Through the summer and fall of 1989, Hegel scholars in America were treated to the unusual spectacle of a debate in the mass media over the meaning and truth of Hegel’s philosophy of history, a debate running through the pages of major daily newspapers, the weekly news magazines, and the journals of opinion. The occasion for this unaccustomed attention devoted to Hegel was the appearance of an article by Francis Fukuyama in the Summer 1989 issue of The National Interest entitled (...) “The End of History?”. (shrink)

This past February 22–24, the University of Virginia held a specially arranged conference on the subject of “Fukuyama and the End of History.” Invitations were extended to philosophers, historians, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and literary critics, with the host university contributing a number a speakers. Each person attending the conference received a copy of Francis Fukuyama’s well known article, “The End of History?” from The National Interest, 16 : 3–18, and Fukuyama himself was expected to attend. At the last minute (...) the organizers learned of the existence of Philip Grier’s “The End of History, and the Return of History,” which would within the next few weeks appear in The Owl, 21, 2 : 131–144. Upon receiving it, and the permission of the Editor of The Owl, the organizers decided to provide an advance copy of this article to everyone attending, along with the Fukuyama piece, so that the controversy over the latter’s possible mis-appropriation of Hegel would be a theme for discussion from the outset. (shrink)

This past February 22–24, the University of Virginia held a specially arranged conference on the subject of “Fukuyama and the End of History.” Invitations were extended to philosophers, historians, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and literary critics, with the host university contributing a number a speakers. Each person attending the conference received a copy of Francis Fukuyama’s well known article, “The End of History?” from The National Interest, 16 : 3–18, and Fukuyama himself was expected to attend. At the last minute (...) the organizers learned of the existence of Philip Grier’s “The End of History, and the Return of History,” which would within the next few weeks appear in The Owl, 21, 2 : 131–144. Upon receiving it, and the permission of the Editor of The Owl, the organizers decided to provide an advance copy of this article to everyone attending, along with the Fukuyama piece, so that the controversy over the latter’s possible mis-appropriation of Hegel would be a theme for discussion from the outset. (shrink)

This translation from Russian of The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity marks the first appearance in English of any of the works of Russian philosopher Ivan Aleksandrovich Il’in. Originally published in 1918, on the eve of the Russian civil war, this two- volume commentary on Hegel marked both an apogee of Russian Silver Age philosophy and a significant manifestation of the resurgence of interest in Hegel that began in the early twentieth century. (...) Il’in’s colleague A. F. Losev accurately observed in the same year it appeared: “Neither the study of Hegel nor the study of contemporary Russian philosophical thought is any longer thinkable without this book of I. A. Il’in’s.” Some Hegel scholars may know this work through the abridged translation into German that Il’in produced himself in 1946. However, that edition omitted most of the original volume two. Noted Hegel scholar Philip T. Grier’s edition—with an introduction setting Il’in’s work in its proper historical, cultural, and philosophical contexts and annotation throughout—represents the first opportunity for non-Russian-speaking readers to acquaint themselves with the full scope of Il’in’s still provocative interpretation of Hegel. (shrink)

The publication of volume 2 of Philip T. Grier’s translation of _The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity _completes the first appearance in English of any of the works of Russian philosopher I. A.Il’in. Most of the contents of volume 2 will be unknown even to those who have read the 1946 German version prepared by Il’in, because in that version he omitted eight of the original ten chapters. These omitted chapters (...) provide an extended reflection on the central categories of Hegel’s moral, legal, and political philosophies, as well as of the philosophy of history. The topics examined are, in order: freedom, humanity, will, right, morality, ethical life, personhood and its virtue, and the state. Contained within these chapters are some notably insightful expositions of core doctrines in Hegel’s philosophy. Il’in’s colleague A. F. Losev accurately observed in the same year the text first appeared: “Neither the study of Hegel nor the study of contemporary Russian philosophical thought is any longer thinkable without this book of I. A. Il’in’s.”. (shrink)

As a young Victoria Scholar from South Africa studying at Oxford from 1931–33, Errol Harris encountered most of the prominent representatives of “Oxford Idealism” there. He discovered that, predominantly under the influence of Bradley, they were uniformly convinced that Hegel’s Naturphilosophie was a superfluous “addition” to his system, accomplishing nothing not already provided by the Science of Logic, and that, moreover, to treat Nature as a reality would introduce a fundamental contradiction into Hegel’s thought. In this general attitude they were (...) strongly supported by the Italian “neo-Idealists” with whom they were closely engaged. In work accomplished during those two years, Harris laid the foundations for a thorough reversal of this attitude, arguing that in the absence of a philosophy of nature Hegel’s system could be neither coherent nor complete. On this basis Harris would eventually succeed in constructing the outlines of a complete cosmology grounded in twentieth-century physical theory. (shrink)

This volume contains ten original essays by leading philosophers in America, Britain and Europe, all addressed to the dialectical holist philosophical position developed by the contemporary philosopher Errol Harris; it also contains an extensive introduction outlining and defending the general contours of that position. It serves not only as a Festschrift for Professor Harris, but also as a comprehensive, critical exposition of the neo-Hegelian system of philosophical thought for which Harris is widely known, a position which is attracting the particular (...) interest of contemporary physical cosmologists and philosophers of science, as well as that of other metaphysicians and students of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Continuing the exploration of a theme that has figured prominently in previous issues of this journal, articles translated for the present issue illuminate various aspects of the fate of philosophy in twentieth-century Russia. The development of philosophy in Russia has encountered extraordinary institutional obstacles for nearly two centuries. Following the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, the tsarist authorities banned the teaching of philosophy in university classrooms as a potential source of revolutionary ideas. The ban was partially modified in 1863 only to (...) permit commentary on certain specified texts of ancient philosophy and was not lifted until 1889. During the 1920s, the Bolsheviks in authority gradually enforced increasingly strict ideological controls on the teaching and publishing of philosophy, so that by the early 1930s no doctrine other than the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy could be taught or advocated in print. (shrink)

Semioticians traditionally honor Russian linguistics of the early 20th century, and study Jakobson, Vinogradov, Vinokur or the early Trubetzkoy. They do, however, seldom consider Russian philosophers of the same period. Gustav Shpet is an important representative of Russian philosophers in discussion with Hegel, Neo-Kantian thinkers and contemporaries in Russia and abroad, among them Edmund Husserl, originator of transcendental phenomenology. Shpet introduced Husserl’s phenomenology in Russia and expanded those ideas in his 1914 Appearance and Sense. A triangle “Hegel—Husserl—semiotics” emerged where Shpet (...) emphasized the concept of discourse in phenomenology: a philosophical challenge to modern semiotics. (shrink)

The Hegel Society of America sponsored two sessions at the recent World Congress in Boston. The first, chaired by Riccardo Pozzo, consisted of three papers on the theme of "Hegel and Paideia," reflecting the general theme of the Congress. The second, chaired by Allen Speight, was a "Book Session" on Hegel's Ladder by Henry Harris - formally speaking, a critical discussion of the work; informally speaking, a public celebration of the appearance of this long-awaited masterwork.

Contributors draw on Hegel’s account of identity and difference to challenge conventional theories of identity.

_Contributors draw on Hegel’s account of identity and difference to challenge conventional theories of identity._.

This chapter discusses two of Ilyin’s major philosophical works : The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity and The Essence of Legal Consciousness. Both are placed against the background of defining events in the often-difficult circumstances of Ilyin’s life. Ilyin provided a substantial exposition, interpretation, and critique of the whole of Hegel’s philosophy. While many elements of that exposition and interpretation deserve commendation, his critique fails in fundamental respects. Ilyin was formally educated in (...) the Faculty of Law of Moscow University, with special concentration on the history of philosophy and philosophy of law. The writing of his major work on legal philosophy stretched over much of his adult life, and was published only after his death. It focused on the concept of pravosoznanie, loosely translatable as “legal consciousness.” The work is a passionate defense of the necessity for the rule of law in any genuine state, and a detailed account of the likely consequences in practice of any corruption of that ideal—with historical examples drawn mainly from his own lifetime. (shrink)

The governing theme in Hegel’s account of the history of religions is the gradual emergence and separation of spirit from nature, culminating in the “infinite” transcendence of spirit over nature. Within the story of spirit itself, however, a more subtle and complex problem arises: the possible transcendence of infinite over finite spirit, of divine over human nature. Hegel firmly insisted that divine and human nature are one, a unity, thereby apparently ruling out the possibility of a transcendence of one over (...) the other. And yet, it is not easy to dismiss the notion that infinite spirit must nevertheless in some respects transcend finite spirit. The remainder of the essay attempts to tease apart several aspects of this problem, exploring possible senses of ‘transcendence’ that might be maintained, without violating Hegel’s central and profound theological claim. (shrink)

Robert R. Williams’s last book, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God (Oxford University Press, 2017) undertakes to reconnect with and revive the largely forgotten “centrist” interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy from the early 1840s, associated especially with the work of Karl Michelet. An immediate consequence of this move is to direct renewed attention to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and his philosophy of religion. Taking this connection seriously appears to entail a re-interpretation of the absolute idea, adding an (...) explicit level of theological significance to it in retrospect which would not appear to be required when the Logic is read on its own. And yet the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion unambiguously seem to require such a re-reading of the Logic. Such a development may appear to raise questions about the possibility of a “presuppositionless” reading of the Logic, along with questions about how the truth claims of the Realphilosophie can be justified. A possible resolution of such questions could be found if one takes seriously George di Giovanni’s suggestion that the Logic must be regarded both as the first element of Hegel’s system, and also the final one. The appropriateness of such a second reading appears to be strongly supported by Errol Harris’s interpretation of the Logic. The additional layers of meaning, the theological interpretation, can be read into the Logic as the final element of the system, without affecting a “presuppositionless” reading of it as the first element. (shrink)

Robert R. Williams’s last book, Hegel on the Proofs and the Personhood of God undertakes to reconnect with and revive the largely forgotten “centrist” interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy from the early 1840s, associated especially with the work of Karl Michelet. An immediate consequence of this move is to direct renewed attention to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and his philosophy of religion. Taking this connection seriously appears to entail a re-interpretation of the absolute idea, adding an explicit level of theological (...) significance to it in retrospect which would not appear to be required when the Logic is read on its own. And yet the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion unambiguously seem to require such a re-reading of the Logic. Such a development may appear to raise questions about the possibility of a “presuppositionless” reading of the Logic, along with questions about how the truth claims of the Realphilosophie can be justified. A possible resolution of such questions could be found if one takes seriously George di Giovanni’s suggestion that the Logic must be regarded both as the first element of Hegel’s system, and also the final one. The appropriateness of such a second reading appears to be strongly supported by Errol Harris’s interpretation of the Logic. The additional layers of meaning, the theological interpretation, can be read into the Logic as the final element of the system, without affecting a “presuppositionless” reading of it as the first element. (shrink)

The three papers published in this number of the Owl of Minerva provide a series of reflections upon the theme of Bildung in Hegel's philosophy. The first, by Jeffrey Reid, explores two contrasting conceptions of Bildung involved in the founding and earliest years of the University of Berlin. The first conception, espoused and developed by Fichte, Humboldt, and Schleiermacher treats Bildung as a spontaneous, natural instinct toward self-development, visible above all in the form of genius, attributed to individuals or to (...) nations. Reid connects this notion of Bildung in significant measure with the Sturm und Drang movement. Hegel opposed to it a very different conception of Bildung resting ultimately upon his distinction between nature and spirit. In Hegel's usage, Bildung refers to the process of development whereby the merely natural individual is transcended, raised to the level of spirit as a member of a moral community, or citizen of an ethical state. As Reid points out, these two conceptions of Bildung have conflicting implications for the role of the university, especially in relation to the state, and the choice between them remains a significant one today. (shrink)

The life and thought of Vladimir Solov’ëv have long fascinated students of Russian culture. Poet, philosopher, mystic, theologian, scholar, humorist, theosopher, ecclesiologist—a tale of Solov’ëv’s very considerable influence could be told by focusing on any single one of these terms. Attempting to encompass all of them at once in a grand summation of the significance of his life is a thoroughly daunting task. Perhaps it will never be accomplished to general satisfaction in a single work, which might partly explain the (...) steadily expanding stream of articles and monographs in several languages devoted to the study of this remarkable figure. Nemeth, perhaps wisely, declines any attempt to... (shrink)

Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism. By Andrzej Walicki. A History of Russian Philosophy, Edited by Valery A. Kuvakin.

If nothing else, Francis Fukuyama seems to have identified one of the more effective conversational gambits of recent memory. The apparently earnest declaration that history has ended seems to have an irresistible power to call forth commentary from all quarters. More than six years have passed since the publication of Fukuyama’s original article, and four years since the publication of his book on the same theme, The End of History and the Last Man, and the commentary still continues.

Wood has produced an important commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right which should be welcomed as a lucid and learned discussion of many aspects of Hegel’s ethical thought. The numerous virtues of Wood’s account clearly outweigh its few but definite flaws, and I suspect it will be widely used as a sophisticated introduction to the subject, though, one hopes, used with appropriate caveats.

Wood has produced an important commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right which should be welcomed as a lucid and learned discussion of many aspects of Hegel’s ethical thought. The numerous virtues of Wood’s account clearly outweigh its few but definite flaws, and I suspect it will be widely used as a sophisticated introduction to the subject, though, one hopes, used with appropriate caveats.

Professor Kainz offers, in the comparatively brief space of just over 100 pages, a very rich series of observations, analyses, interpretations, and suggestions concerning the nature of paradox in the history of philosophy, dialectic as a form of thought involving paradox, and system in Hegel. The over-all tone of the work is tentative, suggestive, inviting us to travel along some particular paths of speculation as to the nature of paradox and its connection with dialectic, not arguing for a definitive analysis (...) of either. Nevertheless there are also some compact summaries of the structure of the Phenomenology which clearly presupposed much painstaking interpretive labor. (shrink)