This is a comprehensive introduction to the history of Western Philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Twentieth Century thought. In addition to all the key figures, the book covers figures whose contributions have so far been overlooked, such as Vico, Montesquieu, Durkheim and Weber. Along with in-depth discussion of the philosophical movements, Skirbekk and Gilje also discuss the natural sciences, the establishment of the Humanities, Socialism and Fascism, Psychoanalysis, and the rise of the social sciences. _History of Western Thought_ is (...) an ideal introduction to philosophy and the sociological and scientific structures that have shaped modern day philosophy. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive introduction to the history of Western Philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Twentieth Century thought. In addition to all the key figures, the book covers figures whose contributions have so far been overlooked, such as Vico, Montesquieu, Durkheim and Weber. Along with in-depth discussion of the philosophical movements, Skirbekk and Gilje also discuss the natural sciences, the establishment of the Humanities, Socialism and Fascism, Psychoanalysis, and the rise of the social sciences. _History of Western Thought_ is (...) an ideal introduction to philosophy and the sociological and scientific structures that have shaped modern day philosophy. (shrink)

This paper, on argumentative reason in a modernization-theoretical perspective, is a revised version of a public lecture held at Oslo University College, in memory of Professor Harald Grimen. There are three main points: argumentative reason conceived as self-critical reflection, to be extended to arguments from absurdity – from Apel to Ryle, as it were; argumentative reason conceived as a search for better arguments, ideally with mutual recognition and personal improvement – a meliorist approach; argumentative reason conceived as situated learning-processes, socially (...) and institutionally. In short, a special blend of late-Wittgensteinian praxeology, transcendental-pragmatics and discourse theory, as it is discussed in my writings. (shrink)

My question is the following: to what extent is ethical anthropocentrism tenable? In a “discourse ethical” perspective I will consider some case-oriented arguments in favor of a paradigmatically unique ethical standing for humans and some arguments in favor of an ethical gradualism between humans and other mammals and between humans and nature, ending with a conclusion in favor of a fair treatment of all moral subjects, human and non-human.

Obszar etyki jest najczęściej ograniczany do człowieka i świata ludzkiego: tylko ludzie mogą działać moralnie lub niemoralnie, tylko ludzie mogą być z moralnego punktu widzenia godni pochwały lub nagany; tylko ludziom przypisuje się status podmiotów moralnego działania i podmiotów moralnych praw. W jakim stopniu ten antropocentryzm etyczny daje się utrzymać? Czy współczesna wiedza biologiczna, uwydatniająca ciągłość i stopniowalność cech właściwych dla istot żywych, nie podważa takiego mocnego rozgraniczenia i założenia o uprzywilejowanej pozycji człowieka? Czy nie powinniśmy wyjść poza gatunkowy egoizm, (...) a przynajmniej go ograniczyć? W niniejszym artykule rozważę argumenty na rzecz stanowiącej osobny paradygmat, wyjątkowej pozycji etycznej człowieka oraz zbadam argumenty na rzecz etycznego gradualizmu [czyli stopniowalnych różnic] między istotami ludzkimi a pozostałymi ssakami oraz między człowiekiem a przyrodą. (shrink)

This article1 I 2014 hadde nærmere én av tre høyere utdanning. Blant folk mellom 25 og 39 år har mer enn halvparten av kvinnene høyere utdanning, noe som gjør denne aldersgruppen til den høyest utdannede i Norge.2 presents reflections on women's presence in Norwegian philosophy, partly as a result of input from key persons in the Norwegian philosophy environment. We discuss the low proportion of women among students and staff in the field, then we investigate whether gender perspectives are present (...) in the study of philosophy and why women's low participation in the study of philosophy is regarded as a vital challenge. We argue that awareness of the impact history of categorization of gender is important and it is necessary to examine current direct and indirect stereotypes of gender, rationality and natural properties and their role in Norwegian philosophy today. We identify characteristics of the Norwegian post-war philosophy, such as diversity and openness, power struggles and gender blindness, and argue that women throughout the postwar period and until today been a minority in philosophy. Our material shows that measures to improve gender balance in philosophy, and attempts to integrate gender perspectives, has met fierce resistance. The article also shows how the study of feminist philosophy and its influence and position in Norway, is well suited to give us a richer and more complex picture of the Norwegian philosophy. It may tell us something about how open-minded or closed the philosophical communities are, but it can also throw light on how philosophy itself plays the role as critical and self-reflective. (shrink)

What is transcendental-pragmatics? Why is transcendental-pragmatics important? In this paper, I focus on four main points: I delineate what I see as the strength and relevance of transcendental-pragmatics within the intellectual setting in the post-war period. I indicate how the discussions within transcendental-pragmatics have revealed inherent challenges, at the same time as the intellectual and institutional surroundings have changed unfavorably during the last decades. Finally, I indicate how these inherent challenges and new constellations could and should be met, to the (...) effect that transcendental-pragmatics could reveal its philosophical importance and practical relevance under changed conditions. In so doing, I defend a gradualist and meliorist version of transcendental-pragmatics. In short, I «situate» transcendental-pragmatics, in a meta-philosophical essay, and at the same time, I argue in favor of a revised version. (shrink)

There are in our time ongoing discussions on the question of global justice and inter-cultural dialogues. This question embraces not only questions of distribution and recognition, but also questions of peace and survival. In this paper, focusing on the latter, I shall discuss the question of the possibility of a philosophical justifi cation for universally binding principles for international law and thus for inter-state and intercultural behavior.

Focusing on the terms 'possibly affected persons' and 'those affected' in the Habermasian ' discourse principle', I argue that we need a notion of moral subjects in addition to that of a person and that this notion of moral subjects implies a 'normative gradualism' which weakens the participatory and consensual aspect of discourse theory and strengthens the aspect of enlightened 'advocatory' deliberation in terms of needs and the good life. I argue that this notion of moral subjects represents a challenge (...) for the discourse principle. Confronted with the huge number of moral subjects and of future persons, demanding various kinds of advocatory representation, the Habermasian discourse principle, as stated in Between Facts and Norms, becomes unsatisfactory. (shrink)

The debate between Habermas and Rawls that took place in 1990s concerned how philosophy can justify the principles of justice under the conditions of pluralism of different and irreconcilable moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines. The context of the debate was mainly Rawls’ Political Liberalism and Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms as well. This paper argues that a wider geo-cultural perspective is pertinent in order to better comprehend the different justification strategies in Habermas and Rawls, concerning the principle of justice. This (...) goes for their different geo-cultural experiences and presuppositions – in short, Rawls living in a self-confident North America in the post-war period versus Habermas’ German experience of civilization breakdown. However, it might also be relevant for the assessment of these two strategies in our time, faced with new kinds of geo-political differences and conflicts. (shrink)

"The notion of sustainability is interdisciplinary, requiring more than multidisciplinary research, and normative, requiring ongoing discussion about ethical priorities." "Hence, the authors of this anthology recommend improved interdisciplinary collaboration and intensified public discussion about sustainability. By such admittedly fallible procedures we should try, again and again, to avoid or rectify instances of unsustainability." "Further, the authors argue in favour of reduced material consumption, an ideal of 'good life', and gradualistic obligations toward non-human beings."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North (...) America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

In an age of cultural pluralism, and in light of serious counterarguments, this work offers a justification of universal principles. The book focuses on a series of modern challenges and argues in favor of an awareness for varieties and nuances, as well as a discursive universality. Timely Thoughts represents a serious contribution to inter-cultural dialogues and is appropriate for academia and the public sphere.

Reviews : John Rawls, Political Liberalism, ; Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des deomkratischen Rechtstaats, ; Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moraliscben Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, ; Philosophy of Mind: Theory and Practice, ; Gunnar Skirbekk, Rationality and Modernity: Essays in Pbilosopbical Pragmatics, ; Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition".

Reviews : John Rawls, Political Liberalism, ; Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des deomkratischen Rechtstaats, ; Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moraliscben Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, ; Philosophy of Mind: Theory and Practice, ; Gunnar Skirbekk, Rationality and Modernity: Essays in Pbilosopbical Pragmatics, ; Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition".

Ethical theories in sport philosophy tend to focus on interpersonal relations. Little has been said about sport as part of the good life and as experienced from within. This article tries to remedy this by discussing a theory that is fitting for sport, especially elite sport. The idea of perfection has a long tradition in Western philosophy. Aristotle maintains that the good life consists in developing specific human faculties to their fullest. The article discusses Hurka's recent version of Aristotelian perfectionism (...) and relates it to various aspects of, and the good life in, sport. How much time should be spent on sport in relation to other activities, how much should one concentrate on one sport to reach one's best and how should one's efforts be spent over a season? Well-roundedness and concentration are central alternatives for theories of perfection. Similarly some activities are simple whereas other are complex and thIs poses problems for persons that want to maximise their achievements. Whereas Hurka thinks one has obligations to perfect oneself, the author of this article thinks perfection is an attractive choice but no obligation. (shrink)

We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others have raised (...) parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism; we argue for a parallel solution. (shrink)

This paper lists a number of puzzles for shared obligations – puzzles about the role of individual influence, individual reasons to contribute towards fulfilling the obligation, about what makes someone a member of a group sharing an obligation, and the relation between agency and obligation – and proposes to solve them based on a general analysis of obligations. On the resulting view, shared obligations do not presuppose joint agency.

The chapter begins by introducing the problem of free will and moral responsibility and the standard terminology used to frame it in the philosophical context. It turns to the contributions of experimental philosophy and the prospects for the use of this methodology in the area. People believe that experimental philosophy is relevant to the traditional debates. The chapter discusses an error theory for incompatibilist intuitions proposed by Eddy nahmias and colleagues, and the role that empirical studies might have in the (...) assessment of manipulation arguments for incompatibilism. It also presents the suggestion that empirical studies reveal that core criteria for moral responsibility ought not to be applied invariantly across different sorts of cases. A number of philosophers argue that the results of surveys provide confirming evidence for a meta‐view about moral theories, variantism. (shrink)

The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgmentswould be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, andmoral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way inmaking sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and itsindependence (...) of moral judges and their attitudes or standards. Thesuccess of this strategy would undermine the traditional way of understanding the distinction, and it is not obvious how it can be reformulated. In this paper, I outline the difficulty posed by quasi-realism, raise problems for some prior attempts to overcome it, and present my own suggestion, focusing on correctness conditions that are internal to the act of moral judgment. (shrink)

Gunnar Olsson's tale follows an explorer from the oldest creation epics extant to the power struggles of today, an attempt to codify the taken-for-granted, a struggle with the invisible powers that make us so obedient and so predictable.

This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...) between parties of deep ethical disagreement challenges both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself. (shrink)