Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that helps us better understand some of the most fundamental issues in philosophy: those having to do with the relationship between the meaning of words, the way the world is, and our knowledge of the meaning of words. This selection of new essays by some of the world's leading authorities in this field sheds fresh light both on foundational issues regarding two-dimensional semantics and on its specific applications. Contributors: Richard Breheny, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Martin (...) Davies, Gareth Evans, Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Josep Maci`, Martine Nida-Rumelin, Christopher Peacocke, James Pryor, Francois Recanati, Scott Soames, Cara Spencer, Robert Stalnaker, Kai-Yee Wong, Stephen Yablo. (shrink)

Presuppositions are well known phenomena. One way of treating them is as partial 'meaning-functions '. There is an attractive argument that holds that in order to explain the contrast between such sentences as "John came into the room" and "That bastard John came into the room" it is required to make our semantic theory essentially more complex. This argument appeals to the fact that contrasts such as the ones just mentioned play a role in the validity of logical inferences. In (...) this paper I argue that these contrasts can be accounted for by appealing to presuppositions. In order to defend this view we will have to offer a characterization of logical consequence that applies to sentences that involve presuppositions. (shrink)

In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke offers a number of arguments in order to show that no descriptivist theory of proper names is correct. We present here a certain version of descriptivist theory -we will characterize it as an individual-use reference-fixing descriptivist theory that appeals to descriptions regarding how a name is used by other speakers. This kind of theory can successfully answer all the objections Kripke puts forward in Naming and Necessity. Such sort of descriptivist theory is furthermore compatible (...) with the picture about reference that Kripke presents. It also seems to be able to account for some phenomena that are difficult to explain on Kripke’s view (the existence of informative identity statements and true negative singular existential statements). (shrink)

In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke offers a number of arguments in order to show that no descriptivist theory of proper names is correct. We present here a certain version of descriptivist theory -we will characterize it as an individual-use reference-fixing descriptivist theory that appeals to descriptions regarding how a name is used by other speakers. This kind of theory can successfully answer all the objections Kripke puts forward in Naming and Necessity. Such sort of descriptivist theory is furthermore compatible (...) with the picture about reference that Kripke presents. It also seems to be able to account for some phenomena that are difficult to explain on Kripke’s view. (shrink)

We can distinguish different senses in which a formal language can be said to have been provided with an interpretation. We focus on two: (i) We provide a model (or structure) and a definition of satisfaction and truth in the standard way (ii) We provide a translation into a natural language. We argue that the sentences of a formal language interpreted as in (i) do not have meaning. A formal language interpreted as in (i) models the way the truth of (...) a sentence would be affected by two factors: the interpretation as in (ii) of the language, and a way the world might be. Viewing in this way the relation between interpreting a formal language as in (i) and as in (ii) allows us to justify the conceptual adequacy of the standard model-theoretic definitions of the properties of logical truth and logical consequence. (shrink)

In recent writings Paul Horwich has pursued two related aims: (i) To show “how small a constraint is provided by compositionality” (Horwich 1998, chapter 7, p. 183). “The compositionality of meaning imposes no constraint at all on how the meaning properties of words are constituted” (p. 154). (ii) To present a deflationary alternative to the “Davidsonian truth-theoretic perspective” (Horwich 2001) The paper has three sections: in section 1 I make some comments on compositionality, in section 2 I argue that Horwich (...) does not succeed in achieving aim (i), and in section 3 I argue that he does not succeed either in achieving aim (ii). (shrink)

This volume analyzes in detail Spinoza's reasoning in Tractatus theologico-politicus, identifies allies and enemies in its historical context, and explores its more or less obvious connection with the Ethica.

In 2016, Béziau introduces a restricted notion of paraconsistency, the so-called genuine paraconsistency. A logic is genuine paraconsistent if it rejects the laws $\varphi,\neg \varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\vdash \neg (\varphi \wedge \neg \varphi)$. In that paper, the author analyzes, among the three-valued logics, which of them satisfy this property. If we consider multiple-conclusion consequence relations, the dual properties of those above-mentioned are $\vdash \varphi, \neg \varphi$ and $\neg (\varphi \vee \neg \varphi) \vdash$. We call genuine paracomplete logics those rejecting (...) the mentioned properties. We present here an analysis of the three-valued genuine paracomplete logics. A very natural twist structures semantics for these logics is also found in a systematic way. This semantics produces automatically a simple and elegant Hilbert-style characterization for all these logics. Finally, we introduce the logic LGP which is genuine paracomplete is not genuine paraconsistent, not even paraconsistent and cannot be characterized by a single finite logical matrix. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Volume: 2014 Issue: 198 Pages: 205-240.

Se analiza la obra poética de Angelina Muñiz, su actividad poética, elevada al rango de la mística, comprenderá todos los textos sacralizados de cualquier manera o por cualquier tradición para conferirles una nueva dimensión desde su propia perspectiva del mundo. Un mundo en el que las mujeres salen de su silencio para tomar la palabra y dejar oír sus pensamientos y manifestar su propia interpretación del mundo.

Un principio formal y universal es que se debe tratar igual a todas las personas en lo que son y tienen de igual, y de modo diferente en lo que son o tienen de desigual. Consecuentemente, tratar de modo igual a lo desigual, o de modo desigual a lo igual es un error y una injusticia. Un principio homólogo de la gnoseología exige que los seres pertenecientes a diversas categorías de ser –seres ideales y reales; naturales y culturales; de razón (...) o de ficción, etc.–, puestos como objeto de conocimiento, han de tratarse de igual manera, es decir con las conceptuaciones, enjuiciamientos, pruebas y valoraciones que les corresponden; con los esquemas teóricos o prácticos, cuantitativos o cualitativos, y con los métodos, que requiere cada categoría y modalidad de ser. Por tanto, tratar de conocer con los mismos principios de necesidad y de causalidad, con iguales esquemas funcionales y con las mismas pruebas empíricas, propias de la ciencia físico-natural moderna, los distintos modos de ser pertenecientes a las diversas categorías de seres no naturales es un error que, por una parte, produce una deformación del conocimiento y, por otra, la falta de conocimiento necesario y adecuado para su comprensión. El cientificismo consiste fundamentalmente en el error de trasladar los supuestos de partida, los principios de necesidad causal, los esquemas cuantificables y las pruebas empíricas, propias de la ciencia natural, a las acciones y obras humanas, inexplicables sin tener en cuenta la causalidad libre (la libertad) del hombre, y sobre todo injustificables sin ideas de bien, de justicia y de otros valores ideales. Cientificismo, modalidades y consecuencias pone al descubierto varios errores y los males que de ellos derivan, cometidos por autores relevantes al incurrir en las distintas modalidades de cientificismo. El cientificismo impide el progreso del saber científico y filosófico sobre el hombre y sobre el mundo creado por él. (shrink)

No hay en la historia reciente de la justicia constitucional contemporánea evidencia del diálogo académico entre dos jueces constitucionales supremos en activo.

La filosofía fue entre nosotros, durante largo tiempo, un “juego social”, en las últimas décadas se ha venido transformando en (pseudo)campo, y en la actualidad está expuesta a sucumbir a la heteronomía, decayendo a la degradada situación de “espacio de servicios”. Así la doctrina de Bourdieu esclarece el surgimiento, la situación actual, y en cierto modo también la peripecia futura de la filosofía en España. Y al mismo tiempo consigue explicar porque, en este preciso momento, es plausible el pesimista diagnóstico (...) de que el peligro de regresión a la heteronomía compromete la existencia del incipiente campo filosófico español. Simplemente ocurre que en las situaciones de crisis las percepciones de los agentes adquieren una relevancia de la que suelen carecer en etapas más apacibles. En los períodos de desilusión los agentes se vuelven lúcidos, en una palabra, porque entonces resulta más difícil “seguir el juego” que el campo les exige. Ya que tomar parte en dicho juego no es más, según Bourdieu, que una forma de ilusión. (shrink)

In this paper two deductive systems associated with relevance logic are studied from an algebraic point of view. One is defined by the familiar, Hilbert-style, formalization of R; the other one is a weak version of it, called WR, which appears as the semantic entailment of the Meyer-Routley-Fine semantics, and which has already been suggested by Wójcicki for other reasons. This weaker consequence is first defined indirectly, using R, but we prove that the first one turns out to be an (...) axiomatic extension of WR. Moreover we provide WR with a natural Gentzen calculus. It is proved that both deductive systems have the same associated class of algebras but different classes of models on these algebras. The notion of model used here is an abstract logic, that is, a closure operator on an abstract algebra; the abstract logics obtained in the case of WR are also the models, in a natural sense, of the given Gentzen calculus. (shrink)

The inference systems proposed for solving SAT are unsound for solving MaxSAT and MinSAT, because they preserve satisfiability but not the minimum and maximum number of clauses that can be falsified, respectively. To address this problem, we first define a clause tableau calculus for MaxSAT and prove its soundness and completeness. We then define a clause tableau calculus for MinSAT and also prove its soundness and completeness. Finally, we define a complete clause tableau calculus for solving both MaxSAT and MinSAT, (...) in that the minimum number of generated empty clauses provides an optimal MaxSAT solution and the maximum number provides an optimal MinSAT solution. (shrink)