THE TITLE OF THIS PAPER calls for clarification. Not only are there several senses in which something may be said to "be," there are also many nuances to the terms "categorial" and "intuition." Taking Aristotle as a guide, let us focus upon the primary sense of "being," that is, substance considered both as first substance and second substance. We may then take "categorial" as referring to what Aristotle calls the "figures of predication," the ways in which predicates characterize subjects, indicating (...) "what" the subject is, its quality, quantity, relation, its "where," its "when," and so forth. The term "intuition" expresses something too primitive to be defined, but Edmund Husserl's metaphorical contrast between the "emptiness" of thought and speech and the "fullness" of intuition successfully highlights its essential characteristic. A couple of examples should suffice to grasp the import of Husserl's distinction. Consider the difference, for instance, between first entertaining vague plans of visiting a foreign city and then experiencing the fulfillment of actually strolling through its streets, or the difference between first reading a manual of instructions for performing some task and then actually executing the task skillfully. Taking Husserl as a guide, let us therefore characterize intuition broadly as the presentation of something in its fullness, as opposed to thinking or talking about it in an empty way. Finally, combining Husserlian and Aristotelian terminologies, we may describe categorial intuition as the presentation of figures of predication. Rather than presenting some particular thing, say a red chair, categorial intuition presents the chair's being red, the red quality's belonging to the chair. In short, categorial intuition makes present the modes of presentation of things. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION ". . . a universe unfinished, with doors and windows open to possibilities uncontrollable in advance." A possibility which William James would ...

Si la tradition analytique cautionne en general la preference moderne pour une rationalite de type mathematique, et demeure mefiante vis-a-vis de la causalite formelle et de l'intuition eidetique, la tradition phenomenologique, en revanche, privilegie l'intuition intellectuelle plutot que les procedures techniques, et propose de rehabiliter nombre des categories meprisees par les penseurs modernes. La these developpee dans cette etude soutient que la phenomenologie offre une explication a la fois plus equilibree et plus coherente de l'objectivite de la connaissance. La vulnerabilite (...) de la philosophie analytique face aux versions contemporaines de l'historicisme et du relativisme est l'aboutissement logique des premisses empiristes communes a la critique fregeenne du psychologisme et a la critique wittgensteinienne de la representation. Le point de vue phenomenologique a pour clef la theorie husserlienne de l'intuition categoriale qui retrouve et renouvelle l'explication aristotelicienne de l'origine des predicats classificatoires a partir des aspects des choses. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserls manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon (...) both Husserls published works and posthumous material, Husserls Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserls thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking. (shrink)

The history of epistemology has always been closely linked with the tradition of skepticism. Indeed, the earliest philosophical efforts to describe the nature and limits of our knowledge were largely motivated by the skeptical suggestion that things may not be as they appear to us. Every attempt to find an adequate response to these early doubts about the reliability of our knowledge met new and powerful skeptical criticisms which in turn engendered new attempts to justify the conviction that we are (...) capable to achieving at least some degree of truth about ourselves and our world. At a time when the latest swing of the pendulum has taken philosophy from excessive confidence in our cognitive powers to an equally excessive tendency to reduce of all truth claims to pleasing or powerful illusions, the essays collected in this volume offer some balanced and attractive alternatives to these extreme positions. (shrink)

Whenever the name Edmund Husserl appears in the context of nursing research, what correctly comes to mind is the phenomenological approach to qualitative methodology. Husserl is not only considered the founder of phenomenology, but his broad concept development also contributed to the demise of positivism and inspired fruitful approaches to the social sciences. In this spirit of inspiration, it must be expressed that Husserl's theory of wholes and parts, and particularly his differentiation of parts into ‘pieces’ and ‘moments’, is very (...) helpful in guiding the selection of research methods across the board in nursing science. The purpose of this paper is to highlight a frame of reference for nursing researchers to use in examining the essential nature of that which is being studied. This frame of reference is the Husserlian philosophy of ‘pieces’ and ‘moments’ in relation to the whole. ‘Pieces’ are independent parts of the whole that are subject to isolability in study, whereas ‘moments’ are nonindependent parts, which cannot be detached, presented, or studied apart from the whole. The intent is to propose this frame of reference as a philosophical base from which nursing researchers may better select among paradigms and methodological approaches in regard to the essential nature (‘pieces’ or ‘moments’) of that which they are researching. (shrink)

This book is a collection of superbly crafted essays on some fundamental texts of modern and contemporary philosophy. All were first published elsewhere in French. The translation here is accurate and graceful. Typically the author comments on works in which one philosopher engages in dialogue with another: Hegel with Hobbes, Hegel and Heidegger with Kant, Heidegger with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty with Husserl. After reconstructing the historical context and the issues relevant for an understanding of each text, Taminiaux selects points of comparison, (...) suggests remarkably fresh interpretations, and artfully leads the reader to reformulate and rethink basic questions. These confrontations highlight the strengths as well as the blind spots of each thinker. There are no refutations or definitive conclusions; the tone is always exploratory rather than polemical. The goal of the book's dialectical method is not to achieve final clarity, but to be faithful to the richness, complexity, and inexhaustible depth of philosophical problems. Taminiaux is resolutely committed to the notion that acceptance of finitude should be construed not as an unfortunate constraint, but rather as a positive precondition of a thinking attuned to the showing-hiding structure of being. Philosophy must abandon the project of mathesis, for the dream of detached objectivity is incompatible with the circularity incumbent upon a thinking that finds itself always preceded by pre-theoretical experience. The task of understanding the relationships between organism and milieu, existence and consciousness, nature and spirit requires a perpetual recasting of questions from multiple points of departure. This interpretation of dialectic rejoins the original meaning of dialegein: to welcome the difference. (shrink)

This is an important book. It makes a powerful and convincing critique of two standard and influential interpretations of Husserl's noema which were originally proposed by Aron Gurwitsch and Dagfinn Føllesdal. It also develops an alternative interpretation of the noema which is based upon a more comprehensive reading of Husserl's texts and a better understanding of his emancipation from the epistemological preoccupations of modern philosophy.

This is a collection of essays dealing with such topics as personal identity, fear of death, self-deception, akrasia, jealousy, the virtues and their vicissitudes, and practical reasoning. Despite the wide range of these topics, the author's method and style yield a strong sense of continuity. Each essay calls attention to the historical contexts in which human actions, virtues, and vices have been defined, and to the psychological complexities that have often been neglected in more exclusively epistemological studies of reason and (...) emotion. The book is divided into four sections. "Persons and Personae" characterizes as a philosophical dream the project of deriving normative political and moral principles from a single foundational conception of personhood. Intractable debates about moral issues tend to arise whenever the practical contexts governing diverse definitions of personhood are blurred. We may learn more about such practical contexts, and therefore about the uses and abuses of the concept of a person, by tracing the literary representations of human agency in the characters, figures, selves, and individuals depicted in Biblical narratives, Greek dramas, medieval mystery plays and Chaucerian tales, romantic and social novels, and twentieth-century short stories, plays, and science fiction. (shrink)

Husserl describes arithmetic as a branch of formal ontology. It is an ontology because its goal is to lay out the essential truths about a region of objects, and it is formal because the determinate region of number deals with a characteristic of every possible object. The mathematical experience proper requires something more than the constitution of "concrete numbers" in acts of collecting and counting, for its objects are "ideal numbers" that emerge from eidetic variation over corresponding concrete numbers. With (...) remarkable clarity, Miller coordinates Husserl's various writings on the nature of number by stressing the key theme of identity in presence and absence. Concrete numbers are "determinate multitudes" which are not presented in sensuous intuition, but rather in sensuously founded categorial operations, i.e., explication, in which the parts of an indiscriminately given whole are explicitly articulated as parts, and comparison, in which the multitude generated through such explication is explicitly related to other multitudes. These operations account for the original presence of number. But we can intend numbers in their absence as well as in their presence. For example we may intend a determinate multitude in the absence of the sensuous group in question, or we may experience a different mode of absence when an intended number is frustrated by subsequent intuitive registration, or we may deploy the distinctive absence generated by signs in the process of calculating without authentic articulation of the relevant determinate multitudes. The presence of ideal numbers requires the free play of fantasy, for we must imagine collections of items and also imagine ourselves counting the items in order to disengage their purely formal character. We must discern an identical presence of "four" in a cluster of persons, a collection of apples, and even in some arbitrarily contrived group such as a "feeling, an angel, the moon, Italy." The absence of generic community in the latter example helps us to appreciate what Husserl means by the purely formal nature of arithmetic. Formal ontology is not restricted in scope to some particular region, but is concerned with properties that belong to every possible object precisely as such. Thus, whereas Euclidean geometry is a regional ontology, set-theory and number-theory must be considered as branches of formal ontology, for the basic concepts of these disciplines are strictly formal. Anything that can be thought of can be counted. (shrink)

Many commentators on John Dewey’s pragmatism contend that, after an early emphasis on the role of transcendent ideals in his philosophical studies of aesthetics, ethics, religion, and education, Dewey gradually but conclusively adopted an instrumentalist account of reason and a thoroughgoing naturalism. Stanley Cavell, for example, suggests that Dewey’s pragmatism has little place for transcendence and does not take metaphysical distinctions seriously. Kestenbaum’s elegantly written book makes a convincing case for the thesis that Dewey’s philosophy always remained committed to the (...) “atmospheric” priority of transcendent ideals, to a horizon of meaning which “outruns” the empirically verifiable. Dewey’s striking reference to “the grace and severity of the ideal” provides the title and leit-motif for this study, for it suggests that the transcendent ideals are experienced as guides in the pragmatic struggle for the good. Dewey also describes our relationship to the ideal as “the most far-reaching question” of philosophy. (shrink)

Taking as his point of departure Heidegger’s description of hermeneutics as the “process of making things clear in talking about them,” Smith sets out to “lay bare” or “lay out” the nature of argument by presenting a tightly interwoven series of readings of the great philosophical works that have shaped our understanding of demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric. His interpretations of the relevant works of Plato and Aristotle focus on explicit and implicit references to argument as it actually occurs in conversations (...) and discussions rather than as it is filtered through abstractive theories. In the process the author discloses heretofore unnoticed or deemphasized themes in these ancient texts. (shrink)