Petr Dvořák hájí ve své knize Kauzalita činitele libertariánské pojetí svobody lidské vůle. Vůli považuje za duševní schopnost člověka a její svobodu spatřuje v možnosti její sebedeterminace. Tuto tezi autor tohoto příspěvku kritizuje. Dokazuje, že sebedeterminující schopnost je contradictio in terminis. Libertariánsky pojatá svobodná vůle je možná jen, pokud není schopností. Takovou vůlí je pouze vůle Boží. Autor připojuje historické upozornění, že autorem omylu zaměňujícího lidskou vůli s Boží je renezanční teolog Ludvík Molina, že k jeho stoupencům náležel i René (...) Descartes. (shrink)

The author explains in the following paper the main ideas of the substratum and bundle theories of individuals and tries than to sketch some important features of the traditional Aristotelian first-substance theory.

Discussion on Two Remarks on Ondřej Švec’s Note regarding Philosophy of History.

This paper is a Czech translation and critical interpretation of 'Dialog s Pünjerem' by G. Frege.

The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) (...) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned. (shrink)

The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, (...) a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare. (shrink)

This paper is a book review of 'A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis († 1323), The Doctor Perspicacissimus, On second Intentions' by John P. Doyle.

This paper is a Philosophical Interview with Prof. Stanislav Sousedík.