Canguilhem is known to have regretted, with some pathos, that Life no longer serves as an orienting question in our scientific activity. He also frequently insisted on a kind of uniqueness of organisms and/or living bodies – their inherent normativity, their value-production and overall their inherent difference from mere machines. In addition, Canguilhem acknowledged a major debt to the German neurologist-theoretician Kurt Goldstein, author most famously of The Structure of the Organism in 1934; along with Merleau-Ponty, Canguilhem (...) was the main figure who introduced the work of Goldstein and his ‘phenomenology of embodiment’ into France. In this paper I inquire if we should view Canguilhem and Goldstein as ‘biochauvinists’, that is, as thinkers who consider that there is something inherently unique about biological entities as such, and if so, of what sort. (shrink)

La pensée de Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) connaît un regain d'intérêt dans les lieux académiques et de recherche. Ainsi, eut lieu à l'Université Paris-1 un colloque international intitulé «Un nouveau Canguilhem? » pour la parution des Oeuvres complètes jetant une nouvelle lumière sur des écrits de jeunesses peu connus. Mais que peut-on apprendre de ces manuscrits privés? Ces écrits inédits confirment-ils l'opinion vague qui lie le philosophe aux sciences naturelles? Ce livre privilégie un autre angle: Canguilhem en philosophe (...) de l'action. (shrink)

Canguilhem’s contemporary relevance lies in how he critiques the relation between knowledge and life that underlies Kantian rationality. The latter’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment represent life in the form of an exception: life is simultaneously included and excluded from understanding. Canguilhem’s critique can be grouped into three main strands of argument. First, his reference to concepts as preserved problems breaks with Kant’s idea of concepts regarding the living as a ‘unification of the manifold’. Second, (...) Canguilhem’s vital normativity represents life as the potential to resist normative orders that judge the living, relegating Kant’s ‘lawfulness of the contingent’ to a ‘mediocre regularity’. Third, Canguilhem’s introduction of the environment as a ‘category of contemporary thought’ decentres the living/knowing subject and introduces contingency. His idea of the ‘knowledge of life’ leads to the conclusion that life is the condition of possibility of rationality, rather than rationality’s ‘blind spot’. (shrink)

In this paper we examine aspects of Canguilhem’s philosophy of biology, concerning the knowledge of life and its consequences on science and vitalism. His concept of life stems from the idea of a living individual, endowed with creative subjectivity and norms, a Kantian view which “disconcerts logic”. In contrast, two different approaches ground naturalistic perspectives to explore the logic of life and the logic of the living individual in the 1970s. Although Canguilhem is closer to the second, there (...) are divergences; for example, unlike them, he does not dismiss vitalism, often referring to it in his work and even at times describing himself as a vitalist. The reason may lie in their different views of science. (shrink)

This paper outlines a hypothesis regarding the close connection between two problems in Georges Canguilhem’s work. The first problem is that of Canguilhem’s insistence to include considerations about natural selection in his work and of the role that this notion could play therein. The second problem consists in Canguilhem’s tendency to often use the term “life” as the subject of his sentences, even though this tendency may seem to at least partially contradict some of the central theses (...) advanced in his philosophy. This paper attempts to show that these two problems should not be viewed as being isolated from one another, that there is a strong connection between the two and that a certain interpretation of the first one allows us to make sense of the second. To put it otherwise, the aim of this paper is to show that a particular interpretation of the role of natural selection in Canguilhem’s work could help explain why “life” plays the role of a preferred grammatical subject in his writings. (shrink)

Un Canguilhem philosophe à part entière revient aujourd'hui sur le devant de la scène grâce, d'une part, à l'édition des Œuvres complètes reprenant l'ensemble des textes publiés par l'auteur de son vivant et, de l'autre, à la constitution du Fonds Canguilhem qui a mis à disposition pour consultation l'ensemble de ses écrits inédits. Considérée dans son ensemble, l'œuvre de cet étrange philosophe apparaît comme une extraordinaire méditation sur le problème de la création et de l'erreur à l'ère des (...) sciences de la vie ; une méditation au cours de laquelle on voit la tradition philosophique elle-même, notamment celle de l'idéalisme, s'ouvrir aux problèmes posés par la biologie et s'engager dans la voie d'une « pensée du vivant ». Commencée au contact de l'esthétique d'Alain comme une méditation sur l'erreur en tant qu'acte créateur, la réflexion de Canguilhem s'ouvre, de façon à la fois cohérente et inattendue, sur la révolution darwinienne et retrouve dans l'initiative même du vivant la puissance créatrice du sujet et de l'erreur. (shrink)

O presente trabalho pretende comparar o debate ocorrido entre Georges Canguilhem e Robert Pagès em Qu’est-ce que la Psychologie?, de 1956, com os escritos de Michel Foucault publicados nos anos 1950. Para isso, após alguns apontamentos históricos, faz-se uma breve análise dos textos de Foucault publicados em 1954, Maladie Mentale et Personnalité e a Introduction à Le Rêve et l’Existence. Os textos de Foucault são então confrontados com o debate entre Canguilhem e Robert Pagès, que por sua vez (...) são analisados e comparados com outros dois textos de Foucault publicados em 1957, La Psychologie de 1850 à 1950 e La Recherche Scientifique et la Psychologie. Tenta-se mostrar que o início da trajetória de Foucault não apenas dialoga com diversos temas sobre a Psicologia e as Ciências Humanas colocados por Canguilhem e Pagès, mas também ensaia respostas cujo teor será mais visível em Folie et Déraison e na Introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant. (shrink)

We examine aspects of Canguilhem’s philosophy of biology, concerning the knowledge of life and its consequences on science and vitalism. His concept of life stems from the idea of a living individual endowed with creative subjectivity and norms, a Kantian view which “disconcerts logic.” In contrast, we examine two naturalistic perspectives in the 1970s exploring the logic of life (JacobJacob, François) and the logic of the living individual (MaturanaMaturana, Humberto and VarelaVarela, Francisco). Canguilhem can be considered to be (...) a precursor of the second view, but there are divergences; for example, unlike them, he does not dismiss vitalism, often referring to it in his work, and even at times describing himself as a vitalist. The reason may lie in their different views of science. (shrink)

En este artículo se defiende la tesis de que la noción de vida, en la obra de Foucault, no es sólo el correlato de prácticas históricas de poder y saber. Foucault sostiene una ontología vitalista, intermitente y no del todo explícita. La fuente de esta opción filosófica en Foucault no es nietzscheana ni deleuziana, sino que coincide en muchos aspectos con el vitalismo no esencialista de Georges Canguilhem. En primer lugar comparamos la relación de Canguilhem y de Foucault (...) con la tradición kantiana, en su vertiente crítica y trascendental. En segundo lugar, comparamos la noción de vida en las propuestas filosóficas de Canguilhem y Foucault. Por último analizamos la procedencia canguilhemiana del concepto foucaultiano de normalización. Esta filiación se advierte también en el concepto de biopolítica, referido a un poder que actúa sobre la vida, imitando su funcionamiento. Este arraigo del pensamiento de Foucault en el vitalismo de su maestro permite resolver dos tensiones internas en la trayectoria del primero: la justificación de los movimientos de revuelta y el carácter autoformativo de la subjetividad. (shrink)

Cet article répond aux critiques de Latour selon lesquelles Canguilhem, vénérant la science, était incapable d’en écrire l’histoire. Je soutiens, au contraire, que Canguilhem a poursuivi une philosophie critique qui cherche les limites de diverses pratiques, y compris celles des rationalités et idéologies scientifiques. Bien qu’il défende l’efficacité d’une pratique médicale scientifiquement informée, il en identifie également les limites en interprétant les mouvements anti-médicaux comme des réponses aux échecs d’une médecine considérée comme infaillible parce que scientifique. Pour (...) class='Hi'>Canguilhem, la pratique médicale doit être comprise en elle-même plutôt que considérée comme une application de connaissances scientifiques. En conséquence, il s’intéresse aux sciences dans leur rapport à la pratique médicale. Pour répondre en détail à l’accusation de Latour, cet article étudie la préoccupation fondamentale de la philosophie critique de Canguilhem. S’il s’agissait d’établir quelque vérité, valeur par excellence de la science selon Canguilhem, alors il semble que la critique serait valable. Mais en considérant attentivement l’histoire de ses projets et de ses réalisations telle que racontée dans son discours de réception de la médaille d’or du CNRS en 1987, cet article soutient au contraire que sa philosophie critique ne vénère pas la science, mais trouve son orientation ailleurs. En accordant une attention particulière à son intérêt constant pour l’erreur, et à sa distinction entre l’erreur intellectuelle et les essais et erreurs de la vie, je soutiens que sa philosophie critique s’intéresse en fin de compte à l’action et à la promotion du courage requis par la vie humaine. (shrink)

Following Hannah Arendt’s insights into the affinities between Marxism and the philosophy of life, this article reconstructs a theoretical position that we propose to call ‘vitalist Marxism’. This position conceives of life not only as an essential foundation of the production process, but also as a critical resource for resistance to the capitalist logic of exploitation. We highlight the role Georges Canguilhem (1904–95) played in developing this position, in particular by depicting tools and machines as ‘organs of life’. Drawing (...) on Canguilhem’s early writings as well as unpublished manuscripts, we show that this ‘organological’ understanding of technology was rooted in the increasingly anti-fascist reception of Marx in France during the 1930s. Against the background of today’s protests against climate destruction, racism, and anti-feminist violence, all of which invoke the defense of basic living conditions, we argue that the critical position of vitalist Marxism acquires remarkable topicality. (shrink)

우리는 푸코와 캉길렘의 관계를 살펴보기 위해서, 푸코가 마지막에 발표한 글인 캉길렘의 『정상과 병리』에 대한 서문에서 실마리를 찾고자 한다. 이 글에서 푸코는 자신과 캉길렘이 개념의 철학이라는 전통에 속한다고 말하면서도 이 개념의 철학을 생명에 대한 새로운 접근 방식으로 특징짓고 있다. 어떻게 개념의 철학이 새로운 생명주의가 될 수 있는지를 살펴보기 위해서 다음의 질문들을 통해 이 두 사람의 지적 여정을 따라가 볼 것이다. 푸코의 『임상의 탄생』은 캉길렘의 『정상과 병리』를 어떻게 반박했가? 어떻게 캉길렘은 결코 명시적으로 이에 대답하지 않으면서도 논의의 지형을 변형시켜 죽음을 중심에 놓는 생명주의로 (...) 나아갔는가? 그리고 마지막으로 푸코는 어떻게 자신의 마지막 텍스트에서 오류의 철학에 주목하면서 캉길렘에 화답하는가? 이 질문들을 통해서 우리의 탐구는 방황의 생명주의라는 새로운 연구 프로그램 속에서 이 두 철학자가 서로 만나면서 우리에게 이를 과제로 넘겨주고 있다는 결론에 이를 것이다. (shrink)

Review of "Maß und Eigensinn. Studien im Anschluß an Georges Canguilhem“, ed. by Cornelius Borck, Volker Hess and Henning Schmidgen, München (Fink Verlag) 2005.".

This article explores the links between the philosophies of Georges Canguilhem and Gilbert Simondon. It highlights their shared emphasis on the difficult character of human life, framing this difficulty in terms of an existential encounter with problems and their resolutions. It shows how the notion of ‘problem’ which grounds both of their thinking presupposes a neo-vitalist conception of life as purposive behaviour, extended to forms of collective, technical and symbolic activity. The consequences of this conception for Canguilhem's and (...) Simondon's engagement with questions of pedagogy, and the role of philosophical education in particular, are then examined. The article concludes by considering the ambiguous place of anxiety in their work and its significance for thinking about the conditions of knowledge and action. Following Canguilhem and Simondon, I argue for the importance of helping the human organism develop relatively autonomous interior and exterior milieus to cope with life's fundamental difficulty. (shrink)

Some of Catherine Malabou’s recent work has developed her conception of plasticity (originally deployed in a reading of Hegelian Aufhebung ) in relation to neuroscience. This development clarifies and advances her attempt to bring contemporary theory into dialogue with the natural sciences, while indirectly indicating her engagement with the French tradition in philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine, especially the work of Georges Canguilhem. I argue that we can see her development of plasticity as an answer to some (...) specific shortcomings in Canguilhem’s conception of organic or biological normativity as advanced in The Normal and the Pathological . Such a view of plasticity shows its potential to provide the basis for a powerful critical engagement with contemporary conceptions of selfhood, self-transformation, subjectivation, and the general theory of norms. (shrink)

Dans la première préface à sa thèse Folie et déraison, Foucault remercie trois hommes qu’il considérait comme ses maîtres et qui ont considérablement influencé son travail. Ainsi, dans sa conférence inaugurale au Collège de France en décembre 1970, ces mêmes noms sont invoqués par Foucault : Georges Canguilhem, Georges Dumézil et Jean Hyppolite. Le rapport de ces trois figures, considérées individuellement, à Foucault a été sujet de discussions plus ou moins détaillées. Cet article explore les affinités intellectuelles et les (...) tensions entre ces trois intellectuels. Canguilhem et Hyppolite avaient été contemporains à l’École Normale Supérieure dans les années 1920, et, des années après, collègues à l’Université de Strasbourg. Notamment, en 1965, ils participent à l’entretien télévisé médié par Alain Badiou et Dina Dreyfus. Même si Dumézil et Hyppolite avaient été collègues au Collège de France, ils n’ont pas discuté les travails l’un de l’autre. Dumézil, il semble, n’a pas discuté le travail de Canguilhem ; ce dernier, en revanche, a considéré soit l’œuvre de Dumézil que celle d’Hyppolite. Cet article analyse le compte rendu de Les mots et les choses par Canguilhem, où il signale l’importance de Dumézil pour le livre de Foucault ; et un rapport d’un séminaire très peu connu, qui a eu lieu dans l’automne 1970, dont Foucault discute les travaux de Dumézil et Canguilhem répondit. L’article donc considère la lecture d’Hyppolite par Canguilhem dans son texte « Hegel en France », et dans les hommages qu’il a écrit à son ami et collègue, après la mort d’Hyppolite en 1968. Une analyse de la lecture de Canguilhem de ses deux contemporains nous aide à mieux situer Canguilhem dans le contexte des débats intellectuels de la première moitié du XX e siècle. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the role of ancient Greek medicine and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem’s analysis of vitalism at the intersection of history and philosophy in his essay “Aspects of Vitalism” in light of larger questions about the historicity of “life” as a concept in the history and philosophy of science and contemporary biopolitical theory. Vitalism, for Canguilhem, is not a proper object of the history of science. But nor is it a philosophy that exists outside of (...) historical time. I show how Canguilhem embeds vitalism both historically and trans-historically by threading each of its three “aspects” in the essay through ancient Greece. Canguilhem distinguishes his own understanding of both life and vitalism from that of the “classical” vitalists of the eighteenth century by refusing to read ancient Greece as romantically naïve or pre-technological and instead locating a dialectic between vitalism and mechanism already in antiquity. I argue for a critical re-reading of Canguilhem’s own conjunction of vitalism and Hellenism that resists its figuration of ancient Greece as the place where the human qua species first comes to take itself as an object of knowledge. I instead propose reading ancient Greek medical and philosophical texts that are read and reread in debates about the nature of human life and the life of Nature over millennia as part of a milieu that shapes how contemporary thinkers theorize life in the interest of human flourishing. (shrink)

A relação entre o vital e o social no pensamento de Georges Canguilhem envolve uma específica reestruturação filosófica, por ele empreendida em O normal e patológico, realizando um deslocamento teórico em face das análises quantitativas da saúde quanto, ao mesmo tempo, construindo uma problemática própria a respeito da normação, fazendo com que o vital seja pensado, inexoravelmente, como a imbricação do biológico com o social, acarretando, ainda, um reposicionamento político, crítico, no que tange à consideração sobre saúde e doença.

This paper brings Georges Canguilhem and Gilles Deleuze together with the contemporary biologist Mary Jane West-Eberhard. I examine the concepts of adaptation and adaptivity in Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological in light of West-Eberhard’s notion of “developmental plasticity,” which is, I claim, adaptivity in the developmental register. In turn, I interpret Canguilhem’s notion of “comparative physiology” and West- Eberhard’s notion of an “eco-devo-evo” approach to biology in terms of Deleuze’s notion of multiplicity.

Foundations -- The normal and the pathological -- Philosophy of biology -- Physiology and the reflex -- Regulation and psychology -- Evolution and monstrosity -- Philosophy of history -- Writings on medicine -- Legacies.

Our goal in this paper is to reassess the relationship between norms and life by drawing on the philosophy of Georges Canguilhem, particularly some of his unpublished lectures about teratology and sexual determination. First, we discuss the difficulties Canguilhem identified in the introduction of life and sexuality as objects of philosophical reflection. Second, we reassess Canguilhem’s understanding of normativity as rooted in life and the axiological activity of the living. Third, we analyze how Canguilhem drew from (...) past and contemporary teratology to conceive of the notions of anomaly and abnormality. Finally, we reconstruct Canguilhem’s analysis of a case of hermaphroditism, highlighting how he presented it as evidence that sexual determination is the result of a normative choice. One of the key contributions of the paper to scholarly literature on Canguilhem is a better understanding of his notion of choice, which was considered not the conscious and intentional act of a subject but rather an axiological activity of the living. We conclude by positioning Canguilhem’s concept of normativity and his belief that norms are produced by the living in relation to the naturalist/normativist divide in medicine. (shrink)

Il s?agit de nuancer l?opposition massive, mise en place par Michel Foucault dans sa préface à la traduction anglaise du Normal et le patho­logique , entre la tradition phénoménologique et l?épistémologie française. Cette opposition est raffinée sur la base d?une confrontation entre la pensée de Georges Canguilhem et celle du psychiatre allemand Erwin Straus, qui tâche, dans son ouvrage majeur Vom Sinn der Sinne , de poser les fondements d?une psychologie phénoménologique. La confrontation s?organise autour de deux thématiques abordées (...) de manière centrale par les deux auteurs, l?une portant sur la physiologie, le problème du réflexe et les rapports entre le vivant et son milieu, l?autre sur les notions de normal et de pathologique. (shrink)

Dans sa thèse de médecine de 1943 sur le normal et le pathologique, Georges Canguilhem se sert largement des idées de Kurt Goldstein lorsqu’il définit la normalité comme la capacité de l’organisme à créer de nouvelles normes de vie dans un débat polarisé avec son milieu. Pourtant, il déclara ensuite que les conceptions de Goldstein avaient constitué pour lui un « encouragement et non une inspiration ». Les archives personnelles de Canguilhem nous permettent effectivement de considérer le rapport (...) de Canguilhem à Goldstein comme une convergence plutôt que comme une influence mais surtout, l’usage que Canguilhem fait de Goldstein nous permet de mieux saisir la portée de ses propres idées. Nous interrogeons dans une première partie la conception holiste de l’organisme de Goldstein, dans ses rapports à la gestalt-théorie et à Kant, conception qui se réfère au processus d’actualisation de l’essence de l’organisme dans son rapport avec le milieu. Ceci nous permet d’appréhender l’usage que fait Canguilhem de certains concepts et idées de Goldstein pour élaborer son propre concept de normativité vitale. Dans une deuxième partie, nous nous proposons de comprendre la manière dont Canguilhem pose le problème du rapport de la connaissance à la normativité vitale à partir de sa lecture des textes du neurologue allemand. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 317-319 [Access article in PDF] Canguilhem and Social Pathology Victoria Margree Keywords: Canguilhem, organism, society, pathology. MIKE GANE'S COMMENTARY on my paper "Normal and Abnormal" engages with the important question of the possibility of a concept of social pathology. However, I would like to begin my response by conceding a couple of his points around my definitions of epistemological positions. First, (...) I agree that the critique of my original piece was indeed directed most specifically toward biological reductionism, and that this should not perhaps be conflated with all positions that might be grouped under positivism. Indeed, I found Gane's description of scientific objectivity as conceived by sociological positivism ("[as] the result of epistemological procedures, not what might be called ontological reduction to a physical level of the object") tantalizingly reminiscent of Bachelard's own conception of objectivity in the physical sciences, a conception that Canguilhem must have been in sympathy with, and that Bachelard himself explicitly opposes to the epistemology of the "positivists" in his own arena (Bachelard 1984). Second, Professor Gane is quite correct to foreground the changes that take place in Canguilhem's thinking around the pathological once his attention turns to the new discoveries of the genetic sciences. For the purposes of the original piece, my focus was on the work conducted in the thesis on the Normal and the Pathological of 1943, and the version of normativity/health elaborated there shall continue to provide the main frame of reference for my reply.However, it is the attention to the problem of social pathology that forms the major ground of Gane's response, and it is toward this issue that I will direct my remaining comments. Without reaching any final conclusions, I would like to outline what I believe would be at least one major tendency in Canguilhem's thinking on the possibility of such a concept, and then to explore some of the productive aporias or difficulties in this.Canguilhem's early theorization of health as normativity would seem to explicitly prohibit its extension to an idea of social pathology. For Canguilhem health, as Greco (1998) explains, is a meaningful concept because it is indexed to the inherent teleology of the living organism. Because a society is not alive, does not possess the intrinsic teleology of the organic body, terms such as health or disease cannot be attributed to society in anything other than an explicitly metaphorical way.In my original paper, I argued that for Canguilhem environmental features can be characterized as possessing pathological value for organisms—indeed, health for Canguilhem is always a matter of relations and not a quality inherent in isolated features. I then suggested that because the human environment is an irreducibly social one, social norms, such as impose a fixed regularity [End Page 317] upon what sorts of mental phenomena count as normal, could possess pathological value for the individual. As the previous paragraph ought to suggest, this was perhaps already to strain against the limits of Canguilhemian thinking by veering close to an idea of social pathology. Institutionalized racism and intolerance of aberrant mental experiences may not be diseases for the social body in quite the same way that cancer may be for the organic body, but because these could be argued to be detrimental to the health and normativity of those who live within that society, I argued that they could be said to have a pathological value in relation to the individual.This is a formulation that I suspect Canguilhem could not accept. As Greco again explains, for Canguilhem society is not an environment. Social norms do not possess vital value for the human organism (Greco 1998, or Canguilhem 1991 in the "New Reflections"). Social norms in fact present constraints with respect to which the individual has a choice, whereas environmental norms are determining for the health of the individual.Now, it seems to me that there are at least a couple of problems with this. First, what about societies that use violence to back up their social injunctions? Is it not the case that... (shrink)

On a pris l’habitude avec Foucault de présenter Canguilhem comme un philosophe « du savoir, de la rationalité et du concept », en raison d’une œuvre qu’on pensait « volontairement délimitée à un domaine particulier de l’histoire des sciences ». Pourtant, l’édition en cours de ses Œuvres complètes révèle que Canguilhem ne s’est jamais « véritablement » considéré comme historien des sciences. Lus de manière synoptique, ces écrits témoignent en effet d’une subordination de l’histoire des sciences à l’enseignement (...) de la philosophie, dont l’objectif est de faire paraître l’unité de l’expérience comme la norme des normes. (shrink)

The living body appears like an endlessly renewable reservoir of authenticity, hope, and taboo. But, for the sake of conceptual clarity, we are often been told that the (mere) body should be distinguished from the flesh. That is, it’s undeniable that I have a body; that I notice yours; that we worry about their birth and death and upkeep. But the flesh is a more transcendentalized, loaded concept – not least given its frequently religious background (incarnation: the Word made Flesh). (...) It is the body ‘kicked upstairs’, ‘bumped up’ one ontological level. Flesh is like a mantra, an obsessive leitmotif. Is the difference just one of abstraction? Indeed, crucial to the narrative of phenomenology (most obviously in Merleau-Ponty but really, throughout, including in enactivism), to the story of ancestor worship and identity it tells itself and its acolytes around the campfire, is a basic distinction between the merely physical body and the flesh as something requiring ‘mineness’, namely, an understanding of it as uniquely ‘my own’, a feeling of ‘what it is like to be embodied’. This goes back to the Husserlian distinction between Körper, ‘body’ in the sense of one body among others in a vast mechanistic universe of bodies, and Leib, ‘flesh’ in the sense of a subjectivity which is the locus of experience. In this essay I reflect on this vision of the body’s authenticity and its costs, and contrast it with insights derived from Georges Canguilhem, whose critique of mechanism/mechanicism is not done in the name of a wholescale organicism and/or an unproblematized éloge of embodiment and privacy. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je défends l’hypothèse que l’analyse éthico-politique de l’histoire des sciences par Georges Canguilhem est le résultat d’une synthèse originale de différentes interprétations de l’œuvre d’Auguste Comte soutenues par les philosophes français venus du milieu académique. Ces interprétations n’étaient elles-mêmes pas sans lien avec la reconfiguration progressive des institutions d’enseignement et de recherche sous la Troisième République (1870-1940). Je montre que cette synthèse est à l’œuvre dans la première lecture de Comte par Canguilhem, à savoir dans (...) sa dissertation inédite La théorie de l’ordre et du progrès chez Auguste Comte (1926). J’examine d’abord la pénétration du positivisme dans le champ philosophique français sous la Monarchie de Juillet, le Second Empire et la Troisième République ; j’aborde ensuite l’interprétation de Comte proposée par Émile Chartier (1868-1951), dit Alain, mentor philosophique de Canguilhem au lycée Henri-IV ; enfin, je me concentre sur la première lecture de Comte par Canguilhem. (shrink)

At first, Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy is a philosophy of medicine recognizing the main contribution of biological knowledge to medicine. However, this philosophy also questions the nature of life. Life involves biological processes, but life is also normativity. In this paper, we question the normativity and the epistemological history in Canguilhem’s works to understand their relevance for current scientific questions. According to Canguilhem, the epistemological history of the life sciences concerns an activity of constitution of (biological) scientific disciplines. (...) The relevance of Canguilhem is the fact that a historian of science has not only to restore a history of the scientific theories or a history of the development of the sciences in context, but he also has to explore the relationship and the limits between life science and its context in the process of genesis and scientific elaboration. Scientific work is a vital activity of the human being, the history of science is the history of this axiological activity, and this implies a philosophical approach. In this paper, we propose that the history of ecology may give a valuable example of a scientific elaboration from various elements and from diverse skills: ideologies that announce or extend a scientific construction also affect this discipline. (shrink)

Le renouveau des études sur Canguilhem ces vingt dernières années est étroitement lié à la création d’un Fonds documentaire conservant ses archives à la bibliothèque du CAPHES ainsi qu’à la publication des Œuvres complètes. L’hétérogénéité de la production de Canguilhem pendant soixante ans de pratique de la philosophie peut gagner en intelligibilité si on l’aborde comme le résultat d’un métier, celui de philosophe, s’exerçant dans des contextes et des moments différents.

Canguilhem’s vitalism is not obvious, neither does is consist of a more known form of this type of thinking; it does not come from the old diatribes that, coming from the 19th century, are still relevant to the 20th century’s discussions. Canguilhem reclaims vitalism from a unique ontological approach, and does not hesitate to allude to the classics and, most of all, to a Hippocrates that, read mainly through the perspective of the history written by Charles Singer, brings (...) to light other themes such as the critic to the concept of homeostasis revitalized and named by Walter Cannon. Canguilhem gives another perspective to Hippocrates’ homeostasis, that was “scientified” by Cannon, giving it mobility that is considered essential to its concept and redraws the vitalism project, rejecting the place of mechanism antithesis. This paper aimed to map Canguilhem’s longue durée contribution to the medical discourse, as well as his funding role of a new conception of normality formulated from his own interpretation of a vitalism that, in his point of view, comes from a “Hippocratic spirit”. (shrink)

This edited volume presents papers on this alternative philosophy of biology that could be called “continental philosophy of biology,” and the variety of positions and solutions that it has spawned. In doing so, it contributes to debates in the history and philosophy of science and the history of philosophy of science, as well as to the craving for ‘history’ and/or ‘theory’ in the theoretical biological disciplines. In addition, however, it also provides inspiration for a broader image of philosophy of biology, (...) in which these traditional issues may have a place. The volume devotes specific attention to the work of Georges Canguilhem, which is central to this alternative tradition of “continental philosophy of biology”. This is the first collection on Georges Canguilhem and the Continental tradition in philosophy of biology. The book should be of interest to philosophers of biology, continental philosophers, historians of biology and those interested in broader traditions in philosophy of science. (shrink)

This article analyzes the repercussions of G. Politzer’s thought on the philosophy of life elaborated by G. Canguilhem. During the first thirty years of the twentieth century, Politzer’s texts provide important material for the construction of the philosophy that Canguilhem builds on human individuality and its autonomy. The reading of Politzer constitutes for Canguilhem a motive of inspiration for his axiological, moral and political proposals. By associating the ideas of the concrete psychology that encapsulates the existence of (...) man-actor, Canguilhem reconciles two series of arguments: a). the philosophy of life cannot do without an approach to human action; b). the presence of human action becomes inseparable from the assumptions that debate its existence between the singularity of its productions, and the apprehension that can be made of it by means of the universals that are proposed by science. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza el periodo de conformación de la filosofía de Georges Canguilhem (1926-1939). Se concentra en la elaboración temprana de sus ideas relativas a la teoría del valor y de la autonomía de la acción humana. Dos aspectos de esta filosofía son tomados en consideración. En primer lugar, el vinculo que mantiene el entendimiento con los hechos que forman parte de la realidad, observando la incidencia de esta filosofía del valor y de la acción en el dominio (...) de tres disciplinas pertenecientes a las ciencias sociales (psicología, sociología, historia). Un segundo momento del texto analiza el espacio asignado por estas elaboraciones al psicoanálisis, teoría que Canguilhem asocia a los fundamentos de la dimensión política y ética de esta filosofía. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Georges Canguilhem nous laisse une oeuvre marquée par une exigeante lucidité et une grande rectitude morale. Ce livre se limite à analyser ses recherches sur la biologie et la médecine. L'apport majeur de Canguilhem porte sur l'histoire des idées médicales des origines jusqu'au début du XXe siècle. Il avait l'intention, et c'est ainsi que certains cherchent à le lire, de donner à ses recherches une dimension à la fois médicale et philosophique. En (...) fait, il nous propose un regard anthropologique sur la médecine, un regard qui lui est extérieur, et qui ne réussit pas à saisir la réalité humaine, sociale, culturelle et finalement médicale de la maladie. Il tirait de ses recherches des spéculations et des critiques sur la médecine contemporaine, en général surannées, car il n'avait pas compris la mutation profonde dont elle était, sous ses yeux, l'objet, car lui ont manqué les connaissances, l'expérience et le jugement clinique, qui eurent été nécessaires pour réaliser son ambition. Il a mal compris les concepts de normes, de normal et d'anormal en médecine". (shrink)

There is still a question about what it means to say that Georges Canguilhem was a philosopher of error. This paper, unlike other work on the topic, investigates archival sources and early texts, up to and including the publication of theEssay on Some Problems Concerning the Normal and the Pathologicalin 1943, in order to reveal Canguilhem’s early thoughts on error and to formulate the basic philosophical problem therein, as he understood it. This work reveals a partial transformation of (...) his thinking as he seeks to develop this question through the study of concrete human problems.La question demeure de savoir en quel sens Georges Canguilhem peut être considéré comme un penseur de l’erreur. Cet article, par contraste avec d’autres textes sur le même sujet, s’intéresse aux documents d’archives et à des écrits de jeunesse, jusqu’à l’Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologiquede 1943, en vue de mieux comprendre la première pensée de Canguilhem sur l’erreur et de formuler le problème philosophique fondamental auquel elle est associée. Ce travail montre qu’il y a eu une transformation partielle de sa pensée alors qu’il entreprend de répondre à cette question par le biais d’une étude des problèmes humains concrets. (shrink)