ABSTRACTPsychiatric research is advancing rapidly, with studies revealing new investigative tools and technologies that are aimed at improving the treatment and care of patients with psychiatric disorders. However, the ethical framework in which such research is conducted is not as well developed as we might expect. In this paper we argue that more thought needs to be given to the principles that underpin research in psychiatry and to the problems associated with putting those principles into practice. In particular, we comment (...) on some of the difficulties posed by the twin imperatives of ensuring that we respect the autonomy and interests of the research subject and, at the same time, enable potentially beneficial psychiatric research to flourish. We do not purport to offer a blueprint for the future; we do, however, seek to advance the debate by identifying some of the key questions to which better answers are required. (shrink)

BackgroundAs the COVID-19 pandemic develops, healthcare professionals are looking for support with, and guidance to inform, the difficult decisions they face. In the absence of an authoritative national steer in England, professional bodies and local organisations have been developing and disseminating their own ethical guidance. Questions inevitably arise, some of which are particularly pressing during the pandemic, as events are unfolding quickly and the field is becoming crowded. My central question here is: which professional ethical guidance should the professional follow?Main (...) bodyAdopting a working definition of “professional ethical guidance”, I offer three domains for a healthcare professional to consider, and some associated questions to ask, when determining whether – in relation to any guidance document – they should “bin it or pin it”. First, the professional should consider the source of the guidance: is the issuing body authoritative or, if not, at least sufficiently influential that its guidance should be followed? Second, the professional should consider the applicability of the guidance, ascertaining whether the guidance is available and, if so, whether it is pertinent. Pertinence has various dimensions, including whether the guidance applies to this professional, this patient and/or this setting, whether it is up-to-date, and whether the guidance addresses the situation the professional is facing. Third, the professional should consider the methodology and methods by which the guidance was produced. Although the substantive quality of the guidance is important, so too are the methods by which it was produced. Here, the professional should ask whether the guidance is sufficiently inclusive – in terms of who has prepared it and who contributed to its development – and whether it was rigorously developed, and thus utilised appropriate processes, principles and evidence.ConclusionAsking and answering such questions may be challenging, particularly during a pandemic. Furthermore, guidance will not do all the work: professionals will still need to exercise their judgment in deciding what is best in the individual case, whether or not this concerns COVID-19. But such judgments can and should be informed by guidance, and hopefully these preliminary observations will provide some useful pointers for time-pressed professionals. (shrink)

BackgroundDespite its ubiquity in academic research, the phrase ‘ethical challenge(s)’ appears to lack an agreed definition. A lack of a definition risks introducing confusion or avoidable bias. Conceptual clarity is a key component of research, both theoretical and empirical. Using a rapid review methodology, we sought to review definitions of ‘ethical challenge(s)’ and closely related terms as used in current healthcare research literature.MethodsRapid review to identify peer-reviewed reports examining ‘ethical challenge(s)’ in any context, extracting data on definitions of ‘ethical challenge(s)’ (...) in use, and synonymous use of closely related terms in the general manuscript text. Data were analysed using content analysis. Four databases (MEDLINE, Philosopher’s Index, EMBASE, CINAHL) were searched from April 2016 to April 2021.Results393 records were screened, with 72 studies eligible and included: 53 empirical studies, 17 structured reviews and 2 review protocols. 12/72 (17%) contained an explicit definition of ‘ethical challenge(s), two of which were shared, resulting in 11 unique definitions. Within these 11 definitions, four approaches were identified: definition through concepts; reference to moral conflict, moral uncertainty or difficult choices; definition by participants; and challenges linked to emotional or moral distress. Each definition contained one or more of these approaches, but none contained all four. 68/72 (94%) included studies used terms closely related to synonymously refer to ‘ethical challenge(s)’ within their manuscript text, with 32 different terms identified and between one and eight different terms mentioned per study.ConclusionsOnly 12/72 studies contained an explicit definition of ‘ethical challenge(s)’, with significant variety in scope and complexity. This variation risks confusion and biasing data analysis and results, reducing confidence in research findings. Further work on establishing acceptable definitional content is needed to inform future bioethics research. (shrink)

Background There is growing interest in the use and incorporation of empirical data in bioethics research. Much of the recent focus has been on specific “empirical bioethics” methodologies, which attempt to integrate the empirical and the normative. Researchers in the field are, however, beginning to explore broader questions, including around acceptable standards of practice for undertaking such research. The framework: In this article, we further widen the focus to consider the overall shape of an empirical bioethics research project. We outline (...) a framework that identifies three key phases of such research, which are conveyed via a landscaping metaphor of Mapping-Framing-Shaping. First, the researcher maps the field of study, typically by undertaking literature reviews. Second, the researcher frames particular areas of the field of study, exploring these in depth, usually via qualitative research. Finally, the researcher seeks to shape the terrain by issuing recommendations that draw on the findings from the preceding phases. To qualify as empirical bioethics research, the researcher will utilise a methodology that seeks to bridge these different elements in order to arrive at normative recommendations. We illustrate the framework by citing examples of diverse projects which broadly adopt the three-phase framework. Amongst the strengths of the framework are its flexibility, since it does not prescribe any specific methods or particular bridging methodology. However, the framework might also have its limitations, not least because it appears particularly to capture projects that involve qualitative – as opposed to quantitative – research. Conclusions Despite its possible limitations, we offer the Mapping-Framing-Shaping framework in the hope that this will prove useful to those who are seeking to plan and undertake empirical bioethics research projects. (shrink)

This work focuses upon decisions to withhold or withdraw life-supporting treatment from incompetent patients. It offers a critical examination of the latest developments with a view to developing a new framework for resolving disputes in the clinic that is not only theoretically robust but also practically relevant.

The four principles approach to biomedical ethics points to respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice as the norms that should guide moral agents working in the biosciences, and particularly in health care. While the approach is well known, it is not without its critics. In this paper, which is primarily aimed at health professionals and students (from various disciplines) who are studying health care ethics, I consider four problems with the four principles, which respectively claim that the approach is (...) imperialist, inapplicable, inconsistent and inadequate. In keeping with the aims of the ‘five-minute focus’, the primary objective is to introduce these debates, rather than seek to resolve them. However, I will suggest that the approach does have its merits, not least for time-pressed clinicians who are keen to keep an eye on the ethical dimensions of their practices, and for students training in the health care professions, provided that they appreciate that the approach provides only a starting point for, and not the end point of, moral deliberation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Dutch case of Brongersma presents novel challenges to the definition and evaluation of voluntary euthanasia since it involved a doctor assisting the suicide of an individual who was (merely?) ‘tired of life’. Legal officials had called on the courts to ‘set a principled boundary’, excluding such cases from the scope of permissible voluntary euthanasia, but they arguably failed. This failure is explicable, however, since the case seems justifiable by reference to the two major principles in favour of that (...) practice, respect for autonomy and beneficence. Ultimately, it will be argued that those proponents of voluntary euthanasia who are wary of its use in such circumstances may need to draw upon ‘practical’ objections, in order to erect an otherwise arbitrary perimeter. Furthermore, it will be suggested that the issues raised by the case are not peculiarly Dutch in nature and that, therefore, there are lessons here for other jurisdictions too. (shrink)

BackgroundDuring the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, various professional ethical guidance was issued to (and for) health and social care professionals in England and Wales. Guidance can help to inform and support such professionals and their patients, clients and service users, but a plethora of guidance risked information overload, confusion, and inconsistency. MethodsDuring the early months of the pandemic, we undertook a rapid review, asking: what are the principles adopted by professional ethical guidance in England and Wales for dealing with (...) COVID-19? We undertook thematic content analysis of the 29 documents that met our inclusion criteria.ResultsThe 29 documents captured 13 overlapping principles: respect, fairness, minimising harm, reciprocity, proportionality, flexibility, working together, inclusiveness, communication, transparency, reasonableness, responsibility, and accountability.ConclusionsWe intend this attempt to collate and outline the prominent principles to be helpful, particularly, for healthcare practice during the COVID-19 pandemic and, hopefully, for future pandemic planning. We also offer some reflections on the guidance and the principles therein. After describing the principles, we reflect on some of the similarities and differences in the guidance, and the challenges associated not only with the specific guidance reviewed, but also with the nature and import of “professional ethical guidance”. (shrink)

Law’s processes are likely always to be needed when particularly intractable conflicts arise in relation to the care of a critically ill child like Charlie Gard. Recourse to law has its merits, but it also imposes costs, and the courts’ decisions about the best interests of such children appear to suffer from uncertainty, unpredictability and insufficiency. The insufficiency arises from the courts’ apparent reluctance to enter into the ethical dimensions of such cases. Presuming that such reflection is warranted, this article (...) explores alternatives to the courts, and in particular the merits of specialist ethics support services, which appear to be on the rise in the UK. Such specialist services show promise, as they are less formal and adversarial than the courts and they appear capable of offering expert ethical advice. However, further research is needed into such services – and into generalist ethics support services – in order to gauge whether this is indeed a promising development. (shrink)

In this chapter, we seek to offer a fresh perspective on whether or not doctors should be “licensed to kill”. As that phrase indicates, we metaphorically refer to the adventures of fictional spy James Bond, although we hope, in doing so, that readers will not think that we are belittling the serious topic with which the chapter is concerned. Having surveyed some of the familiar arguments for and against allowing medically-assisted dying, we advance a new proposal, which seeks to strike (...) a compromise between such arguments. Our exploratory model builds on an analogy with armed response police units as they operate in England, and specifically with situations in which such officers are found to have killed someone in the course of their duties. Rather than confer immunity prospectively (as proponents of assisted dying often seek) or deny immunity completely (as opponents insist), our policy would provide a potential retrospective excuse. (shrink)

Compromise on moral matters attracts ambivalent reactions, since it seems at once laudable and deplorable. When a hotly-contested phenomenon like assisted dying is debated, all-or-nothing positions tend to be advanced, with little thought given to the desirability of, or prospects for, compromise. In response to recent articles by Søren Holm and Alex Mullock, in this article I argue that principled compromise can be encouraged even in relation to this phenomenon, provided that certain conditions are present . In order to qualify (...) as appropriately principled, the ensuing negotiations require disputants to observe three constraints: they should be suitably reflective, reliable and respectful in their dealings with one another. The product that will result from such a process will also need to split the difference between the warring parties. In assisted dying, I argue that a reduced offence of ‘compassionate killing’ can achieve this. I acknowledge, however, that splitting the difference can induce splitting headaches, as there remain certain questions to be answered. Hopefully, however, sufficient work is done here to defend attempts to occupy the middle ground, whether these relate to assisted dying specifically or to other disputed moral matters. (shrink)

ABSTRACT An American surgical team has announced its intention to perform the first human facial transplantation. The team has, however, invited further analysis of the ethical issues before it proceeds and in this paper we take up that challenge in seeking to frame the debate with a particular focus on the recipients of the transplant. We address seven related areas of concern and identify numerous questions that require answers or, perhaps, better answers. We start by examining the nature of the (...) procedure and its intended benefits, why the procedure is being developed, and whether or not this should be viewed as experimental. Having concluded that this is experimental in nature, we then consider the broad question, who is the patient? Here we perceive difficulties in terms of the autonomy of the recipient, the unpredictable effects of receiving the transplant, and the role and influence of society. We conclude by asking whether the question should be ‘whether or not?’ rather than ‘when?’, particularly while the risks of losing face appear to far outweigh the likelihood of gaining face. (shrink)

Simon Woods proposes that we ought to re-orientate clinical decisions at the end of life back towards the patient, so as to honour his or her account of their “global” interests. Woods condemns the current medico-legal approach for remaining too closely tethered to the views of doctors. In this response, I trace the story of Mrs Kelly Taylor, who sought to be sedated and have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn, and I do so in order to show not only why Woods is (...) right to detect an asymmetry in the law but also why there is more to the legal landscape than first appears. I argue that patient choice is indeed bounded—most obviously by the views of the doctors (and the judges), but no less significantly by so-called “public interest” concerns. Woods’ proposal implicitly, and rightly, forces reconsideration of these public interest dimensions of medico-legal decision-making. This often invisible boundary is not presently granted the attention it deserves (not least by the judges themselves). However, as soon as we delve into the ethical values at stake, then it becomes apparent that there are many more questions to be asked regarding their meaning and interaction before we can determine the appropriate ethical prism through which to view the health care endeavour in English medical law. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the ruling inY[2018], the UK Supreme Court has confirmed that there is no general requirement for the courts in England and Wales to authorise the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The perceived requirement, which originated in a court ruling in 1993, encompassed those in the vegetative state and those in the minimally conscious state. The ruling inYconfirms that the court may still be approached to decide difficult or contested cases, but (...) there is otherwise no routine requirement that the judges be approached.Main bodyThere is much to welcome in this ruling, particularly as it means that these decisions for these patients are no longer (unusually) singled out for a judicial decision, with all the financial and emotional costs that court proceedings can entail. However, there is also a risk that the ruling might have unwelcome consequences. First, there is the possibility that patients might die too soon, particularly if doctors should now adopt the courts’ previous reasoning, which has suggested that patients in the vegetative state lack interests, so treatment may – perhaps must – be withdrawn. Secondly, there is the converse possibility that patients might live too long, since empirical research suggests that – whether intentionally or not – patients’ families, clinicians, and the health system appear to promote treatment-by-default.ConclusionRather than adopt general positions, which may be contestable and potentially risky, this article argues, on a pluralistic basis, that the individual patient should be the focus of any decision made in his or her ‘best interests’. The existing legal framework in England and Wales, which is provided by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, already points in this direction, although more efforts may be needed to ensure that those involved in making these decisions are suitably educated and supported. Fortunately, new guidance from the British Medical Association could help clinicians and families to make decisions in the future, which are appropriate for the incapacitated individual patient in question. (shrink)

The recent ruling from England on the case of M is one of very few worldwide to consider whether life-sustaining treatment, in the form of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration, should continue to be provided to a patient in a minimally conscious state. Formally concerned with the English law pertaining to precedent autonomy (specifically advance decision-making) and the best interests of the incapacitated patient, the judgment issued in M's case implicitly engages with three different accounts of the value of human (...) life, which respectively emphasise its self-determined, intrinsic and instrumental value. The judge appeared to be most persuaded by the intrinsic value of life and he concluded that treatment ought to continue. Assessing whether his approach or conclusion were ethically appropriate involves significant substantive and evidential questions regarding where the burden of proof should lie and what standard of proof should be required when decisions are to be made about the fates of patients inhabiting ‘twilight worlds’. (shrink)

This new edition of The Cambridge Medical Ethics Workbook builds on the success of the first edition by working from the 'bottom up', with a widely praised case ...

Live broadcasts of surgical procedures are most common at professional conferences, but they are not uncommon in the wider public arena, with operations having recently been transmitted in realtime on public television in the UK. This phenomenon raises ethical concerns familiar from the professional context, along with some distinct considerations which merit further attention. In this article I aim to examine the issues in terms of patient autonomy, patient welfare and the public interest. Prompted by the interest recently expressed by (...) the Royal College of Surgeons of England, under each topic I pose a series of questions, before closing with a call for enhanced ethical oversight, such as might be afforded by a clinical ethics committee. (shrink)

Despite intense academic debate in the recent past over the use of ‘sham surgery’ control groups in research, there has been a recent resurgence in their use in the field of neurodegenerative disease. Yet the primacy of ethical arguments in favour of sham surgery controls is not yet established. Preliminary empirical research shows an asymmetry between the views of neurosurgical researchers and patients on the subject, while different ethical guidelines and regulations support conflicting interpretations. Research ethics committees faced with a (...) proposal involving sham surgery should be aware of its ethical complexities. An overview of recent and current placebo-controlled surgical trials in the field of Parkinson's Disease is provided here, followed by an analysis of the key ethical issues which such trials raise. (shrink)

Living kidney transplantation offers the best treatment in terms of life-expectancy and quality of life for those with end-stage renal disease. The long-term risks of living donor nephrectomy, although real, are very small, with evidence of good medium-term outcomes. Who should be entitled to donate, and in which circumstances, is nevertheless a live question. We explore the ethical dimensions of a request by an individual to donate both of their kidneys during life: ‘dual living kidney donation’. Our ethical analysis is (...) tethered to a hypothetical case study in which a father asks to donate a kidney to each of his twin boys. We explore the autonomy of the protagonists, alongside different dimensions of the public interest, such as the need to protect not only the recipients, but also the donor and even the wider community. Whilst acknowledging objections to ‘dual-donation’, not least by reference to the harms that the donor might be expected to endure, we suggest there is a prima facie case for permitting this, provided that both donor and recipients are willing and that due attention is paid to such considerations as the autonomy and welfare of all parties, as well as to the wider ramifications of acting on such a request. We argue for broader interpretations of the concepts of autonomy and welfare, recognizing the importance of relationships and the relevance of more than merely physical well-being. Equipped with such a holistic assessment, we suggest there is a prima facie case for allowing ‘dual living kidney donation’. (shrink)

General Practitioners (GPs) and allied healthcare professionals working in primary care are regularly required to make decisions with, for and on behalf of patients who lack capacity. In England and Wales, these decisions are made for incapacitated adult patients under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which primarily requires that decisions are made in the patient’s ‘best interests’. Regarding children, decisions are also made in their best interests but are done so under the Children Act 1989, which places paramount importance on (...) the welfare of the child. Decisions for children are usually made by parents, but a GP may become involved if he or she feels a parent is not acting in the best interests of the child. Internationally, including elsewhere in the UK, different approaches are taken. We hypothesise that, despite the legislation and professional guidelines, there are many different approaches taken by GPs and allied healthcare professionals in England and Wales when making these complex decisions with, for and on behalf of patients who lack capacity. To better understand what is known about how these decisions are made, we plan to undertake a scoping review and directed content analysis of the literature. While the majority of decisions made in primary care are made by GPs, for completeness, this review will include all allied healthcare professionals working in primary care. (shrink)

Sale of Sperm, Health Records, Minimally Conscious States, and Duties of Candour Content Type Journal Article Category Recent Developments Pages 7-14 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9347-6 Authors Cameron Stewart, Centre for Health Governance, Law and Ethics, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia 2006 Bernadette Richards, Law School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia 5005 Richard Huxtable, Centre for Ethics in Medicine, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH UK Bill Madden, School of Law, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, (...) Australia Tina Cockburn, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 9 Journal Issue Volume 9, Number 1. (shrink)

Smart-home technologies, comprising environmental sensors, wearables and video are attracting interest in home healthcare delivery. Development of such technology is usually justified on the basis of the technology’s potential to increase the autonomy of people living with long-term conditions. Studies of the ethics of smart-homes raise concerns about privacy, consent, social isolation and equity of access. Few studies have investigated the ethical perspectives of smart-home engineers themselves. By exploring the views of engineering researchers in a large smart-home project, we sought (...) to contribute to dialogue between ethics and the engineering community. Either face-to-face or using Skype, we conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with 20 early- and mid-career smart-home researchers from a multi-centre smart-home project, who were asked to describe their own experience and to reflect more broadly about ethical considerations that relate to smart-home design. With participants’ consent, interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed using a thematic approach. Two overarching themes emerged: in ‘Privacy’, researchers indicated that they paid close attention to negative consequences of potential unauthorised information sharing in their current work. However, when discussing broader issues in smart-home design beyond the confines of their immediate project, researchers considered physical privacy to a lesser extent, even though physical privacy may manifest in emotive concerns about being watched or monitored. In ‘Choice’, researchers indicated they often saw provision of choice to end-users as a solution to ethical dilemmas. While researchers indicated that choices of end-users may need to be restricted for technological reasons, ethical standpoints that restrict choice were usually assumed and embedded in design. The tractability of informational privacy may explain the greater attention that is paid to it. However, concerns about physical privacy may reduce acceptability of smart-home technologies to future end-users. While attention to choice suggests links with privacy, this may misidentify the sources of privacy and risk unjustly burdening end-users with problems that they cannot resolve. Separating considerations of choice and privacy may result in more satisfactory treatment of both. Finally, through our engagement with researchers as participants this study demonstrates the relevance of ethics as a critical partner to smart-home engineering. (shrink)

Decisions about long-term ventilation in children can be clinically contentious and ethically challenging. In this article, the relevant legal, professional and moral principles inherent in such cases are explored. We commend the central importance of deliberation in the assessment of best interests, and propose a practical framework to assist the parent–clinical team to reach decisions in as transparent and equitable a manner as possible.

Psychiatric research is advancing rapidly, with studies revealing new investigative tools and technologies that are aimed at improving the treatment and care of patients with psychiatric disorders. However, the ethical framework in which such research is conducted is not as well developed as we might expect. In this paper we argue that more thought needs to be given to the principles that underpin research in psychiatry and to the problems associated with putting those principles into practice. In particular, we comment (...) on some of the difficulties posed by the twin imperatives of ensuring that we respect the autonomy and interests of the research subject and, at the same time, enable potentially beneficial psychiatric research to flourish. We do not purport to offer a blueprint for the future; we do, however, seek to advance the debate by identifying some of the key questions to which better answers are required. (shrink)

Amongst the latest, and ever-changing, pathways of death and dying, “suicide tourism” presents distinctive ethical, legal and practical challenges. The international media report that citizens from across the world are travelling or seeking to travel to Switzerland, where they hope to be helped to die. In this paper I aim to explore three issues associated with this phenomenon: how to define “suicide tourism” and “assisted suicide tourism”, in which the suicidal individual is helped to travel to take up the option (...) of assisted dying; the legality of assisted suicide tourism, particularly in the English legal system where there has been considerable recent activity; and the ethical dimensions of the practice. I will suggest that the suicide tourist—and specifically any accomplice thereof—risks springing a legal trap, but that there is good reason to prefer a more tolerant policy, premised on compromise and ethical pluralism. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page 25-27.

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 80-82.

BackgroundIn most Anglophone nations, policy and law increasingly foster an autonomy-based model, raising issues for large numbers of people who fail to fit the paradigm, and indicating problems in translating practical and theoretical understandings of ‘good death’ to policy. Three exemplar populations are frail older people, people with dementia and people with severe traumatic brain injury. We hypothesise that these groups face some over-lapping challenges in securing good end-of-life care linked to their limited agency. To better understand these challenges, we (...) conducted a scoping review and thematic synthesis.MethodsTo capture a range of literature, we followed established scoping review methods. We then used thematic synthesis to describe the broad themes emerging from this literature.ResultsInitial searches generated 22,375 references, and screening yielded 49, highly heterogeneous, studies that met inclusion criteria, encompassing 12 countries and a variety of settings. The thematic synthesis identified three themes: the first concerned the processes of end-of-life decision-making, highlighting the ambiguity of the dominant shared decision-making process, wherein decisions are determined by families or doctors, sometimes explicitly marginalising the antecedent decisions of patients. Despite this marginalisation, however, the patient does play a role both as a social presence and as an active agent, by whose actions the decisions of those with authority are influenced. The second theme examined the tension between predominant notions of a good death as ‘natural’ and the drive to medicalise death through the lens of the experiences and actions of those faced with the actuality of death. The final theme considered the concept of antecedent end-of-life decision-making, its influence on policy and decision-making, and some caveats that arise from the studies.ConclusionsTogether these three themes indicate a number of directions for future research, which are likely to be applicable to other conditions that result in reduced agency. Above all, this review emphasises the need for new concepts and fresh approaches to end of life decision-making that address the needs of the growing population of frail older people, people with dementia and those with severe traumatic brain injury. (shrink)

Improving surgical interventions is key to improving outcomes. Ensuring the safe and transparent translation of such improvements is essential. Evaluation and governance initiatives, including the IDEAL framework and the Macquarie Surgical Innovation Identification Tool have begun to address this. Yet without a definition of innovation that allows non-surgeons to identify when it is occurring, these initiatives are of limited value. A definition seems elusive, so we undertook a conceptual study of surgical innovation. This indicated common conceptual areas in discussions of (...) innovation, that we categorised alliteratively under the themes of “purpose”, “place”, “process”, “product” and “person”. These conceptual areas are used in varying—sometimes contradictory—ways in different discussions. Highlighting these conceptual areas of surgical innovation may be useful in clarifying what should be reported in registries of innovation. However our wider conclusion was that the term “innovation” carries too much conceptual baggage to inform normative inquiry about surgical practice. Instead, we propose elimination of the term “innovation” from serious discourse aimed at evaluation and regulation of surgery. In our view researchers, philosophers and policy-makers should consider what it is about surgical activity that needs attention and develop robust definitions to identify these areas: for our own focus on transparency and safety, this means finding criteria that can objectively identify certain risk profiles during the development of surgery. (shrink)

Consent remains a crucial, yet challenging, cornerstone of clinical practice. The ethical, legal and professional understandings of this construct have evolved away from a doctor-centred act to a patient-centred process that encompasses the patient’s values, beliefs and goals. This alignment of consent with the philosophy of shared decision-making was affirmed in a recent high-profile Supreme Court ruling in England. The communication of information is central to this model of health care delivery but it can be difficult for doctors to gauge (...) the information needs of the individual patient. The aim of this paper is to describe ‘core information sets’ which are defined as a minimum set of consensus-derived information about a given procedure to be discussed with all patients. Importantly, they are intended to catalyse discussion of subjective importance to individuals. The model described in this paper applies health services research and Delphi consensus-building methods to an idea orginally proposed 30 years ago. The hypothesis is that, first, large amounts of potentially-important information are distilled down to discrete information domains. These are then, secondly, rated by key stakeholders in multiple iterations, so that core information of agreed importance can be defined. We argue that this scientific approach is key to identifying information important to all stakeholders, which may otherwise be communicated poorly or omitted from discussions entirely. Our methods apply systematic review, qualitative, survey and consensus-building techniques to define this ‘core information’. We propose that such information addresses the ‘reasonable patient’ standard for information disclosure but, more importantly, can serve as a spring board for high-value discussion of importance to the individual patient. The application of established research methods can define information of core importance to informed consent. Further work will establish how best to incorporate this model in routine practice. (shrink)

Healthcare Ethics, Law and Professionalism: Essays on the Works of Alastair V Campbell features 15 original essays on bioethics, and healthcare ethics specifically. The volume is in honour of Professor Alastair V Campbell, who was the founding editor of the internationally-renowned Journal of Medical Ethics, and the founding director of three internationally leading centres in bioethics, in Otago, New Zealand, Bristol, UK, and Singapore. Campbell was trained in theology and philosophy and throughout his career worked with colleagues from various disciplines, (...) including law and various branches of healthcare. The diversity of topics and depth of contributors' insights reflect the breadth and impact of Campbell's philosophical work and policy contributions to healthcare ethics. Throughout his long academic career, Campbell's emphasis on healthcare ethics being practice-oriented, yet driven by critical reflection, has shaped the field in vital ways. The chapters are authored by leading scholars in healthcare ethics and law. Directly engaging with Campbell's work and influence, the essays discuss essential questions in healthcare ethics relating to its methodology and teaching, its intersection with law and policy, medical professionalism, religion, and its translation in different cultural settings. Chapters also grapple with specific enduring topics, such as the doctor-patient relationship, justice in health and biomedical research, and treatment of the human body and the dead. (shrink)

BackgroundRegulations on forgoing life-sustaining treatment (LST) have developed in Asian countries including Japan, Korea and Taiwan. However, other countries are relatively unaware of these due to the language barrier. This article aims to describe and compare the relevant regulatory frameworks, using the (more familiar) situation in England as a point of reference. We undertook literature reviews to ascertain the legal and regulatory positions on forgoing LST in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England.Main textFindings from a literature review are first presented to (...) describe the development of the regulatory frameworks surrounding the option of forgoing LST in each country. Based on the findings from the four countries, we suggest five ethically important points, reflection on which should help to inform the further development of regulatory frameworks concerning end-of-life care in these countries and beyond. There should be reflection on: (1) the definition of – and reasons for defining – the ‘terminal stage’ and associated criteria for making such judgements; Korea and Taiwan limit forgoing LST to patients in this stage, but there are risks associated with defining this too narrowly or broadly; (2) foregoing LST for patients who arenotin this stage, as is allowed in Japan and England, because here too there are areas of controversy, including (in England) whether the law in this area does enough to respect the autonomy of (now) incapacitated patients; (3) whether ‘foregoing’ LST should encompass withholdingandwithdrawing treatment; this is also an ethically disputed area, particularly in the Asian countries we examine; (4) the family’s role in end-of-life decision-making, particularly as, compared with England, the three Asian countries traditionally place a greater emphasis on families and communities than on individuals; and (5) decision-making with and for those incapacitated patients who lack families, surrogate decision-makers or ADs.ConclusionComparison of, and reflection on, the different legal positions that obtain in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and England should prove informative and we particularly invite reflection on five areas, in the hope the ensuing discussions will help to establish better end-of-life regulatory frameworks in these countries and elsewhere. (shrink)

This paper responds to the commentaries from Stacy Carter and Alan Cribb. We pick up on two main themes in our response. First, we reflect on how the process of setting standards for empirical bioethics research entails drawing boundaries around what research counts as empirical bioethics research, and we discuss whether the standards agreed in the consensus process draw these boundaries correctly. Second, we expand on the discussion in the original paper of the role and significance of the concept of (...) ‘integrating’ empirical methods and ethical argument as a standard for research practice within empirical bioethics. (shrink)

This document is designed to give guidance on assessing researchers in bioethics/medical ethics. It is intended to assist members of selection, confirmation and promotion committees, who are required to assess those conducting bioethics research when they are not from a similar disciplinary background. It does not attempt to give guidance on the quality of bioethics research, as this is a matter for peer assessment. Rather it aims to give an indication of the type, scope and amount of research that is (...) the expected in this field. It does not cover the assessment of other activities such as teaching, policy work, clinical ethics consultation and so on, but these will be mentioned for additional context. Although it mentions the UK’s Research Excellence Framework, it is not intended to be a detailed analysis of the place of bioethics in the REF. (shrink)

Agich and Siemionov are to be congratulated for their attempt to refocus the debate on facial transplantation on those with most to gain: individuals with severe facial disfigurement.1 They make a good case for the surgical benefits offered by what they term facial allograft transplantation . Moreover, they fare better than other teams in recognising that candidates for FAT might also have much to lose. The team in Louisville had little to say on this issue, writing only rather benignly of (...) the possible “loss of transplanted tissue”.2 In contrast, Agich and Siemionov squarely confront this risk and offer the most complete account to date of how the risk will be minimised and rejection dealt with. This is an important development, which can only enhance the discussions that, contrary to what these authors imply, must indeed continue.According to Agich and Siemionov, their paper also provides a counterbalance to the numerous more sceptical views being expressed in bioethical and media circles—views which are said to rely more on fiction than fact. In response, we wish to argue that, as persuasive as some of their arguments undoubtedly are, the authors will not succeed in stalling this debate for there remain numerous issues that require further attention. We start with a central component of the authors’ argument, their appeal to “clinical need”, and suggest that this is not straightforwardly identifiable. No more straightforward is their suggestion that metaphors and lessons from the creative world have no place in this debate. This seems particularly unlikely when we consider that FAT will not offer the “ideal” solution; perhaps, then, wholesale facial transplantation is or will become the ideal and a film like Face/Off can offer some insights. Finally, we query the role and influence of …. (shrink)

This classic, provocative introduction to classical metaphysical questions focuses on appreciating the problems, rather than attempting to proffer answers.

The Exchange of Words is a philosophical exploration of human testimony, specifically as a form of intersubjective understanding in which speakers communicate by making themselves accountable for the truth of what they say. This account weaves together themes from philosophy of language, moral psychology, action theory, and epistemology, for a new approach to this basic human phenomenon.

The paper argues for the centrality of believing the speaker (as distinct from believing the statement) in the epistemology of testimony, and develops a line of thought from Angus Ross which claims that in telling someone something, the kind of reason for belief that a speaker presents is of an essentially different kind from ordinary evidence. Investigating the nature of the audience's dependence on the speaker's free assurance leads to a discussion of Grice's formulation of non-natural meaning in an epistemological (...) light, concentrating on just how the recognition of the speaker's self-reflexive intention is supposed to count for his audience as a reason to believe P. This is understood as the speaker's explicitly assuming responsibility for the truth of his statement, and thereby constituting his utterance as a reason to believe. (shrink)

In this volume Rorty offers a Deweyan account of objectivity as intersubjectivity, one that drops claims about universal validity and instead focuses on utility for the purposes of a community. The sense in which the natural sciences are exemplary for inquiry is explicated in terms of the moral virtues of scientific communities rather than in terms of a special scientific method. The volume concludes with reflections on the relation of social democratic politics to philosophy.