Burning fossil fuel in the North American continent contributes more to the CO2 global warming problem than in any other continent. The resulting climate changes are expected to alter food production. The overall changes in temperature, moisture, carbon dioxide, insect pests, plant pathogens, and weeds associated with global warming are projected to reduce food production in North America. However, in Africa, the projected slight rise in rainfall is encouraging, especially since Africa already suffers from severe shortages of rainfall. For all (...) regions, a reduction in fossil fuel burning is vital. Adoption of sound ecological resource management, especially soil and water conservation and the prevention of deforestation, is important. Together, these steps will benefit agriculture, the environment, farmers, and society as a whole. (shrink)

There is no way literally to measure health, because health is multi-dimensional, and there is no metric whereby one person who is healthier than a second with respect to one dimension but less healthy with respect to another counts as healthier, less healthy or equally healthy overall. Health analysts instead measure how good or bad health states are in some regard. If these values are measures of health states, then identical health states must have identical values. But in different circumstances, (...) the same health state may have different values. It may be better or worse. Uniform values can nevertheless be assigned to kinds of health states, either as a weighted average of the values of their tokens or as the value of the performance in a standard environment of the capacity the health state constitutes. These uniform values are not well suited for some of the purposes for which summary measures of population health have been intended, and a set of non-evaluative indicators may be an attractive alternative. (shrink)

This essay responds to the helpful criticisms of Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering, which have been offered by Elselijn Kingma, Adam Oliver, Anna Alexandrova, Alex Voorhoeve, Erik Nord and James Wilson. I am extremely grateful to Jonathan Wolf and especially James Wilson for arranging a one-day conference on my book, Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering [Hausman, D.. Valuing Health: Well-Being, Freedom, and Suffering. Oxford: Oxford University Press.], and for publishing this symposium. I am also grateful to the (...) wonderful six scholars who took the time to study my work and to offer perceptive and helpful criticisms. Without unduly trying the patience of readers, I cannot respond to all their remarks, but I hope that in what follows I have replied to the most important of their comments on the arguments and conclusions of Valuing Health. Before I begin these replies, a brief synopsis of Valuing Health may be helpful to the reader. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Idealizing Hume Alan Hausman and David Hausman Hume's explanation of our belief in the continuing existence of unperceived bodies is notoriously elusive.1 Stroud, for example, despairs that it is difficult to see how Hume's elaborate discussion of the constancy and coherence of perceptions explains the origin of the idea of continuing existence, let alone our belief that there are continually existing things.2 Yet Stroud, careful as he (...) is, does not spot the key to the problem. It is not merely that constancy and coherence, the mainstays ofHume's four-part system, are obscure; rather, there is, we shall argue, a hidden assumption in the discussion which necessitates the construction of the system that embodies that obscurity. This hidden assumption is Hume's implicit idealism. That idealism,we shall show,fashionstheentirediscussionin"Ofscepticism with regard to the senses," as well as key passages in his discussion of the derivation of the idea of the self. Its main influence is on Hume's claims concerning the place of causal reasoning in forming our belief in continued existence. Once that influence is understood, Hume's theory ofcausation can itselfbe seen in a new light. Early in the Treatise, it does not seem as ifthere will be a problem in explaining beliefin the continuing existence ofindependent, thatis, unperceived, bodies. We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, tho' severaltimesabsentfrom andpresenttothe senses; andascribe to itOn identity, notwithstanding the interruption of the perception, whenever we conclude, that if we had kept our eye or hand constantly upon it, it wou'd have convey^ an invariable and uninterrupted perception. But this conclusion beyond the impressions ofour senses can be founded only on the connexion ofcause and effect; nor can we otherwise have any security, that the object is not chang"d upon us, however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses. Whenever we discover such a perfect resemblance, we consider, whether it be common in that species of objects; whether possibly or probably any cause cou'd operate in producing the change and resemblance; and according as we determine concerning these causes and effects, we form our judgment concerning the identity of the object. Volume XVIII Number 2 209 ALAN HAUSMAN AND DAVID HAUSMAN Here then it appears, that ofthose three relations, which depend not upon the mere ideas, the only one, that can be trac'd beyond our senses, and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, is causation. (T 74) What is Hume committing himself to here? It certainly seems to be that,ifthereiscausal reasoninggoingonviathe principle ofassociation ofcausation in the cases he cites, itis done upon the observation ofthe constant conjunctions of physical objects and events. Furthermore, if we considercausation as aphilosophical relation, wehave here genuine constant conjunctions which would justify the belief that physical objects exist unperceived.3 Granted that sometimes we associate causally on the basis of*bad' constant conjunctions, there is no prima facie reason to think that this case is one of them. Given these implications, the knowledgeable reader of Hume must be taken somewhat aback; this does not sound like the arch sceptic of all time talking. Yet there are no qualifying passages around the onejust cited. Hume now embarks on his long analysis ofthe causal relation. He then turns, in the section "Ofscepticism with regard to the senses," to a detailed explanation of our belief in the continuing existence of unperceived bodies. He uses as one illustration a fire that one observes, after leaving one's chamber then returning, to have changed in the interim. Since we are accustomed in other instances to seeing the fire burn down, we here reason from what he calls the coherence of the change to the beliefthat the fire existed when we were not in the room. We have in the past observed five log fires burn down to four log fires and then to three log fires. We light a five log fire, leave the room, and return to a three log fire. Using coherence as our guide, we reason that there was a four log fire in the interim. What sort of reasoning... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:424 CAN HUME'S USE OF A SIMPLE/COMPLEX DISTINCTION BE MADE CONSISTENT? There is little doubt that Hume equivocates on the distinction between simple and complex impressions and ideas. Sometimes he identifies properties such as colors and shapes as simples. This is what he does, in fact, when he first introduces the distinction: Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex (...) are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other. Later, however, Hume speaks of simples not as qualities (or, of course, as substances) but as objects, i.e., things with properties: it is not red and round that are the simples but the red, round spot. He says, for example: Before I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain that distinction of reason, which is so much talk'd of, and is so little understood, in the schools. Of this kind is the distinction betwixt figure and the body figur'd; motion and the body mov'd. The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle above explain'd, that all ideas, which are different, are separable. For it follows from thence, that if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable; if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor distinguishable (T 2425 ). 425 A genuine inconsistency with regard to the simple/complex distinction would have far reaching implications for Hume's system. Even the question concerning his understanding of necessity may be affected. It has been argued, for example, that what Hume believes separates the philosophical relations that are necessary from those that are not is that the former are internal relations. The suggestion is that the doctrine of internal relations, which is inextricably tied to a specific characterization of a simple/complex distinction, provides the essential contrast Hume needs for his ultimate denial that the causal relation is necessary. The consequences are compounded if we also take Robinson to be right in his attempt to reconcile Hume's 'conflicting' statements about causation in terms of the distinction between the natural and philosophical relations. While it is pointless to deny the ambiguity just set out (and, of course, one must remain constantly watchful to determine how Hume is employing the simple/complex distinction in a particular case), I believe a reconciliation of the two positions is still possible and that there is no genuine contradiction in Hume's system over this issue. The principle shift occurs between the distinction presented in logical terms and its presentation in psychological terms. In the latter instance what Hume seems to be worried about is Platonism: a metaphysics that countenances the existence of unexemplif ied qualities. This is most evident in the passage above where Hume, in effect, makes the following argument: if it were the case that (1) what is distinguishable in thought is separable in reality; and (2) figure and body are 426 distinguishable in thought; then it would follow that (3) figure and body are separable in reality. However, (3), i.e., Platonism, is false. But then so must be (2). Hume never deviates from this conclusion and its implications for his model of thought throughout the Treatise. It is this argument, for example, which became the basis for Hume's accusation against Locke's theory of abstraction and the foundation of his own view. So far Hume has it that neither thought nor experience present us with colors and shapes in isolation. This is his psychological point. Yet that need not be seen as conclusive with regard to what is to count as a logical simple. Building on his notion of a distinction of reason, Hume says: Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos 'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing afterwards... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S USE OF ILLICIT SUBSTANCES Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be consider 'd as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being. 1. The Problem Hume is often classified as an 'atomist'. He is alleged (...) to hold that every simple perception (impression and idea) is 'independent': to say that a simple perception P. exists does not entail the existence of any other entity. As the passage above makes clear, part of this atomism is a neutral monism. That is, no perception is intrinsically mental, or material. Yet, he is also claimed to adhere staunchly to the so-called theory of ideas. Indeed, Stroud devotes the entire second chapter of his book Hume to discussion of Hume's adaptation of it. Now we shall argue that any plausible reading of the theory of ideas identifies that which is directly perceived -in Hume's case, (at least) simple perceptions -- as intrinsically mental. This means either that every perception P_ must be in some mind, thus violating one tenet of atomism, or that perceptions themselves are intrinsically mental, thus compromising their neutrality. Can Hume escape this apparent dilemma? The answer seems reasonably clear if one knows Hume. He claims that the mind is a bundle of perceptions. As a member of the bundle, a perception is mental. However, this notion of the mental is genuinely contextual; that is, no perception is, despite appearances, intrinsically mental, due to some nonrelational quality it has. To say the same thing differently, Hume holds merely that perceptions must, as a matter of fact, be 'in' minds in order to exist. Why he thinks this, according to Stroud (and others), is probably at least a function of the reasons other members of the way of ideas tradition classify the directly perceived as mental. More accurately, the following two propositions are considered to be merely contingent, i.e., non-necessary truths for Hume; one can imagine their contradictories: (1)In order to exist, a perception must be 'in' a mind, i.e., some mind or other. (2)If a person S_ has a perception P., then P_ is 'in' S., in the sense that P is a member of a collection of perceptions that constitute S_. Thus, if a perception exists, it must as a matter of fact be in some mind or other, but it is not connected necessarily to any mind. Hence perceptions are mental, yet independent i.e., neither necessarily in the collections they are in fact in, nor necessarily in any collections at all. Given (1) and (2), the existence of a perception entails the existence of a mind only in a contingent, not a logical, sense. As the reader shall see, this defense of Hume comes in the end to classifying him as some sort of phenomenalist, who reconstructs the 1 notions of mental and physical from a given data base. Ne are not satisfied with this answer. Indeed, we think it quite inadequate. To begin to show that, let us turn to a set of passages in the Treatise that set the problem we have been trying to outline. Hume himself speculates, in an infamous passage in the Appendix, that something is radically wrong with his claims about the self, that somewhere in his system there is a contradiction and, indeed, he senses that the contradiction has something to do with his atomism (T 633ff). We think he is right. Our thesis is as follows. The contradiction Hume senses is that he both holds and disavows the claim that g perceptions are mind dependent in an intrinsic sense. Thus, though a given perception is (perhaps) not necessarily in a given mind, it must either be in some mind or other in a logical sense of "must," or intrinsically mental in the sense of being intentional. As we explain in detail in section 2, the argument from perceptual variation, a cornerstone of the theory of ideas, leads inevitably to the view that there are intentional entities. Not only is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IT AIN'T NECESSITY, SO... (With Apologies to George Gershwin) I shall argue in this paper that what Hume calls the idea of necessary connection is mislabelled, and that what he ought to call the idea of necessary connection is not so labelled. My argument is not that there are, on Hume's view, real necessary connections between causes and their effects but rather that there is an idea of genuine (...) necessary connection — what I call logical necessity — which we all mistakenly believe extends to causal connections. The genesis of this mistake is given a psychological explanation in the Treatise. Precisely how does Hume account for the origin of what he calls our idea of necessary connection? I have argued elsewhere that, whatever the answer, it has little philosophical importance. My reason was that, given Hume's view that causal connections are not necessary, the question must be viewed as one within psychology. Recent work on Hume, however, has convinced me that my former opinion was much too quick. Imlay, for example, has challenged Hume's distinction between demonstrative and probable inference on the grounds that Hume gives only one account of necessity for both 2 mathematical and lawlike truths. As I now see much more clearly, there are important philosophical distinctions that must be made in any full explication of Hume's view of the origin of our idea of causal necessity. I shall attempt an answer to the lead question of the second paragraph. My strategy is as follows. I shall first present a synopsis of Hume's account of our belief in causal necessity. Next, I shall develop 87. 88. a view of logical necessity. Finally, I shall briefly examine the exact genesis of the confusion between logical and causal necessity. Consider the following three propositions: (1)Hume does not believe that there are necessary causal connections. (2)All statements of laws of nature are on Hume's view descriptions of constant conjunctions, the logical form of which is captured by the Russellian " (x) [fx => gx]." (3)This logical form captures Hume's first definition of "cause." On these three propositions I and many other philosophers agree. I and an ever-shrinking number of philosophers also believe that Hume is right. But everyone, according to Hume, in some sense believes that causal connections are necessary; the Humean philosopher knows they are not but acts otherwise, while the ordinary person simply acts without the knowledge. Since everyone believes what is false, only a psychological explanation can be given for why we believe it anyway. Thus, Hume's second definition of "cause", and the view that the idea of necessity arises from the determination of the mind to pass from the impression of a cause to an idea of 3 its effect. The three most salient passages from the Treatise on the production of the idea of necessary connection follow. As we shall see, these passages cannot be understood without considering a number of others. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objecte, the mind is determin 'd by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of 89. its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity. (T 156) Tho ' the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of power, have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in the object, which can be the model of that idea, yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its real model. For after we have observ 'd the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that relation. This determination is the only effect of the resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy, whose idea is deriv 'd from the resemblance. The several instances of resembling conjunctions leads us into the notion of power and necessity.... Necessity, then... (shrink)

Book Reviews Daniel M. Hausman, Economics and Philosophy, FirstView Article.

Book Reviews Daniel M. Hausman, Economics and Philosophy, FirstView Article.

Woodward present an argument for the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) on the basis of a principle they dub ‘modularity’ ([1999, 2004]). I show that the conclusion of their argument is not in fact the CMC but a substantially weaker proposition. In addition, I show that their argument is invalid and trace this invalidity to two features of modularity, namely, that it is stated in terms of pairwise independence and ‘arrow-breaking’ interventions. Hausman & Woodward's argument can be rendered valid through (...) a reformulation of modularity, but it is doubtful that the argument so revised provides any substantially new insight regarding the basis of the CMC. Introduction The CMC versus Hausman & Woodward's conclusion Hausman & Woodward's argument Modularity and independent error terms Conclusion Appendix: D-separation. (shrink)

This essay aims to provide a rigorous foundation for Gilboa's, Postlewaite's, Samuelson's and Schmeidler's (GPSS's) account of the constitution of models and the role of models in explanation and prediction. Although I shall offer some criticisms, my goal is to sketch analyses of explanations and models that complement GPSS's distinctions between the uses of models to explain, prescribe, predict, and explore the consequences of theories.

As the title suggests, this is a book devoted not merely to logic; students will also examine the philosophical debates that led to the development of the field.

This essay defends the controversial and indeed counterintuitive claim that there is a good argument to be made from a Lockean perspective for government action to guarantee access to health care. The essay maintains that this argument is in some regards more robust than the well-known argument in defense of universal health care spelled out by Norman Daniels, which this essay also examines in some detail. Locke's view that government should protect people's lives, property, and freedom–where freedom is understood as (...) independence and self-determination–justifies government action to ensure access to health care, because (roughly), just as individuals cannot protect themselves from crime and foreign invasion, so individuals are unable to provide for their own health care. Defense from disease is as important as defense from crime, and–although this is arguable–government action to guarantee access to health care does not itself undermine freedom. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Economics and Philosophy of Economics Six Central Methodological Problems Inexactness, Ceteris Paribus Clauses, and “Unrealistic Assumptions” Contemporary Directions in Economic Methodology Conclusion References.

Les modèles basés sur des agents en interactions, constituent des systèmes sociaux complexes, qui peuvent être simulés par informatiques. Ils se répandent dans les sciences économiques et sociales - comme dans la plupart des sciences des systèmes complexes. Des énigmes épistémologiques (ré)apparaissent. On a souvent opposé modèles et investigations empiriques : d’un côté, on considère les sciences empiriques fondées sur une observation méthodique (enquêtes, expériences) tandis que de l’autre, on conçoit les approches théoriques et la modélisation comme s’appuyant sur une (...) approche conceptuelle ou hypothético-déductive. la simulation a de son coté souvent été comparée à une forme d’expérience ou à une méthode intermédiaire entre la théorie et l’expérience. Tesfatsion a parlé de « laboratoire computationnel » comme d’une manière d’étudier « les comportements des systèmes complexes au moyen d’expériences sous contrôle qu’on peut répéter (réplicable)» et Axelrod a proclamé que la simulation serait « une troisième manière de pratiquer la science dans les sciences sociales », entre l’induction et la déduction. Nous introduisons de nouveaux concepts épistémologiques afin de montrer dans quelle mesure les auteurs ont raison lorsqu'ils se concentrent sur une signification empirique, instrumentale ou conceptuelle de leur modèle ou simulation. La première partie du chapitre discute plus particulièrement de l'épistémologie des modèles économiques à partir des travaux d’Hausman, Guala, Mäki, Sugden, Schelling etc. pour expliquer les divergences entre modèles et simulations. En distinguant entre modèles et simulations, comme entre entre types de modèles, types de simulations informatiques et types d'empiricité obtenue par une simulation, la seconde partie donne la possibilité de comprendre plus précisément - et ensuite de justifier - la diversité des positions épistémologiques présentées dans la première partie. En utilisant les notion de sous-symbolisation (due à Smolensky) et, de hiérarchie dénotationnelle (due à Goodman), une attention particulière est accordée à la multiplicité des pouvoirs dénotationnels des symboles en jeu dans les modèles complexes et les simulations informatiques. Selon cette grille d'analyse, on peut déterminer, dans chaque cas particulier son statut épistémique et la crédibilité qui peut y être associée. -/- Ce chapitre est une traduction (par Gilles Campagnolo) réviséee et augmentée par les auteurs de : Agent-Based Models and Simulations in Economics and Social Sciences: From Conceptual Exploration to Distinct Ways of Experimenting, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 13 (1) 5 DOI: 10.18564/jasss.1532. (shrink)

In his Introduction to Logical Theory, Strawson argues that Aristotelian logic can be given a successful interpretation into ordinary English, but not into the symbolism of Principia Mathematica, on the grounds that Aristotelian logic and ordinary English share something absent in PM, namely, the doctrine of presupposition. It is argued that Strawson is mistaken. PM does justice to the logical rules of Aristotelian logic and also has a fully articulated doctrine of presupposition.

Interpreting a scene of lactation failure allows us to represent breast-feeding as a contested social practice. This essay reads a novelistic scene of lactation failure in the context of the decline of breast-feeding in the twentieth century. The protagonist's ignorance of the female experiences of pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation is an effect of her objectification within the opposition between science and nature. Unnatural as a woman because she is a natural individual, the pastor's wife exemplifies the dilemmas of breast-feeding as (...) a biosocial practice of maternity in a technological society which features the breakdown of traditional female networks in which knowledge about maternity and breast-feeding are circulated. (shrink)

The Knobe effect :190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect : people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in (...) morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim rather than a predictive claim. I use the omissions account :550–571, 2015) to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases. Unlike the doxastic heuristic account :264–289, 2012), the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slight-chance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account. I show that ESEE occurs in Butler-type scenarios. Some of the studies involve close replications of Nadelhoffer’s :277–284, 2004) study. (shrink)

We discuss two philosophical explanations of the epistemic side-effect effect: the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. The Monist 95 (2): 264–289, 2012) and the consequence account (Paprzycka-Hausman Synthese 197: 5457–5490, 2020). We argue that the doxastic heuristic account has problems with explaining knowledge attributions in cases where the probability that the side effect will occur is low and where the side effect does not ultimately occur. It can explain why there is a difference between the harm and the (...) help cases but it cannot explain why people are willing to attribute knowledge in the harm cases. Such attributions can be explained on the consequence account, which takes knowledge attributions in norm-violation cases to be due to the increased salience of a consequence-awareness claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of the chairman’s action is that the environment would be harmed). We report the results of a new study that tests the predictions of both accounts. In some conditions, people attribute knowledge of the side effect even in cases where the chairman does not have the relevant belief. This result directly contradicts the central tenet of the doxastic heuristic account. Linear regression models of knowledge attribution that correspond to the two accounts were compared. The addition of different justification options significantly contributes to the predictive power of the statistical model. The consequence account can explain the pattern of justifications better than the doxastic heuristic account. Our findings support the consequence account and pose a challenge to the proponents of the doxastic heuristic account. (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman argues against those who, like Carnap, claim extensional identity is the criterion for correct constructional definition. Goodman argues that internal logical difficulties sink such a criterion, thus he proposes his own criterion of extensional isomorphism. We argue that Goodman's criterion itself falls prey to his own arguments or else extensional identity is not shown faulty.