This chapter contains section titled: Cultural Imperialism in Rawls's Law of Peoples Rawls's Answers to the Charge Conclusion: Peace or Justice? Acknowledgements Notes.

John Rawls is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Contemporary political philosophy has been reshaped by his seminal ideas and most current work in the discipline is a response to them. This book introduces his central ideas and examines their contribution to contemporary political thought. In the first part of the book Catherine Audard focuses on Rawls' conception of political and social justice and its justification as presented in his groundbreaking A Theory of Justice. (...) This includes sustained examination of Rawls' moral philosophy and its core thesis, the primacy of justice, the complex relation between Rawls' views and utilitarianism, and his most famous concept, the Original Position Device. In the second half of the book, Audard explores Rawls' more practical concerns for stability and political consensus, citizenship and international justice, and shows the continuity between these concerns and his earlier work. Throughout, Audard contextualizes Rawls' ideas by giving a sense of their historical development, which underlines the intellectual cohesion of his thought. The move between ethics and politics so characteristic of Rawls' work, and which makes for the richness of his philosophy, is shown to also create for it significant problems. John Rawls combines clear exposition with insightful analysis and provides an interpretative and critical framework that will help shape ongoing debates surrounding Rawls' work. (shrink)

John Rawls is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Contemporary political philosophy has been reshaped by his seminal ideas and most current work in the discipline is a response to them. This book introduces his central ideas and examines their contribution to contemporary political thought. In the first part of the book Catherine Audard focuses on Rawls' conception of political and social justice and its justification as presented in his groundbreaking A Theory of Justice. (...) This includes sustained examination of Rawls' moral philosophy and its core thesis, the primacy of justice, the complex relation between Rawls' views and utilitarianism, and his most famous concept, the Original Position Device. In the second half of the book, Audard explores Rawls' more practical concerns for stability and political consensus, citizenship and international justice, and shows the continuity between these concerns and his earlier work. Throughout, Audard contextualizes Rawls' ideas by giving a sense of their historical development, which underlines the intellectual cohesion of his thought. The move between ethics and politics so characteristic of Rawls' work, and which makes for the richness of his philosophy, is shown to also create for it significant problems. John Rawls combines clear exposition with insightful analysis and provides an interpretative and critical framework that will help shape ongoing debates surrounding Rawls' work. (shrink)

What is the appropriate legal response to terrorist threats? This question is discussed by politician Tony McWalter, The Philosophers' Magazine editor Julian Baggini, and philosophers Catherine Audard, Saladin Meckled-Garcia, and Alex Voorhoeve.

Qu'est-ce que l'utilitarisme? Philosophie du bourgeois, philosophie de l'homo oeconomicus, dénoncée, entre autres, par Marx, Nietzsche et Foucault? Ou la seule philosophie morale de taille à concurrencer le kantisme et l'une des bases de l'éthique appliquée contemporaine? L'utilitarisme a cherché à constituer une morale purement rationnelle, critique des croyances religieuses et des conventions sociales. L'exemple le plus illustre est celui de la justice pénale. Bentham, dans des textes révolutionnaires, soutient, à la suite de Beccaria, que la peine doit être proportionnée (...) au tort commis par le coupable, non au besoin de vengeance de la victime et de la société. Dans le premier volume de cette Anthologie, Bentham et ses précurseurs, la filiation entre Bentham et les philosophes des Lumières est établie. De Shaftesbury et Hume à Beccaria et William Paley, on pourra prendre la mesure des continuités, mais aussi du génie du fondateur de ce radicalisme philosophique. Surtout, le lecteur aura accès aux textes majeurs de Bentham qui n'avaient jamais été traduits, en dehors du Panoptique et des Sophismes anarchiques écrits directement en français. On pourra ainsi apprécier combien l'utilitarisme a été et demeure un outil d'analyse et de critique de la morale ordinaire. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Faced with the present migrant crisis and the dismal record of Europe in protecting vulnerable refugees’ and migrants’ rights, what could be the view of the moral philosopher? The contrast between the principles enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the reality of present policies is shocking, but more scrutiny will show that it is the result of a larger trend towards an understanding of freedom mostly in economic terms, at a time when economists such as Amartya Sen (...) have revised their approach to economic growth and prosperity, noting the central role played by a much richer conception of freedom. The paper will scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the person from which they derive and will provide an alternative and more coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy of the European Charter, at a time of growing dissatisfaction and so‐called democratic deficit. Such a vision could help reconnect the Charter with a conception of the human person as in need not solely of passive legal protection, but also of active promotion of her self‐respect and capabilities, and of her aspiration to a valuable life. (shrink)

La question de la cohérence de la théorie rawlsienne de la justice et de son tournant politique a été depuis longtemps une source de débats et de malentendus. Pour certains interprètes, l’abandon par le second Rawls d’un fondement kantien des principes de justice au profit d’un libéralisme purement politique serait un prix trop élevé à payer pour obtenir un large consensus sur des principes de justice dans des sociétés démocratiques traversées par des conflits de valeurs insurmontables. « La vérité dérangeante (...) ( inconvenient truth ) que Rawls découvre est qu’il est impossible, écrit Robert Taylor (2011), de parvenir à un consensus par recoupement sur une conception kantienne de la personne ou plus largement sur la justice comme équité », mais qu’en même temps, sans un tel fondement, la force morale de la théorie de la justice serait diluée. Dans cet article, je voudrais répondre à ces critiques et montrer que, bien loin de conduire au relativisme, l’exigence d’autonomie doctrinale et d’indépendance des principes de justice à l’égard de toute conception substantielle du Bien exprimée par Rawls ( Libéralisme politique, p. 133) exprime le sens qu’a pour lui l’idéal démocratique : le respect pour l’autonomie morale des personnes et le rejet de « la pratique séculaire de l’intolérance comme condition nécessaire à l’ordre et à la stabilité de la société » ( Libéralisme politique, p. 14). Mais un tel idéal n’est-il pas irréaliste? Faire ainsi confiance à l’autonomie des citoyens, à leur capacité à distinguer entre leurs doctrines morales personnelles et des principes publics de justice ( Libéralisme politique, p. 7) ne risque-t‑il pas d’affaiblir les démocraties au lieu de garantir leur stabilité, comme l’espère Rawls ( Libéralisme politique, p. 4)? Cette ambition d’autonomie doctrinale est-elle une force ou une faiblesse de la théorie rawlsienne? (shrink)

O artigo procura mostrar que sem uma comunidade civil democratizante de justificação, em lugar do atual sistema internacional, as normas da justiça global não passam de uma ficção, uma mera expressão do imperialismo cultural e político, um instrumento de controle e dominação dos povos em escala mundial, segundo um modelo colonizador ampliado que torna as declarações dos direitos humanos inoperantes. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Direitos humanos. Ética. Habermas. Justiça global. Normas internacionais. Rawls. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show that without a civil, (...) democratizing community of justification, replacing the current international system, the norms of global justice remain a fiction, a mere expression of cultural and political imperialism, an instrument of control and domination of the peoples worldwide, according to an enlarged colonizing model which render the declarations of human rights inoperative. KEY WORDS – Ethics. Global justice. Habermas. Human rights. International norms. Rawls. (shrink)

The reception of Rawls in France has been an extremely complex story where forces of innovation have been, in the end, overwhelmed by the resistance of `philosophical nationalism'. This is surprising as, in many ways, France was going through tremendous changes and modernization at the time of the translation of A Theory of Justice in 1987. In that context, Rawls's project seemed to have something useful and suggestive to offer: bridging the gap between freedom and equality in a new version (...) of social democracy, combining social justice and market efficiency, respecting the plurality of values within civil society and creating a consensus on democratic legitimacy. But the intellectual obstacles, represented mostly by the French idiosyncratic brand of republicanism, were to prove too strong to allow for a true `liberalization' of French intellectual and political life. Whereas a number of lawyers, economists and political scientists as well as proportion of the French civil service saw all the benefits of a rigorous engagement with Rawls, philosophers and the intelligentsia on the whole, with the exception of Paul Ricoeur, reacted negatively to Rawls. (shrink)

" La justice, écrit John Rawls, est la première vertu des institutions sociales comme la vérité est celle des systèmes de pensée. " Rawls renoue ainsi avec la grande tradition de la philosophie politique classique, kantienne en particulier. Les principes de justice qui gouvernent nos démocraties peuvent faire l'objet d'un accord unanime, légitimé par la procédure suivie et non plus par référence à une conception du souverain bien. Mais sa démonstration suppose une société unifiée. Or cette condition n'est plus valable (...) étant donné la diversité culturelle de nos sociétés multiethniques. La nouvelle question qui se pose est donc celle " de savoir comment une société juste et libre est possible dans des conditions de conflits doctrinaux profonds sans espoir de solution. " Dans Libéralisme politique, Rawls amorce une réponse. Le consentement recherché sur des principes de justice ne doit pas être compris comme une adhésion globale : c'est un consentement uniquement " politique " qui laisse toute liberté en matière philosophique, morale ou religieuse. Mais peut-on ainsi séparer le politique et le métaphysique? Est-il possible et même utile de rester " philosophiquement superficiel " pour parvenir à un consensus politique? (shrink)

. In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so‐called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see (...) a contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability. (shrink)

In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so-called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see a (...) contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability. (shrink)

This is French version of John Stuart Mill's essay "On Nature" accompanied by a introduction by the translator and a lexicon of English words (used in moral philosophy) often wrongly translated into French and a short reflection on the two senses of the word "law" that often cause confusion.

Esta resenha versa sobre a obra Cidadania e Democracia Deliberativa de Catherine Audard que se refere à uma articulação rawlsiana entre uma teoria da justiça e as teses centrais do seu liberalismo político sobre o pluralismo razoável, democracia deliberativa, cidadania participativa, razão pública, direito dos povos e multiculturalismo.

This review essay on three recent books on John Rawls’s theory of justice, by Catherine Audard, Samuel Freeman, and Thomas Pogge, describes the great boon they offer serious students of Rawls. They form a united front in firmly and definitively rebuffing Robert Nozick’s libertarian critique, Michael Sandel’s communitarian critique, and more generally critiques of “neutralist liberalism,” as well as in affirming the basic unity of Rawls’s position. At a deeper level, however, they diverge, and in ways that, this (...) essay suggests, go astray on subtle questions of interpretation: Freeman overemphasizes reciprocity, Pogge miscasts Rawls as a consequentialist, and Audard exaggerates the Kantian aspect of Rawls’s core, continuing commitment to “doctrinal autonomy.”. (shrink)

Although pragmatism and phenomenology have both contributed significantly to the genealogy of so-called “4E” – embodied, embedded, enactive and extended – cognition, there is benefit to be had from a systematic comparative study of these roots. As existing 4E cognition literature has tended to emphasise one or the other tradition, issues remain to be addressed concerning their commonalities – and possible incompatibilities. We begin by exploring pragmatism and phenomenology’s shared focus on contesting intellectualism, and its key assumption of mindedness as (...) representation. We then outline distinctive insights from both traditions regarding the nature and role of habits, in order to put forward a habit-based epistemology as an alternative to the Cartesian idea-based epistemology that has dominated modern philosophy. We pay particular attention to the work of classical pragmatist C.S. Peirce, arguing that his semiotics, which analyses sign-use as habit, shows how theorists of embodied cognition can break a certain false dichotomy between embodiment and logical or intellectual structure which has prevented them from fully theorising propositional knowledge. In this way, our work both augments and challenges the Dewey/Merleau-Ponty connection that has been much more extensively explored by the field. (shrink)

But in this book, Catherine Malabou proposes a more radical meaning for plasticity, one that not only adapts itself to existing circumstances, but forms a ...

This chapter contains sections titled: Catherine Malabou : “Unbind Me” Judith Butler : What Kind of Shape Is Hegel's Body in? Catherine Malabou : What Is Shaping the Body? Judith Butler : A Chiasm between Us, but No Chasm.

This paper argues that we can acknowledge the existence of moral truths and moral progress without being committed to moral realism. Rather than defending this claim through the more familiar route of the attempted analysis of the ontological commitments of moral claims, I show how moral belief change for the better shares certain features with theoretical progress in the natural sciences. Proponents of the better theory are able to convince their peers that it is formally and empirically superior to its (...) rivals, and the better theory may be promoted to the status of the truth. Yet there is no 'decision-procedure' for ethics any more than there is for molecular biology. The betterness of true theories can be grasped through what I term 'undirectional narratives' of progress. And while there are true moral claims and perhaps numerous moral truths yet to be discovered, we should reject currently popular forms of moral realism with bivalence. Some moral claims lend themselves to the construction of fully reversible, bi-directional narratives and are likely neither true nor false. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is described and assessed how political scientists use rational choice theories to offer causal explanations. We observe that the ways in which rational choice theories are considered to be successful in political science differs, depending on the explanandum in question. Political scientists use empirical variants of rational choice theories to explain the political behavior of individual agents and analytical variants to explain the behavior of collective actors. Both variants are used for distinct explananda, which ask for (...) different modes of explanation that raise in turn different explanatory demands toward rational choice theories. We argue that when political scientists discuss the explanatory usefulness of rational choice theories, they should assess them in light of the demands they are supposed to meet. This would enable a more nuanced and problem-oriented appraisal of rational choice theories in political science. (shrink)

Tracing the sign -- Signing the trace -- The messianic without messianism -- Mourning terminable and interminable : law and (commmodity) fetishism -- Justice, law, and Antigone's singular act -- Generalizing the economy of fetishism.

Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint addresses in a novel format the major topics and themes of contemporary metaethics, the study of the analysis of moral thought and judgement. Metathetics is less concerned with what practices are right or wrong than with what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong.' Looking at a wide spectrum of topics including moral language, realism and anti-realism, reasons and motives, relativism, and moral progress, this book engages students and general readers in order to enhance their (...) understanding of morality and moral discourse as cultural practices. Catherine Wilson innovatively employs a first-person narrator to report step-by-step an individual's reflections, beginning from a position of radical scepticism, on the possibility of objective moral knowledge. The reader is invited to follow along with this reasoning, and to challenge or agree with each major point. Incrementally, the narrator is led to certain definite conclusions about 'oughts' and norms in connection with self-interest, prudence, social norms, and finally morality. Scepticism is overcome, and the narrator arrives at a good understanding of how moral knowledge and moral progress are possible, though frequently long in coming. Accessibly written, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint presupposes no prior training in philosophy and is a must-read for philosophers, students and general readers interested in gaining a better understanding of morality as a personal philosophical quest."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...) not trustworthy. We ought not use it as a basis for inference or action and ought not give others to believe it. The trustworthiness of a belief, I urge, depends on its being backed by reasons—considerations that other members of the appropriate epistemic community cannot reasonably reject. Trustworthiness is intersubjective. It both depends on and contributes to the evolving cognitive values of an epistemic community. (shrink)

Introduction: Platonic dramatology -- The political and philosophical problems. Using pre-Socratic philosophy to support political reform: the Athenian stranger ; Plato's Parmenides: Parmenides' critique of Socrates and Plato's critique of Parmenides ; Becoming Socrates ; Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good -- Paradigms of philosophy. Socrates' positive teaching ; Timaeus-Critias: completing or challenging Socratic political philosophy? ; Socratic practice -- The trial and death of Socrates. The limits of human intelligence ; The Eleatic challenge ; The trial (...) and death of Socrates -- Conclusion: Why Plato made Socrates his hero. (shrink)

"Articulating a fresh vision for teaching, one that focuses on ensuring justice, believing people, and believing in people, this how-to offers evidence-based insights and draws from the author's own rich experiences as a professor to provide practical tips for reshaping syllabi, assessing student performance, and creating trust and belonging in the classroom"-Provided by publisher.