This chapter traces some of the ancient and medieval history of the debate about whether there are distinct and potentially conflicting true goods or genuine tension between the pursuit of self-interest and the pursuit of what has intrinsic value. Much modern moral theory posits that morally good agents are prepared to restrain the pursuit of even their enlightened self-interest when it conflicts with what is intrinsically good or is good for others. This puts Morality at odds with a long Ethical (...) tradition that is especially indebted to Aristotle and his followers and that proposes the ultimate aim of any rational agent to be that agent’s flourishing or happiness. The chapter concludes, pace Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre, that while the view embedded in much modern moral theory reached its full development in the context of a theologically infused medieval tradition, which involved Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Abelard and John Duns Scotus, its roots are earlier, and its metaphysical underpinnings are independent of that context. (shrink)

In the nearly half a century since its modern inception (Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969)), the Representation theory has faced no more implacable enemy than Ned Block. He has offered objection after objection, usually in the form of apparent counterexamples, and as I write this he shows no sign of flagging.

I argue that the numbering system of the Tractatus lets us see how it was constructed, in two closely related senses of that term. First, it tells us a great deal about the genesis of the book, for the numbering system was used to assemble and rearrange a series of drafts, as recorded in MS 104. Second, it helps us understand the structure of the published book, as cryptically summarized in the opening footnote. I also discuss an unpublished letter from (...) Anscombe to von Wright from 1948 which contains the very first sketch of a tree-structured reading, and what I believe is Stenius’s response to Anscombe’s proposal. The paper critically evaluates previous work on tree-structured readings and contends that we need to read the Tractatus in both the number order used in the published book and the tree order that Wittgenstein used to draft it. It also considers some of the main ways of turning this complex branching structure into a linear, printed text, and so serves as an introduction to the three tree-structured editions of the Tractatus that accompany this paper (the German text, and the translations by Ogden/Ramsey and Pears & McGuinness). (shrink)

I argue that the current view (as held by, eg., Warnock, Anscombe and Stenius) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractates is mistaken. This view maintains that Wittgenstein's theory is one of 'isomorphism'; that, roughly, a sentence has meaning in virtue of its being a facsimile of a fact or possible fact. But a detailed study of significant passages in the Tractattis shows that Wittgenstein held no such view. His use of important terms, such as Salz, Bild, Sachverhalt, Tatsache (...) , etc., has been crucially misunderstood. There is no isomorphism. The theory is not about sentences at all, but about talking sense. (shrink)

This anthology is designed for teachers who wish a text that deals with practical, normative issues of popular interest. The selected readings, nearly all of which were first published in the last ten years, are grouped under the following seven headings: Sex, Abortion, Prejudice and Discrimination, Civil Disobedience, Punishment, War, and Suicide and Death. The selections include such popular pieces as Judith Jarvis Thomson’s "A Defense of Abortion," John Rawls’ "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," and Elizabeth Anscombe’s "War and Murder," (...) and such fresh, provocative essays as Peter Singer’s "Animal Liberation," and Richard Brandt’s "The Morality and Rationality of Suicide." Since the readings, which are philosophically interesting and, with effort, understandable by most undergraduates, present opposing views within each section, the text is not biased in favor of any particular viewpoint. One minor complaint is that some of the sections do not present sufficient material to allow for an adequate presentation of the topic; for example, the section on sex contains just two essays. A second complaint is the omission of any introductions; a clear discussion of the issues dealt with in each section might ease the problem undergraduates have in following the subtle argumentation contained in some of the papers. Despite these minor complaints, the book is one of the best of its type available.—M.G. (shrink)

Although social scientists have been devoted to discovering specific realities of social life, many theorists devoted to critical judgment have turned to philosophy in search of universal grounds of truth and reality. They have, however, worried about the problem of relativism. Although Wittgenstein has often been characterized as a relativist, Cora Diamond, inspired by G. E. M Anscombe, argues that his work, despite internal tensions, provides rational grounds for external criticism of social practices. Her argument and her critique of the (...) work of Peter Winch and Ilham Dilman are, however, neither adequately supported by Wittgenstein’s texts nor sufficiently developed on their own terms. (shrink)

Philosophers of action and perception have reached a consensus: the term ‘intentionality’ has significantly different senses in their respective fields. But Anscombe argues that these distinct senses are analogically united in such a way that one cannot understand the concept if one focuses exclusively on its use in one’s preferred philosophical sub-discipline. She highlights three salient points of analogy: (i) intentional objects are given by expressions that employ a “description under which;” (ii) intentional descriptions are typically vague and indeterminate; and (...) (iii) intentional descriptions may be false. I explore these three features as they apply to both perception and action and defend Anscombe’s view that the analogical concept of intentionality is a grammatical concept. That is, there are two distinctive linguistic/social practices that involve, respectively, a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ and a special sense of the question ‘What?’ To competently ask and answer the questions that constitute these practices not only reflects, but also conveys a grammatical understanding of intentionality’s basic, formal structure. (shrink)

The present paper proposes to analyse the role of the practical syllogism in G.E.M. Anscombe’s theory of action. To this end, I have rst of all chosen to examine, even if in broad terms, the conception of practical syllogism as it is present in the Aristotelian doctrine, and to reveal/delineate some critical points found within it. The following section is the central part of the paper, where, starting from § 33 of Intention, a re ection is carried out on the (...) practical syllogism, which is among Aristotle’s most signi cant discoveries, chie y bringing into focus its teleological prospective. Action, in Anscombe’s thought, almost seems be the cornerstone of a profound, and in a certain sense “contextual”, comprehension of the subject. (shrink)

Die Wittgenstein-Schülerin Elizabeth Anscombe zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mit der Monographie Absicht begründete sie die analytische Handlungstheorie, viele ihrer Abhandlungen gelten als Klassiker, aber nur wenige liegen bislang in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Der vorliegende Band füllt diese Lücke: Er versammelt zwölf von Anscombes wichtigsten Aufsätzen, die thematisch von der praktischen Philosophie über die Metaphysik und die Philosophie des Geistes bis hin zu Aristoteles- und Wittgenstein-Interpretationen reichen, also das ganze Spektrum ihres Denkens repräsentieren. Die Anmerkungen und Erläuterungen (...) der Herausgeber sowie das Nachwort von Anselm W. Müller erschließen die Texte und bieten zusätzliche Einblicke in das facettenreiche Werk dieser solitären Denkerin. (shrink)

L’opera più importante per la filosofia dell’azione dopo l’Etica di Aristotele: così Donald Davidson ha definito il libro di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Intention, che Elisa Grimi ci presenta oggi attraverso questa preziosa guida alla lettura, il primo testo di questo genere in lingua italiana. dalla Prefazione di Cyrille Michon. Che cosa sia un’intenzione, quale sia il ruolo che essa svolge all'interno di un’azione, se vi si possa trovare traccia della vera intenzione del soggetto guardando l’azione che compie: questi e (...) molti altri sono gli interrogativi ai quali Anscombe tenta di rispondere. Intention non è un’opera di etica o di politica ma si muove su uno sfondo etico o politico, uno sfondo da cui lo scritto trae la propria forza e il proprio spirito. L’intenzione infatti è capace di modellare l’azione e generare una storia. Come un mazzo di fiori scelto ad hoc è capace di suscitare emozioni e sentimenti e, allo stesso tempo, custodire la promessa di una storia a venire. (shrink)

The number of wars in which modern countries, primarily the United States and Great Britain, have been involved in the past one hundred years might leave the impression that peace movements there are ineffectual. Virtually every war in recent US and UK history has had its corresponding anti-war protests, and there is no record of a peace movement actively stopping an impending significant military action at inception, although evidence exists that peace movements have affected martial policy after the initial stages (...) of a military action. Instead, peace movements seem to elicit ill will and accusations of self-preservation and treason. This paper will show that peace movements are thus censored through a sense of patriotism constructed by those in positions of influence, including government entities and the press. More important, this paper will argue that the reasoning of these pacifist movements and of their detractors can be more clearly understood through application of the work of philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe, particularly her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” than through other philosophers such as Richard M. Weaver. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombes 1958 erschienene Monographie Intention (Absicht) gilt als Klassiker der der Handlungstheorie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Das vorliegende Buch knüpft an das erneut wachsende Interesse an Anscombes Philosophie an und bietet erstmals in deutscher Sprache eine durchgängige Werkinterpretation von „Intention“. Anscombes Buch wird in den Kontext ihres Werks gestellt und vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Anknüpfung an die aristotelisch-thomistische Tradition der Handlungsreflexion sowie an die Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins diskutiert. Dabei werden Fehldeutungen korrigiert, die die Rezeption von Anscombes Handlungstheorie nach wie vor erschweren.

Questo studio costituisce la prima monografia italiana su una delle più complesse pensatrici dell’ultimo millennio. Filosofa dal pensiero formidabile, così ne parlò Sarah Boxer sul New York Times, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, moglie di Peter Geach e madre di sette figli, ha sempre battagliato per la verità. In lei vita, passione e filosofia sono un tutt’uno e in tale unità si cela l’irriducibilità e il fascino del suo pensiero. In compagnia dei classici dell’antichità, dei moderni e di quei filosofi del (...) panorama contemporaneo con cui era solita dialogare, in primis Ludwig Wittgenstein, ella arrivò a elaborare un pensiero del tutto personale quale risposta ai diversi problemi sollevati in ambito sociale. Non a caso, come osserva Jane O’Grady, talvolta venne soprannominata la Dragon Lady di Oxford. Basti citare la sua opposizione pubblica al conferimento della laurea honoris causa al presidente Truman, o alle sfide che fronteggiò in campo morale. Autrice di numerosissime pubblicazioni, nel 1958 stilò il famoso scritto Modern Moral Philosophy, poi divenuto il manifesto della rinascita di un’etica di tipo neo-aristotelico. Il volume si conclude con una breve raccolta di testimonianze di persone, docenti, allievi e amici che hanno avuto occasione di incontrarla. E come ricorda Rosalind Hursthouse, Anscombe era una “filosofa straordinaria, e del tutto eccezionale”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Language, thought, and reality Time, necessity, and causation From experience to self‐consciousness Human action and practical thought Under a description Existence by convention and intention Challenges to contemporary moral philosophy.

Philosophical anarchism, in its strongest form, says that a right to be obeyed would run up against the duty to act autonomously, so there must be no one with a right to be obeyed. More recently, a parallel criticism of moral testimony has been advanced according to which there can be no right to be believed about moral matters because it would lead us to fail in our duty to form our moral beliefs for ourselves, and thus to bear responsibility (...) for the beliefs and the actions we perform on account of them. This essay advances an interpretation of both objections to practical deference and a novel solution drawing on G.E.M. Anscombe’s little discussed essay, “Authority in Morals.” I argue that the concern animating a priori anarchism and this version of moral testimony pessimism is that practical deference undermines our responsibility for our actions or beliefs. Anscombe’s discussion of teaching authority affords us a way of seeing that this is wrong-headed. In fact, the right to be obeyed or believed does not— and cannot— threaten to undermine a subject’s responsibility for what she believes or does out of deference to authority. (shrink)

On the face of it, conflicting constraints are placed on agents' knowledge of their own action: it is demanded that that which is known is an event happening in the “outside world”, but that the way in which it is known is “from the inside”. I propose to look at the way in which Anscombe sets up this epistemological puzzle and attempts to solve it. I discuss two ways in which Anscombe proposes to dissolve the paradox of agents' knowledge, whereof (...) the first one is rejected. Finally, I discuss different problems for the second way and suggest that we can save the Anscombian framework by rethinking the role of perception in action. (shrink)

Reigning orthodoxy in the philosophical study of human rational capacities, such as being able to act intentionally and to reason, is to characterize them in causal psychological terms. That is, to analyze these capacities in terms of mental states and their causal relations. It is against this background that the work of G.E.M. Anscombe has gained renewed interest. The main goal of this chapter is twofold. First, I will explicate Anscombe’s philosophical approach by analyzing her account of intentional action and (...) by relating it to the misperceptions of that account in (the history of) the philosophy of action. Importantly, Anscombe holds that an analysis of intentional action in terms of what it is, e.g., an event with certain specific features, cannot provide non-circular explanations. Instead, following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Wittgenstein, Anscombe seeks to explicate intentional action in terms of its form, i.e., the way in which it exists. The second aim of the chapter is to show the import of Anscombe’s approach by applying it to the philosophy of reasoning. After discussing two main problems for the current orthodox view in epistemological debates on reasoning, I will propose an alternative Anscombe-inspired view of reasoning. In this so-called form view of reasoning, reasoning is characterized as a tool to drag out implications, embodied in judgments of the form p as following from q. The upshot of the chapter is that concepts of our rational capacities do not depict certain psychological states or processes, but rather our involvement with rational connections that exist in our lives and practices. (shrink)

Re-Reading: G.E.M Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy, Vol 33, No. 124 (1958) 1 -33.