This paper represents an attempt to indicate the idea of a logic slightly more general than sentential calculus, which is applicable to many philosophical issues. In particular, I shall use this generalized calculus to discuss a variation of the logic of imperatives. In part I, certain general considerations about indicative calculi provide the basis, as well as indicate the need, for the more formal construction of part II. Part III illustrates the analytical power of the tool constructed, and tries to (...) show its relevance for philosophy. (shrink)

As everyone who has looked into almost any philosophical journal within the last year is aware, Charles Morris has written a book on signs. More precisely, he has elaborated a strain of thought found in his very earliest writings. A first, partial culmination of these ideas is his monograph Foundations of the Theory of Signs. Since the publication of FTS, Morris has conducted experiments relative to human sign behavior. SLB, I believe, is a revision and expansion of FTS to take (...) into account new material supplied by these experiments and increased insight into the nature of behavior psychology. For Morris now asserts explicitly, what before he only hinted: that “Semiotic thus becomes a part of the empirical science of behavior, and can utilize whatever principles and predictions the general theory of behavior has attained or can attain.”. (shrink)

In his reexamination of the relationship between quality and quantity, Professor Plochmann has avoided the method of linguistic analysis in favor of a more traditional method of philosophizing. Since I agree with him that in general quality and quantity are irreducible one to the other, but may both be reducible to some category more fundamental than either, my comments are to be considered supplementary to his. In particular, I should like to see what clarifications, if any, arise if one considers (...) qualities and quantities from the purely linguistic point of view. (shrink)

The Wittgensteinian thesis that “the result of philosophy is not a number of ‘philosophical propositions,’ but to make propositions clear” has been given various interpretations by subsequent philosophers. Thus, for example, certain British philosophers have confined themselves to the analysis of colloquial language and have developed great skill in sophistical demonstrations intended to show that there is no such thing as a philosophical problem. Another group of philosophers considers language solely as a phenomenon of human behavior and attempts to clarify (...) confusions and misunderstandings within language by utilizing the statistical techniques of contemporary behavior psychology. Still other philosophers, under the impact of logical positivism, have maintained that the clarification of propositions entails the construction of a language with precise rules of formation, transformation, and reference into which one could translate all the non-contradictory portions of ordinary spoken language. (shrink)

Mr. Thomas Storer does not believe that a science of signs is of basic importance to philosophy, for philosophy, he holds, is not a formal or a factual science but an activity of clarifying meaning and building linguistic systems. I should like to defend the relevance to philosophy of a science of signs even when philosophy is so conceived, and then to question this conception of philosophy itself.

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

Part One. In our strife to express the meanings of moral terms, we have neglected the one transparently built?in meaning: ?A man ought to keep his promises? could mean ?A man owes it to other men to keep his promises. Such is his debt and duty ? just what is due or owed?. This proposal is supported by the evidence of major languages of the world, ancient and modern, in all of which identical or closely related words serve to express (...) both the idea of material debt and that of moral obligation. But on study the revealing model and analogue of ?moral debt? is found, not in debts of exchange, the simplest and most obvious class of debts, but in debts of shared responsibility. Working from such models we conclude that ?A ought to do X? means X is part of A's share in the cost of the good community, the common cause and stake of all mankind? (shrink)

This volume brings together for the first time a significant number of Reid's manuscript papers on natural history, physiology and materialist metaphysics. An important contribution not only to Reid studies but also to our understanding of eighteenth-century science and its context.

In his presidential address (American Philosophical Association, Western Division), William Frankena sets himself against the relativist and irrationalist drift of our time in asserting that ?It is of the essence of a normative judgment to claim that it is justified, rational or valid?, and that fully informed men of reason will ultimately agree about value questions. Applauding the return to reason, this note finds a need for further clarification on the definition of normative terms, the justification of normative judgments, the (...) basis of obligation to be rational, and on the promise of agreement among men of reason in axiology. (shrink)

This study identifies and explores evolving concepts of trust and privacy in the context of user-generated health data. We define “user-generated health data” as data captured through devices or software and used outside of traditional clinical settings for tracking personal health data. The investigators conducted qualitative research through semistructured interviews with researchers, health technology start-up companies, and members of the general public to inquire why and how they interact with and understand the value of user-generated health data. We found significant (...) results concerning new attitudes toward trust, privacy, and sharing of health data outside of clinical settings that conflict with regulations governing health data within clinical settings. Members of the general public expressed little concern about sharing health data with the companies that sold the devices or apps they used, and indicated that they rarely read the “terms and conditions” detailing how their data may be exploited by the company or third-party affiliates before consenting to them. In contrast, interviews with researchers revealed significant resistance among potential research participants to sharing their user-generated health data for purposes of scientific study. The widespread rhetoric of personalization and social sharing in “user-generated culture” appears to facilitate an understanding of user-generated health data that deemphasizes the risk of exploitation in favor of loosely defined benefits to individual and social well-being. We recommend clarification and greater transparency of regulations governing data sharing related to health. (shrink)

Thomas Reid was a philosopher who founded the Scottish school of 'common sense'. Much of Reid's work is a critique of his contemporary, David Hume, whose empiricism he rejects. In this work, written after Reid's appointment to a professorship at the university of Glasgow, and published in 1785, he turns his attention to ideas about perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste. He examines the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, arguing that 'when we find philosophers maintaining that (...) there is no heat in the fire, nor colour in the rainbow … we may be apt to think the whole to be only a dream of fanciful men, who have entangled themselves in cobwebs spun out of their own brain'. Written by one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most important thinkers, this work brings to life the intellectual debates of the time. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas produced a voluminous body of work on moral theory, and much of that work is on virtue, particularly the status and value of the virtues as principles of virtuous acts, and the way in which a moral life can be organized around them schematically. Thomas Osborne presents Aquinas's account of virtue in its historical, philosophical and theological contexts, to show the reader what Aquinas himself wished to teach about virtue. His discussion makes the complexities of Aquinas's (...) moral thought accessible to readers despite the differences between Thomas's texts themselves, and the distance between our background assumptions and his. The book will be valuable for scholars and students in ethics, medieval philosophy, and theology. (shrink)