In January, 1914, I published in the Classical Quarterly an article on t1he Five Grammatical Chapters of Quintilian, in which I endeavoured to set out the general scheme of the writer and his relation to the educational practice of his time. In the present paper I propose to deal with some of the numerous difficulties of detail—difficulties both of text and meaning—which crop up in chapters 4–7. The technicality of the subject and the abbreviated method of treatment produce much obscurity, (...) even when we have no reason to doubt the text. And as to the text, one can but echo the words of Varro with regard to philological and grammatical questions, ‘librarios haec spinosiora indiligentius elaturos putaui.’ The result is that these chapters provide perhaps more problems than are to be found in the same limits in any first class Latin writer—problems which, though not perhaps of much intrinsic importance, have that interest which must always attach to questions which have baffled generations of commentators. I have divided the questions which I have treated into two classes. The first consists of passages in which I feel some confidence in the text which I have adopted or the meaning which I have proposed. The second consists of those which I fear must be left unsolved, though I hope that I have been able to advance the discussion a few steps. (shrink)

The five chapters which Quintilian has devoted to ‘Grammatica’ are in many ways the most valuable discussion of the subject which we possess. They are older than any other surviving account, except the remains of Varro De lingua Latino, and the grammar of Dionysius Thrax, and this last, though far more complete than Quintilian in its examination of the parts of speech, has nothing that compares with the other chapters on analogy, etymology, etc., nor does it give so clear a (...) view of ‘grammatica’ as a whole. These chapters do not appear to have been treated by any scholar since Nettleship published his article on ‘Latin Grammar in the First Century’ in the Journal of Philology, vol. xv. If, in the course of this paper, I traverse on certain points the opinions of so distinguished a scholar, let it be understood that I do so with much diffidence, and only after much consideration of the facts as they appear to me. (shrink)

The passage here discussed, VIII. 6. 33, occurs in one of the lacunas, and we are thus deprived of the help of the great mutilated MSS., and have to fall back upon A. and G. (the scribe who in the eleventh century filled up the lacunas in the mutilated Bambergensis. In § 31 Quintilian, in the course of his treatment of tropes, has reached onomatopoeia, and in § 32 that subdivision of the last-named, or perhaps we should say the kindred (...) subject, which he calls πεποιημένα This was as follows: uix ilia quae πεποιημένα uocant quae ex uocibus in usum receptis quocumque modo declinantur, nobis permittimus, qualia sunt ‘sullaturit’ et ‘proscripturit,’ atque ‘laureati postes’ pro illo ‘lauru coronati’ ex eadem fictione sunt. Sed hoc feliciter eualuit. (shrink)

The controversy between the Anomalists and Analogists has not, I think, attracted as much of the attention of scholars as it deserves. It was perhaps not a very practical matter, though, as I shall point out presently, it probably had indirectly some important practical results. The interest of the controversy lies rather in the spirit in which it was conducted. Anyone who reads for instance Varro, De Ling. Lat. VIII. 31–32, where the anomalist argues that as in life variety of (...) furniture and the like is necessary for aesthetic enjoyment, so in language anomaly is desirable; or IX. 24, etc., where the analogist argues from the unchanging order that prevails in the heavenly bodies, in the tides, in the continuity of species, will feel that he is moving in a world of thought very different in one way from our own, though in another rather like it. By the analogist language is conceived as a world in itself, much as we conceive of the visible world. Its phenomena are being laid bare and constantly reveal fresh signs of law and order. The investigator sometimes finds facts which prima facie suggest anomaly, but he is as confident that behind them must lie some unifying principle as the scientific man of to-day is with regard to the phenomena of the visible world, as impatient of the suggestion of disorder as he is of any miraculous interference with the order of nature. Even the anomalist, sceptic as he is, approaches the question not in a spirit of mere denial, but of aesthetic consideration. We get a glimpse of a lost point of view. The world of words had a glamour and a wonder for them which it cannot have for us. (shrink)

The various attempts to make sense of ‘sequitur,’ e.g. Palmer ‘naturally follows,’ taking pudor as subject and amorem as object, seem to me most unsatisfactory. Sedlmayer reads ‘quitur’ which Palmer calls ‘mira coniectura.’ But it is obvious that as far as sense and transcriptional probability go the correction is excellent, and also that since a passive infinitive is understood, it is grammatically right or at least would be if we found it in Lucretius. The only, and it may be thought (...) fatal, objection is that this passive use of potestur, quitur, nequitur, etc., has not been found in any writ er later than Lucretius, with the possible and not very relevant exception of Apuleius. Birt, the original author of the conjecture, met this objection by adducing other archaisms in Ovid. My purpose here is not to discuss these, but to add to them the fact that Quintilian did not consider that quitur was obsolete. (shrink)

I have never read the two great stanzas of Odes III. 3 without a feeling that the above phrase was rather inadequate, according to what I suppose to be the accepted translation. I base the word ‘accepted’ on Forcellini, and Lewis and Short, who give the reference under the head of propositum, ‘purpose,’ ‘intention,’ ‘resolution,’ ‘design.’ But the capacity of sticking to some particular purpose is not a very noble quality, and if we take the phrase in the wider sense (...) of general tenacity of purpose, I do not feel that we get the ‘iustus’ of the ode, though we may perhaps get a person who is likely to succeed in life. Taken in this way, ‘tenax propositi’ suggests the portrait of Henry VIII., with his gross face and striding legs, dominating the English Church and the High Table of Trinity. I shall perhaps be told that the context shows the meaning. It may no doubt prevent the phrase from being misleading, but it does not make it worthy of its setting. I may add that in the other two places, where I know of its occurring, it has no very lofty meaning. In Ovid Met. X. 415, ‘propositi tenax’ is used to describe the persistent efforts of Myrrha's nurse to find out what is the matter. In Quintilian XI. 1, 90, in a discourse on mild equivalents, we are told that the ‘pertinax’ may be spoken of as ‘ultra modum propositi tenax.’. (shrink)

Laughter as superiority -- The elements of laughter -- The one necessary thing -- Objections to the normative thesis -- Comic virtues and vices -- The social virtues -- The charismatic virtues -- Machine law -- Machine scholarship -- Machine art and machine cities -- The battle of the norms -- Resistance to laughter -- The sociability thesis -- Conclusion.

Richard Polt takes a fresh approach to Heidegger’s thought during his most politicized period, and works toward a philosophical appropriation of his most valuable ideas. Polt shows how central themes of the 1930s—such as inception, emergency, and the question “Who are we?”—grow from seeds planted in Being and Time and are woven into Heidegger’s political thought. Working with recently published texts, including Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, Polt traces the thinker’s engagement and disengagement from the Nazi movement. He critiques Heidegger for his (...) failure to understand the political realm, but also draws on his ideas to propose a “traumatic ontology” that understands individual and collective existence as identities that are always in question, and always remain exposed to disruptive events. Time and Trauma is a bold attempt to gain philosophical insight from the most problematic and controversial phase of Heidegger’s thought. (shrink)

Ook al staan de beelden van Confucius, Lao Zi en Boeddha in sommige Chinese tempels weer broederlijk bijeen op het altaar, hun verschillende wegen tot zelfcultivering worden zelden in onderlinge samenhang beschreven. Dit boek benadert confucianisme, daoïsme en het Chinese boeddhisme in zijn vroege ontwikkeling vanuit hun visie op de praktijk van de zelfcultivering. Hoewel ze een volstrekt ander doel hebben dan de westerse zelfverwerkelijking, mogen de Chinese wegen zich in onze contreien toch in een grote populariteit verheugen. Omdat de (...) zelfcultivering in China primair gericht is op de emoties, vormt de emotiecultivering de rode draad in dit boek. Het begrip Qi, levenskracht, speelt een grote rol in alle cultiveringspraktijken en staat centraal in het klassieke Chinese denken. Het eerste hoofdstuk biedt een inleiding in dit begrip, waardoor de lezer een overzicht krijgt van een aantal Chinese kernconcepten en theorieën en daarmee ook van de context van de emotiecultivering. Naast de beschrijving daarvan in confucianisme, daoïsme en boeddhisme biedt het boek verder een beschouwing van de Chinese landschapsschilderkunst als "filosoferen met het penseel". Het slothoofdstuk vat de verschillende cultiveringspraktijken samen en presenteert ze onder de noemer van Wegen naar het Midden. (shrink)

"Not only one of the best but also the most comprehensive treatment of Stoicism written in this century." --Times Literary Supplement.

This work combines two early pamphlets by F. H. Bradley, the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist movement. The first essay, published in 1874, deals with the nature of professional history, and foreshadows some of Bradley's later ideas in metaphysics. He argues that history cannot be subjected to scientific scrutiny because it is not directly available to the senses, meaning that all history writing is inevitably subjective. Though not widely discussed at the time of publication, the pamphlet was influential on (...) historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood. The second pamphlet is Bradley's critique of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick was the first to propose the paradox of hedonism, which is the idea in ethics that pleasure can only be acquired indirectly. Published in 1877, this work is divided into three parts, treating Sidgwick's definitions, arguments, and his view of ethical science. (shrink)

This work combines two early pamphlets by F. H. Bradley , the foremost philosopher of the British Idealist movement. The first essay, published in 1874, deals with the nature of professional history, and foreshadows some of Bradley's later ideas in metaphysics. He argues that history cannot be subjected to scientific scrutiny because it is not directly available to the senses, meaning that all history writing is inevitably subjective. Though not widely discussed at the time of publication, the pamphlet was influential (...) on historian and philosopher R. G. Collingwood. The second pamphlet is Bradley's critique of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick was the first to propose the paradox of hedonism, which is the idea in ethics that pleasure can only be acquired indirectly. Published in 1877, this work is divided into three parts, treating Sidgwick's definitions, arguments, and his view of ethical science. (shrink)