Despite providing the basic theoretical framework for Western biology and all related sciences, Darwinism continues to be a controversial perspective when it comes to understanding ourselves as distinctly "human." In this paper, I try to correct a common misinterpretation of Thomas Hobbes' conceptualization of human nature which I think sheds light on some of the significant misunderstandings and sources of objection to Darwinism. I begin by contrasting this common misreading of Hobbes' philosophy of human nature with an alternative reading that (...) suggests a more subtle notion than is often allowed. I then summarize the basic ideas of Darwinism and explain why I think a Darwinian conceptualization of humanity, freed from misinterpretations of Hobbes, need not lead to an agonistic or reductive notion of human nature. Suggestions made by the philosophers Charles Taylor and Howard Gardner about how science and philosophy can help or hinder conceptualizations of personhood are considered insofar as they corroborate this idea. (shrink)

In this chapter, Amato explores the concept of “vernacular rationality” introduced by Emmanuel Chukwude Eze in his On Reason: Rationality in a World of Cultural Conflict and Racism. Amato interrogates the different ways this idea can be unfolded, expanded, and developed in the spirit if not the letter of Eze’s employment in relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics—in particular, its conception of the role tradition plays in the pursuit of understanding and the idea of hermeneutics as practical philosophy. (...) A more hermeneutical conception of vernacular rationality would have the benefit of embracing the linguisticality of our circumstance, and reorienting our rationality toward one another in conversation and dialogue. From the standpoint of Philosophical Hermeneutics this requires us to engage in a critical-constitutive relation toward our tradition(s), emphasizing the work of listening within and between tradition(s), and broadening the circle of listening so as to strengthen the practical connections that allow conversation and dialogue to overcome the irrational and inhumane. (shrink)

A kind of political complacency has become a common complaint of Habermasian philosophy. At odds with some earlier stances, according to which he had claimed to represent the best critical hopes of a Marxist tradition that he regarded as exhausted, Habermas has come to defend the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions and forms ofpolitical expression. No longer the last Marxist, but a hesitant post-Marxist, Habermas is today arguably the foremost intellectual spokesperson for a presently existing democracy which bears as much (...) relation to its stated principles as did the so-called socialisms suffered during the Cold War. The author seeks in this article merely to identify the philosophical bases for the seemingly increasing conservatism of Habermas’s thought. I argue that tensions between the normative dimensions of communicative rationality emerge more clearly as Habermas moves from a general account of discourse, to ethics, and then to democratic politics. Habermas increasingly embraces an abstract normativity and abandons the practical-critical dimensions which were embedded in the counterfactual moment of communicative action. The normative ground for politics itself has narrowed to accommodate the abstract normativity of discourse. (shrink)

Philosophically robust conceptions of ethical life and moral critique would advance the struggle against capital. Marx can be read as implying that human life is irreducibly meaningful, linguistic, and cultural, but he often is not. Whether or not Marx recognized them himself, these dimensions of life have not been sufficiently thematized or developed by Marxists. I argue that we can move toward doing so with assistance from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. A hermeneutical approach to historical materialism would help clarify and (...) articulate some aspects of Marxism which in particular have been hard to resolve within a wider view of the ethical, political, scientific, and historical dimensions of social action and change. (shrink)

Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought” is criticized from the standpoint that the author assumes a dichotomous framework taken over in his decision to articulate the African view of the person in the idiom of modern philosophy. Kwame Gyekye’s critique of Menkiti in “Person and Community in Akan Thought” is also scrutinized to see if it manages to break free from this framework. I conclude by calling for a departure from quasi-scientific approaches to human nature and experience (...) that attempt to apprehend culture from a position without culture. (shrink)

Discusses the nature of philosophical rationality and modernity.

Singer argues that thinking on the Left insufficiently appropriates the broader insights about life and human nature made possible by Darwin. I think Singer has it backwards: the problem is not that Darwin has insufficiently been allowed to influence thinking on the Left, but, rather, that the meaning of “Darwinism” has been distorted by the wider scientific and intellectual communities broadly as a support for Right-wing views including patriarchy and racism since its early days. That Darwin’s theories have so often (...) been made to serve and support such views marks the power of ideology. The problem is not what bad scientists Leftists are, but why Singer thinks they bear the primary responsibility for explaining Darwinism to a world that still doesn’t get it. Even scientists have tended to associate Darwinism with a caricature of Hobbes’ “perpetual warre,”—in which only the activities of males in battle over resources, females, and territory, seem to matter. Yet, Darwinism is a theory of survival, not death. In contrast with the “Hobbesian” view of Darwinism, it is better understood as a theory that sees organisms as embedded within contexts of life-sustaining activities that define a form of life for their species’ within definite local environments. Their activities, understood as natural history, within the horizon of the life of a species in the midst of others, complete our picture of the lives of organisms. This view of life coordinates better with Leftist goals and attitudes than those typical on the Right, and it is not surprising that it has tended to be suppressed in popular and conventional scientific thinking. (shrink)

Rousseau -- Karl Marx -- Dostoevsky -- Friedrich Nietzsche -- Henry Adams -- Emmanuel Mounier -- Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre.

Michel Foucault, de la fin des années 1970 au début des années 1980, au moment où le primat de la production cède le pas au primat de la consommation, sublime les problèmes politiques actuels en menant une vaste enquête sur les dilemmes propres à l'éthique classique (grecque, romaine, chrétienne). Emergent ainsi des notions qui nous fournissent des indications historiques et conceptuelles pour mettre en place des résistances inédites - résistances fondées sur le caractère exemplaire de formes de vie minoritaires - (...) face à un gouvernement de la vie qui n'admet dans son principe aucune opposition à sa diffusion capillaire. Il s'agit de mettre à jour des existences, des textes, des documents fragmentaires, oubliés et refoulés, situés sur le bord du temps, dans le sous-sol de l'histoire. L'hypothèse qui guide la composition de cet ouvrage est que, dans les dernières années de son travail, Foucault met à l'épreuve des formes de subjectivation capables de se soustraire à une condition telle que celle que nous vivons où la liberté elle-même est devenue un dispositif de contrôle subtile et puissant. Parrêsia, cynisme antique, esthétique de l'existence, désir, souci de soi, plaisirs, ascèse, Aristote, Deleuze, Hadot, Heidegger, Kant, Nietzsche, Platon sont les thématiques et les notions convoquées ici pour documenter comment s'organise chez Foucault un vocabulaire éthico-politique insoupçonné pour nous orienter dans la catastrophe du présent. (shrink)

As I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical caxc. The suffering and death that are occurring there now axe not inevitable, 1101; unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond Lhe capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to (...) very small proportions. The decisions arid actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any signihczmt way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written t0 their parliamentaxy representatives demanding increased government assistance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing thc refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At thc government level, no govcrmmcnt has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive fm: more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative purposes, B1~itain’s share of thc nonreccverabla development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,¤00. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as.. (shrink)

This paper argues that a set of questioning attitudes are among the foundations of human and animal minds. While both verbal questioning and states of curiosity are generally explained in terms of metacognitive desires for knowledge or true belief, I argue that each is better explained by a prelinguistic sui generis type of mental attitude of questioning. I review a range of considerations in support of such a proposal and improve on previous characterizations of the nature of these attitudes. I (...) then broaden their explanatory scope to include a number of forms of exploratory search. The paper has three main goals: to characterize the nature of the questioning attitudes, outlining their causal role and type of content; to argue that they are fundamental components of the mind, being widespread among animals and not constructed during ontogeny out of other attitudes; and to suggest that they explain a great deal more behavior than one might think. (shrink)

Since its original publication in 1975, this groundbreaking work has awakened millions of people to the existence of "speciesism"—our systematic disregard of nonhuman animals—inspiring a worldwide movement to transform our attitudes to animals and eliminate the cruelty we inflict on them. In Animal Liberation, author Peter Singer exposes the chilling realities of today’s "factory farms" and product-testing procedures—destroying the spurious justifications behind them, and offering alternatives to what has become a profound environmental and social as well as moral issue. (...) An important and persuasive appeal to conscience, fairness, decency, and justice, it is essential reading for the supporter and the skeptic alike. (shrink)

Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...) on two brands of epistemic theory that naturally incorporate closure restrictions. The first type holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant question. The second holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription is relative to a relevant topic. For each approach, I offer a formalization of a leading theory from the literature and use this formalization to evaluate the theory’s adequacy in terms of a precise set of desiderata. I conclude that neither theory succeeds in meeting these desiderata, casting doubt on the viability of the underlying approaches. Finally, I offer a novel variant of the topic-sensitive approach that fares better. (shrink)