J'examine plusieurs sources selon lesquelles Swyneshed (malgré les prétentions d'Angel D'Ors dans ses articles récents) donne une nova responsio en partie sous forme de la règle « On peut nier une proposition conjonctive après avoir concédé ses deux parties. » Je montre que cette nova responsio est liée à un rejet de la règle « Chaque proposition qui suit de l'ensemble de propositions déjà concédées doit être concédée », et j'attribue ce rejet à une théorie selon laquelle une inférence se (...) base sur le rapport logique entre seulement deux propositions. I examine a number of sources according to which Swyneshed (despite the claims made by Angel D'Ors in his recent articles) does give a nova responsio partly in the form of the rule « One can deny a conjunction whose conjuncts have already been granted. » I show that this nova responsio is linked to a rejection of the rule « Every proposition following from a set of propositions which have already been granted must be granted », and I attribute this rejection to a theory whereby an inference is based on the logical relations between just two propositions. (shrink)

British logic teaching in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was provided in England by Oxford and Cambridge, both medieval foundations, and in Scotland by the universities of St Andrews and A...

Quand on parle d'une substance et de ses accidents, peut-on dire que tous deux sont des etants au meme sens? Quand on parle de Dieu et de ses creatures, peut-on dire que tous les deux sont bons ou justes au meme sens? Quand on parle d'une potion et d'un animal, peut-on dire que tous les deux sont sains au meme sens? Telles sont les problematiques metaphysiques, theologiques et semantiques que la notion d'analogie developpee par les penseurs du Moyen Age cherche (...) a affronter. Les quatre etudes, issues des Conferences Pierre Abelard presentees a l'Universite de Paris-IV Sorbonne en 2004, examinent les modes complexes selon lesquels ces trois problematiques se sont croisees et les questionnements nouveaux auxquels elles ont donne lieu pendant plus de quatre siecles. L'auteur interprete la pensee de Thomas d'Aquin dans le contexte qui en a permis l'emergence, et analyse les critiques qui ont suivi, ainsi que les reponses nouvelles qui ont ete avancees. Ce faisant, elle jette une lumiere nouvelle sur les rapports entre l'Aquinate et le Cardinal Cajetan, et sur l'importance de la semantique durant la periode medievale. (shrink)

This paper considers the nature of the changes that took place in logic teaching at the University of Oxford from the beginning of the sixteenth century, when students attended university lectures on Aristotle’s texts as well as studying short works dealing with specifically medieval developments, to the beginning of the eighteenth century when teaching was centred in the colleges, the medieval developments had largely disappeared, and manuals summarizing Aristotelian logic were used. The paper also considers the reasons for these changes, (...) including changes in English society, and the effect of humanism and the more scholarly Aristotelianism that it produced. (shrink)

I examine the treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians and how it stemmed from their reception of classical texts in logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I consider the relation of the word 'metaphor' to the notions of translatio and transumptio, and show that it is not always synonymous with these. I also show that in the context of commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations metaphor was subsumed under equivocation. In turn, it was linked with the notion of analogy not so much in (...) the Greek sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations as in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et posterius. Whether or not analogy could be reduced to metaphor, or the reverse, depended on the controversial issue of the number of acts of imposition needed to produce an equivocal term. A spectrum of views is canvassed, including those found in the logic commentaries of John Duns Scotus. (shrink)

L'ed. delle Obligationes si basa su quattro mss.: Praha, Knihovni Metropolitni Kapituly, M.CXLV ; Oxford, New College, E 289 ; Praha, Státní Knihóvna CSR, VIII E 11 ; Salamanca, Biblioteca de la Universidad, 2358 . Nell'introduzione l'A. prende in esame la tradizione manoscritta delle opere di Giovanni Tarteys, fornendo anche una breve notizia biografica di questo magister artium attivo ad Oxford tra la fine del Trecento e gli inizi del Quattrocento. Segue un'analisi comparata del De Obligationibus di Giovanni con le (...) trattazioni analoghe di altri maestri, tra i quali Rodolfo Strode, Gualterio Burley, Paolo da Venezia e Giovanni Wyclif. Discussi infine i criteri di edizione. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 372 - 390 This paper investigates a series of Oxford _Obligationes_ texts, all of which can be associated with Richard Billingham. My study is based on eleven of the surviving manuscripts and two early printed texts. I focus on one aspect of their discussion, namely the rule for granting the initial _positum_ of an obligational disputation of the type called _positio_, and the six restrictions that could be placed on that rule. I explain (...) these restrictions with reference to several sophismata that were meant to illustrate the problems that the restrictions were intended to solve, and in particular, I discuss the fifth restriction ‘not inconsistent with the _positum_’. I also shed light on the final restriction, which has not always been well understood, namely the restriction ‘wherever there is no _obligatio_ relevant to the _positum_’. (shrink)

Paul Spade has attacked the theory of the modes of personal supposition as found in Ockham and Buridan, partly on the grounds that the details of the theory are incompatible with the equivalence between propositions and their descended forms which is implied by the appeal to suppositional descent and ascent. I trace the development of the doctrines of ascent and descent from the mid-fourteenth century to the early sixteenth century, and I investigate Domingo de Soto’s elaborate account of how descent (...) and ascent actually worked. I show that although Soto himself shared some of Spade’s doubts, including those about the use of merely confused supposition, he had a way of reducing at least some propositions containing terms with such supposition to equivalent disjunctions and conjunctions of singular propositions. Moreover, he gave explicit instructions on how to avoid the supposed problem of O-propositions. (shrink)

An awareness of the wide scope of medieval logic and the role it played in university education at all levels, together with the way it was used in writings on both science and theology, is crucial for the historian of medieval thought. The growth of this awareness since the mid-twentieth century is shown by the ongoing expansion of editorial work, together with the discussion of the logic actually found in such prominent authors as Aquinas and Scotus. It has gone hand (...) in hand with the use of developments in modern logic. First came the realization that medieval logic extended beyond basic Aristotelian syllogistic, and could be related to modern developments in propositional and quantificational logic in... (shrink)

Theiones is a work in medieval logic from the second half of the 13th century. Clearly a product of the British university culture and much cited, quoted and imitated, it is attributed in two manuscripts to 'Master Richard the Sophist'. This Richard is referred to by other philosophers and logicians as 'The Master of Abstractions' - an honorific title which indicates that his work was a standard textbook. The Abstractiones is a collection of sophismata, or logical puzzles of increasing complexity (...) and difficulty which have been gathered under logical operators like 'all'. Each sophisma is introduced by a proposition that appears to be both provably true and provably false, like 'God knows whatever he knew'. The Master determines the truth or falsity of the proposition and analyses the defects of the arguments that have been offered by detecting logical fallacies, equivocal expressions and the like. The work as we have it is clearly the result of a process of development, modification, and interpolation, probably extending over at least a generation. Although there came to be works that imitated the Abstractions and followed some of its plan and style, these are 'descendants,' rather than variations.The Abstractions gives us a better sense than does an independent and original work of medieval logic like William of Ockham's Summa Totius Logicae of how instruction in techniques of argumentation and reasoning, often of a fairly sophisticated sort, was carried on in British universities in the latter part of the 13th century and well into the 14th century. (shrink)

Peter Abelard is one of the best-known figures of mediæval intellectual history, if only because of the disastrous love affair with Heloise which ended in his castration by thugs in the pay of Heloise’s outraged uncle. He is also one of the most accessible, by virtue of his letters to Heloise and his lively account of his own life in the Historia calamitatum. However, while specialists have paid detailed attention to his ethics and to his logic, including his discussion of (...) the problem of universals, little has been written that presents an overview of his thought to a wider audience. In this book, John Marenbon sets out to do two things: to give us a general view of Abelard’s life and writings, and to present analyses of Abelard’s ontology, epistemology, and semantics, and of his ethical theory, particularly as it grows out of his theology. Marenbon hopes to show that Abelard was not merely a gifted logician and critic of poor arguments wherever they may be found, but a constructive philosopher in his own right. (shrink)

Geoffrey of Aspall, who died in 1287 and was master of Arts by 1262, was active at Oxford in the years 1255 to1265. He wrote commentaries on several Aristotelian works, and was certainly a major protagonist of the introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford. In particular, he produced a very extensive question-style commentary on Aristotle's Physics, which contains important discussions of the fundamental topics of Aristotle's natural philosophy, like matter, form, natural agency, causes, change, the infinite and the continuum, time, (...) the eternity of the world, self-movers. Aspall's Physics commentary shows the influence of Grosseteste's metaphysics of light and of Roger Bacon's view on the physical role of intentional species, as well as a strong inclination to ontological realism.Aspall's commentary on Aristotle's Physics is edited here in two volumes, which together form the first critical edition of this work. The Latin text is accompanied by a facing English translation, and the text is extensively cross-referenced and provided with scholarly apparatus. The detailed introduction guides the reader through the intricacies of the textual transmission of Aspall's commentary, and also presents the main topics discussed in this commentary. The appendix to the edition makes available alternative versions of some sections of Aspall's commentary. (shrink)

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Although many of the details of the development of logic in the Middle Ages remain to be filled in, it is well known that between ...

As a historian of logic, I am frequently puzzled by the things which people have to say about the relationship between mathematical logic and some other kind of logic which is variously described as ‘intentional’ and ‘traditional.’ Part of my puzzlement arises from my failure to understand precisely what kind of system is being offered under the guise of intentional logic. I have always taken it that logic is concerned with valid inferences, with showing us how we may legitimately derive (...) a conclusion from a set of premisses; yet the validation of inferences seems to be the least of the concerns of the intentional logician. He says that it can be done, but he does not bother to show us how. My purpose in this paper is to list some of the sources of my puzzlement in the hope that an exponent of intentional logic will show me how they can be resolved, and how their resolution will contribute to the building of a system (however informal) in which different types of argument can be validated. (shrink)

(1963). The early teaching of anatomy at Padua, with special reference to a model of the Padua anatomical theatre. Annals of Science: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-26.

"For riding is required a horse"--"I promise you a horse"--Chimeras and imaginary objects--Theories of the proposition--The structure of mental language--Mental language and the unity of propositions--"Do words signify ideas or things?"--Locke on language--The doctrine of exponibilia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries--Multiple quantification and the use of special quantifiers in early sixteenth century logic--Thomas Bricot(d. 1516) and the Liar paradox--Will Socrates cross the bridge?

This paper is a case study of how a few short lines in two of Aristotle’s logical works were read in the thirteenth century. I shall begin with a quick look at Aristotle’s own remarks about equivocation in the Categories and the Sophistical Refutations, as they were transmitted to the West by Boethius’s translations. I shall continue with an analysis of the divisions of equivocation and analogy to be found in an anonymous commentary, on the Sophistical Refutations written in Paris (...) between 1270 and 1280. I have chosen this author’s work to focus on, because it offers a remarkably full account which brings together the elements found in many other logical works from the second half of the thirteenth century. In the course of my analysis I shall attempt to show the part played by four different sources: the Greek commentators of late antiquity; the new translations of Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics; the reception of Arabic works, particularly the commentaries of Averroes; and new grammatical doctrines, notably that of modi significandi. At the same time, I hope to throw some light on the development of the doctrine of analogy as it was understood by late thirteenth-century logicians. (shrink)

The last thirty years have seen a resurgence of interest in virtue among philosophers, psychologists, and educators. This co-authored book brings an interdisciplinary response to the study of virtue: it not only provides a framework for quantifying virtues, but also explores how we can understand virtue in a philosophically-informed way that is compatible with the best current thinking in personality psychology. The volume presents a major contribution to theemerging science of virtue and character measurement.