This article argues that — despite the value of distinguishing between insiders and outsiders in a contingent and relative sense — there is no fundamental insider—outsider problem. We distinguish weak and strong versions of 'insiderism' (privileged versus monopolistic access to knowledge) and then sociological and religious versions of the latter. After reviewing critiques of the sociological version, we offer a holistic semantic critique of the religious version (i.e. the view that religious experience and/or language offers sui generis access to knowledge). (...) We argue that all evidence for mental states is overt, public, and observable, and, hence, that there can be no significant difference in the access to knowledge of insiders and outsiders. (shrink)

The methodology implicit in empirically grounded social scientific studies of religion naturally allies with forms of semantic holism. However, a well known argument which questions whether holism in general is consistent with the fact that languages are learnable can be extended into an epistemological one which questions whether holism is consistent with an empirical methodology. In other words, there is question whether holism, in fact, makes social science possible. I diagnose the assumptions on which that objection rests, pointing out that (...) they are not necessary for semantic holism per se. I argue that a form of semantic holism along the lines advocated by W. V. O. Quine and Donald Davidson can avoid the objection. Moreover, when seen in this light, it has the resources to withstand an even deeper methodological problem. In so doing, though, several important but overlooked implications for the study of religion emerge. (shrink)

Putnam's Model-Theoretic argument purports to show that, contrary to what the metaphysical realist is committed to, an epistemically ideal theory which satisfies all operational and theoretical constraints can be guaranteed to be true. He draws the additional antirealist conclusion that there can be no single privileged relation of reference. I argue that the very possibility of a so-called ideal theory satisfying all operational constraints presupposes a determinate relation of reference, and hence Putnam must assume precisely what he denies.

Organismal form arises by the coordinated movement, arrangement, and activity of cells. In metazoans, most morphogenetic programs that establish the recognizable body plan of any given species are initiated during the developmental period, although in many species growth continues throughout life. By comparing the cellular and molecular development of the bilaterians (bilaterally symmetrical animals) to the development of their closest outgroup, the cnidarians, it appears that morphogenesis and the cell fate specification associated with germ layer formation during the process of (...) gastrulation are separately controlled by two distinct downstream pathways (canonical and planar cell polarity) of Wnt signaling. Furthermore, a fundamental change in the early developmental program, the positioning of the site of gastrulation, allowed the spatial separation of gene regulatory networks that facilitated the rapid diversification of bilaterian body plans. (shrink)

In this volume, Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach present arguments for and against the relevance of ethics to global climate policy. Gardiner argues that climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue, since it is an early instance of a distinctive challenge to ethical action, and ethical concerns are at the heart of many of the decisions that need to be made. Consequently, climate policy that ignores ethics is at risk of.

This makes study of it paradoxical. On the one hand, there are grounds for saying that contemporary work is, if not quite in its theoretical infancy, ...

Although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Gardiner's unpretentious style and lucid organization make sense of Dummett's and Putnam's discourse.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Environmental Midwifery and the Need for an Ethics of the Transition:A Quick Riff on the Future of Environmental EthicsStephen M. Gardiner (bio)It is worth remembering that in many ways environmental ethics is a very successful field. Over the course of only thirty or forty years, we have reached a point at which almost every significant philosophy program in the country offers a course in environmental ethics, there are (...) several established and well respected journals, and the subject is regarded as one of the core areas of "applied ethics." This is quite an achievement; and one that is easy to forget. (When I listen to the complaints of environmental colleagues in other disciplines, or of philosophers working in many areas of applied ethics, I am vividly reminded.)Still, there is a sense that the job is only half done. For one thing, although environmental ethics classes are ubiquitous, they are usually undergraduate survey courses taught by nonspecialists. For another, although good work appears in the specialist journals, it rarely makes it into the "mainstream" journals that most philosophers read. Finally, although environmental ethics counts as one of three or four core areas of applied ethics, environmental philosophers are rarely hired by (so-called) top departments (and if they are, it is often not because they are environmental philosophers, but because of the other things they do).Now, many questions arise about this situation. One of them, of course, is whether there is some kind of "glass ceiling" on environmental ethics, and if there is, what causes it? Another is whether the core problem [End Page 122] is that we're just not all that good at environmental ethics (yet)? These are reasonable worries (about which my own views would be rather sanguine). But I am more concerned about another issue, which one might call that of "interfacing".The claim that environmental ethics has some problems in interacting with philosophy more generally, with allied disciplines, and with the wider public has been widely discussed in recent years, especially in the emergence of what has come to be called "environmental pragmatism." There is something important about this debate, but my own sense is that it can become overblown. For example, when I teach my undergraduate survey course, mainly to nonphilosophers, they are, if anything, more excited about the Land Ethic, Biocentric Egalitarianism, and the worth of species than about climate change and sustainability. Still, there is something going on. However sympathetic they are to philosophy, I have the sense that my students (as well as my colleagues in other disciplines and the wider public) are dissatisfied. Having heard the critiques and the first set of grand visions, the new challenges and their problems, they want more. Irritatingly, they want to know what to do now—either how to turn grand visions into actions, or (more usually) how to successfully muddle through in the absence of a compelling grand vision. In short, they want an ethics for the transition.For what it is worth, my sense is that the main task of an ethics for the transition lies somewhere between grand theory and pragmatism. What people are hoping for is a way to transform serious environmental concern into social change. But they want this transformation to be responsive to, reflective of, and integrated with wider values. Sensing that modern life has significant vices, but also major virtues, they wish to see environmental ethics synthesize their concerns in new and creative ways. In short, like a Socratic midwife, they want environmental philosophy to help them to articulate the way forward.I'm sympathetic to the need for an ethics for the transition. I also think that taking on the task of articulating such an ethic may help the field to break through some of the institutional constraints now restricting it. But mainly it just seems to be a worthy topic in its own right. Environmental ethics should try to become an ethics for living now. In the nicest sense of the phrase, it should seek to "grow up."Stephen M. Gardiner Stephen M. Gardiner is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Program on Values in Society at the... (shrink)

The dissertation puts forwards the theoretical foundations for an alternative to the traditional egoist interpretation of eudaimonism, the ethical theory associated with ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle. The first section builds a case for looking for such an alternative by arguing that the connection between egoism and eudaimonism posited by the traditional view is more complex than usually thought, and so requires more defense than usually thought. The second section suggests a way of generating a nonegoistic account. Characteristic claims (...) the eudaimonist makes about there being a single ultimate end to human action make sense if they are understood in light of what I call our `basic metaphysical position'. This position constitutes the framework within which action occurs for us, and generates rational constraints on the kinds of action we should perform. In particular, it captures a sense in which our position is fundamentally agent-centered. The final section discusses a dilemma faced by this agent-centered eudaimonism which makes its requirements seem excessively demanding. It is suggested that one way to overcome this dilemma emerges from a new reading of Aristotle's theory of the virtues. This strengthens the eudaimonist credentials of agent-centered eudaimonism. (shrink)

Realism has traditionally been a philosophical doctrine embodying an ontological element asserting the existence of various types of entities and a meta-theoretic element asserting that the existence of those entities is independent of our knowledge of their existence. Anti-realism, on the other hand, denies that the existence of objects is independent of our knowledge. ;Recently, attempts have been made to reinterpret the basic realist/anti-realist dispute in semantic terms. Basically, realism would be the view that the truth of sentences are independent (...) of our knowledge of their truth-values. Anti-realism, on the other hand, would hold that truth is not so independent of our knowledge. ;Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam have presented two of the most famous extended semantic criticisms of metaphysical realism. Dummett argues that realism is committed to an unacceptable theory of meaning. Putnam argues that realism rests upon incoherent assumptions regarding truth and reference. ;Unlike many commentators, I accept basic Dummettian constraints. I argue, however, that his conclusions do not follow. Not only can the semantic realist conform to his constraints, a realist construal of truth is in fact ineliminable in such an account. Thus, I turn Dummett's framework against its own conclusions. ;Regarding Putnam, I proceed by rejecting his premises. I show that the arguments he constructs do not support the claim of incoherence levelled at metaphysical realism. Often, indeed, his arguments, if carefully understood, actually support realism. ;I thus conclude that the two most famous and formidable attempts to reject metaphysical realism on the basis of semantic considerations fail. As such, there is no reason to abandon realism traditionally understood. (shrink)

Inherited disorders of ion‐channels are associated with paroxysmal dysfunction of excitable tissues and manifest as diseases of the brain, heart and skeletal muscle. These so‐called channelopathies have now been described for most of the major categories of voltage‐dependent ion‐channels including those selectively permeable to sodium. Sodium channelopathies affecting the heart and brain are reviewed in this essay. They show striking differences and similarities including, for example, their responsiveness to changes in body temperature and sleep state. They represent a paradigm for (...) efforts to trace disturbed behaviour of physiological systems back to its molecular origins and understanding their molecular basis may provide clues to important health issues such as cardiac side effects of drugs and response to medication used to treat epilepsy. BioEssays 25:981–993, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

forthcoming in reisner and steglich-peterson, eds., Reasons for Belief If I believe, for no good reason, that P and I infer (correctly) from this that Q, I don’t think we want to say that I ‘have’ P as evidence for Q. Only things that I believe (or could believe) rationally, or perhaps, with justification, count as part of the evidence that I have. It seems to me that this is a good reason to include an epistemic acceptability constraint on evidence (...) possessed…1 It is a truism that adopting an unjustified belief does not put you in a better evidential position with respect to believing its consequences. This truism has led many philosophers to assume that there must, at a minimum, be a justification condition (and perhaps even a knowledge condition) on what it takes to count as having evidence. This is the best (or only) possible explanation of the truism, these philosophers have believed. This paper explores an alternative explanation for the truism. According to the alternative explanation that I will offer, unjustified beliefs do not put you in a better evidential position with respect to believing their consequences because any evidence you have in virtue of having an unjustified belief is guaranteed to be defeated. Since the lack of justification for a belief guarantees its defeat, I will suggest, we don't need to postulate a special justification condition (much less a knowledge condition) on what it takes to count as having evidence. Why is this important? It is important because the assumption that there must be a justification condition (or perhaps a knowledge condition) on what it takes to count as having evidence places a high bar on what it takes to have evidence - such a high bar that it is difficult to see how this bar could be met in the case of basic, perceptually justified beliefs. As a result, the high bar set by this condition plays a fundamental role, I will claim, in central features of a core dialectic from the epistemology of basic perceptual belief which plays a central role in the debates between internalism and externalism, foundationalism and coherentism, and rationalism and empiricism.. (shrink)

John Hawthorne has two forceful arguments in favour of:Single-Premise Closure Necessarily, if S knows p, competently deduces q from p, and thereby comes to believe q, while retaining knowledge of p throughout, then S knows q.Each of Hawthorne's arguments rests on an intuitively appealing principle which Hawthorne calls the Equivalence Principle. I show, however, that the opponents of SPC with whom he's engaging - namely Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick - have independent reason to reject this principle, and resultantly conclude (...) that Hawthorne's arguments in favour of SPC are not knock-down. (shrink)

Recently, I argued against framing geoengineering—understood here in terms of the paradigm example of stratospheric sulfate injection ('SSI')—as a global public good. My main claim was that this framing is seriously misleading because of its neglect of central ethical concerns. I also suggested that 'global public good' is best understood as an umbrella term covering a cluster of distinct, but interrelated ideas. In an effort to be charitable, I adopted an inclusive approach, considering two general attitudes to the technical definition, (...) six interpretations of the universal benefit claim, three of nonrivalness, and two of nonexcudability. I then argued that SSI as such does not fit the canonical definition, and that the more relaxed versions are unhelpful. Noticing that I agree that SSI is a global public good in one relaxed sense, David Morrow insists that this is the only acceptable interpretation, that describing SSI in this way is useful, and that it becomes misleading only when the concept is misunderstood by "non-economists", and that it is uncharitable to attribute such confusion to those presenting SSI as a global public good. I will suggest that Morrow's markedly exclusive approach is uncharitable, that his relaxed interpretation remains unhelpful, that there are good reasons to respect other uses, and most importantly that the definitional dispute is an unfortunate distraction that leaves my central point about the framing of SSI largely untouched. This discussion reinforces my suggestion that it is time to excise the term 'global public good' from the framing of SSI, and perhaps more generally. (shrink)

One of the key concepts in autonomist Marxism is the ‘general intellect’. As capitalism develops, labour and its products become increasingly ‘immaterial’, inasmuch as the physical side of production is taken over by automated systems. The result is that all aspects of the collective worker's affective, desiring and cognitive capabilities are now brought to bear on production itself. This problematises capitalistic notions of proprietary control, because it raises the possibility that the mass ‘cognitive worker’, and the inherently co-operative principles it (...) embodies, can detach itself from neoliberal mechanisms of subsumption and valorisation and lay the foundation for a new communalistic ethos. What is intriguing is that several autonomists evoke the work of Mikhail Bakhtin vis-à-vis the ‘general intellect’. Bakhtin did maintain that dialogism is an irreducibly collective phenomenon, and that we all contribute to the continuous making and remaking of language. We do not ‘own’ the words we use; as such, meaning is necessarily plural and heterogeneous, the product of the interaction of many texts and voices that can only be pragmatically and contingently unified. The present article seeks to explore the connection between Bakhtin and autonomism, focusing on the insight that communication is always ‘more than myself’, and hence integral to the ‘social brain’ that is a shared legacy, our ‘commonwealth’. It also raises the possibility of a more ‘troublesome’ Bakhtin than is generally countenanced by the liberal academy, and a concomitantly ‘dangerous’ dialogism that haunts a digitalised and networked world marked in equal measure by tremendous emancipatory promise and catastrophic threat. (shrink)

The global financial crisis beginning in 2008 has encouraged the revitalization of a wide spectrum of leftist theorizing, but arguably the most audacious is that of ‘accelerationism’. Left-accelerationism sees the intensification of certain tendencies in late capitalist society as a way to escape its gravitational orbit and ‘repurpose’ the very material infrastructure of capitalism itself, to universally emancipatory ends. The central task here is to engage accelerationism with a thinker of the post-Autonomist tradition, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi. Contrary to Williams and (...) Srnicek, co-authors of the #Accelerate manifesto, Bifo asserts that acceleration per se only augments the power and dynamism of capital, and posits instead a ‘post-politics’ of ironic detachment, aesthetic cultivation, and ‘therapy’. Contrasting Bifo and accelerationism clarifies each of their assumptions and core arguments, and points the way to a more nuanced perspective on these issues, in a contemporaneous moment marked in equal measure by inestimable threat and liberatory promise. (shrink)

This book does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and it argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question (so, more specifically, the book argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects—or material objects of any other kind). Second, the book explains how these non-factualist (...) views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and it explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view is that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions—call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.—such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn’t say anything about reality and, if it’s true, isn’t made true by reality. (shrink)

Several axiom systems for preference among acts lead to a unique probability and a state-independent utility such that acts are ranked according to their expected utilities. These axioms have been used as a foundation for Bayesian decision theory and subjective probability calculus. In this article we note that the uniqueness of the probability is relative to the choice of whatcounts as a constant outcome. Although it is sometimes clear what should be considered constant, in many cases there are several possible (...) choices. Each choice can lead to a different "unique" probability and utility. By focusing attention on statedependent utilities, we determine conditions under which a truly unique probability and utility can be determined from an agent's expressed preferences among acts. Suppose that an agent's preference can be represented in terms of a probability P and a utility U.That is, the agent prefers one act to another iff the expected utility of that act is higher than that of the other. There are many other equivalent representations in terms of probabilities Q, which are mutually absolutely continuous with P, and state-dependent utilities V, which differ from U by possibly different positive affine transformations in each state of nature. We describe an example in which there are two different but equivalent state-independent utility representations for the same preference structure. They differ in which acts count as constants. The acts involve receiving different amounts of one or the other of two currencies, and the states are different exchange rates between the currencies. It is easy to see how it would not be possible for constant amounts of both currencies to have simultaneously constant values across the differentstates. Savage (1954, sec. 5.5) discovered a situation in which two seemingly equivalent preference structures are represented by different pairs of probability and utility. He attributed the phenomenon to the construction of a "small world." We show that the small world problem is just another example of two different, but equivalent, representations treating different actsas constants. Finally, we prove a theorem (similar to one of Karni 1985) that shows how to elicit a unique state-dependent utility and does not assume that there are prizes with constant value. To do this, we define a new hypothetical kind of act in which both the prize to be awarded and the state of nature are determined by an auxiliary experiment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Schopenhauer's Pessimism and the Unconditioned Good MARK MIGOTTI SCHOPENHAUERTOOK PESSIMISMtO be a profound doctrine that had long been accepted by the majority of humanity, albeit usually in the allegorical form given to it by one or another religious creed. Accordingly, he credited himself, not with the discovery of pessimism, but with the provision of a satisfactory philosophical exposition and defense of its claims. It was, he contended, only (...) within the context of his philosophy, animated by the "single thought" that "the world is the self-knowledge of the will,"' that the ultimate significance of pessimism and the arguments demonstrating its inescapability can be brought to light. If, nevertheless, he sometimes appears to protest too much, to defend pessimism as if it were a striking and novel affair, he would have attributed this to the fact that he was, unfortunately, writing in the midst of one of the most naively optimistic cultures known to world history. 2 The philosophical reception of Schopenhauer's pessimism since the publication of The World as Will and Representation in 1818 would, one suspects, have been taken by him as further evidence of modern Western philosophy's optimistic somnambulance. For while other, comparably fundamental aspects of his thought--for example, his theories of action, of the self, and his criticisms of Kant--have received a welcome amount of fruitful, critical attention, his I would like to thank John Atwell, David Schmidtz, Susan Haack, Rudolf Makkreel and, especially,two anonymous referees, for prompting me to make substantial improvements to an earlier draft of this paper. ' Arthur Schopenhauer, Der handschrifllicher Nachlass 1, ed. Arthur Hiibscher (Frankfurt-amMain : Kramer, 1967),462; Manuscript Remains 1, trans. E. F.J. Payne(NewYork: Berg Publishing, 1988), 512. 'See, for example, Arthur Schopenhauer, D/e Welt als Wille und VorsteUung II. In Arthur Schopenhauer. Ziircher Ausgabe, ed. Arthur Hiibscher et. al. (Zurich: DiogenesVerlag, 1977),w 4:721, 732-33; The World as Will and Representation II, trans. E. F. J. Payne(New York: Dover Press, 1969),615, 625-26. Future references to this work willbe made within the text, by the abbreviation WW followed by section number, German edition volume and page number and English translation page number. [643] 644 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 pessimism has not. Amongst enthusiastic followers it has sometimes been swallowed more or less whole, but from more independent-minded readers it has generally met with disdainful mockery or well-intentioned neglect.3 The aim of this paper is to help rectify' this imbalance. In the first of its four sections, I present an account of Schopenhauerian pessimism that can claim a good measure of textual support, and the essential features of which are found often enough in the secondary literature to warrant calling it the mainstream interpretation.4 In section 2 I show that, as critics have charged, the arguments for pessimism on this interpretation suffer from a pair of fatal ambiguities, and in section 3 I sketch an alternative argument for pessimism, one not so obviously open to the sort of knock-down refutation to which the first argument succumbs. In the paper's final section l explore further the philosophical consequences of this alternative argument for pessimism. 3Gyorg'yLukacs, "Schopenhauer," chapter ~,section 4 of The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1979), 19~-243, isthe locusclassicusof an attitude of superior scorn. Bryan Magee, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer (Oxford: "the Clarendon Press, 1983), z3-14, D. W. Hamlyn, Schopentmuer (London: Routledge, z98o), *43, Michael Fox, "Schopenhauer on Death, Suicide, and Renunciation." in Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement, ed. Michael Fox (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books, 198o), ]47-7o, and David Cartwrigh*, "Schopenhauer on Suffering, Death, Guilt, and the Consolation of Metaphysics,"in Schopenhauer: New Essays in Hotwr ofHis 2ooth Birthday, ed. Eric yon der Luft (Lewiston,NY: Edwin Mellen Press, t988), 66, all incline to the viewthat it was temperament, not argument, that drove Schopenhauer to pessimism, while Patrick Gardiner, Schopenhatwr (London: Penguin Books, ]963), does not discuss pessimism by name. Not even Nietzsche, the deepest and most astute of Schopenhauer'scritics,can resistbarbs of the following sort: "Schopenhauer, although a pessimist, in ]act played the flute... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:preface This special issue of Feminist Studies presents an eclectic view of women ’s friendships from across Western history and from several different cultures. Several of the articles question whether identity or sameness is a prerequisite for friendship and ask what friendships across difference look like, including charting the difficulties of making and sustaining such friendships. The articles in this issue contrast the variety and functions of women’s friendships (...) with the narcissistic masculinist ideals of classical Western thought about friendship in which friends serve as reflections of a person—typically a male and upper-class person. The authors in this issue present women’s friendships that are more pragmatic and more vulnerable and that contend more fully with difference. Some authors reflect on the high expectations placed on friendship within Second Wave feminism in the United States, noting how competition and feelings of betrayal can suffuse friendships; others trace more autonomous, productive, and forgiving contemporary visions of friendship. The issue opens with Susan Van Dyne’s archival study of student friendships in a pioneering US women’s college, revealing how love, flirtation, and desire between women was expressed in Smith College’s class of 1883. In another historical study, sociologist Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen contrasts the narratives of Norwegian girls and young women from the late nineteenth century with those of present-day women and girls, noting differences between rural and urban contexts. Ivy Schweitzer 272Preface surveys classical Western masculinist ideals of friendship from Aristotle to Montaigne and traces the transformation of this tradition into the present quest for equality without hierarchy. Alexandra Verini addresses models of female friendship in the European Middle Ages, arguing that Christine de Pizan and Margery Kempe illustrate a “viable female alternative ” to classical models. The vulnerability of women’s close relationships comes to the fore in Nancy K. Miller’s moving elegies for deceased feminist friends, while Judith Taylor explores the more open and autonomous friendships adumbrated in contemporary fictions by Zadie Smith and Jillian and Mariko Tamaki, themes also addressed in Judith Kegan Gardiner’s review essay of advice books on friendships between women and other studies of women’s friendships. Richa Nagar’s interview articulates an ideal of feminist friendships that “enable continuous evolution of our beings and mindsets... without feeling threatened by one another.” If our articles focus on the close bonds between women, our News and Views pieces in this issue point to collective ties formed in response to political and social threats: Dalia Abd El-Hameed and Nadine Naber describe responses by Egyptian feminists to government crackdowns, and our forum “Orlando: Observances” offers a selection of first-person accounts from vigils organized to mark the massacre at the Pulse nightclub this summer. This issue also presents internal negotiations of identity, identification, and body image in Stephanie Han’s short story and in the vivid and bold transgressions of Wangechi Mutu’s collages as described by Sarah Jane Cervenak. In “‘Abracadabra’: Intimate Inventions by Early College Women,” Susan Van Dyne takes us on a fascinating journey into the “the early formation of a homosocial student culture and the bonds between women” at Smith College in the late nineteenth century. Mining an archive of diaries, letters, photos, and other materials from a group of friends from the class of 1883, she focuses on two kinds of written evidence: one, the inchoate expressions of homoerotic desire in one student’s journal at a moment when “lesbian” did not yet exist as an identity, and the other, a love poem to two students, written as a parody by one of their women professors, but which reverberated beyond the college and ignited male opprobrium. In her discussions of these developments, rather than ascribing identity, Van Dyne navigates the “messiness” of the archive, keeping her eye trained on the “only partially intelligible strategies of self-representation that can’t be translated or reduced to the modern Preface 273 language of sexual self-recognition.” What is most surprising in her account is not that young women would feel desire for one another, nor that male peers or authorities might find this threatening, but that the fabric of the students’ homosocial community had such resilience, nurturing... (shrink)