Extending ethical leadership theory and research beyond the walls of the organization, we propose a spillover model wherein ethical leaders impact customer loyalty (i.e., repeat purchase amount) by first establishing trusting relations with employees, who in turn emulate their leaders’ ethical behavior. In Study 1, we examined how this initial trust (i.e., trust primacy) facilitates new employees’ moral imprinting in a controlled experiment. In Study 2, with a field design, we tested our model among new employees and their respective customers (...) over a 6-month timespan. Results indicate that perceptions of ethical leadership operate through trust primacy to affect customer repeat purchase, with accelerated growth over time. We conclude by considering theoretical and practical implications as they relate to ethical leadership and trust primacy, as well as marketing and salesforce management. (shrink)

The idea that human beings have a distinct moral worth—a moral significance over and above any moral worth, such as that may be, possessed by other animals—has a long history and has traditionally been taken for granted by philosophers and theologians. However, in a variety of quarters in recent philosophy, this idea has come into disrepute, seeming to indicate a mere prejudice in favour of our own species. For example, Peter Singer has argued that such a position is mere speciesism, (...) a prejudice of a kind with racism and sexism in that it involves making moral distinctions between our own and other species that cannot be morally justified. What on such views is needed to justify any such distinction is a difference in terms of the morally relevant properties possessed by our own species as compared with other species. I will call this view the moral property view. Insofar as other species share with us morally relevant properties, for example the capacity to suffer cognitive ability and so on, it is mere prejudice not to accept moral requirements with respect to them as we do with respect to our own species. While on the surface such a view may seem morally enlightened, it indicates what will seem to many problematic moral judgments with respect to severely disabled human beings. In this paper, I will respond to these concerns by suggesting a different basis for the idea of human moral distinctiveness, one that draws on recent work by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers and which denies what I called above the property view. According to this view, while our shared life with other animals involves the recognition of their moral significance, our shared life with other human beings involves recognising that human beings as human beings have a distinctive moral value. (shrink)

The essays in this collection examine the influence of Gaita's ethical thought in a broad sense, beyond academic philosophy, especially within Australian society and culture where it has been most significant. Through his various works, including his acclaimed biography, Romulus: My Father, Gaita's ethical thought has had a considerable impact on the intellectual and cultural life of Australia.

The conversation seeks to extend and complicate Charles Taylor’s (2004) account of three constitutive formations of modern social imaginaries: market, the public sphere, and the nation-state based on popular sovereignty in two critical respects. First, it seeks to show how these key imaginaries, especially the market imaginary, are not contained and sealed within autonomous spheres. They are portable and they often leak into domains beyond the ones in which they originate. Second, it seeks to identify and explore the new (...) incipient and/or emergent imaginaries vying for recognition and demanding consideration in the constitution (as well as analysis) of contemporary social life, such as the risk-reward entrepreneurial culture. (shrink)

While Hume remains one of the most central figures in modern philosophy his place within Enlightenment thinking is much less clearly defined. Taking recent work on Hume as a starting point, this volume of original essays aims to re-examine and clarify Hume's influence on the thought and values of the Enlightenment.

Moralism involves the distortion of moral thought, the distortion of reflection and judgement. It is a vice, and one to which many - from the philosopher to the media pundit to the politician - are highly susceptible. This book examines the nature of moralism in specific moral judgements and the ways in which moral philosophy and theories about morality can themselves become skewed by this vice. This book ranges across a wide range of topics: the problem of the demandingness of (...) morality; the conflict between moral and other values; the contrast between the practice of moral philosophy and other modes of moral thought or reflection; moralism in the media; and, moralism in the public discussion of literature and art. This highly original and provocative book will be of interest to students of philosophy, psychology, theology and media, and to anyone who takes a serious interest in contemporary morality. (shrink)

This unique collection of essays has two main purposes. The first is to honour the pioneering work of Cora Diamond, one of the most important living moral philosophers and certainly the most important working in the tradition inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second is to develop and deepen a picture of moral philosophy by carrying out new work in what Diamond has called the realistic spirit. The contributors in this book advance a first-order moral attitude that pays close attention to (...) actual moral life and experience. Their essays, inspired by Diamond's work, take up pressing challenges in Anglo-American moral philosophy, including Diamond's defence of the concept 'human being' in ethics, her defence of literature as a source of moral thought that does not require external sanction from philosophy, her challenge to the standard 'fact/value' dichotomy, and her exploration of non-argumentative forms of legitimate moral persuasion. There are also essays that apply this framework to new issues such as the nature of love, the connections of ethics to theology, and the implications of Wittgenstein's thought for political philosophy. Finally, the book features a new paper by Diamond in which she contests deep-rooted philosophical assumptions about language that severely limit what philosophers see as the possibilities in ethics. Morality in a Realistic Spirit offers a tribute to a great moral philosopher in the best way possible--by taking up the living ideas in her work and taking them in original and interesting directions. (shrink)

Eduardo Mendieta is professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. --.

Bernard Williams distinguishes moral incapacities – incapacities that are themselves an expression of the moral life – from mere psychological ones in terms of deliberation. Against Williams I claim there are examples of such moral incapacity where no possible deliberation is involved – that an agent's incapacity may be a primitive feature or fact about their life. However Michael Clark argues that my claim here leaves the distinction between moral and psychological incapacity unexplained, and that an adequate understanding of the (...) kind of examples I suggest must involve at least some implicit reference to deliberation. In this paper I attempt to meet Clark's objection and further clarify my account of primitive moral incapacities by considering an example from Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn. What this example shows, I argue, is how our characterization of an agent's response as a moral incapacity turns not on the idea of deliberation but on the way certain primitive incapacities for action are connected to a larger pattern of response in an agent's life, a pattern of response that itself helps to constitute our conception of that agent's character and the moral life more generally. (shrink)

I will consider what literature might add to moral thought and understanding as distinct from moral philosophy as it is commonly understood. My argument turns on a distinction between two conceptions of moral thought. One in which the point of moral thought is that it should issue in moral judgement leading to action; the other in which it is concerned also with what Iris Murdoch calls ‘the texture of a man’s being or the nature of his personal vision’. Drawing on (...) this second conception and Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, I argue that the question ‘what ought I to do?’ can itself distort moral understanding—that this question may undermine the connection between understanding human life and living a human life. I then argue that insofar as literature is concerned with what is possible within a human life, it has a distinct contribution to make to moral thought, in particular to our reflections on the nature of moral thought itself. (shrink)

Bernard Williams distinguishes moral incapacities – incapacities that are themselves an expression of the moral life – from mere psychological ones in terms of deliberation. Against Williams I claim there are examples of such moral incapacity where no possible deliberation is involved – that an agent's incapacity may be a primitive feature or fact about their life. However Michael Clark argues that my claim here leaves the distinction between moral and psychological incapacity unexplained, and that an adequate understanding of the (...) kind of examples I suggest must involve at least some implicit reference to deliberation. In this paper I attempt to meet Clark's objection and further clarify my account of primitive moral incapacities by considering an example from Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn. What this example shows, I argue, is how our characterization of an agent's response as a moral incapacity turns not on the idea of deliberation but on the way certain primitive incapacities for action are connected to a larger pattern of response in an agent's life, a pattern of response that itself helps to constitute our conception of that agent's character and the moral life more generally. (shrink)

abstract In this paper I consider the nature of the purported vice of moralism by examining two examples that, I suggest, exemplify this vice: the first from Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter; the second from David Owen's account of his experience as European negotiator between the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. I argue that in different ways both these examples show the kind of human weakness or failure that is involved in the most extreme version of moralism, a weakness (...) that involves an inability to see or acknowledge those one seeks to judge as real, morally accountable, human beings. (shrink)

For Murdoch the importance of the fact–value dichotomy is not to suggest that value is not real. Rather this separation is required in order to keep value pure and untainted with empirical facts. Here Murdoch focuses Kant and Wittgenstein, notably the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. For both, value appears as an intimation of ‘something higher’. And it is here that Murdoch sees the deeper problem with various forms of the fact–value dichotomy: that in our explanations of human life the essential (...) thing, value, must be built into our model or picture from the start if it is to be ultimately integrated into it at all, but that in doing so we may be accused of what Murdoch calls an unwarranted act of faith or intuition. (shrink)

Research has consistently shown ‘ability’ grouping (tracking) to be prey to poor practice, and to perpetuate inequity. A feature of these problems is inequitable and inaccurate practice in allocation to groups or ‘tracks’. Yet little research has examined whether such practices might be improved. Here, we examine survey and interview findings from a large-scale intervention study of grouping practices in 126 English secondary schools. We find that when schools are encouraged to allocate students and move them between groups according to (...) equitable principles by participation in a ‘best practice’ intervention, there is some increased equity of practice (i.e. a reduction in non-attainment factors used in allocation). However, the majority of schools continue to use subjective and potentially biased information to group students. Furthermore, some schools that claim to be using attainment setting appear to be using the inequitable practice of streaming. Our findings show that improvements in equity are constrained by operational and strategic factors, including timetabling, finance, and teachers’ values and beliefs relating to student ability and progression. We suggest strategies for encouraging schools to change their grouping practices, drawing on approaches for working with complex organisations. (shrink)

It may seem to follow from Peter Winch's claim in ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements’ that a certain class of first‐person moral judgments are not universalizable that such judgments cannot be given a cognitivist interpretation. But Winch's argument does not involve the denial of moral cognitivism and in this paper I show how such judgements may be cognitively determined yet not universalizable. Drawing on an example from James Joyce's The Dead, I suggest that in the kind of situation Winch envisages (...) where we properly return a different moral judgement to another agent it may be that we accept their judgement is right for them because we recognise that it is determined by values that, simply because of the particular people we are, we could never know or understand in just the same way. (shrink)

It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends.

abstract In this paper I consider the nature of the purported vice of moralism by examining two examples that, I suggest, exemplify this vice: the first from Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter; the second from David Owen's account of his experience as European negotiator between the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. I argue that in different ways both these examples show the kind of human weakness or failure that is involved in the most extreme version of moralism, a weakness (...) that involves an inability to see or acknowledge those one seeks to judge as real, morally accountable, human beings. (shrink)

In his influential paper 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn', Jonathan Bennett suggests that Huck's failure to turn in the runaway slave Jim as his conscience — a conscience distorted by racism — tells him he ought to is not merely right but also praiseworthy. James Montmarquet however argues against what he sees here as Bennett's 'anti-intellectualism' in moral psychology that insofar as Huck lacks and so fails to act on the moral belief that he should help Jim his action is (...) not praiseworthy. In this paper I suggest that we should reject Montmarquet's claim here; that the case of Huck Finn indicates rather how many of our everyday moral responses to others do not and need not depend on any particular moral beliefs we hold about them or their situation. (shrink)

Mrs. Digby told me that when she lived in London with her sister, Mrs. Brooke, they were every now and then honoured by the visits of Dr. Johnson. He called on them one day soon after the publication of his immortal dictionary. The two ladies paid him due compliments on the occasion. Amongst other topics of praise they very much commended the omission of all naughty words. 'What! my dears! then you have been looking for them?' said the moralist. The (...) ladies, confused at being thus caught, dropped the subject of the dictionary. (shrink)

Bernard Williams questioned whether impartial morality “can allow for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience.” Underlying his position is a distinction between factual and practical deliberation. While factual deliberation is about the world and brings in a standpoint that is impartial, practical deliberation is, he claims, radically first‐personal; it “involves an I that [is] intimately the I of my desires.” While it may be thought that Williams's claim implies an unpalatable Humean subjectivism, the present article (...) argues that this does not follow: That first‐person practical deliberation is directed both by the “I of my desires” and by the world. Drawing on Peter Winch's argument against the universalizability of moral judgments and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, the article argues that practical deliberations involve discovering value in the world, but that what is revealed about the world depends constitutively on the first‐person deliberations and decisions of particular agents. (shrink)

While a number of philosophers have argued recently that it is through our emotional response to certain literary works that we might achieve particular moral understanding, what has not been discussed in detail in this connection are works which generate conflicting responses in the reader; which is to say literary works in which there is significant element of ambiguity. Consider Joseph Conrad's novel Lord Jim. I argue that in making sense of our potentially conflicting responses to this novel, and specifically (...) to its central character Jim, we may gain a richer sense of the ways in which literature may contribute to moral understanding – in this case by contributing to an understanding of our own character, its blind spots and its limitations. (shrink)

According to a widely held view, moral thought essentially involves the survey of an array of independently specifiable morally relevant facts, on the basis of which an agent is to reach a judgment about how anybody in that situation ought to act. I argue, drawing on Henry James’s.

Peter Winch's famous argument in "The Universalizability of Moral Judgments" that moral judgments are not always universalizable is widely thought to involve an essentially sceptical claim about the limitations of moral theories and moral theorising more generally. In this paper I argue that responses to Winch have generally missed the central positive idea upon which Winch's argument is founded: that what is right for a particular agent to do in a given situation may depend on what is and is not (...) morally possible for them. I then defend the existence of certain genuine moral necessities and impossibilities in order to show how certain first-person moral judgements may be essentially personal. (shrink)

In light of recent technological innovations and discourses around data and algorithmic analytics, scholars of many stripes are attempting to develop critical agendas and responses to these developments. In this mutual interview, three scholars discuss the stakes, ideas, responsibilities, and possibilities of critical data studies. The resulting dialog seeks to explore what kinds of critical approaches to these topics, in theory and practice, could open and make available such approaches to a broader audience.

This book updates and adds to the classic Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, showing how social movement theory has grown and changed.

"Charles Taylor is one of the most influential contemporary philosophers, arguably the most important living political philosopher writing in English. Taylor and Politics assesses Taylor's thought and its relevance to contemporary political challenges, especially religion and secularity, multicultural diversity, political alienation and demands for greater democracy. Craig Browne and Andrew Lynch outline Taylor's key concepts and highlight the substantive applications of his ideas. They explain the substantial differences between Taylor's conception of social imaginaries and (...) that of Cornelius Castoriadis, and contrast Taylor's account of the political form of modernity with Claude Lefortäs."--. (shrink)

Hierarchy has been a central concern of work on the modern political imaginary. The need to elucidate hierarchy’s deeper sources and its legitimations were some of the motivations behind Cornelius Castoriadis’ development of the notion of the imaginary. The work of Claude Lefort on the political imaginary similarly commences from a critical analysis of the hierarchical form of bureaucracy and its place in the constitution of totalitarian political regimes. In a different vein, Charles Taylor’s conception of the imaginary details (...) a long-term process of the erosion of preceding forms of hierarchy and their justifications. In the contemporary period, the opposition to hierarchy has penetrated organisations and institutions that had previously been shaped by it, like the family, the capitalist firm, the school, and the political movement. Despite the potentials that these initiatives suggest of a change in the political imaginary, it will be argued that forms of hierarchy have, to varying degrees, been reconstituted and that the problem of hierarchy appears in new ideological forms, both with respect to institutionalised power and the legitimating justifications for how things are organised. The critique of hierarchy was once associated with the radical democratic imaginary, however, there have recently been perverse mobilisations. (shrink)

This paper is an analysis of John Caputo’s philosophical interpretation of ‘the event’ as a form of revelation with specific reference to political theology and in dialogue with the theological notion of ‘interruption’ by the fundamental theologian Lieven Boeve. Following Charles Taylor’s interpretation of the post-secular, the argument is that Boeve’s ‘radical hermeneutics of religion’ is more postmodern than Caputo because it presents religion as co-constituted with language, particularity, and contingency and grounded within the specificity of the Christian narrative.

Charles Taylor’s conception of the relationship between democracy and social creativity developed through a critical synthesis of various traditions, including the Romantic Movement and liberal political philosophy. However, it is argued that Taylor’s understanding of the implications of religion and revolution significantly differentiates his standpoint from that of pragmatism and theories of democratic creativity. Taylor’s defence of religious transcendence is shown to give rise to tensions with the latter perspective. The theorists of democratic creativity suggest that democracy (...) originates in the rupturing of religious significations and their closure of meaning. Taylor essentially inverts these arguments and perceives that the loss of transcendence may lead to a closed world structure. Taylor claims that the dilemmas of the modern immanent frame were prefigured in the French Revolution’s inability to generate an institutional form consistent with its understanding of democracy and that social creativity should be qualified in light of this historical experience. (shrink)

John Taylor complains that the "Kalam" cosmological argument gives the appearance of being a swift and simple demonstration of the existence of a Creator of the universe, whereas in fact a convincing argument involving the premiss that the universe began to exist is very difficult to achieve. But Taylor's proffered defeaters of the premisses of the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe are themselves typically undercut due to Taylor's inadvertence to alternatives open to the defender (...) of the "Kalam" arguments. With respect to empirical confirmation of the universe's beginning Taylor is forced into an anti-realist position on the Big Bang theory, but without sufficient warrant for singling out the theory as non-realistic. Therefore, despite the virtue of simplicity of form, the "Kalam" cosmological argument has not been defeated by Taylor's all too swift refutation. (shrink)

“What does it mean to say that we live in a secular age?” This apparently simple question opens into the massive, provocative, and complex A Secular Age, where Charles Taylor positions secularism as a defining feature of the modern world, not the mere absence of religion, and casts light on the experience of transcendence that scientistic explanations of the world tend to neglect. -/- In Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, a prominent and varied group of scholars chart (...) the conversations in which A Secular Age intervenes and address wider questions of secularism and secularity. The distinguished contributors include Robert Bellah, José Casanova, Nilüfer Göle, William E. Connolly, Wendy Brown, Simon During, Colin Jager, Jon Butler, Jonathan Sheehan, Akeel Bilgrami, John Milbank, and Saba Mahmood. -/- Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age is edited by Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun. (shrink)

Background and objectives: Developmental coordination disorder is a neurodevelopmental motor disorder occurring in 5-6% of school-aged children. It is suggested that children with DCD show deficits in motor learning. Transcranial direct current stimulation enhances motor learning in adults and children but is unstudied in DCD. We aimed to investigate if tDCS, paired with motor skill training, facilitates motor learning in a pediatric sample with DCD.Methods: Twenty-eight children with diagnosed DCD were randomized and placed into a treatment or sham group. Anodal (...) tDCS was applied in conjunction with fine manual training over 5 consecutive days. Children's motor functioning was assessed with the Purdue Pegboard Test and Jebsen-Taylor Hand Function Test at baseline, post-intervention and 6 weeks following intervention. Group differences in rates of motor learning and skill transfer/retention were examined using linear mixed modeling and repeated measures ANOVAs, respectively.Results: There were no serious adverse events or drop-outs and procedures were well-tolerated. Independent of group, all participants demonstrated improved motor scores over the 5 training days [F, p < 0.001, 95% CI ], with no skill decay observed at retention. There was no interaction between intervention group and day [F, p = 0.086, 95% CI ].Conclusion: Children with DCD demonstrate motor learning with long-term retention of acquired skill. Motor cortex tDCS did not enhance motor learning as seen in other populations. Before conclusions of tDCS efficacy can be drawn, additional carefully designed trials with reproducible results are required.Clinical Trial Registration:ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT03453983. (shrink)

"E. L. Hebden Taylor, M.A. (Cantab.), L. Th. (A.T.C.), The christian Philosophy of Law, Politics and the State, A study of the Political and Legal Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd of the Free University of Amsterdam, Holland, as the Basis for Christian Action in the English-Speaking World. The Craig Press, Nutley, New Jersey 1966." published on 20 Feb 1969 by Brill.