Over the past forty years, economists associated with the University of Chicago have won more than one-third of the Nobel prizes awarded in their discipline and have been major influences on American public policy. Building Chicago Economics presents the first collective attempt by social science historians to chart the rise and development of the Chicago School during the decades that followed the Second World War. Drawing on new research in published and archival sources, contributors examine the people, institutions and ideas (...) that established the foundations for the success of Chicago economics and thereby positioned it as a powerful and controversial force in American political and intellectual life. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.

Introduction: Religious experience in modernity : faith itself as the "unknown God" -- Fides qua creditur : the Enlightenment mind and the theology of the heart -- Within the bounds of reason alone : the subjective justification of religious belief in the thought of Immanuel Kant -- Schleiermacher's "higher order Pietism" : subjectivity and Protestant liberal thought -- Søren Kierkegaard and the paradox of faith : subjectivity in Christian existentialism -- Subjectivity and religious belief in Anglo-American revivalism : Jonathan Edwards (...) and John Wesley -- Subjectivity and religious belief in Anglo-American revivalism : George Whitefield and Charles G. Finney. (shrink)

We compare Gödel’s and Brouwer’s explorations of mysticism and its relation to mathematics.

Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.

The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy comprises over fifty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of this period. Starting in the late eighth century, with the renewal of learning some centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, a sequence of chapters takes the reader through developments in many and varied fields, including logic and language, natural philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and theology. Close attention is paid to the context of medieval philosophy, with discussions of the rise of the (...) universities and developments in the cultural and linguistic spheres. A striking feature is the continuous coverage of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian material. There are useful biographies of the philosophers, and a comprehensive bibliography. The volumes illuminate a rich and remarkable period in the history of philosophy and will be the authoritative source on medieval philosophy for the next generation of scholars and students alike. (shrink)

The meaning of sustainability is the subject of intense debate among environmental and resource economists. Perhaps no other issue separates more clearly the traditional economic view from the views of most natural scientists. The debate currently focuses on the substitutability between the economy and the environment or between “natural capital” and “manufactured capital”—a debate captured in terms of weak versus strong sustainability. In this article, we examine the various interpretations of these concepts. We conclude that natural science and economic perspectives (...) on sustainability are inconsistent. The market-based Hartwick-Solow “weak sustainability” approach is far removed from both the ecosystem-based “Holling sustainability” and the “strong sustainability” approach of Daly and others. Each of these sustainability criteria implies a specific valuation approach, and thus an ethical position, to support monetary indicators of sustainability such as a green or sustainable Gross Domestic Product. The conflict between “weak sustainability” and “strong sustainability” is more evident in the context of centralized than decentralized decision making. In particular, firms selling “services” instead of material goods and regarding the latter as “capital” leads to decisions more or less consistent with either type of sustainability. Finally, we discuss the implications of global sustainability for such open systems as regions and countries. Open systems have not been dealt with systematically for any of the sustainability criteria. (shrink)

For a writer who forces his readers to plunge fast and deeply into a wealth of material and experience, Hegel nonetheless spends an inordinate amount of time and effort in prefaces and introductions in order to prepare the reader for the explorations to be undertaken. Hegel clearly seems to think that how one begins philosophical investigation is crucial. Yet, ironically, he commits us to beginning everywhere and all at once. The tension of this irony may be localized as we consider (...) the “beginning” of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit with sense certainty and the “beginning” of the Logic with Being. The very possibility of beginning in such radically different ways, as well as the relationship between them, will be the subject of our essay. We must follow the remarks of the introductory materials to both works in order to address these questions. More specifically, for each work we will investigate what Hegel understands by “beginning” and by the “resolve” to begin as a means for establishing some sense of the relationship between, and development of, the Phenomenology and the Logic. (shrink)

For a writer who forces his readers to plunge fast and deeply into a wealth of material and experience, Hegel nonetheless spends an inordinate amount of time and effort in prefaces and introductions in order to prepare the reader for the explorations to be undertaken. Hegel clearly seems to think that how one begins philosophical investigation is crucial. Yet, ironically, he commits us to beginning everywhere and all at once. The tension of this irony may be localized as we consider (...) the “beginning” of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit with sense certainty and the “beginning” of the Logic with Being. The very possibility of beginning in such radically different ways, as well as the relationship between them, will be the subject of our essay. We must follow the remarks of the introductory materials to both works in order to address these questions. More specifically, for each work we will investigate what Hegel understands by “beginning” and by the “resolve” to begin as a means for establishing some sense of the relationship between, and development of, the Phenomenology and the Logic. (shrink)

Trenton Merricks has recently argued that substance dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness do not cohere well with the Incarnation. He has also claimed that physicalism about human persons avoids this problem, which should lead Christians to be physicalists. In this paper, I argue that there are plausible dualist accounts of embodiment and humanness that avoid his objections. Furthermore, I argue that physicalism is inconsistent with the Incarnation.

In this paper it will be shown how conditional presuppositions can be strengthened to unconditional ones if we assume that the antecedent and consequent of a conditional presupposition are independent of one another. Our notion of independence is very weak, and based on Lewis' notion of orthogonality of questions. It will be argued that our way of strengthening these presuppositions does not give rise to some wrong predictions Geurts argued other proposed strengthening accounts do.

Potentiality, Entanglement and Passion-at-a-Distance is a book for theoretical physicists and philosophers of modern physics. It treats a puzzling and provocative aspect of recent quantum physics: the apparent interaction of certain physical events that cannot share any causal connection. These are said to be `entangled' in some way, but an explanation remains elusive. Abner Shimony - to whom the book is dedicated - and others suggest the need to revive the category of what may be seen as a metaphysical potentiality. (...) Abner has described these events without actions to link them as `passion at a distance': not active, but passive. The discussions gathered here are written by a truly remarkable cast of scientists and philosophers and shed new light on the most profound puzzles of our times. (shrink)

I en række afhandlinger beskrives den hollandske ISAF styrkes indsats i Afghanisatn fra 2001-2010. I en fireårig periode fra 2006-2010 var det hollandske kontingent indsat i den afghanske provins Uruzgan og opnåede bemærkelsesværdige resultater. Sikkerhedssituationen blev forbedret, den økonomiske udvikling blev stabiliseret ligesom den offentlige administration, uddannelsen af børn og sundhedsplejen m.v. blev forbedret. Efter 2010 er provinsen overtaget af amerikanske og australske tropper.

In light of the already-here disasters of the Anthropocene, what might it mean to define “ground” phenomenologically? That is, if one is to get beyond the ‘merely rational’ and enter into the ‘dustier’ matters of ecological philosophizing, how might one phenomenologically consider the ground? This article will dwell on the nature of the earth-ground—or, soil—as a rematerialized grounding principle for phenomenology in this age of climate crisis. Contending with Heidegger, among others, this poietic article limns possibilities for a ‘grounded’ phenomenology.

In this paper we study language use and language organisation by making use of Lewisean signalling games. Standard game theoretical approaches are contrasted with evolutionary ones to analyze conventional meaning and conversational interpretation strategies. It is argued that analyzing successful communication in terms of standard game theory requires agents to be very rational and fully informed. The main goal of the paper is to show that in terms of evolutionary game theory we can motivate the emergence and self-sustaining force of (...) (i) conventional meaning and (ii) some conversational interpretation strategies in terms of weaker and, perhaps, more plausible assumptions. (shrink)

A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...) non-identity position. In the final section, the suggestions that the relevant notions of functional equivalence might be unpacked solely in terms of abstract automata features or entirely in terms of causal relations to nonintentionally characterized behavior are shown to be inadequate. (shrink)

I begin with a basic account of teleo-pragmatic functionalism and its main features. I then discuss what that view implies about the nature of cognition, theories and understanding and thus about the limits on our ability to explain the mental and its relation to the non-mental. I show that teleo-pragmatic functionalism leads naturally to a version of non-reductive physicalism that combines theoretical pluralism with a strongly contextualist and pragmatic view of theories and models. Though non-reductionist at the theoretical and conceptual (...) level, the view is nonetheless thoroughly and robustly physicalist in its ontology. (shrink)

The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy comprises over fifty specially commissioned essays by experts on the philosophy of this period. Starting in the late eighth century, with the renewal of learning some centuries after the fall of the Roman Empire, a sequence of chapters takes the reader through developments in many and varied fields, including logic and language, natural philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, and theology. Close attention is paid to the context of medieval philosophy, with discussions of the rise of the (...) universities and developments in the cultural and linguistic spheres. A striking feature is the continuous coverage of Islamic, Jewish, and Christian material. There are useful biographies of the philosophers, and a comprehensive bibliography. The volumes illuminate a rich and remarkable period in the history of philosophy and will be the authoritative source on medieval philosophy for the next generation of scholars and students alike. (shrink)

Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...) and the Nowhere Man principle. Kim’s Dictum says that causation requires a spatial relation. Nowhere Man says that souls can’t be in space. By our lights, both premises can be called into question. We’ll begin our evaluation of the argument by pointing out some consequences of Kim’s Dictum. For some, these will be costs. We will then present two defeaters for Kim’s Dictum and a critical analysis of Kim’s case for Nowhere Man. The upshot is that Kim’s argument against substance dualism fails. (shrink)

In pragmatics, the theory of language use, it is standard to assume that communication is a cooperative affair. Recently, this standard view has come under attack by Ducrot and Merin, and it has been proposed that an argumentative view on natural language use is more appropriate. In this paper I discuss to what extent this attack is justified and whether the alternative view can provide a more adequate analysis of ‘pragmatic meaning’, i.e., implicatures.RésuméEn pragmatique, la théorie de l’usage du langage, (...) on suppose habituellement que la communication est une affaire coopérative. Cette conception standard a été récemment attaquée par Ducrot et Merin, et il a été avancé qu’un point de vue argumentatif sur l’usage du langage naturel serait plus approprié. Dans cet article, je discute la question de savoir dans quelle mesure cette attaque est justifiée et si le point de vue alternatif peut fournir une analyse plus adéquate de la « signification pragmatique », à savoir les implicatures. (shrink)

En pragmatique, la théorie de l’usage du langage, on suppose habituellement que la communication est une affaire coopérative. Cette conception standard a été récemment attaquée par Ducrot et Merin, et il a été avancé qu’un point de vue argumentatif sur l’usage du langage naturel serait plus approprié. Dans cet article, je discute la question de savoir dans quelle mesure cette attaque est justifiée et si le point de vue alternatif peut fournir une analyse plus adéquate de la « signification pragmatique (...) », à savoir les implicatures. (shrink)

According to Frege, the meaning of an expression is the description that helps language users to determine what its reference is. Natural as the view might seem, it gives rise to the conceptual problem that it presupposes that we already know the meaning of the terms used in the description, and it is empirically incorrect because ‘having a correct description in mind’ is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for successful reference. Perhaps reference for at least some times is (...) non-descriptive, and depends on context. Anaphora have a referential use as well, picking up the speaker’s referent of an earlier used indefinite description. The challenge of this view is to provide a satisfactory analysis of so-called donkey-sentences. (shrink)

Is the Internet an appropriate medium to use when attempting to resolve conflicts over ethical issues in business? The research reported on in this paper focuses on internet versus face-to-face negotiations as a component of applied discourse ethics. Although internet negotiation has serious restrictions, it also has specific qualities. It enhances reflection and plays down emotion. Important qualities when handling complex and delicate ethical issues.