1Neurology Department and Cyclotron Research Center, University of Lie`ge, Sart Tilman B30, 4000 Liege, Belgium 2Neurorehabilitation Medicine, Hoˆpital Caremeau, CHU Nıˆmes, 30029 Nıˆmes Cedex, France 3Department of Speech Therapy, Hospital Pitie´ Salpe´trie`re, Paris and French Association Locked in Syndrome (ALIS), 225 Bd Jean-Jaures, MBE 182, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, France 4Neurosciences et Syste`mes Sensoriels Unite´ Mixte de Recherche 5020, Universite´ Claude Bernard Lyon 1 – CNRS, 69007 Lyon, France 5Intensive Care Medicine, Hoˆpital Erasme, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Route de Lennik 808, 1070 (...) Brussels, Belgium 6Anesthesiology, Reanimation and Pain Clinic, CHU University Hospital, Sart Tilman B33, 4000 Liege, Belgium 7German Association Locked in Syndrome LIS e.V., Evangelischen Krankenhaus Ko¨ningin Elisabeth Herzberge gGmbh (Lehrkrankenhaus der Charite´), Haus 30, Herzbergstrasse 79, 10365 Berlin, Germany 8Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Re´gional de la Citadelle, Boulevard du 12e de Ligne 1, 4000 Liege, Belgium 9Biomedical PET Unit, Hoˆpital Erasme, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, Route de Lennik 808, 1070 Brussels, Belgium.. (shrink)

While philosophers have, for centuries, pondered upon the relation between mind and brain, neuroscientists have only recently been able to explore the connection analytically — to peer inside the black box. This ability stems from recent advances in technology and emerging neuroimaging modalities. It is now possible not only to produce remarkably detailed images of the brain’s structure (i.e. anatomical imaging) but also to capture images of the physiology associated with mental processes (i.e. functional imaging). We are able to see (...) how specific regions of the brain ‘light up’ when activities such as reading this book are performed, and how our neurons and their elaborate cast of supporting cells organize and coordinate their tasks. As demonstrated in the other chapters of this book, the mapping of the human mind (mostly by measuring regional changes in blood flow, initially by positron emission tomography (PET) and recently by functional magnetic resonance imaging or (fMRI)) has provided insight into the functional neuroanatomy of neuropsychiatric diseases. Amazingly, the idea that regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) is related intimately to brain function goes back more than a century. As is often the case in science, this idea was initially the result of unexpected observations. The Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso first expressed the idea while studying pulsations of the living human brain that keep pace with the heartbeat (Mosso, 1881). These brain pulsations can be observed on the surface of the fontanelles in newborn children. Mosso believed that they reflected blood flow to the brain. He observed similar pulsations in an adult with a post-traumatic skull defect over the frontal lobes. While studying this subject, a peasant named Bertino, Mosso observed a sudden increase in the magnitude of the ‘brain’s heart-beats’ when the church bells signalled 12 o’clock, the time for a required prayer. The changes in brain pulsations occurred independently of any change in pulsations in the forearm.. (shrink)

Soltis' paper contains little data on the underlying neural substrate of the discussed signal function of early infant crying – probably because there is amazingly little known about it. We here discuss the interest of functional neuroimaging as an objective measurement of brain activity in (1) early infants during crying and (2) parents hearing their offspring cry.

Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is (...) a bold, timely, and systematic treatment of the philosophical foundations of an information society. (shrink)

One possible aim of epistemology is to advise cognizers on the proper choice of beliefs or other doxastic attitudes. This aim has often been part of scientific methodology: to tell scientists when they should accept a given hypothesis, or give it a certain degree of credence. This regulative function is naturally linked to the notion of epistemic justification. It may well be suggested that a cognizer is justified in believing something just in case the rules of proper epistemic procedure prescribe (...) that belief. Principles that make such doxastic prescriptions might thereby "double" as principles of justification. In the first part of this paper I contrast the regulative conception of justification with another, equally tenable, conception. Then, after noting a fundamental worry about the applicability of the regulative conception, I proceed to lay it out in more detail. The regulative justificational status of a doxastic attitude for person S at time t depends upon (a) the right set of doxastic instructions and (b) the states S is in at (or just before) t. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of justified belief. What I have in mind is an explanatory theory, one that explains in a general way why certain beliefs are counted as justified and others as unjustified. Unlike some traditional approaches, I do not try to prescribe standards for justification that differ from, or improve upon, our ordinary standards. I merely try to explicate the ordinary standards, which are, I believe, quite different from those of many classical, (...) e. g., ‘Cartesian’, accounts. (shrink)

Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.

For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each theory can (...) profit by borrowing elements from the other. Comesana concentrates on reliabilism’s problems and how it might be improved by infusions from evidentialism. This paper follows a similar tack. My emphasis, however, is the reverse of Comesana’s. I highlight problems for evidentialism and show how it could benefit by incorporating reliabilist themes. I am not sanguine that evidentialists will see it my way. They might even view my proposals as an insidious attempt to convert evidentialists to reliabilism. Well, I won’t debate the best way to formulate this paper’s recipe. At any rate, it began with the idea (which anteceded my reading of Comesana) of creating a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism. It retains significant strands of that idea, although the synthesis theme does not pervade the entire paper. What is mentalist evidentialism? Its original formulation was succinct. (shrink)

What is the mission of epistemology, and what is its proper methodology? Such meta-epistemological questions have been prominent in recent years, especially with the emergence of various brands of "naturalistic" epistemology. In this paper, I shall reformulate and expand upon my own meta-epistemological conception (most fully articulated in Goldman, 1986), retaining many of its former ingredients while reconfiguring others. The discussion is by no means confined, though, to the meta-epistemological level. New substantive proposals will also be advanced and defended.

Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information. There is little consensus, however, on what the term "knowledge" comprehends, what is the scope of the "social", or what the style or purpose of the study should be. According to some writers, social epistemology should retain the same general mission as classical epistemology, revamped in the recognition that classical epistemology was too individualistic. According to other writers, social epistemology should be a more radical departure from classical (...) epistemology, a successor discipline that would replace epistemology as traditionally conceived. The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the truth-values of agents’ beliefs. A second version of the classical approach would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social institutions. (shrink)

I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...) epistemic norms (e.g., norms for perceptual belief), there are sharp differences across groups in other types of epistemic norms. (shrink)

This volume will be of great interest to scholars and students in epistemology.

A far-reaching reinterpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and its engagement with time, eternity, body, and soul that in its original French edition profoundly influenced Derrida The Tomb of the Artisan God provides a radical rereading of Timaeus, Plato’s metaphysical text on time, eternity, and the relationship between soul and body. First published in French in 1995, the original edition of Serge Margel’s book included an extensive introductory essay by Jacques Derrida, who drew on Margel’s insights in developing his own concepts (...) of time, the promise, the world, and khōra. Now available in English with a new preface by Margel, this engagement with Platonic thought proceeds from two questions that span the history of philosophy: What is time? What is the body? Margel’s twinned interrogation centers around Plato’s concept of the demiurge (divine artisan or craftsman): its body, its anthropomorphic attributes, its productive capacities and regulatory functions in the ordering/organization/assembling of the world. He posits that this paradoxical figure is not merely a cosmological metaphor for the living body but also the site of its destruction, dissolution, and disappearance. Torn between the finite and the infinite, being and becoming, the concept of demiurge also poses metaphysical questions about time, time before time, and the end of time. The ontological status of the demiurge’s body, Margel argues, would become increasingly decisive in the history of philosophy, particularly in Christianity and the dogma of incarnation. (shrink)

This volume surveys 150 law books of fundamental importance in the history of Western legal literature and culture. The entries are organized in three sections: the first dealing with the transitional period of fifteenth-century editions of medieval authorities, the second spanning the early modern period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, and the third focusing on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The contributors are scholars from all over the world. Each 'old book' is analyzed by a recognized specialist in (...) the specific field of interest. Individual entries give a short biography of the author and discuss the significance of the works in the time and setting of their publication, and in their broader influence on the development of law worldwide. Introductory essays explore the development of Western legal traditions, especially the influence of the English common law, and of Roman and canon law on legal writers, and the borrowings and interaction between them. The book goes beyond the study of institutions and traditions of individual countries to chart a broader perspective on the transmission of legal concepts across legal, political, and geographical boundaries. Examining the branches of this genealogical tree of books makes clear their pervasive influence on modern legal systems, including attempts at rationalizing custom or creating new hybrid systems by transplanting Western legal concepts into other jurisdictions. (shrink)

Part I. Philosophy of novels. 1. Introduction: philosophical content and literary value -- 2. Interpreting novels -- 3. The sun also rises: incompatible interpretations -- 4. The appeal of the mystery -- Part II. Philosophy in novels. 5. Moral development in Pride and prejudice -- 6. Huckleberry Finn and moral motivation -- 7. What we learn about rules from The cider house rules -- 8. Nostromo and the fragility of the self.

Social epistemology is the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information. There is little consensus, however, on what the term "knowledge" comprehends, what is the scope of the "social", or what the style or purpose of the study should be. According to some writers, social epistemology should retain the same general mission as classical epistemology, revamped in the recognition that classical epistemology was too individualistic. According to other writers, social epistemology should be a more radical departure from classical (...) epistemology, a successor discipline that would replace epistemology as traditionally conceived. The classical approach could be realized in at least two forms. One would emphasize the traditional epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs. It would study social practices in terms of their impact on the truth-values of agents' beliefs. A second version of the classical approach would focus on the epistemic goal of having justified or rational beliefs. Applied to the social realm, it might concentrate, for example, on when a cognitive agent is justified or warranted in accepting the statements and opinions of others. Proponents of the anti-classical approach have little or no use for concepts like truth and justification. In addressing the social dimensions of knowledge, they understand "knowledge" as simply what is believed, or what beliefs are "institutionalized" in this or that community, culture, or context. They seek to identify the social forces and influences responsible for knowledge production so conceived. Social epistemology is theoretically significant because of the central role of society in the knowledge-forming process. It also has practical importance because of its possible role in the redesign of information-related social institutions. (shrink)

This chapter argues that empirical findings in cognitive science can play a significant evidential role in an optimal methodology for metaphysics. It does not propose any radical metaphysical methodology or any wholesale replacement of traditional methods. Rather, it offers a supplement to traditional methods. The chapter proposes a general template for metaphysical methodology under which cognitive scientific considerations might become routine or commonplace factors in realist metaphysics, not just isolated or occasional factors. This template is applied to four problems in (...) metaphysics: the passage of time, moral value, natural kinds, and theism. (shrink)

People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which (...) starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis. (shrink)

Qui étaient les gnostiques? Simplement des hérétiques? Ou bien ont-ils, par leurs questionnements, contribué à la redéfinition de la religion monothéiste? Relevaient-ils du judaïsme, du christianisme, du mandéisme, du sabéisme, du manichéisme? Comment le mouvement gnostique a-t-il influencé le développement du christianisme dans l’Antiquité? L’Église a-t-elle rejeté ce mouvement? L’ouvrage de Serge Hutin répond à ces questions essentielles.

Sont ici rassemblés dix-sept textes qui reflètent un travail délibérément orienté sur plusieurs champs du savoir. Celui de la philosophie, ses œuvres et ses auteurs, antiques et modernes, comme Augustin, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant ou Derrida. Celui de la littérature, et sa critique, comme Blanchot, Duras ou Deguy. Celui du religieux, comme l'exorcisme avec le Malleus maleficarum, la cruentation avec Ranchin, le miracle avec Augustin, ou la Bible et langue hébraïque avec Spinoza. Enfin celui du cinéma, avec les voix fantômes de (...) Duras, les spectres de Farocki, la question des genres d'Akerman, les utopies de Kluge, et la fin du monde de Bela Tarr. Tous ces textes sont philosophiques, dans leur effort de pensée, dans le but de faire l'expérience d'une écriture de la pensée, d'une invention d'un langage de la pensée ou du regard. Ils cherchent à penser le travail de la lettre, dans un livre, une croyance religieuse, un événement surnaturel, une pratique déviante, une voix narrative, la description d'un personnage, un plan-séquence, etc. Chacun d'eux se concentre sur un détail qui aurait pu passer inaperçu. En somme, ces textes proposent des argumentations précises, analysent des récrits et décryptent des séquences, dans le désir d'en poursuivre l'écriture par le seul jeu de la pensée."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the relationship between Rorty's pragmatist philosophy and his view of literature and literary writing. It begins by examining the relationship between philosophy and literature, construed by Rorty in terms of the opposition between “normal,” professionalized, argument‐centered philosophical discourse and the kind of cultural criticism which emphasizes human finitude and contingency, seeking through the use of irony and literary inventiveness to transform our prevalent visions of what it means to be human. This humanist side of Rorty's argument is (...) further developed through the discussion of the role that literature plays in intellectual self‐formation and moral edification, by educating moral sensibility and providing transformational shifts of conceptual perspective. These dynamics of literary innovation are then shown to dovetail nicely with Rorty's naturalistic, evolutionary conception of cultural development as well as his views regarding the indispensable role of the personal, the private, and the unshared in producing genuine cultural innovation. (shrink)

Various four- and three-valued modal propositional logics are studied. The basic systems are modal extensions BK and BS4 of Belnap and Dunn's four-valued logic of firstdegree entailment. Three-valued extensions of BK and BS4 are considered as well. These logics are introduced semantically by means of relational models with two distinct evaluation relations, one for verification and the other for falsification. Axiom systems are defined and shown to be sound and complete with respect to the relational semantics and with respect to (...) twist structures over modal algebras. Sound and complete tableau calculi are presented as well. Moreover, a number of constructive non-modal logics with strong negation are faithfully embedded into BS4, into its three-valued extension B3S4, or into temporal BS4, BtS4. These logics include David Nelson's three-valued logic N3, the four-valued logic N4 bottom, the connexive logic C, and several extensions of bi-intuitionistic logic by strong negation. (shrink)

On ne peut pas dénoncer " la société de consommation " sans se référer aux analyses de Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007). Le démontage de la publicité et la mise en lumière de son omniprésence manipulatrice sont au coeur de son premier grand livre. La décroissance, qui implique de s'extraire de la religion de la croissance et de l'économie, trouve aussi, dans un autre de ses livres majeurs, L'économie politique du signe, les arguments pour déconstruire la prétention de l'économie à dire le (...) réel. Baudrillard résiste pourtant à l'appropriation pure et simple dans une perspective de transformation sociale. Car si sa critique du système touche juste, les conclusions qu'il en tire sont si radicales qu'elles tendent à neutraliser l'action. L'entretien totalement inédit que nous publions à la suite de l'analyse détaillée de Serge Latouche éclaire ainsi la singularité et la dualité de cette figure, dont l'oeuvre toute entière tourne finalement autour du désenchantement mélancolique de la modernité, entre révolte rentrée et subversion ironique. (shrink)