Why is it commonplace for us to contemplate distorted depictions of faces with eagerness and enjoyment, but to be repelled by real people whose physiognomies resemble the depicted ones? More generally, what makes perceiving pictured physically anomalous individuals so different from perceiving physically anomalous people themselves? . . . I will suggest how we can theorize human beauty, as we do beauty in art, so as to savor, rather than rebuff, novelty, disproportionateness, and even crookedness in the human shape. For (...) anomaly to present as originality rather than deviance requires a context in which we theorize the connectedness of successors with their heritage. (shrink)

How should we respond to individuals with disabilities? What does it mean to be disabled? Over fifty million Americans, from neonates to the fragile elderly, are disabled. Some people say they have the right to full social participation, while others repudiate such claims as delusive or dangerous. In this compelling book, three experts in ethics, medicine, and the law address pressing disability questions in bioethics and public policy. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary B. Mahowald test important theories (...) of justice by bringing them to bear on subjects of concern in a wide variety of disciplines dealing with disability. They do so in the light of recent advances in feminist, minority, and cultural studies, and of the groundbreaking Americans with Disabilities Act. (shrink)

Liberalism welcomes diversity in substantive ideas of the good but not in the process whereby these ideas are formed. Ideas of the good acquire weight on the presumption that each is a person's own, formed independently. But people differ in their capacities to conceptualize. Some, appropriately characterized as cerebral, are proficient in and profoundly involved with conceptualizing. Others, labeled cognitively disabled, range from individuals with mild limitations to those so unable to express themselves that we cannot be sure whether their (...) behavior is mediated by concepts at all. Constricted cognitive capacities have been thought to prevent participation in the prescribed process for forming personalized ideas of the good. So liberal theory, when formulating principles and practices of justice, often disregards cognitively disabled peoples' perspectives. We put aside metaphysically driven notions about personhood and show how interpersonal processes of “prosthetic” thinking (different from surrogacy) can satisfy liberalism's standards, positioning cognitively disabled individuals as fully participating subjects of justice. (shrink)

A feminist ethics that bases morality on dependence or vulnerability challenges the moral priority of uniform over disparate treatment. Persons with disabilities resist equality's homogenization of moral personhood. But displacing equality in favor of caring or trust reprises the repression of those already marginalized. The ethics of difference proves an ineffective remedy for the negative consequences attendant on how historically marginalized groups are different. An historicized conception of equality resolves the dilemma.

The article introduces readers to the study of disability, both with respect to the interdisciplinary field of disability studies and the field of philosophy of disability. We then offer an overview of three central areas of philosophical inquiry where feminist work in philosophy and disability has made significant contributions: (1) metaphysics and ontology, (2) epistemology and phenomenology, and (3) ethical, social, and political philosophy.

Disagreement about the properattitude toward disability proliferates. Yetlittle attention has been paid to an importantmeta-question, namely, whether ``disability'' isan essentially contested concept. If so, recentdebates between bioethicists and the disabilitymovement leadership cannot be resolved. Inthis essay I identify some of the presumptionsthat make their encounters so contentious. Much more must happen, I argue, for anydiscussions about disability policy andpolitics to be productive. Progress depends onconstructing a neutral conception ofdisability, one that neither devaluesdisability nor implies that persons withdisabilities are inadequate. So, (...) first, I clearaway the conceptual underbrush that makes usthink our idea of disability must bevalue-laden. Second, I sketch someconstituents of, and constraints upon, aneutral notion of disability. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction: Liberalism and Inclusiveness Liberalism: Political and Metaphysical Collaborating on Ideas of the Good Powers of Self‐Control Conclusion References.

The potential power of predictive genetic testing as a risk regulator is impressive. By identifying asymptomatic individuals who are at risk of becoming ill, predictive genetic testing may enable those individuals to take prophylactic measures. As new therapies become available, the usefulness of genetic testing undoubtedly will increase. Further, when a person's family medical history indicates a propensity towards a particular genetic disease, a negative test result may open up otherwise denied opportunities by showing that this person has not inherited (...) suspect genes. In the latter type of case, a negative test result may reassure the individual that pursuing a particular course of action is worthwhile, or may convince prospective employers that the individual will be a serviceable employee. (shrink)

The potential power of predictive genetic testing as a risk regulator is impressive. By identifying asymptomatic individuals who are at risk of becoming ill, predictive genetic testing may enable those individuals to take prophylactic measures. As new therapies become available, the usefulness of genetic testing undoubtedly will increase. Further, when a person's family medical history indicates a propensity towards a particular genetic disease, a negative test result may open up otherwise denied opportunities by showing that this person has not inherited (...) suspect genes. In the latter type of case, a negative test result may reassure the individual that pursuing a particular course of action is worthwhile, or may convince prospective employers that the individual will be a serviceable employee. (shrink)

Elizabeth Barnes’s recently proposed value-neutral model for disability provoked a familiar storm of oft-made objections from philosophers who appear committed to equating being disabled with being intrinsically or inescapably disadvantaged. Their narrow framing of the options for disabled people is influenced, I suggest, by purposes to which “disability” (on my analysis, a term of art) now is put. But there are both epistemic and moral reasons to refrain from importing the normative narrowness imposed by these purposes into our philosophical investigation (...) of disability. Barnes’s ontological account opens up our framing options. Developing a full institutional theory of disability that both rests on and extrapolates from a social ontology of disablement is a promising direction for exploration at the intersect of metaphysics and public policy in the new field of Philosophy and Disability. (shrink)

The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act enacted a conceptual shift in the meaning of ‘disability.’ Rather than defining ‘disability’ as a disadvantageous physical or mental deficit of persons, it codifies the understanding of ‘disability’ as a defective state of society which disadvantages these persons. In contrast, the standard medical model incorrectly conceptualizes disabled persons as biologically inferior, and thus confines them to the role of recipients of benevolence or care. Turning to an ethic of caring yields counter-intuitive results that conflict (...) with the conceptual apparatus of the ADA. It is argued that in order to liberate social thought from this medical model and thus move the disabled from being socially marginalized to being socially enabled, one must re-conceptualize current practice by adopting the ADA's conceptual framework. Keywords: caring, disability, equality, ethics, health care polic CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

(2001). A Neutral Ethical Framework for Understanding the Role of Disability in the Life Cycle. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 57-58.

Prevailing philosophies about parental and other caregiver responsibilities toward children tend to be protectionist, grounded in informed benevolence in a way that countenances rather than circumvents intrusive paternalism. And among the kinds of children an adult might be called upon to parent or otherwise care for, children with disabilities figure among those for whom the strongest and snuggest shielding is supposed be deployed. In this article, we examine whether this equation of securing well-being with sheltering by protective parents and other (...) care-givers should unreflectively be adopted for disabled children. We also consider why healthcare providers might reasonably be reluctant to yield to this principle, even if parents instinctively suppose that protectionism is the parenting policy that best serves their disabled child’s interest. We contend that caregivers owe children with disabilities at least as much, and possibly more, respect for self-governance than other children need. In spite of disabled children’s vulnerability and even in view of it, we argue that they should be accorded not only welfare rights to well-being but at least a modified version of liberty rights as well. Healthcare providers are especially favorably positioned to facilitate the latter response. The main components of respectful caregiving can come into conflict with one another, but we present some priorities that advise against adopting a protectionist account of parenting rights, or at least against accepting protectionist views that focus parenting narrowly on shaping ideas about the child’s welfare. In sum, caring for a disabled child, we argue, involves more than creating conditions that will afford her contentment and comfort over the course of life. (shrink)

This article argues that, under existing jurisprudence, the disability insurance business will be harmed, not benefited, from broad access to the results of genetic testing identifying people with higher than species-typical genetic propensities for illness.

The idea that disability insurers would benefit if the use of predictive genetic testing expands may seem little short of obvious. If individuals with higher than species-typical genetic propensities for illness or disease are identified, and barred or discouraged from participating in disability insurance programs, is it not obvious that the amount that disability insurers pay out will decrease? Is there any reason to doubt that insurers thus would gain advantage by promoting genetic testing? Writers on this subject typically have (...) taken on faith that advantage goes to whoever knows most about the genetic characteristics of the individual seeking insurance. They therefore have assumed, without proving, that insurers’ interests lie with proliferating genetic information about insurance seekers.Consequently, from a perspective that gives priority to commercial interests, denying insurers the freedom to obtain genetic information about insurance seekers or holders appears obviously damaging and even unfair. On the other hand, from a perspective that gives priority to the interests of citizens who may use insurance, the greater use of and access to predictive genetic testing sets off ethical alarms. (shrink)

Maxwell J. Mehlman, The price of perfection: Individualism and society in the era of biomedical enhancement, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, reviewed by Anita Silvers.

_The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics_ is a guide to the complex literature written on the increasingly dense topic of ethics in relation to the new technologies of medicine. Examines the key ethical issues and debates which have resulted from the rapid advances in biomedical technology Brings together the leading scholars from a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, medicine, theology and law, to discuss these issues Tackles such topics as ending life, patient choice, selling body parts, resourcing and confidentiality (...) Organized with a coherent structure that differentiates between the decisions of individuals and those of social policy. (shrink)

Result of a conference, "Sociobiology: implications for human studies", held at San Francisco State University on June 14-15, 1977. Includes index. Bibliography: p. 295-316.

Artemisia Gentileschi (c. 1593-1652) was well paid and highly thought of as a painter by some of the leading art patrons of the Europe of her time. In other words, in her own time she was a socially acceptable, successful artist. Yet, subsequently, the shadow of obscurity fell over her. Only about thirty paintings, from what must have been a much greater body of work, have been identified and attributed to her. Moreover, relatively little has been written about her, and (...) only very recently has she been the subject of an extensive art-historical monograph. In Contrast, Agostino Tassi, the painter tried for raping Artemisia she was nineteen years old, has been the subject of at least two monographs in this [20th] century. Does Artemisia now lack esteem because the lines along which the story of European art has been permitted to unfold serve non aesthetic ends, objectives prescribed by dominating male interests? Was Artemisia's art eclipsed because the narrative structure of the story of art admits heroes but erects heroines? Such questions are typically raised in feminist or gym-criticism. What remains to be seen is whether feminists can supply answers which draw upon considerations sufficiently compelling to radically revise--indeed, to reform--the history of art. (shrink)