The monumental works of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat have set a firm pattern of interpretation which many follow in their approach to the Philosophy of Leibniz. In the Preface to the second edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz , Russell reaffirms his contention that “Leibniz’s philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic”. He welcomes the support provided in Couturat’s La Logique de Leibniz . Russell remarks “No candid reader—can doubt that Leibniz’s metaphysic was derived by him from the (...) subject-predicate logic. This appears, for example, from the paper ‘Primae Veritates’ where all the main doctrines of the Monadology are deduced, with terse logical rigor from the premises; ‘Always therefore the predicate or consequent adheres in the subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the nature of truth in general—But this is true in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent’.” Referring further to Couturat, he points out that in his book the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” and “The Identity of Indiscernibles” are “expressly deduced—from the analytic character of all true propositions”. In short, Russell is contending that in formulating his metaphysics Leibniz used the rigorous methods of deductive logic and employed “models” drawn from logic to construct his “picture of reality”, i.e. his metaphysics. (shrink)

In the Platonic work Alcibiades I, a divinely guided Socrates adopts the guise of a lover in order to divert Alcibiades from an unthinking political career. The contributors to this carefully focussed volume cover aspects of the background to the work; its arguments and the philosophical issues it raises; its relationship to other Platonic texts, and its subsequent history up to the time of the Neoplatonists. Despite its ancient prominence, the authorship of Alcibiades I is still unsettled; the essays and (...) two appendices, one historical and one stylometric, come together to suggest answers to this tantalising question. (shrink)

Some recent discussions of A. N. Whitehead's treatment of the problem of value have stressed the point that his work in this field is open to serious objection. For example, Professor John Goheen claims that Whitehead's attempt to indicate distinguishing characteristics of experience of “the Good”, is too general to be adequate. He also suggests that this generality of approach makes it impossible for Whitehead to differentiate between different species of value. Further, according to Goheen, Whitehead involves himself in confusion (...) when he claims that satisfaction is achieved when experience is characterized by order ; and yet he also suggests that in some cases, the presence of disorder makes possible a higher type of satisfaction. Professor P. A. Schilpp agrees with Goheen in feeling that Whitehead's explanation of the good life in terms of “pattern” is too vague. In Schilpp's opinion, Whitehead does not answer the basic question: “What kind of pattern?” There is a further objection to Whitehead's “theory of the close connection between morality and beauty,” because at times it looks like an actual identification. Schilpp also objects to what appears to be Whitehead's identification of “good” with “interest”. Finally, it is claimed by Schilpp that Whitehead subordinates goodness to beauty. This interpretation is apparently supported by Prof. George Morgan who states: “Truth and moral values are instrumental except in so far as they enhance beauty.” Professor B. Morris objects to Whitehead's attempt to apply the mathematical method to aesthetic experience. He suggests that the method of symbolic logic is too abstract to deal adequately with concrete aesthetic data. Professor J. W. Blyth, as the result of his examination of Whitehead's theory of truth, reaches the conclusion that “the various elements involved in Whitehead's theory of truth cannot be brought together in one coherent and consistent system. (shrink)

There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, concerning a visit made by Alfred North Whitehead to the University of Virginia. He drove from the station to the campus in a horse drawn vehicle under the guidance of a garrulous “darkie”. Said the driver, “Are you a traveller?” “Yes”, replied Whitehead. … long silence …. “What do you sell?”. “Wit and wisdom”, replied Whitehead. … long silence. … At the end of the drive the darkie remarked, “I've never seen a traveller before (...) who wouldn't show me some of his goods.”. (shrink)

It is true that Hartshorne apparently softens the impact of his criticism by the word "rather." However, the accused begs leave to defend himself against the charge of being arbitrary and of perpetrating a misdeed.

Unfortunately Beer is guilty of serious misunderstandings of Whitehead's metaphysics. This vitiates a promising project and mars an otherwise effective discussion of political theory.

Whitehead's philosophy of civilization is discussed in this book. noting that this aspect of whitehead's philosophy is less well known and appreciated than his work in mathematics and metaphysics, the author presents it as "an impressive treatment of the meaning and values of civilization." actually the book presents whitehead's views on western christian civilization rather than on civilization "per se", as discerned in "a series of insights," rather than by "detailed systematic presentation." since whitehead wrote no treatise exclusively on this (...) topic, this book draws from "science and the modern world", "process and reality", "adventures in ideas", and articles written by him after 1925. the final chapter relates whitehead's philosophy of civilization to his "highly technical terminology" and "demonstrates that whitehead's main ideas in his philosophy of civilization are in accordance with his metaphysics--, i.e., his theory of reality." one chapter discusses various criticisms of whitehead. (bp). (shrink)

This article is an attempt to: outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.