Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Moral disagreement has long been thought to create serious problems for certain views in metaethics. More specifically, moral disagreement has been thought to pose problems for any metaethical view that rejects relativism—that is, for any view that implies that whenever two thinkers disagree about a moral question, at least one of those thinkers’ beliefs about the question is not correct. In this essay, I shall outline a solution to one of these problems. As I shall argue, it turns out in (...) the end that this problem is not really a special problem about moral disagreement at all: it is a general problem about disagreement as such. For this reason, in the later sections of this essay, I shall turn to some general questions in epistemology, about the epistemic significance of disagreement. (shrink)

This book gives a general theory of rational belief. Although it can be read by itself, is a sequel to the author's previous book The Value of Rationality (Oxford, 2017). It takes the general conception of rationality that was defended in that earlier book, and combines it with an account of the varieties of belief, and of what it is for these beliefs to count as "correct", to develop an account of what it is for beliefs to count as rational. (...) According to this account, rationality comes in degrees: the degree to which one's beliefs counts as rational is determined by their distance from a corresponding probability function - where this distance is measured by those beliefs' "expected degree of incorrectness" according to the probability function; the account also involves an explanation of what determines exactly which probability function plays this role in each case, and of why this probability function should play this role. In developing and defending this account, new light is shed on several central epistemological issues. These issues include: the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification; the debates between internalism and externalism, and between foundationalism and coherentism; the significance - or lack of it - of the notion of 'evidence'; the relationship between credences, full belief, inference, and suspension of judgment; the nature of the kind of possibility that is presupposed by the relevant sort of probability; and whether rationality is "diachronic" - so that the beliefs that it is rational for us to have now depend, in part, on the beliefs that we held in the past. Finally, some suggestions are made about how this theory bears on a range of further topics, including the defeasibility of inference, scepticism, and the analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

Most approaches to animal ethics ground the moral standing of nonhumans in some appeal to their capacities for intelligent autonomy or mental sentience. _Corporal Compassion _emphasizes the phenomenal and somatic commonality of living beings; a philosophy of body that seeks to displace any notion of anthropomorphic empathy in viewing the moral experiences of nonhuman living beings. Ralph R. Acampora employs phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism and deconstruction to connect and contest analytic treatments of animal rights and liberation theory. In doing so, (...) he focuses on issues of being and value, and posits a felt nexus of bodily being, termed symphysis, to devise an interspecies ethos. Acampora uses this broad-based bioethic to engage in dialogue with other strains of environmental ethics and ecophilosophy. _Corporal Compassion_ examines the practical applications of the somatic ethos in contexts such as laboratory experimentation and zoological exhibition, and challenges practitioners to go beyond recent reforms and look to a future beyond exploitation or total noninterference--a posthumanist culture that advocates caring in a participatory approach. (shrink)

What is normativity? It is argued here that normativity is best understood as a property of certain concepts: normative thoughts are those involving these normative concepts; normative statements are statements that express normative thoughts; and normative facts are the facts (if such there be) that make such normative thoughts true. Many philosophers propose that there is a single basic normative concept—perhaps the concept of a reason for an action or attitude—in terms of which all other normative concepts can be defined. (...) It is argued here that this proposal faces grave difficulties. According to a better proposal, what these normative concepts have in common is that they have a distinctive sort of conceptual role—a reasoning-guiding conceptual role. This proposal is illustrated by a number of examples: different normative concepts differ from each other in virtue of their having different conceptual roles of this reasoning-guiding kind. (shrink)

Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find (...) his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress. (shrink)

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars discuss when is deliberate ignorance a virtue, and what type of environment does it require.

The dominant theory of the evolution of moral cognition across a variety of fields is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation: a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons—many unrelated to social cooperation—were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission (...) of social norms. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the emerging behavioral neuroscience of moral cognition. It then outlines a novel theory of moral cognition that I have previously argued explains these findings better than alternatives. Finally, it shows how the evidence for this theory of moral cognition and human evolutionary history together suggest that moral cognition is likely not a biological adaptation. Instead, like reading sheet music or riding a bicycle, moral cognition is something that individuals learn to do—in this case, in response to sociocultural norms created in our ancestral history and passed down through the ages to enable cooperative living. (shrink)

Kant’s revolutionary new approach to philosophy was accompanied by the introduction of a largely novel terminology. With the Kant-Lexikon, a lexical reference gives the modern reader access to his work on the basis of present-day editions and takes into account 20th century and contemporary research and advances in lexicology. The Kant-Lexikon includes 2395 entries authored by 221 scholars.

This is a theological adventure based on the thought of Charles Hartshorne. Its appearance at this time represents an attempt to begin anew in theology on the assumption that the abstract God of classical thinking is dead. Hartshorne's philosophy advances a God of concrete and changing reality, as opposed to the abstract, immutable and "dead" God image of the radical theologians. The author argues that the "Death of God" theology is no more than a recognition that Christian incarnation is impossible (...) given classical presuppositions; argues for disallowance of the traditional image and positing of a neo-classic, dipolar concept of God which surpasses the abstract and makes acceptable the belief in a Supreme Being. (shrink)

The foundation of historical materialism.--A study on authority.--Sartre's existentialism.--Karl Popper and the problem of historical laws.--Freedom and the historical imperative.

This classic collection, newly revised and with a foreword by classicist Spencer Klavan, includes the famed original introduction by Russell Kirk, the full text of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the complete Enchiridion of Epictetus, and key selections from Seneca and Hierocles of Alexandria in one compact volume.

Kant held the moral law to be an objective imperative, an entity in its own right. It carries with it prescriptive force, in parallel to other principles of pure reason, like those of logic and mathematics. Objective imperatives therefore do not derive their authority from any other source,such as common consensus or the will of God. In Objective Imperatives, Ralph C. S. Walker seeks to show that this is a highly defensible view: Kant's Categorical Imperative, properly understood, is broadly (...) right. The key to it is rationality, and not universality, which functions only as anapproximate test. Often, Kant sets the matter out badly, and most of the common objections to him can be shown to be due to misunderstandings. A morality that gives us an objective imperative does appear incompatible with the determinism to which Kant commits himself, but Walker argues that thisappearance is misleading. (shrink)

The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent’s sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there (...) is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent’s sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent’s sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent’s sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms. (shrink)

Der Band prasentiert zwei bislang unedierte Dialoge des normannischen Abts Ralph von Battle (1040-1124), eines Schulers von Lanfrank und Anselm von Canterbury. In Der Fragende und der Antwortende legt ein Christ einem anderen Christ seine Glaubenszweifel vor. Sie betreffen Themen einer philosophischen Theologie des Christentums wie das Problem des Bosen oder die Rede von 'der Schopfung aus dem Nichts'. Beide Gesprachspartner zeigen sich dem Denken des Augustinus verpflichtet. Der Wissende und der Nichtwissende ist das Gesprach eines Christen mit einem (...) Atheisten, das den Entwurf einer naturlichen Theologie einschliesslich ihrer Grenzbestimmung enthalt. (shrink)

This work is Emerson's set of essays published in 1860 just before the start of the Civil War: 'Fate,' 'Power,' 'Wealth,' 'Culture,' 'Behavior,' 'Worship,' 'Considerations by the Way,' 'Beauty,' 'Illusions.'.

Meditations offers timeless guidance for troubled times. Renowned for his principled leadership, Aurelius kept private notes detailing his philosophy on life and leadership. Meditations is a collection of those private notes, filled with insights on responding well to hardship both in thought and in action. His writings are a cornerstone of the Stoic philosophy, embraced by leaders throughout history and across the world for its emphasis on collaboration, rationality, and striving for the good of all people. George Long's elegant 1862 (...) translation balances accessibility with preserving the classic tone of the text. With archival printing, this pocket-sized new hardcover edition is designed for both portability and longevity. "Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite duration of ages." -Marcus Aurelius. (shrink)

Marcus Aurelius was Emperor of Rome from 121 to 180. Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius was written for school age children. The author believed that children should be given the wisdom of great leaders from all eras. Marcus Aurelius believed that human happiness arises in part from man's acceptance of his duties and responsibilities. He believed that one should accept calmly what cannot be avoided and perform one's duties as well as possible. "It was the doctrine of (...) class='Hi'>Marcus Aurelius that most of the ills of life come to us from our own imagination, that it was not in the power of others seriously to interfere with the calm, temperate life of an individual, and that when a fellow being did anything to us that seemed unjust he was acting in ignorance, and that instead of stirring up anger within us it should stir our pity for him. Oftentimes by careful self-examination we should find that the fault was more our own than that of our fellow, and our sufferings were rather from our own opinions than from anything real.". (shrink)

A deluxe special edition of the ancient classic written by the Roman Emperor known as “The Philosopher” Meditations is a series of personal journals written by Marcus Aurelius, Emperor of Rome from 169 to 180 AD. The last of the “Five Good Emperors,” he was the most powerful and influential man in the Western world at the time. Marcus was one of the leaders of Stoicism, a philosophy of personal ethics which sought resilience and virtue through personal action (...) and responsibility. Stoicism, viewed as a foundation of modern self-help, has inspired many personal development and psychotherapy approaches through to the present day. Meditations is perhaps the most important source of our modern understanding of Stoic philosophy. Its twelve books chronicle different stages of Marcus Aurelius’ life and ideas. Although he ruled during the Pax Romana, the age of relative peace and stability throughout the empire, his reign was marked by near-constant military conflict and a devastating plague which killed upwards of five million people. Aurelius’ writings give modern readers an unprecedented look into the “spiritual exercises” which helped him through his tumultuous life and strengthened his patience, empathy, generosity, self-knowledge and emotional health. The private reflections recorded in the Meditations were never meant to be published, rather they were a source for Marcus’ own guidance and self-improvement, and jotted down by campfires or in military tents on the Roman front. The lessons, insights and perspectives contained within this remarkable work are just as relevant today as they were two millennia ago. This volume: Presents the timeless wisdom of Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his Stoic philosophy, with new research on his life and times Contains valuable insights on topics such as resilience, moderation and emotional control Discusses how to live “in agreement with nature” and abide by strong ethical principles Part of the bestselling Capstone Classics Series edited by Tom Butler-Bowdon, this attractive, high-quality hardcover volume includes: An original Introduction by Marcus Aurelius authority and Stoicism expert Donald Robertson, author of How To Think Like A Roman Emperor. A modernised, up to date version of the classic George Long translation. Meditations: The Philosophy Classic is a volume which will occupy a prominent place in any library for years to come. (shrink)

We argue that many intuitions do not have conscious propositional contents. In particular, many of the intuitions had in response to philosophical thought experiments, like Gettier cases, do not have such contents. They are more like hunches, urgings, murky feelings, and twinges. Our view thus goes against the received view of intuitions in philosophy, which we call Mainstream Propositionalism. Our positive view is that many thought-experimental intuitions are conscious, spontaneous, non-theoretical, non-propositional psychological states that often motivate belief revision, but they (...) require interpretation, in light of background beliefs, before a subject can form a propositional judgment as a consequence of them. We call our view Interpretationalism. We argue (i) that Interpretationalism avoids the problems that beset Mainstream Propositionalism and (ii) that our view meshes well with empirical results in contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

-- Douglas Kellner, University of Texas, Austin.

It is widely assumed that our “evidence” is at least one source of the “justification” that we have for believing things—where this notion of “justification” seems to be a normative notion. More precisely, it seems to be an agential normative notion, evaluating the different possible attitudes that are available to an agent at a time, on the basis of facts that are just “given”—that is, facts that it is not available to the agent to change through the way in which (...) she exercises her reasoning capacities at that time. However, given the meaning that the term “evidence” has in everyday English, what is in this sense “given” to you cannot be identified with your current “evidence”. First, some propositions count as part of the “evidence” that you now have precisely in virtue of the fact that you now believe those propositions; but these beliefs are not part of what is now “given” to you—they are themselves among the attitudes whose justification is in question. Secondly, what is now “given” to you arguably includes facts about what you believed in the past—but such facts cannot naturally be called part of your current “evidence” unless you now know or believe these facts. In fact, it seems, the concept “evidence” does not really belong to individualistic epistemology, but to social epistemology: the function of “evidence” is that it is what we can use to show that something is true to the contextually relevant audience. (shrink)

This essay defends a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) – the doctrine that there is normally a stronger reason against an act that has a bad state of affairs as one of its intended effects than against an otherwise similar act that has that bad state of affairs as an unintended effect. First, a precise account of this version of the DDE is given. Secondly, some suggestions are made about why we should believe the DDE, and about (...) why it is true. Finally, a solution is developed to the so-called ‘closeness problem’ that any version of the DDE must face. (shrink)

Reading Certainty offers incisive historical analysis of the foundational questions of the Christian tradition: how are we to read scripture, and how can we know we are saved? This collection of essays honors the work and thought Susan E. Schreiner by exploring the import of these questions across a wide range of time periods. With contributions from renowned scholars and from Schreiner's students from her more than three decades of teaching, each of the contributions highlights the nexus of certainty, perception, (...) authority, and exegesis that has defined her scholarly work. Intellectual historians, early modernists, and scholars of Christianity will all appreciate this testament to Schreiner's influence. Contributors include: Vincent Evener, Bruce Gordon, Ralph Keen, Mark Lambert, Kevin J. Madigan, Richard A. Muller, Willemien Otten, Daniel Owings, Elizabeth Palmer, Karen Park, Barbara Pitkin, Ronald K. Rittgers, William Schweiker, Jonathan Strom, and Matthew Vanderpoel. (shrink)

This new edition brings Farquharson's authoritative 1944 translation up to date and includes a helpful introduction and notes for the student and general reader. Rutherford includes a selection of letters from Marcus to his tutor Fronto--most of which date from his earlier years--that offer personal detail and help to fill out the somber portrait of the emperor that is found in the Meditations.