In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional ac-tion presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An en-dorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by (...) reflecting on the reasons to make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions behind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rationality and intentional action. If I am right, the fact that our intentions can be rationalised is widely misunderstood. Normally, it is taken for granted that the role of rationalisations is to show the reasons that the agent had to make up her mind. I will argue against this. I do not object to the idea that acting intentionally is, at least normally, acting for reasons, (...) but I will propose a teleological reading of the expression ‘for reasons.’ On this reading, it is quite possible to act for reasons without having reasons to act. In a similar way, paradigmatic cases of cogent practical reasoning do not require the transference of justification from the premises to the practical conclusion. (shrink)

Moran's conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.

Moran’s conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.

This volume includes a lucid discussion of recent developments by philosophers such as Block, Davidson, Fodor, Kim, Lewis, Mellor, Putnam, Schiffer, Shoemaker, ...

In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained (...) mental contents could be physically implemented in the way that functional properties are. Therefore, we will examine the metaphysical conditions under which the implementing mechanism of a particular instance of a functional property may be individuated, and see how genuine beliefs and desires—insofar as they track the world—cannot meet such conditions. (shrink)

In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that fine-grained (...) mental contents could be physically implemented in the way that functional properties are. Therefore, we will examine the metaphysical conditions under which the implementing mechanism of a particular instance of a functional property may be individuated, and see how genuine beliefs and desires—insofar as they track the world—cannot meet such conditions. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica - Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies / Revue de l'Association Internationale de Sémiotique Volume: 2014 Issue: 198 Pages: 205-240.

En la gran producció filosòfica d’Eusebi Colomer, s’hi poden distingir tres grans centres d’interès particularment destacats. En primer lloc, la seva dedicació a l’estudi del pensament de Ramon Llull i de Nicolau de Cusa. La seva tesi doctoral va mostrar les influències lul·lianes en l’obra de Nicolau de Cusa a partir de les anotacions autògrafes en què el jove Nicolau es feia ressò de les coses que més li interessaven de Llull. El segon gran centre d’interès el van constituir, naturalment, (...) els grans corrents de la filosofia alemanya moderna i contemporània. Des dels anys d’estudiant s’havia familiaritzat particularment amb l’idealisme, la fenomenologia i la filosofia de l’existència. Finalment, el seu tercer centre d’interès va ser el diàleg filosòfico-teològic. Colomer lamentava profundament el divorci produït entre la filosofia i la teologia. Adaptant una coneguda formulació de Kant, pensava que la teologia sense filosofia és cega, però que la filosofia sense teologia és buida. Format en la tradició metafísica espiritualista i defensor de l’humanisme cristià, Colomer es trobava, però, a les antípodes de qualsevol sectarisme o dogmatisme. La seva formació, el seu tarannà i, segurament, els seus enormes coneixements de la història de la filosofia, li havien conferit una gran capacitat per al diàleg. Ell no veia el diàleg com un recurs o com una tàctica, sinó com un element constitutiu de l’ésser humà. \n. (shrink)

This book explores the philosophical, legal, and theological roots of Western multiculturalism, that is, the encounter and coexistence of different cultures within a liberal society. Rather than concerning themselves with the particulars of cultural dialogue, the authors of this volume go deeper and question the very reality of "multiculturalism" itself. As a whole the volume devotes attention to the origins of human nature, arguing that regardless of how different another person or culture seems to be, universal human experience discloses what (...) it means to be human and to relate to others and to God. The contributors represent different cultures and faith traditions but are united in friendship and in the conviction that the Christian faith enables an authentic approach to long-standing debates on multiculturalism. Contributors: Massimo Borghesi Francesco Botturi Marta Cartabia Carmine Di Martino Pierpaolo Donati Costantino Esposito Stanley Hauerwas Antonio Lopez Francisco Javier Martnez Fernandez John Milbank Javier Prades David L. Schindler Angelo Cardinal Scola Lorenza Violini Joseph H. H. Weiler. (shrink)

In this paper we study the relations between the fragment L of classical logic having just conjunction and disjunction and the variety D of distributive lattices, within the context of Algebraic Logic. We prove that these relations cannot be fully expressed either with the tools of Blok and Pigozzi's theory of algebraizable logics or with the use of reduced matrices for L. However, these relations can be naturally formulated when we introduce a new notion of model of a sequent calculus. (...) When applied to a certain natural calculus for L, the resulting models are equivalent to a class of abstract logics (in the sense of Brown and Suszko) which we call distributive. Among other results, we prove that D is exactly the class of the algebraic reducts of the reduced models of L, that there is an embedding of the theories of L into the theories of the equational consequence (in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi) relative to D, and that for any algebra A of type (2,2) there is an isomorphism between the D-congruences of A and the models of L over A. In the second part of this paper (which will be published separately) we will also apply some results to give proofs with a logical flavour for several new or well-known lattice-theoretical properties. (shrink)

The shortcomings of Merleau-Ponty’s crucial concept of “institution” led him into a turning point where the way out he selected was actually much inferior, as regards the prospects of fulfillment that were latent in his thought, to the alternative path he did not take.

The shortcomings of Merleau-Ponty’s crucial concept of “institution” led him into a turning point where the way out he selected was actually much inferior, as regards the prospects of fulfillment that were latent in his thought, to the alternative path he did not take.

Anàlisi crítica sobre les bases doctrinals de l'ecologisme. Idees i reflexions que trenquen els tòpics més divulgats.

The object of this paper is to make a study of four systems of modal logic (S4, S5, and their intuitionistic analogues IM4 and IM5) with the techniques of the theory of abstract logics set up by Suszko, Bloom, Brown, Verdú and others. The abstract concepts corresponding to such systems are defined as generalizations of the logics naturally associated to their algebraic models (topological Boolean or Heyting algebras, general or semisimple). By considering new suitably defined connectives and by distinguishing between (...) having the rule of necessitation only for theorems or as a full inference rule (which amounts to dealing with all filters or with open filters of the algebras) we are able to reduce the study of a modal (abstract) logic L to that of two nonmodal logics L - and L + associated with L. We find that L is "of IM4 type" if and only if L - and L + are both intuitionistic and have the same theorems, and logics of type S4, IM5 or S5 are obtained from those of type IM4 simply by making classical L -, L + or both. We compare this situation with that found in recent approaches to intuitionistic modal logic using birelational models or using higher-level sequent-systems. The treatment of modal systems with abstract logics is rather new, and in our way to it we find several general constructions and results which can also be applied to other modal systems weaker than those we study in detail. (shrink)

No tenim temps per a res. La família, els amics, l’esport o altres dèries sempre queden en un segon pla. També el cultiu del pensament, que suposadament és una de les coses que identifica més i millor la nostra espècie, resta a l’espera. La pressa ens aclapara. En aquest context precipitat necessitem temps per descobrir el temps. Un oasi de pensament que comencem a explorar gràcies a parar atenció aquí i allà: ressenyem les observacions resultants, plantegem sengles qüestions estimulants i (...) esmolem el senderi amb l’exercici compartit d’enraonar, altrament conegut com a diàleg. No en va Ramon Llull augurava taxatiu que: “Pensar per un mateix és l’únic projecte a la vida”. (shrink)

Cell‐wall‐less bacterial variants, or L‐forms, have been described in many bacterial species under laboratory conditions, in infected eukaryotic cell cultures and inside animals. Of special interest for human health is the formation of L‐forms as a consequence of specific antibiotic treatments, and the potential involvement of L‐forms in persistent and relapsing infections. An old enigma about L‐forms is how they can divide in the absence of cell wall synthesis, since septum formation is an essential requisite for cell division. However, the (...) classical definition of L‐forms as cell‐wall‐less bacterial variants may need a revision to accomodate recent observations by Richard d'Ari and coworkers:1 genetic and biochemical evidence indicates that E. coli L‐forms induced by β‐lactam antibiotics do contain small amounts of peptidoglycan, essential for their growth and probably required for septum formation. If these observations are extrapolated to all known L‐forms, the very concept of cell‐wall‐less bacteria may need revision, and be restricted to mycoplasmas and their relatives. BioEssays 29:1189–1191, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

La tradition éthique en économie politique a été régénérée par l’Ecole de Salamanque, mais nous ne sommes pas habitués à associer le libéralisme aux scholastiques qui avaient élaboré une théorie du juste prix de validité universelle. Le marché a perdu sa dimension morale avec le rationalisme et, non dans une moindre mesure, à travers le biais religieux de la théorie de la valeur travail. Quand elle fut redécouverte en tant qu’origine véritable de la valeur, l’utilité ne recouvrit pas sa portée (...) morale, en raison du traitement mathématique qu’on lui réserva. Le rationalisme a supprimé toute conception d’évolution sociale en même temps qu’il a favorisé l’intervention. Cependant, dans cette ère de corruption, un retour à l’acception de sens commun des prix requiert, selon l’auteur, le franchissement d’une étape supplémentaire, celui de maintenir l’ancrage éthique du juste prix ou du prix du marché.The ethical tradition in political economy was regenerated by the School of Salamanca, but we are not used to associating liberalism with these Scholastics who built a theory of the just price with universal validity. The market lost its moral dimension with rationalism, not least through the religious bias of the labor theory of value. When rediscovered as the correct source of value, utility did not regain its former moral significance because of mathematical treatment. Rationalism has suppressed any concept of social evolution while promoting intervention, but, in the age of corruption, a return to the common sense of prices, the author argues, requires the further step of upholding the ethical standards of the just price or market price. (shrink)

La categoria de passivitat és tan nuclear en la filosofia d’Emmanuel Levinas com en la de Paul Ricoeur. Aquesta categoria està intrínsecament vinculada a una altra que també és crucial: la d’alteritat. Per entendre la proximitat entre aquests dos autors, alhora que per veure’n la distància que els separa, resulta molt revelador prestar atenció, primer, a la manera com cadascun d’ells concep les dues categories i, després, al motiu pel qual mentre en el cas de Levinas el lloc de la (...) passivitat és exclusivament un —la relació amb l’altre—, en el de Ricoeur és triple: la carn o el cos propi, l’altre i la consciència. (shrink)

Thinking the Visual, Visualizing the Thought. A perceptual and Political Model of VisionMerleau-Ponty’s program of perceptivizing thought has depoliticizing effects that, though he does not recognize them, undermine his understanding of politics. These anti-political consequences, moreover, bring out the internal difficulties of his anti-intellectualist starting point. There are three areas in which Merleau-Ponty gave a thorough application, though with unequal success, of his perception-based model: the presentation of his own thought, in which his program of picturalization had a striking success; (...) the explanation of the historical process, in which his visualization model was only partly effective; and access to other people’s thought, in which his perceptivist views encountered an undeniable failure. Merleau-Ponty’s successive approaches to other people’s thought show, by two distinct paths, and beyond his own intentions, an unforeseen political defect. His perceptive model proves incompatible with his political ideas when it is applied in depth, and it thus breaks apart the cohesion of his thought. From a larger perspective, it disrupts reflective approaches to politics since it damages their conceptual bases. This article shows successively that Merleau-Ponty laid out a perceptive model of universal scope; that he applied it to several areas, including politics; that this model proves politically deficient when it serves to remove the autochthonous sources of sense; that these depoliticizing effects become more acute when Merleau-Ponty employs the perceptive model to elucidate other people’s thought; and that its frustration in this area not only devalues his political reflections, but also signals that the perceptive model simply prevents a “thinking of the political.”Pensare il visuale, visualizzare il pensiero.Un modello percettivo e politico della visioneIl programma di percettivizzazione del pensiero intrapreso da Merleau-Ponty comporta effetti spoliticizzanti che sconfessano nascostamente la sua comprensione della politica. Tali conseguenze antipolitiche mettono altresì in rilievo le difficoltà intrinseche alla sua posizione anti-intellettualista. Vi sono tre ambiti nei quali Merleau-Ponty, con diverso successo, ha applicato il suo modello percettivo : la presentazione del suo stesso pensiero, nella quale questo programma di pittoricizzazione incontra un successo trionfale; la chiarificazione del processo storico, dove tale modello “visualeˮ non è efficace che in parte; infine l’accesso al pensiero di altri autori, terreno sul quale questa prospettiva percettivista subisce uno scacco innegabile. Molti tentativi merleaupontiani di approcciare il pensiero di altri autori attestano in vario modo un imprevisto deficit politico. Il modello percettivo di Merleau-Ponty si rivela in altri termini incompatibile con le sue idee politiche, nel momento in cui viene applicato in profondità, e in ultima analisi mette a dura prova la coerenza del suo pensiero. In una prospettiva più ampia, esso ostacola un approccio riflessivo alla politica poiché ne degrada le stesse basi concettuali. Il nostro articolo mostra quindi che Merleau-Ponty ha articolato un modello percettivo di portata universale; che l’ha applicato a svariati ambiti d’indagine, tra cui la politica; che quel modello si rivela deficitario quando viene utilizzato per attingere a specifiche fonti di senso; che tali effetti spoliticizzanti si acuiscono nel momento in cui Merleau-Ponty adotta il modello percettivo per illuminare il pensiero di altri autori; che, per concludere, la sua incongruenza con questo peculiare ambito di riflessione non solo impoverisce le sue riflessioni politiche, ma attesta che in linea generale il modello percettivo sbarra la strada a un qualsiasi «pensiero del politico». (shrink)