicts that induce concerns about polarization and social cohesion. Yet although conflicts are a core feature of democracies, the forms, functions, and dynamics of democratic conflicts have rarely been subject of political theory. This paper aims at furthering our understanding of democratic conflicts. It analyzes the theory of conflict in Mouffe's agonistic pluralism, confronts it with sociological conflict theory, and presents concrete points of departure for a more comprehensive theory of democratic conflicts. The paper, thus, contributes (...) to two lines of research: (1) Regarding agonistic theories, the paper shows that agonistic pluralism fails to provide a convincing theory of conflict since it underestimates the mechanisms and effects of conflict dynamics (e.g. intergroup cohesion, intragroup conflict, domination, and escalation) and fails to account for the variety of conflict interactions. Proponents of agonistic pluralism should therefore invest more into clarifying their core concept. (2) For a general account of democratic conflicts, the paper proposes to pursue interdisciplinary research on the cognitive concepts shaping conflict interactions, the linked practices of conflict regulation, and the processual dynamics of conflicts. (shrink)

L'identité, dans les acceptions que ce terme revêt aujourd'hui, est une véritable énigme lexicale : elle désigne tout autant l'objet de contrôles sécuritaires policiers, un retour à la religion de ses parents, que, dans un guide touristique, la spécificité en voie de disparition d'un quartier. Reprenons. «Qui suis-je?», «Qui sommes-nous?», ce sont là ce qu'on appelle précisément des «questions d'identité». Nous comprenons spontanément de quoi il retourne parce que nous disposons d'un modèle : connaître l'identité de quelqu'un, c'est savoir comment (...) il s'appelle. Toutefois, lorsque la question de l'identité est posée à la première personne, mon intention n'est pas d'apprendre quels sont mes nom, prénoms et qualité, comme si je devais passer un «contrôle d'identité». Que signifie le mot dès lors qu'il est utilisé avec le possessif («mon identité», «notre identité») et qu'il ne désigne pas l'énoncé d'un état civil? Jadis le mot voulait dire exclusivement qu'il n'y a qu'une seule et même chose là où on aurait pu penser qu'il y en avait deux. Or, depuis quelques dizaines d'années, le mot a revêtu une signification autre, à savoir qu'il y a une chose ou un être qui possèdent la vertu d'être singulièrement eux-mêmes. Ainsi, que des guerres puissent éclater pour des questions qui ne relèvent pas strictement des intérêts matériels bien compris des antagonistes, nul ne saurait s'en étonner, sinon ceux qui nourrissent une conception utilitariste étriquée de l'être humain. En revanche, pourquoi est-ce le mot «identité» qui se trouve désormais chargé de signifier l'enjeu et l'objet de tels conflits? Tel est donc le point précis soulevé par Vincent Descombes : dans tout cela, que vient faire le mot «identit黠? Et que reste-t-il du concept d'identité? (shrink)

A wide-ranging collection of essays inspired by the memory of the cognitive psychologist John Macnamara.

Lauréat du Grand Prix de Philosophie de l'Académie française, Vincent Descombes est aujourd'hui Directeur d'études à l'EHESS et membre du Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron. Il est l'un des rares philosophes français à s'inscrire dans le courant de la philosophie analytique, mouvement qui place la question du langage au centre de sa réflexion. Que savoir? Comment dire? Telles sont les questions que n'aura de cesse de poser le philosophe analytique. Ces entretiens avec Philippe de Lara, maître de conférences (...) à l'université Panthéon Assas, permettront aux non-spécialistes de découvrir l'essentiel de sa pensée. Vincent Descombes revient sur son parcours aux côtés de Paul Ricoeur, sa rencontre intellectuelle avec Russell, et dégage sa méthode conceptuelle, avant d'exposer et d'approfondir les questions qu'il aborde dans ses oeuvres, celle de l'identité, les rapports entre politique et langage... (shrink)

Nous partageons, au sujet de la nature du temps, l’intuition fondamentale selon laquelle le futur est ouvert tandis que le passé est fermé. Par exemple, alors que nous pensons pouvoir influencer le cours du futur, nous savons qu’aucune de nos actions ne peut influencer le cours du passé. Cependant, bien que cette intuition soit largement partagée, identifier la nature de l’asymétrie qu’elle reflète n’est pas chose aisée. Dans cet article, j’explore différentes manières de caractériser l’asymétrie entre le ‘futur ouvert’ et (...) le ‘passé fermé’ dans le but de rendre justice à notre intuition. En particulier, je discute la question de savoir si cette asymétrie doit être caractérisée de façon sémantique, épistémique, métaphysique ou ontologique. Je conclus que, bien que plusieurs de ces caractérisations contribuent à une compréhension globale du phénomène, une caractérisation ontologique de l’asymétrie doit être préférée, car elle s’avère supérieure en termes de pouvoir explicatif, d’intelligibilité, ainsi que dans sa capacité à inclure différents sens que l’on peut prêter au concept d’ouverture. (shrink)

À partir d’une lecture intégrale de l’oeuvre d’Augustin d’Hippone (354-430), Vincent Giraud met au jour les aspects de ce qu’il appelle, dès l’introduction, une « condition herméneutique ». Il s’agit de démontrer que le « il y a », le « es gibt » propre à toute « donation » phénoménale, se situe, pour Augustin, entièrement sous condition du signe : la compréhension de l’existence humaine peut alors faire l’objet d’une reprise radicale à partir du concept de signe. Être (...) au monde, à soi, à autrui, à Dieu, c’est donc d’abord faire face à des signes. Car c’est le signe (signum) qui prévaut dès lors que la chose même (res ipsa) fait défaut. Cette tension fondamentale entre signification et manifestation peut alors être considérée comme la trame profonde qui régit toute la pensée augustinienne de l’humain. L’étude s’ordonne en deux grandes parties, qui permettent de déployer l’ensemble du spectre couvert par l’existence herméneutique telle que l’a conçue Augustin. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage propose de retracer le parcours intellectuel et spirituel de l’écrivain roumain d’expression française Emil Cioran (1911-1995). Le texte s’appuie sur une approche biographique pour saisir les enjeux philosophiques et identitaires de la vie et de l’oeuvre de Cioran. Tout d’abord son enfance imprégnée de culture allemande où liberté et insouciance cèdent vite la place à l’ennui ; sa fascination pour les thèses ultra-nationalistes pendant sa jeunesse studieuse et angoissée ; la volonté d’aveuglement que lui inspire ensuite son mépris (...) des affaires humaines ; la fuite de la Roumanie pendant la Guerre et l’affirmation de son incertitude identitaire et intellectuelle ; l’abandon finalement de son pays et de sa langue comme refus de sa propre histoire. L’ouvrage tente d’apporter un regard nouveau sur l’homme et son oeuvre pour résoudre les contradictions inhérentes à son renversement identitaire: bien que la mémoire soit au centre de sa pensée, Cioran se dirigea toujours plus vers la nécessité de l’oubli. La démarche de Vincent Piednoir démontre que cette volonté d’oubli a inscrit le philosophe dans la mémoire collective. De nombreux livres ont commenté la pensée de Cioran. L’originalité de celui-ci est de s’étendre, sans esprit de polémique mais sans tabou, sur sa jeunesse roumaine et profasciste. (shrink)

Desert-realists maintain that those who do wrong without an excuse deserve blame. Desert-skeptics deny this, holding that though we may be responsible for our actions in some sense, we lack the kind of responsibility needed to deserve blame. In two recent papers, Randolph Clarke advances an innovative defense of desert-realism. He argues for deserved-guilt, the thesis that the guilty deserve to feel guilt. In his 2013 paper, Clarke suggests two strategies for defending deserved-guilt: the fitting-guilt strategy and the good-guilt strategy. (...) In his 2016 paper, Clarke issues a challenge to the desert-skeptic: he calls on them to provide a non-desert based account of guilt’s fittingness. In the first two thirds of the paper, I respond to Clarke’s challenge to the desert-skeptic, showing that guilt felt by the guilty is alethic-fitting, reason-fitting, and value-fitting. None of these notions of fittingness, I argue, are desert based. In the last third of the paper, I show how the work done in previous sections affords us the tools to finely diagnose the failures of both the fitting-guilt and the good-guilt strategies. Here, I draw on one of Clarke’s own insights—namely, that desert is intimately connected to the value of justice. I propose that showing that guilt is fitting, or again non-instrumentally good, fails to show that it is deserved because to show that it is deserved one must show that guilt is fitting or good in a sense that implicates justice. (shrink)

Rivers stopped or flowing backward -- Harmony, number, and others --Twentieth-Century measures.

A l'instantanéité doit succéder la réflexion, à la réaction incessante le recul stratégique. La stratégie naît il y a 2500 ans, à Athènes et en Chine avec Sun Tzu et son célèbre Art de la guerre. Art militaire au départ, méthode de pensée pour l'action, elle apparaît de plus en plus indispensable dans notre monde moderne. Pourtant, le sens en a été oublié. Aujourd'hui, les décideurs - entrepreneurs, politiques, militaires - sont accaparés par le court terme et la tactique. Atteints (...) de myopie décisionnelle, ils éprouvent des difficultés grandissantes à prendre du recul. Ils ont perdu l'habitude et le goût de la stratégie, qu'ils pratiquent de moins en moins alors qu'elle seule peut apporter des réponses à la complexité du monde et à l'accélération du temps. Il faut entrer en stratégie, utiliser celle-ci pour modeler le présent et bâtir l'avenir. Le but de cet ouvrage est de faciliter cette démarche, de l'éclairer et de la démythifier. Entrer en stratégie est un guide de survie et de succès. (shrink)