Since the publication of Self Experiences in Groupin 1998-the first book to apply self psychology and intersubjectivity to group work-there have been tremendous advancements in the areas of affect, attachment, infant research, ...

There is great interest in understanding whether and how mood influences affective processing. Results in the literature have been mixed: some studies show mood-congruent processing but others do not. One limitation of previous work is that decision components for affective processing and responses biases are not dissociated. The present study explored the roles of affective processing and response biases using a drift-diffusion model of simple choice. In two experiments, participants decided if words were emotionally positive or negative while listening to (...) music that induced positive or negative mood. The behavioural results showed weak, inconsistent mood-congruency effects. In contrast, the DDM showed consistent effects that were selectively driven by an a-priori bias in response expectation, suggesting that music-induced mood influences expectations about the emotionality of upcoming stimuli, but not the emotionality of the stimuli themselves. Implications for future studies of emotional classification and mood are subsequently discussed. (shrink)

This paper provides a retrospective and prospective overview of TU Delft’s approach to engineering ethics education. For over twenty years, the Ethics and Philosophy of Technology Section at TU Delft has been at the forefront of engineering ethics education, offering education to a wide range of engineering and design students. The approach developed at TU Delft is deeply informed by the research of the Section, which is centered around Responsible Research and Innovation, Design for Values, and Risk Ethics. These theoretical (...) approaches are premised on the notion that technologies are inherently value-laden, and as such contain the possibility of fostering or hindering moral values. Each of these approaches encourages students to take a proactive attitude with respect to their projects and profession, thinking creatively about – and taking responsibility for – how to both prevent harm and do good via the technologies they help develop. To explain how this is put into practice, this paper sketches a brief history of ethics teaching at TU Delft, outlines current activities, and presents future plans for Bachelor and Master’s level engineering ethics education at TU Delft. (shrink)

Background Academic integrity (AI) is of increasing importance in higher education. At the same time, students are becoming more consumer-oriented and more inclined to appeal against, or complain about, a penalty imposed for a breach of AI. This combination of factors places pressure on institutions of higher education to handle alleged breaches of AI in a way acceptable to students that motivates them to continue to engage with their studies. Method Students (n = 8) were interviewed to discover their perceptions (...) of the process for dealing with breaches of AI. All students were based in one university in a very diverse area of London which has many first-generation students from non-traditional academic backgrounds. Results Students reported strong emotional reactions featuring high levels of anxiety and stress. Some found the process to be threatening and demotivating and questioned continuation on their course of study, while others used more adaptive coping strategies. Students also went to great pains to make it clear that their own, and their friends’, breaches of AI were unintentional, while expressing the view that other people were deliberately cheating and should be penalised. Key recommendations include: support for students to re-engage after the intervention; support for students to develop effective self-regulatory learning strategies and time management; provision of specific examples to clarify what is, and is not, acceptable academic practice; recognition of the strong emotions likely to be invoked, especially if accompanied by declarations of unintentionality. (shrink)

A major recurrent feature of the intellectual landscape in cognitive science is the appearance of a collection of essays by Noam Chomsky. These collections serve both to inform the wider cognitive science community about the latest developments in the approach to the study of language that Chomsky has advocated for almost fifty years now,1 and to provide trenchant criticisms of what he takes to be mistaken philosophical objections to this approach. This new collection contains seven essays, the earliest of which (...) were first published about ten years ago. So the linguistic work that is summarised is within the principles and parameters approach and some of the essays (particularly the first and last) provide an outline of the main ideas of the emerging minimalist programme.2 But this is not primarily a book about the details of recent linguistic theory. Rather, in these essays Chomsky offers a wealth of critical commentary on some of the most influential arguments in the philosophy of mind and language that have appeared over the past two decades or so. Indeed, Chomsky discusses a vast range of philosophical topics and reaches some radical conclusions – that many influential philosophical discussions on language and mind are utterly misconceived and that, for example, the traditional mind-body problem cannot even be coherently stated. (shrink)

I HAVE to correct a mistake in my article in the last number of the C.Q., on p. 195, n. 1. The sentence containing it runs; ‘Thus, for the consular provinces of 51–50, the Senate picked out the two senior ex-consuls who had not yet held consular governorships.’ But, to begin with, it is apparent from Caesar, B.C. I. 6, 5, that Cotta, who had been consul in 65, and was therefore senior to Cicero and Bibulus, had not held a (...) consular province by 49. And secondly, as to what was done in determining who should have the consular provinces of 51–50, there seems to be no evidence. Cicero's statement in Ad Fam. III. 2, i, that praeter opinionem it had become necessary for him to go out to a province, may mean that he had counted on being unaffected by the regulations of 52, and that either a subsequent decree of the Senate or some arrangement made by a few senatorial leaders had upset his expectations. But of course praeter opinionem may refer to his not having expected before 52 that he would have to undertake a governorship. Nor can we tell whether his words, Vides ex senatus consulto provinciam esse habendam, refer to a decree prescribing who should draw lots for the consular provinces of 51–50, or merely to a decree which had the effect of obliging Appius to hand over Cilicia to a successor. However, the point that after 52 the Senate or its leaders had some power to determine what ex-magistrates should draw lots for provinces, seems to be sufficiently proved by Ad Fam. VIII. 8, 8, where praetorian provinces are concerned, and Caesar, B.C. I. 85, 9. (shrink)

The Unfinished: Stone Carvers at Work on the Indian Subcontinent. By Vidya Dehejia and Peter Rockwell. New Delhi: rOLI BOOkS, 2016. Pp. 280, illus.

We report evidence further supporting homology between proteins in the F1FO‐ATP synthetase and the bacterial flagellar motor (BFM). BFM proteins FliH, FliI, and FliJ have been hypothesized to be homologous to FO‐b + F1‐δ, F1‐α/β, and F1‐γ, with similar structure and interactions. We conduct a further test by constructing a gene order dataset, examining the order offliH,fliI, andfliJgenes across the phylogenetic breadth of flagellar and nonflagellar type 3 secretion systems, and comparing this to published surveys of gene order in the (...) F1FO‐ATP synthetase, its N‐ATPase relatives, and the bacterial/archaeal V‐ and A‐type ATPases. Strikingly, thefliHIJgene order was deeply conserved, with the few exceptions appearing derived, and exactly matching the widely conserved F‐ATPase gene orderatpFHAG, coding for subunits b‐δ‐α‐γ. The V/A‐type ATPases have a similar conserved gene order. Our results confirm homology between these systems, and suggest a rare case of synteny conserved over billions of years, predating the Last Universal Common Ancestor (LUCA). (shrink)

The lettering of this inscription begins at the very top of the block, just below the straight edge, and stops half-way down the block, the lower part being smoothed but uninscribed. As the inscription is not set centrally on the block, it is probably the continuation of an inscription which ran on a block once superimposed upon it. Doubtful letters are those which are marked by the dot underneath; and W. Peek reported in Ath. Mitt. lxvi, 200 n. 2, that (...) he had seen the top of the v which Vollgraff suggested in the restorationThe inscription is dated to the seventh century B.C. by epigraphists. The stone itself was seen in 1729 by Fourmont and rediscovered in 1928 by Vollgraff; it was in the wall of a Venetian tower on the Larissa or acropolis of Argos. No one knows whence the Venetians had taken it. Therefore Vollgraff's suggestion that it had originally been set up in porta arcis regiae is no more than an attractive speculation. (shrink)

When some P implies some Q, this should have some impact on what attitudes we take to P and Q. In other words: logical consequence has a normative import. I use this idea, recently explored by a number of scholars, as a stepping stone to a bolder view: that relations of logical consequence can be identified with norms on our propositional attitudes, or at least that our talk of logical consequence can be explained in terms of such norms. I (...) investigate the prospects of such a cognitive norm account of logical consequence. I go over the challenges involved in finding a plausible bridge principle connecting logical consequence to cognitive norms, in particular a biconditional principle that gives us not only necessary but sufficient conditions for logical consequence in terms of norms on propositional attitudes. Then, on the assumption that an adequate norm can be found, I consider what the philosophical merits of such a cognitive norm account would be, and what theoretical commitments it would generate. (shrink)

The author raises the old problem--how can the individual fulfill himself within the restrictive structure of the political state? The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the philosophy of individualism does not lead to a solution, because it considers man as an asocial being. The only logical alternatives for a society based on such a philosophy are anarchy, in which each man serves his own end, or totalitarian rule, in which all individual desires are subjected to the power (...) of the state. The author calls for a society in which man is regarded as naturally social, and in which reason is the corner-stone of order.--K. O'N. (shrink)

Of the ten ships of the barbarians three the reef that is between Sciathus and Magnesia and is called the Ant. When the barbarians had brought to the reef and set up there a pillar of stone, they themselves set out from Therma, as the way ahead had now been made clear for them, and sailed on with all their ships, having let eleven days pass since the king's departure from Therma. The reef, which was right in their course, (...) had been pointed out to them by Pammon, a Scyrian. (shrink)

BackgroundGene drive technologies (GDTs) promote the rapid spread of a particular genetic element within a population of non-human organisms. Potential applications of GDTs include the control of insect vectors, invasive species and agricultural pests. Whether, and if so, under what conditions, GDTs should be deployed is hotly debated. Although broad stances in this debate have been described, the convictions that inform the moral views of the experts shaping these technologies and related policies have not been examined in depth in the (...) academic literature.MethodsIn this qualitative study, we interviewed GDT experts (n = 33) from different disciplines to identify and better understand their moral views regarding these technologies. The pseudonymized transcripts were analyzed thematically.ResultsThe respondents’ moral views were principally influenced by their attitudes towards (1) the uncertainty related to GDTs; (2) the alternatives to which they should be compared; and (3) the role humans should have in nature. Respondents agreed there is epistemic uncertainty related to GDTs, identified similar knowledge gaps, and stressed the importance of realistic expectations in discussions on GDTs. They disagreed about whether uncertainty provides a rationale to refrain from field trials (‘risks of intervention’ stance) or to proceed with phased testing to obtain more knowledge given the harms of the status quo (‘risks of non-intervention’ stance). With regards to alternatives to tackle vector-borne diseases, invasive species and agricultural pests, respondents disagreed about which alternatives should be considered (un)feasible and (in)sufficiently explored: conventional strategies (‘downstream solutions’ stance) or systematic changes to health care, political and agricultural systems (‘upstream solutions’ stance). Finally, respondents held different views on nature and whether the use of GDTs is compatible with humans’ role in nature (‘interference’ stance) or not (‘non-interference stance’).ConclusionsThis interview study helps to disentangle the debate on GDTs by providing a better understanding of the moral views of GDT experts. The obtained insights provide valuable stepping-stones for a constructive debate about underlying value conflicts and call attention to topics that deserve further (normative) reflection. Further evaluation of these issues can facilitate the debate on and responsible development of GDTs. (shrink)

In this paper we shall introduce the variety WQS of weak-quasi-Stone algebras as a generalization of the variety QS of quasi-Stone algebras introduced in [9]. We shall apply the Priestley duality developed in [4] for the variety N of ¬-lattices to give a duality for WQS. We prove that a weak-quasi-Stone algebra is characterized by a property of the set of its regular elements, as well by mean of some principal lattice congruences. We will also determine the (...) simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras. (shrink)

We show, roughly speaking, that it requires ω iterations of the Turing jump to decode nontrivial information from Boolean algebras in an isomorphism invariant fashion. More precisely, if α is a recursive ordinal, A is a countable structure with finite signature, and d is a degree, we say that A has αth-jump degree d if d is the least degree which is the αth jump of some degree c such there is an isomorphic copy of A with universe ω in (...) which the functions and relations have degree at most c. We show that every degree d ≥ 0 (ω) is the ωth jump degree of a Boolean algebra, but that for $n no Boolean algebra has nth-jump degree $\mathbf{d} > 0^{(n)}$ . The former result follows easily from work of L. Feiner. The proof of the latter result uses the forcing methods of J. Knight together with an analysis of various equivalences between Boolean algebras based on a study of their Stone spaces. A byproduct of the proof is a method for constructing Stone spaces with various prescribed properties. (shrink)

In this paper we shall introduce the variety WQS of weak-quasi-Stone algebras as a generalization of the variety QS of quasi-Stone algebras introduced in [9]. We shall apply the Priestley duality developed in [4] for the variety N of ¬-lattices to give a duality for WQS. We prove that a weak-quasi-Stone algebra is characterized by a property of the set of its regular elements, as well by mean of some principal lattice congruences. We will also determine the (...) simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras. (shrink)

Involutive Stone algebras were introduced by R. Cignoli and M. Sagastume in connection to the theory of $n$-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. In this work we focus on the logic that preserves degrees of truth associated to S-algebras named Six. This follows a very general pattern that can be considered for any class of truth structure endowed with an ordering relation, and which intends to exploit many-valuedness focusing on the notion of inference that results from preserving lower bounds of truth values, (...) and hence not only preserving the value $1$. Among other things, we prove that Six is a many-valued logic that can be determined by a finite number of matrices. Besides, we show that Six is a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, we prove that it is a genuine Logic of Formal Inconsistency with a consistency operator that can be defined in terms of the original set of connectives. Finally, we study the proof theory of Six providing a Gentzen calculus for it, which is sound and complete with respect to the logic. (shrink)