In this book, internationally recognized scholars in philosophical hermeneutics discuss various aspects of language and linguisticality. The translations of Hans-Georg Gadamer's two recent essays provoke a preliminary discussion on the philosopher's polemic claim in Truth and Method—"Being that can be understood is language." Topics addressed by the contributors include the relationship of rituals to tradition and the immemorial; the unity of the word; conversation; translation and conceptuality; and the interrelationship between the art of writing and linguisticality. This work is of (...) critical importance to anyone interested in Gadamer's claims regarding the boundaries of language, the transition from the prelinguistic to linguistic realms, and the role of rituals in this transition. (shrink)

Socrates et Platon sont à l'origine de ce qu'on entend traditionnellement par raison - les philosophes qui cherchent la façon juste de vivre qui dépasse la sagesse conventionnelle. 'Jérusalem' fait référence à la foi dont l'origine est l'appel de Dieu à Abraham, le père commun des religions juive, chrétienne et musulmane, et qui se rapporte à la transformation que Dieu offre à l'humanité qu'il sanctifie. Il a fallu attendre le XIIe siècle et l'entrée des oeuvres philosophiques d'Aristote dans l'Occident latin (...) pour que Thomas d'Aquin initie une réconciliation entre la foi et la raison. Le présent article examine la pensée thomiste à ce sujet et son évolution jusqu'à nos jours. (shrink)

This paper sets forth and advocates Bernard Lonergan’s understanding of Aquinas’s use of “intelligible emanations” as an analogy for processions in the Trinity. It argues that some of Lonergan’s views on consciousness, understanding, phronesis, and judgement are similar to views expressed in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method and John Henry Newman’s An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.

Each human being is the best judge of what is most conducive to his or her own self-preservation, whether this be considered strictly as security of mere life, or as comfortable self-preservation, or as the pursuit of happiness. Liberty is just a means to this end, but a means so necessary, so pervasive, so paramount, that it most resembles an end in itself. The ambiguity of modern liberty—this oscillation between end and means—may be a theoretical liability or weakness, but it (...) largelyaccounts for its prodigious dynamism. (shrink)

For two and a half millennia readers of Aristotle have been struggling to understand just what sort of causation is being attributed to the Prime Unmoved Mover or PM, whether final or efficient, assuming that this supreme being could not be a material cause or even a formal cause of the entire cosmos. Fred Miller entered into this still ongoing debate with a fresh proposal, drawing on an almost incidental remark in GC 1.6.323a25-33 that was later picked up by (...) Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle’s text. The fundamental question is whether the PM’s causal role is to be restricted to a case of final causation or is there evidence for efficient causation as well? Just how ancient this question of interpretation is can be clearly shown by the following remarks made by Simplicius in the first half of the sixth century in his Neo-Platonist commentary on Phys VIII.6.267b17-26:Simplicius goes on to argue in some detail for this dual picture, primarily because of his harmonizing approach to Plato and Aristotle, but also by referencing some very specific passages in other works—notably Cael, GC, DM—but also Met, albeit only from its first book (1361.11-1363.24). He starts out here by claiming that “[n]o one disputes that Aristotle calls god or the primary mover a final cause” but realizes that showing that the PM is an efficient cause as well needs some textual support, which he dutifully attempts to provide. We will be going over some of the same ground cited here in trying to articulate Aristotle’s conception of divine causation and in particular to decide if Fred Miller’s thoughts about the “untouched toucher” will help us in the overall endeavor to explore Λ.6-10. Since he points out (at p. 278) that the PM could hardly be a material cause or even a formal cause, his framing the issue as to whether the mode of causation here is exclusively efficient or exclusively final, or, on the other hand, both at once, seems very close to how Simplicius set up the problem. Indeed, he cites the same section of Simplicius’s commentary quoted above and finds this ancient perplexity a good jumping off point for his own attempt to shed light on a fundamental issue of interpretation, noting that if we balk at the Neo-Platonic suggestion that Aristotle’s PM “is on a par with Plato’s demiurge,” the question becomes: “in what way is the prime mover supposed to be an efficient cause?” (p. 279). Miller’s novel suggestion is that one way of dealing with this question is the thought that the PM is an “untouched toucher.” It is crucial to his picture that this suggestion is strongly tied to the prospect of finding “a way in which the unmoved mover of the cosmos could be a genuine efficient cause” (p. 287) and not I believe, as W.D. Ross may have held, an efficient cause only by being a final cause. This will become important when we explore what untouched touching would be quite generally, given the emphasis on the psychological dynamics of this sort of affective action as suggested by the everyday examples provided by both Aristotle and Philoponus. (shrink)

I would like to nominate one more principle for initial inclusion in the science of teleonomy. This principle is that the nature of the stimuli that initiate and regulate a response may be no indication of the function of the response.George Williams could not have anticipated the special relevance his principle has for contemporary analyses of representational content. In particular, his principle provides both a concise statement of where a currently popular strategy for naturalizing representational content has gone wrong and (...) a positive suggestion for how we should right this wrong. I characterize the kind of naturalistic analysis of representation I have in mind asbottom-upbecause it seeks to build representation up from a non-intentional, and hence naturalistically unimpeachable, correlation relation. Many authors have suggested such an approach to naturalizing intentionality, but for clarity and completeness perhaps Fred Dretske'sExplaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causesought to be construed as the exemplary source. (shrink)

I would like to nominate one more principle for initial inclusion in the science of teleonomy. This principle is that the nature of the stimuli that initiate and regulate a response may be no indication of the function of the response.George Williams could not have anticipated the special relevance his principle has for contemporary analyses of representational content. In particular, his principle provides both a concise statement of where a currently popular strategy for naturalizing representational content has gone wrong and (...) a positive suggestion for how we should right this wrong. I characterize the kind of naturalistic analysis of representation I have in mind as bottom-up because it seeks to build representation up from a non-intentional, and hence naturalistically unimpeachable, correlation relation. Many authors have suggested such an approach to naturalizing intentionality, but for clarity and completeness perhaps Fred Dretske's Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes ought to be construed as the exemplary source. (shrink)