Peter Martyr Vermigli’s Commentary to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which is edited in the present volume, not only evidences his intense engagement with the source material but also his struggle to find an adequate relational conception for an adequate understanding of the relationship between Aristotelian ethics and Protestant theology.

Commentary on Romans The thirtenth Chapiter "Let every soule be subject to the higher powers : for ther is no power but of God : and the powers that be, ...

This volume is devoted to Vermigli's philosophical writings, consisting of topics from commentaries with sections on: reason and revelation; body and soul; ...

Several treatises have come down to us from Christian antiquity devoted to the defence of the dogma of the resurrection of the flesh. Such works are mutually connected by evident similarities in the content and often by literary dependence. The treatise On the resurrection attributed to Justin Martyr is preserved almost exclusively in the Sacra Parallela. This has been used as a source by different authors, e.g. Tertullian and Methodius of Olympus. According to the optimistic viewpoint of recent scholars, the (...) text which is included in the Sacra Parallela represents nearly the totality of the original text. However, this article, by combining the text of Tertullian and Methodius of Olympus, aims to reconstruct some now lost passages of περὶ ἀναστάσεως which are devoted to biblical exegesis or which demonstrate the resurrection of the flesh on the basis of philosophical thought. (shrink)

Confessional Protestant ethics is commonly presented nowadays as opposite to virtue. This article establishes the inaccuracy of this presentation from the centrality of virtue and its compatibility with grace in the ethics of the Protestant Reformer Pietro Martire Vermigli (1499–1562). It argues that the notion of virtue is not only central but also consistent with the notion of grace from the distinction between acquired and infused virtue.

Ibn Bāğğa’s commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption (Kitāb al-Kawn wa-l-fasād, Latin De generatione et corruptione) is one of the first commentaries to elaborate on the essential aspect of Aristotle’s text, that is, the analysis of change (μεταβολή, taġayyur). The commentary’s extant parts comprise a consecutive exposition of the contents of Aristotle’s work. However, the commentary may be read more as an introduction or a guide to the topic of generation than as a substitution for the original, as the (...) paraphrases by Averroes seem to have become in the later tradition. The present study provides a new critical edition of the Arabic text and, for the first time, an English translation and a study of the structure of the commentary on the basis of the only two known manuscripts. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in the context of 19th century epistemology. In particular, I argue that, even though Nietzsche shows the ontological lack of content of truths (both on the theoretic and on the moral plane), he nevertheless leaves the space for a practical use of them, in a way that can be compared with William James' pragmatism. I thus deal with Nietzsche's and James' concept of "truth", and show their relationship with some outcomes (...) of Ernst Mach's epistemology. (shrink)

Tra i numerosi autori attivi nel campo delle scienze naturali che Friedrich Nietzsche ebbe modo di conoscere nel corso della propria vita, Ernst Mach rappresenta certamente un caso significativo. La sua presenza all'interno degli scritti del filosofo è pressoché nulla, ma la comunanza dei temi trattati e la particolare affinità delle prospettive adottate in materia di teoria della conoscenza invitano ad avvicinare questi due autori e a ipotizzare un qualche tipo di influsso diretto tra loro. Ciononostante, fino ad oggi non (...) era mai stato svolto uno studio critico e completo che esaminasse e discutesse tale relazione. Muovendo dai contenuti di una delle principali opere di Mach, i "Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen" (1886) questo volume delinea un quadro esegetico che fa di Mach non tanto un referente diretto, quanto piuttosto il segnale di una prospettiva di ricerca che in qualche modo stimolò l'interesse di Nietzsche e che per molti aspetti egli mostra di condividere. (shrink)

During his late period, Nietzsche is particularly concerned with the value that mankind attributes to truth. In dealing with that topic, Nietzsche is not primarly interested in the metaphysical disputes on truth, but rather in the effects that the "will to truth" has on the human being. In fact, he argues that the "faith in a value as such of truth" influenced Western culture and started the anthropological degeneration of the human type that characterizes European morality. To call into question (...) the value of truth is therefore necessary, if one wants to help mankind to find her way in the labyrinth of nihilism. -/- In this new addition to Nietzsche scholarship, Gori explores the origin and aim of the philosopher's late perspectival thought by merging the theoretical with the historical approach, with a special focus on the epistemological debate that influenced Nietzsche. As a result, the book provides a contextual reading of the issue that supports the idea that Nietzsche’s attitude in addressing the problem of truth is, in a broad sense, pragmatic. (shrink)

This chapter explores Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language and knowledge, establishing a philosophical dialogue between two different positions, which are based on a similar anti-essentialist and instrumentalist concern. The chapter will first focus on Nietzsche’s conception of language as the expression of valuational perspectives developing through the natural and cultural history of mankind. It will then consider Wittgenstein’s account of language as the inherited background of our practical engagement with the world. Finally, by bringing Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views together, (...) the last section reflects on the crucial strategic move they make in their respective battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. -/- . (shrink)

Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in (...) philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

The chapter explores comparatively the attention to the practical dimension that—each in his own way—Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the classic pragmatist thinker William James pay when confronted with the challenge of providing a non-skeptical response to the relativist stance on truth that arose in the post-Kantian age. Particular focus will be given to the extent to which these three authors conceived of the practical framework as the only one that allows us to meaningfully address and determine truth.

È possibile delineare due filoni interpretativi sul _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ (_Il vivente, figlio del desto_) di Ibn Tufayl: secondo l’uno, l’opera è uno sguardo realistico su un solitario in una società corrotta e si ispira agli insegnamenti della _Repubblica_ di Platone; secondo l’altro, l’opera ritrae un ideale puro e astratto di vita ascetica e insiste sull’imperativo morale dell’isolamento. Tuttavia entrambe queste interpretazioni precludono qualsiasi possibilità di felicità per l’uomo o per il filosofo all’interno di una società. In altre parole, tendono (...) a interpretare _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ come un tentativo di dimostrare che l’uomo non sia sociale o politico. La perfezione intellettuale e spirituale ricercata attraverso l’isolamento non può, a mio parere, essere separata da uno scopo pratico. L’isolamento del filosofo non viene praticato per distinguersi dalle società imperfette. Al contrario, tale isolamento è intrapreso per condurlo ad una realizzazione più alta e propriamente pratica. Su questa base, sostengo nell’articolo che l’uomo di Ibn Tufayl sia paragonabile allo ζῷον πολιτικόν aristotelico. Attraverso un confronto tra il _Hayy_ di Ibn Tufayl e lo ζῷον πολιτικόν di Aristotele vedremo come Ibn Tufayl si serva dell’_animale sociale/politico_ arabo (_hayawān insī _o _madanī_) di al-Fārābī e lo trasponga dal dominio della città a quello dell’individuo. Analizzando alcuni passaggi chiave, è possibile chiarire come il concetto di ζῷον πολιτικόν sia entrato nella filosofia araba e in particolare nella concezione di uomo di Ibn Tufayl attraverso il virtuoso di al-Fārābī e il solitario di Ibn Bājja. Prevailing academic views on Ibn Tufayl’s _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ (_Living, the Son of Wakeful_) fall into two camps: either the work is a realistic look at an isolated human being amidst a morally bankrupt population and harks back to the teachings of Plato’s _Republic_, or it portrays a pure and abstract ideal of the spiritual life in the footsteps of the natural first man, and insists on the moral imperative of isolation. The difficulty with both interpretations is that they preclude any possibility of happiness for the human person or the philosopher living in a society. In other words, they tend to interpret _Hayy b. Yaqzān_ as an attempt to demonstrate that the human is not essentially social or political. However, the intellectual and spiritual perfection sought through isolation cannot, in my opinion, be separated from a practical purpose. The isolation of the philosopher is not undergone to distinguish himself from imperfect human societies. On the contrary, such isolation is undertaken in order to lead one to a higher, and properly practical accomplishment. On this basis, I argue in this paper that Ibn Tufayl’s man is comparable to the Aristotelian ζῷον πολιτικόν. Through a comparison of Ibn Tufayl’s _Hayy_ and Aristotle’s ζῷον πολιτικόν we shall see how Ibn Tufayl reuses the Arabic _social/political animal_ (_hayawān insī_ or _madanī_) of al-Fārābī and transposes it from the domain of the city to that of the individual. By analysing some key passages, it becomes possible to illustrate how the concept of ζῷον πολιτικόν has entered Arabic philosophy, and particularly in Ibn Tufayl’s conception of man through the lenses of al-Fārābī’s virtuous and Ibn Bājja’s solitary man. (shrink)

Al lettore che nella produzione speculativa di Anselmo si sofferma in modo particolare su De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli e De concordia, la volontà si manifesta come un indiscutibile centro di interesse della riflessione anselmiana, tesa a determinare teoreticamente il valore e l'efficacia della iustitia, intesa come rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata, in ambito etico ed ontologico. La voluntas si presenta così quale protagonista del rapporto tra Dio e creatura, tra natura, storia ed eternità, perché è proprio (...) mediante gli atti volontari che la creatura può inserirsi od opporsi attivamente al rectus ordo della creazione, che a sua volta costituisce come una forma di libera oggettivazione del farsi altro da sé, rimanendo se stessa, della summa rectitudo. Attraverso questo movimento la rectitudo e la recta voluntas divina si pongono e si mostrano come l'essenza della realtà. Rivelando voluntas e rectitudo una valenza ad un tempo etica e metafisica, si potenzia il significato della volontà come responsabilità e come agente intrinsecamente libero che Anselmo le attribuisce. La voluntas, che vuole perché vuole, si sottrae al regno della necessità e si impone, in quanto artefice di libertà, come la protagonista aporetica della relazione tra la stabilità dell'ordine della realtà e la novità della storia, inchiodando Anselmo, amante della necessità razionale, alla celebrazione di una forza decisiva e ultimativa, che sembra sfuggire al pieno controllo della ratio. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...) ensemble of reasons against naturalistic accounts of content. In a nutshell, it states that covariance relations—even though they are naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do not constitute content. The authors exploit this move in order to promote their preferred radical enactivist and anti-representationalist option, according to which, basic minds—the lower stratum of cognition—do not involve content. Although it is controversial to argue that the Hard Problem of Content effectively dismisses naturalistic theories of representation, a central aspect of it—the idea that information as covariance does not suffice to explain content—finds support among the defenders of classical cognitive representationalism, such as Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with the acknowledgment this remark about covariance is a point already made by Sellars in his criticism of the Myth of the Given—has a number of interesting implications. Not only is it of interest for the debates about representationalism in cognitive science, where it can be understood as an anticipatory move, but it also offers some clues and insights for reconsidering some issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts of representation that is often assumed in cognitive science, a distinction between two types of relevant normativities, and a reconsideration of the naturalism involved in such explanations. (shrink)

I. Del regno terreno.--II. Del regno celeste.--III. Del regno papale.

Reciprocal libertarianism is a version of left-wing libertarianism that combines self-ownership with an egalitarian distribution of resources according to reciprocity. In this paper, I show that reciprocal libertarianism is a coherent and appealing view. I discuss how reciprocal libertarians can handle conflicts between self-ownership and reciprocity, and I show that reciprocal libertarianism can be realised in a framework of individual ownership of external resources or in a socialist scheme of common ownership (libertarian socialism). I also compare reciprocal libertarianism with left-libertarian (...) approaches: I argue that a reciprocity-sensitive version of left-libertarianism (reciprocal left-libertarianism) is coherent and morally superior to traditional left-libertarianism, on grounds of incorporating a distinctively solidaristic and recognition-oriented aspect of equality. The policy implications of reciprocal libertarianism will differ depending on which rights people can have over external resources, but all reciprocal libertarian views acknowledge the existence of social rights that people have as co-operators. (shrink)

Note biografiche -- Opere filosofiche theologiche e varie -- Le questioni I-V del De "conscientia" in relazione alle fonti.

Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in (...) philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)